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The relationship between the Netherlands and the European integration 
process is under pressure. In the past few years, the Netherlands more 
than once adopted an obstructionist attitude on the European stage. In 
the negotiations leading up to the Treaty of Lisbon the country stood 
firm in its demand to drop all symbolic references to a future statelike 
character of the European Union, i.e. the label of a constitution, the flag, 
and the anthem. Afterwards the Dutch government became notorious 
for its insistence on stricter admission criteria for candidate Member 
States, its prolonged resistance against Serbian accession to the eu, and 
later for its initial inflexible attitude in the Greek debt crisis. Moreover, 
current political debates in the Netherlands on immigration and asylum 
issues –think of the discussion about the initiative of Geert Wilders’ 
Partij van de Vrijheid (pvv) to set up a website where trouble caused 
in Dutch cities by workers from Middle and Eastern Europe can be 
reported – have led to criticism from European institutions about the 
Dutch observance of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
of Dutch loyal cooperation with Europe in general.2 
These recent examples of friction between the Netherlands and 
the eu have, both at home and abroad, been regarded as deviations from 
an old trend. From the early start of the process of European integration 
soon after World War ii, the Netherlands got known as one of its 
most loyal supporters. Having started out as one of the six ‘Founding 
Fathers’ of the European Coal and Steel Community (1952), the country 
earned the reputation among its partners – and for a long time prided 
itself on it as well – for assuming a constructive role in the negotiations 
on the consecutive European treaties that brought the integration 
process further. ‘[In European negotiations],’ as a key-player in the field 
of European integration on behalf of the Dutch Ministry of Finance 
phrased it, ‘the Netherlands was pre-eminently aiming at trying to 
get results. […] There had to be a result. It would be pleasant if we also 
thought it to be a beautiful result, but there had to be a result.’3 
The referendum on the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for 
Europe (hereafter: the European Constitution) held on 1 June 2005, 
marked a dramatic turning point in the driving force of the Netherlands 
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in matters of European integration. After almost six decennia of 
progressive European integration in which the concept of a European 
economic, legal and political community had found its way into the 
constitutional core of the Netherlands, the Dutch people indicated in 
unmistakable terms that a limit had been overstepped here: a 61,6% 
majority of the voters rejected the treaty that the Dutch government 
had signed as a matter of course and that had been initially welcomed 
by a great majority in the Dutch parliament. A shock went through 
Europe. How was it possible that the Netherlands, previously best in 
the European class, had voted against this next step in the integration 
process? Bearing in mind the Dutch ratification of the Treaties of 
Rome (1957), the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) and agreement on the 
declaration of Laeken on the Future of Europe (2001), Dutch support 
for the constitutionalisation of Europe had seemed self-evident.4 In 
the referendum on the European Constitution, however, the people 
of the Netherlands put an end to that expectation. A shock also went 
through the Hague; the residence of the Dutch political elite. Here the 
verdict revealed, first and foremost, a breach of confidence between 
the political elite of the Netherlands and the people this elite was 
supposed to represent. In order to bridge the gap and to avert a crisis of 
political legitimacy, in a plenary debate in parliament on 2 June – the 
day following the referendum – all political parties that had initially 
expressed their enthusiasm about the Constitutional Treaty, retraced 
their steps. Following the voice of the people, the Treaty was rejected in 
parliament. 
This apparent quick fix, however, could not prevent years of 
discomfort to follow. The post-2005 quarrels between Europe and the 
Netherlands show that the familiar relationship has been disturbed. 
And also on the national level, repair of the damage turns out not to 
be easy. In its attempts to make up for the event of 1 June 2005, the 
governmental elite has taken a more critical attitude towards the 
process of European integration, but, in doing this, has also passed over 
the core of the matter. Swayed by the political issues and dynamics of 
day to day politics, the fundamental question of how the gap in the field 
of European integration between the Dutch electorate and its political 
representatives had come into existence, is left out of consideration. 
What had happened in the almost sixty years of apparent Dutch 
consensus on the progress of European integration?
Although immediately after the referendum various analyses on 
the causes of the result of the referendum were published, the historical 
perspective is still lacking. Time and again the Dutch rejection of 
the European Constitution was ascribed to medium and short term 
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causes. Short-sighted nationalism as a reaction to globalisation and 
immigration – fanned by the rise of populist politicians such as Pim 
Fortuyn and Geert Wilders –, fear of the accession of Turkey to the eu 
and general feelings of discontent with the Balkenende government 
were mentioned.5 Historical, long term causes, however, were not 
taken into account. The studies referred to are moreover alike in their 
attempt to explain the referendum outcome through focusing on the 
communication between the government and society at large and 
(changes in) the public debate: i.e. the interaction between the political 
and public domain. This implies that, hitherto, the debate and decision 
making cycle as it had taken place within the national political domain 
were largely left out of consideration as an element that might have 
contributed to the course of affairs. 
Looking at the broader field of publications of recent years in 
which the struggles for deeper (political) integration on the eu level 
are addressed, a similar lack of attention can be observed for the 
interaction between government and parliament on the national level 
as a relevant factor to explain the issues at stake. In most publications 
the focus is on decision making at the European level and the problems 
encountered here. In this context the absence of a European demos 
has been a returning topic since the second half of the 1990s.6 This 
also holds good for the resulting (im)possibilities for the European 
institutions and the governments of the Member States to establish a 
satisfactory democratic connection between the eu and the national 
level of decision making.7 Approaching the identified problems from a 
European rather than national perspective and leaning heavily on fairly 
abstract (political) theoretical notions, these studies have failed to shed 
light on how in political practice the peculiarities of national democracy 
have contributed to the problems recently encountered in the process of 
unifying Europe. 
Filling the gap 
Although it is not contested here that in the Netherlands short-term 
factors contributed to the widening of the gap between the electorate 
and their political representatives, as a part of the nwo funded research 
project Contested Constitutions,8 this work aims at showing that the 
outcome of the Dutch referendum of 1 June 2005 was the result of a 
long term process. Such a long term perspective, the study exemplifies, 
is essential in moving beyond the superficial explanations that have 
been given so far. Moreover, this research wants to demonstrate that 
for truly understanding the problems that the eu and its member states 
are currently confronted with, a deep-dive into the history of political 
16
practice in the member states is essential. Understanding national 
political decision making and how this is shaped by a national political 
culture, constructed from conventions, presuppositions, convictions 
and beliefs shared by the main actors in the political domain, is crucial 
for understanding how a political elite could structurally vote in favour 
of further integrating Europe, whereas in society at large more and more 
fundamental questions and doubts arose in the course of time.
In line with the aims of this work, this study concentrates on the 
political system – also referred to as the polity – in the Netherlands. 
More specifically, it analyses how, within this system, decision making 
on European integration came about and examines the considerations 
leading up to it. The key actors within the Dutch polity are the 
government, parliament and the Council of State in its role as the 
highest advisory board in the Netherlands concerning legislation. 
Their interaction, leading up to political decision making, is best traced 
in the parliamentary debates and their written preparations on the 
successive steps in the process of European integration. By examining 
these debates and accompanying documents an insight is gained into 
the preferences of the government, the way these were presented in 
the political arena, the deliberations of the various political parties 
regarding (the presentation of ) these preferences and the extent to 
which popular sentiments, expressed in the public debate, played 
a role in political decision making. The broader context in which 
the parliamentary debates took place is included in this study by 
structurally placing these debates against the background of the relevant 
historic circumstances of the time and the concurrent state of the public 
intellectual debate in the Netherlands on the developments in the field 
of European integration. Lastly, in order to make the picture complete, 
the findings from the primary parliamentary sources and literature 
are complemented with an oral history perspective, i.e. the personal 
recollections of (former) key-players in the field of Dutch European 
politics and policy of what ideas, premises, convictions, and beliefs 
motivated the Dutch political elite in their dealing with the process of 
European integration. These recollections were obtained in a series of 
semi-structured interviews. 
Selection of sources
Following from the objective to reveal the deep and historical 
undercurrents in Dutch political culture that contribute to an 
understanding of the outcome of 1 June 2005, the parliamentary 
debates are central in which the relation between the historically rooted 
national political culture and political identity of the Netherlands 
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on the one hand, and political decision making in the process of 
European integration on the other, becomes visible. In this regard, all 
the parliamentary debates in the Netherlands on the ‘great’ European 
treaties and decisions (i.e. treaties and decisions that significantly 
boosted the process of European integration) qualify.9 These debates, 
which are preserved in the form of written preparations and verbatim 
minutes and that run in accordance with an established pattern,10 are 
rich and relevant sources for this study, since they contain the ‘raw’ 
and unedited exchange of thoughts of the Dutch polity on the subject 
of European integration and – along the way – constitutionalisation. 
As such, these debates reflect the unadulterated political, ideological 
and rhetorical battles that have and have not been fought in the Dutch 
parliament with regard to the process of European constitutionalisation. 
Both issues of fundamental conflict and consensus with regard to this 
process can be deduced from these debates. Thus, essential concords 
and discords of the Dutch political community can be traced. They 
bring us closer to an understanding of the development of Dutch 
political culture and identity as a whole and how these related to 
political decision making on European integration.
It will be demonstrated in this study that the parliamentary 
debates that evolved around the relationship between the Dutch 
constitution and the process of European integration are particularly 
interesting. The starting point of the Contested Constitutions project, 
is that the text of a national constitution reflects the consensus of the 
political community – at a certain point in time – on who belong to it 
and their mutual roles and relations: who has the power, who controls 
the power and what are the rights and duties of those belonging to 
the community. A constitution can be considered to be a ‘solidified’ 
debate on the national political identity. The moments when this 
debate becomes ‘liquid’ again reveal a (latent) change in the identity 
of the political community. Following from this theoretical line of 
thought, the instances in the process of European integration that 
opened up the debate in the Dutch parliament on the constitutional 
identity of the Dutch polity are revealing for how this process affected 
it. These particular debates and the argumentative structures used in 
it, are indicative then for if, how and to what extent the Dutch political 
community felt the need and desire to adjust its political identity under 
influence of the process of European integration. 
In addition to the relevant parliamentary debates, the debate in 
the Netherlands on the process of European integration among public 
intellectuals is included in the analysis. Public intellectuals are situated 
between politics and the wider society. Although their exact influence 
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is difficult to measure, it is clear that in their role as public experts they 
translate political action into public opinion on it. The opposite holds 
true as well: politicians and policy makers are influenced by opinion 
makers. In the various chapters of this study, the public intellectual 
debate on European integration is reconstructed by the way it was 
held within public organisations, the world of scholars and debating 
clubs, by analysing it on the basis of publications. All sorts of people of 
diverse backgrounds had their part in it. Not only jurists, economists, 
journalists, sociologists, political scientists and a few historians but 
also (ex-)politicians in different capacities gave their opinion. They 
expressed their ideas as idealists, as political advisers, as scholars, 
independent publicists or orators, reacting to developments in politics 
or to each other’s contributions. What binds them is their active 
reflection on the Dutch political debate on European integration. By 
doing so they became its fellow designers at the same time and one of 
the driving forces behind this debate as it was held over the past sixty 
years.
Incorporating in this study the contributions of public 
intellectuals reflecting the main concerns in the successive stages in 
the process of European integration was crucial in order to identify 
the broader field of key forces in which the Dutch government and 
parliamentarians had to take their decisions and to discover whether 
and to what extent the political elite of the Netherlands considered the 
public debate in its decision making. In this way the causes and time of 
origin of the much debated gap between the national citizens and the 
political class of the Netherlands in the field of European integration 
can be more closely established. For that reason, as stated, in the 
historic sketches that structurally precede the analyses of the relevant 
parliamentary debates, the opinions and analyses of the Dutch public 
intellectuals with regard to the consequent steps in the process of 
European integration are discussed. 
The last category of sources that should be mentioned here are the 
fragments from a series of over twenty interviews, held with Dutch 
participants who played a role in the European integration process. 
They – former civil servants of various ministries, parliamentarians, 
members of government11 – held key-positions within the political 
and/or governmental domain in the Netherlands in one or more key-
episodes in the history of European integration. In the selection of the 
interviewees, getting a balanced picture, both with regard to the various 
periods in the process of European integration as well as the various 
actors and institutions involved, within the limited time available, was 
decisive. In particular with regard to the earliest years, the selection 
19
of interviewees was naturally bound by a more restricted presence of 
persons able and willing to cooperate. 
A Rhetorical Approach
For the analysis of the parliamentary debates, a rhetorical approach has 
been chosen. The main thesis of the Contested Constitutions project is 
that political language is constitutive for the identity of the polity as 
it crystallizes out in the polity’s constitution.12 From the premise that 
political identity comes about in political discourse, the use of insights 
and concepts from the field of rhetoric follows organically. In rhetoric, 
the instruments are found to approach and scrutinize the exact relation 
between political identity and political discourse. 
In this study, the analysis concentrates on the discursive constructs 
with which the Dutch political elite, since 1948, has spoken about the 
identity of the polity in relation to the process of European integration. 
Logic, topoi, metaphors, (historical) narratives, distinctions and 
rhetorical dissociations that were used by Dutch advocates and/or 
antagonists of European integration in national debates on the process, 
are identified and analysed in order to reveal the ideas, premises, 
convictions and beliefs of the Dutch political elite that stirred it in its 
political decision making. 
The rhetorical theory employed to analyse the content of the 
debates is derived from classical rhetoric (such as the Aristotelian 
concepts of logic and rhetorical commonplaces [topoi]),13 but also 
richly from the modern rhetoricians Chaim Perelman (1912-1984), 
Lloyd Bitzer (1931-) and Maurice Charland (1953-).14 In his well-known 
article on the ‘Peuple Québéçois’ (1987) the latter distinguished the 
specific rhetorical current of ‘constitutive rhetoric’. Here, Charland 
demonstrated how advocates of the political sovereignty of the people 
of Quebec ‘addressed and so attempted to call into being a ‘peuple 
québécois’ that would legitimate the constitution of a sovereign 
Quebec state.’15 By rhetorically emphasising and elaborating on the 
traits and characteristics of this people, he explains, its advocates, in 
fact, constituted it. Charland can be seen as a main defender of the 
conceptual idea that forms the starting point of this study: political 
identity is constructed in rhetorical discourse. He has made this notion 
operational by defending that in rhetorical discourse the narrative is 
a main instrument for claiming and bringing about group identity. 
Effective constitutive rhetoric, Charland contended, starts with a 
story of a common past, that functions as a basis for defining a political 
community in the present while summoning it to act in correspondence 
with its political identity. Thus, Charland’s theory yields a clear focus 
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in analysing the various Dutch debates on European integration. Are 
they attempts to constitute a political identity? And if so, to what end, 
by means of what narratives and by whom? The study will show that 
constitutive rhetoric played a role on various levels. On the European 
level, narratives were constructed in attempting to develop a European 
polity, whilst on the national level also various, conflicting narratives 
were constructed in which a (dis)connection of the identity of the 
Dutch polity with a European polity was argued.16 
Where Charland’s insights are essential for understanding how 
identities are created, Chaim Perelman describes the process and 
techniques by which this objective can be reached in greater detail. 
Perelman became known for developing the theoretical school of the 
new rhetoric. He contended that the traditional focus on formal logic in 
argumentation theory – i.e. a focus on arguments that pretend to reflect 
‘objective reality’ or ‘true knowledge’ – is not sufficient to clarify the 
effectiveness of rhetorical utterances and thus eventually, to explain 
choices and decisions taken by the audience. An argument is sound if 
it is accepted by the public it was aimed at, independent of its relation 
to reality. Starting from these notions, He developed, among other 
things, a supplement to the classical rhetoric in which he distinguished 
between arguments based on association and arguments based on 
dissociation.17 
With regard to the constructive aspects of association, Perelman 
differentiated between quasi-logical arguments, arguments based on 
the structure of reality, and arguments that structure reality. Quasi-
logical arguments – it is in the word – are arguments that suggest a 
logical connection between opinion and argument, which makes the 
opinion inevitable. In other words, they start from the notion that what 
is logical, is also true. But, on the basis of his belief in the ambiguity of 
language, Perelman stressed that this connection between logic and 
truth is a creative construct and often mere appearance. By smartly 
choosing his words and arguments by, for instance, defining terms in 
a certain manner, by analysing in a certain direction, or by claiming 
transitivity (‘the friends of my friends are my friends’), a creative 
speaker can construct logic that is not actually present.18 Having a sharp 
eye for quasi-logical arguments in the Dutch debates on European 
integration is useful for reaching an understanding of what ideas, 
starting points and expectations with regard to the process of European 
integration were presupposed and accepted by the Dutch political 
community as logical and self-evident. 
Arguments based on the structure of reality, Perelman argued, 
make creatively use of factual liaisons, perceived as ‘real’ or ‘true’ by the 
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audience. He distinguished the sub-categories of liaisons of succession 
on the one hand, and liaisons of coexistence on the other. Within the 
context of this research the first category is the most relevant.19 Typical 
of the arguments from this category is that they start from a view of the 
connection between cause and consequence or objective and means. 
Constructing such arguments, a rhetorician appeals to the consequences 
or the objective in order to justify his view. The pragmatic argument is 
a typical example of an argument of succession, based on a certain view 
on the relation between means and objective: in order to effectuate a 
desired consequence, something should be done or refrained from.20 
Arguments of succession in general, and pragmatic arguments in 
particular, as will be demonstrated in this study, have been lavishly 
used in the various debates in the Netherlands concerning European 
integration. The analysis of these arguments demonstrates the view of 
the Dutch political community on what was worth striving for in this 
process and what was seen as a useful and necessary means in pursuing 
that objective. In other words, the perception of the Dutch political 
community of the road leading towards the desired goal is revealed in 
the arguments of succession that this community applied and accepted 
in its debate on the process of European integration. 
The last category of arguments based on association, as 
distinguished by Perelman, are those that structure reality. According 
to him, rhetoricians apply such arguments to produce order in a chaotic 
reality. Typical examples are arguments based on example, analogy or 
metaphor. They all have in common that a certain new and intangible 
situation is represented as equal to or in line with another, more familiar 
situation. All are rhetorical constructions which, considered in their 
mutual connection, work towards a coherent narrative (see Charland). 
In arguments that structure reality, proposed perspectives and/or 
decisions are validated on the basis of the perspective and decisions 
applied in – what are perceived as – ‘similar’ situations in the past. Thus, 
arguments used to structure reality yield insight in how a rhetorician 
proposes his audience to perceive a certain situation. The adoption or 
rejection of the (majority of the) addressees of this proposal is indicative 
then of how they wish to perceive reality. In doing so, core elements of 
the mindset of the audience are uncovered.21 
For the category of arguments based on dissociation, the same 
holds good: the dissociations used, and their being well received or 
not, are indicative of aspects of the mindset of the polity. The construct 
that is called a rhetorical dissociation, Perelman argued, is a means 
usually applied by those who encounter ‘incompatibilities in ordinary 
thought’ when making their argument.22 Instead of conjuring away 
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the difficulty by pretending not to see it – an adequate way of solving 
incompatibilities in thought – Perelman claimed that an orator can – and 
often will – try to resolve the inconsistency in a ‘theoretically satisfying 
manner’ by creatively ‘re-establishing a coherent vision of reality.’ To 
this end ‘he will most often attain such a resolution by a dissociation 
of the ideas accepted at the start.’23 A typical example of a dissociation, 
quite commonly used in legal reasoning, is that the ‘letter of the law is 
not the same as its spirit.’ By dissociating spirit from letter, a margin of 
interpretation is introduced that – if accepted by the audience – benefits 
the rhetoric latitude of the orator. The reception of a dissociation by an 
audience contributes to an understanding of what ideas fit within the 
mindset of the specific audience and those that do not. 
In addition to Charland’s notion of ‘constitutive rhetoric’ and 
Perelman’s analytic tools to scrutinize the constructed narratives, 
Lloyd Bitzer’s insights on the relevance of the ‘rhetorical situation’ 
form the basis of the analyses in this study.24 Rhetorical discourse, this 
American rhetorician has claimed, only comes about in relation to a 
‘specific condition or situation which invites utterance.’25 By letting 
the qualitative content analysis of the argumentative structures in the 
various debates precede by an inquiry into the situational details, it is 
prevented that the arguments are interpreted out of context and that, 
by consequence, they are over- or underestimated with regard to value 
and meaning. Questions that are at the root of every rhetorical situation 
described in this study are: what was – both explicitly and implicitly – 
at stake in the debate? What made the debated matter urgent? What 
made the orator speak and what did he/she have to lose? What were the 
possible solutions to the matter and why did the orator chose a specific 
approach? What were the constraints that influenced the rhetorician 
and (how) could these be brought to bear on the audience? Who were 
involved in the matter, what was their mutual relation, how were they 
related to the issue at stake? How could they decide on the matter and 
to what extent could they affect it? Thus, the situational framework is 
structured, against the background of which the rhetorical content of 
the debate can be analysed. 
So, whereas Charland provides us with a clear focus when reading 
the debates and Perelman’s insights are essential for analysing the exact 
argumentative structures, Bitzer gives us instruments to map out 
the debates before deep diving into them. It is relevant to stress here 
that in this study the application of rhetorical theory is instrumental 
in providing a deeper understanding of how the Dutch political 
community has perceived the process of European integration, how this 
perception related to its self-perception and how the various readings 
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related to political decision making in this process. Validating the 
theory, in the sense that the debates are used in order to demonstrate 
that the various theories work, is not the objective of this study. 
Structure of the argument 
In this work it is argued that the germ for the gap between Dutch 
political elite and society at large, as it became manifest on 1 June 2005, 
was already latently present within the identity of the Dutch polity. It 
resulted from the ideas, premises, convictions, and beliefs, shared by a 
political majority and cherished as part of their group identity, on the 
position of the Netherlands in the wider world, the foreign policy that 
befitted this position, and the democratic sacrifices that were needed 
to guarantee it. These essential elements of what could be summarised 
as the mindset of the political elite, have led to crucial blind spots 
within the political community with regard to its approach to, and 
expectations of the process of European integration; blind spots that, 
in turn, may clarify the development of the gap between those who 
represent and those that were supposed to be represented. 
The analysis takes 1948 as the starting point, the year of the first 
manifestations of the until then purely theoretical notion of European 
integration. It is argued that an exceptionally strong identification of 
the Dutch political elite with the process of European integration in its 
early years, eventually led to the erosion of the democratic legitimacy of 
the process of European integration. Though hidden at first, this process 
gradually became manifest in a widening gulf between the political 
elite that continued to support the constitutionalisation of Europe and 
the Dutch citizens, who were increasingly dissatisfied with national 
decision making on European integration. Blinded by their conviction 
that the process should proceed because it was a goal that purely 
benefitted the economic and international political interests of the 
Netherlands, the political leaders of the Netherlands failed to recognise 
the diminishing support for progressive European integration. Finally, 
when the Dutch people were asked to give their consent on the Treaty 
Establishing a Constitution for Europe, they gave a harsh verdict. 
They protested against European integration and called a halt to the 
seemingly unstoppable legal logics by which it had developed in the 
course of time. 
The full argument is produced in six chronological chapters in 
which the developments in the process of European integration are 
discussed together with developments in the national political domain 
and the perception of the political elite of this process. The division 
into chapters, is based on the turning points in the perception of the 
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political and intellectual elite of the integration process and the political 
decisions that mark them. 
In the first chapter, a study of the crucial elements of the Dutch 
constitutional reform of 1953 demonstrates that, based on a historically 
developed view on the position and role of the Netherlands on the 
international stage, a considerable political majority was willing 
to open up the Dutch constitution for the process of European 
integration. Subsequently, in chapters two to four, on the basis of an 
examination of the parliamentary debates on the coming about of 
the European Defence Community (1953), the European Economic 
Community (1957), the Merger Treaty (1965), the Single European Act 
(1986), the accessions of the United Kingdom (1972), Greece (1981), 
Spain and Portugal (1986) and the introduction of direct elections for 
the European Parliament (1979), it is observed that throughout the 
process of European integration the political majority’s consensus 
that an attitude of fundamental openness in this process came before 
a strong democratic hold, was preserved, strengthened and protected. 
Subsequently, chapters five and six show that when from the second 
half of the 1980s onwards a full-dress European Union came into 
view, the political consensus in Dutch decision making on European 
integration, as it had developed since 1948, became more and more 
contested both in and outside parliament. The political mainstream that 
had held the political power for decennia since 1948, however, failed 
to truly and structurally act upon the growing discontent with the 
coming into being of a fourth administrative layer within the governing 
system of the Netherlands on which the Dutch citizens and their 
political representatives had less and less hold. Estrangement developed 
between a governmental elite that kept justifying ongoing European 
integration on the basis of a political tradition in which instrumental 
internationalist reasoning with regard to economic and security 
interests came before national political sovereignty and the Dutch 
people who increasingly desired to prioritise otherwise. In June 2005, 
the governmental elite paid the price for that.
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Chapter 1
The Land of Grotius 
1948 — 1953
‘ The pursuit of international cooperation is rightly described in  
the Dutch Constitution as “building of the international legal order”.  
It is from this perspective that the country of Grotius must deal with 
the international problems.’ 
 
Johan Willem Beyen26
1. 1  Introduction
At the end of the Second World War, rebuilding international trust 
and relations became a main concern for the countries of Western-
Europe. All heavily enfeebled by the economic and moral costs of the 
war, these countries were convinced that cooperation was essential in 
order for them to arise from their ashes. The Bretton Woods Conference 
(1944) and the Marshall Plan (1947) both aimed at collective economic 
recovery, were among the earliest initiatives to substantiate this notion. 
The intergovernmental organisation of the United Nations (un) 
was established in 1945 to maintain international peace and justice 
by offering a forum for international political deliberation. Also in 
the field of defence, cooperation in Western-Europe was sought and 
found when in the years after 1945 Stalin revealed his true ambitions 
by flouting his Yalta promises and developing the Eastern Bloc. The 
establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (nato) (1949) 
was the result.27 
The un and nato had in common that they were both 
international organisations, based on treaty law and working through 
consultative structures, but without any governing powers of their 
own. Their functioning and decision-making depended on the political 
will of the governments of their members; they were intergovernmental 
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organisations. But with the East-West tension growing, Stalin 
clearly taking no notice of any interstate agreements and the states 
of Western Europe finding themselves in reconstruction stress, the 
intergovernmental approach to international cooperation soon revealed 
its limitations. In reaction to the fragile political situation and the 
failure of the states of Western-Europe to formulate an effective answer, 
ideas were developed among a vanguard of Western-European thinkers 
and politicians to move beyond the old form of intergovernmental 
cooperation. The notion of Western-European unification was 
examined. 
Plans for European unification had been discussed in Europe on 
and off before and during the war, but until then they had never been 
taken seriously as a real political option.28 In the aftermath of the war 
this situation changed. An international group of European federalist 
thinkers, consisting also of several Dutchmen who had met in resistance 
movements during the war, were the first to take the initiative.29 They 
found each other in their consensus that the international political 
system of nation states was to blame for the continent falling into war. 
They saw unification of Europe by means of federalisation as the way 
to prevent such wars in the future. Between 15-22 September 1946 they 
organised the conference of Hertenstein, Switzerland. Here, a shared 
European identity, culture and destiny were discussed. Eventually, they 
came up with the ‘Hertenstein programme’, which has been understood 
as ‘an assertive attempt […] to convince national parliaments of the 
need for creating a European union on federal lines.’30 It contained 
suggestions for the establishment of a European Union – the term was 
used already – based on the voluntary transference of national sovereign 
rights of the Member States, and the draft of a European declaration of 
civil rights. These federal thinkers put such a European Union within 
their broader ambition of developing a World Union.31 
This rather academic initiative received unexpected political 
relevance when on 19 September – the same day as the Hertenstein 
programme was announced – the British opposition leader and ‘war 
hero’ Sir Winston Churchill formulated some outspoken thoughts on 
the future of the European continent. In his ‘speech to the academic 
youth’ held at Zürich University, he stated that the rescue of Europe 
was in the realisation of European unification in what, according to 
Churchill, might be called a ‘United States of Europe’.32 Whatever 
Churchill’s aim with a unified Europe – it is likely that the power 
politician Churchill was driven by the pragmatic consideration of 
forming a Western-European power bloc as a counterbalance against 
the Soviet power, rather than by mere idealism – his appeal perfectly 
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matched the Hertenstein spirit. As such, it contributed to gathering 
momentum for the concept of European integration, which was further 
developed in the follow-up initiatives that these first events brought 
about. 
In the aftermath of the launching of both plans in favour of a 
European federation, various organisations for European unity were 
founded throughout Europe. The Union of European Federalists, an 
initiative of the participants in Hertenstein, realised in December 
1946 and the European Parliamentary Union initiated by Richard 
Coudenhove-Kalergi (1947) are two well-known examples.33 In various 
Western-European states sub-branches of these movements arose, 
such as the Beweging voor Europese Federalisten (bef, Movement 
of European Federalists) and the Europese Beweging (eb, European 
Movement) in the Netherlands, both established in 1947.34 In the spring 
of 1948 – following the Prague putsch of February 1948, a time in 
which the Cold War tensions started to show their real character across 
Europe – the various pro-European organisations joined forces in the 
organisation of what was ambitiously called the ‘Congress of Europe’.35 
The aim of the Congress, which took place from 7-11 May of that year, 
was to broaden the support for the concept of a united Europe, based 
on freedom of expression and respect for human rights.36 Although the 
organisation of the Congress was in the hands of European pressure 
groups for the federalisation of Europe, the purport of the event went 
far beyond that and so the Congress of Europe marked the start of the 
transition in fact between the early-post war years in which the notion 
of European integration was only present as a theoretical one, dreamed 
about in club meetings of a like-minded intellectual elite and the 
development of the concept as a political principle. 
As the location for the Congress, The Hague was chosen. The 
symbolic appeal that this Dutch city had developed as the international 
city of peace and justice after the international peace conferences of 1899 
and 1907 had been held there, might have contributed to this decision. 
With the ideal of European unification being deeply interwoven with 
the ambition to let peace and justice prevail over war, The Hague 
befitted the occasion. The Congress was presided by Winston Churchill 
and attended by various other political spearheads and dignitaries. The 
future German Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, Harold Macmillan 
and François Mitterand, to mention only a few, took part. Even the 
Dutch crown princess Juliana and her husband Prince Bernhard were 
present. There were more than 750 participants, from 26 European 
countries, plus delegations from Canada and the United States. 
Substantial delegations from France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, 
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Italy, Switzerland, Austria, Denmark, Greece, Norway, Sweden and the 
Netherlands were present.37 On behalf of the Dutch pressure groups, 
Hendrik Brugmans and Hans Nord (1919-1996), the front men of the 
eb and the bef, took part. But the delegations not only consisted of 
intellectual idealists. Politicians, churchmen, captains of industry, 
and trade union representatives were present.38 Dutch political names 
figuring on the list of participants were those of Jonkheer Marinus van 
der Goes van Naters – a ‘red lawyer’ from Nijmegen who in 1946 had 
become the leader of the Dutch Labour Party, the Partij van de Arbeid 
(PvdA) – and Emmanuel (Maan) Sassen, the legal specialist in the Dutch 
Lower House for the Katholieke Volkspartij (kvp), the Catholic People’s 
Party.39 
The plenary meetings of the Congress took place in the Ridderzaal 
of the Dutch parliamentary building.40 The ceremonial setting of 
the Congress was to contribute to the message that something very 
special was happening there. Close to the luxurious tapestries with 
which the room was decorated, was a flag of Europe, ‘boasting a red 
‘E’ on a white background.’41 At the conference, Churchill’s proposal 
of bringing about a United States of Europe in the form of a federative 
union was confirmed. The practical result was the adoption of a series 
of resolutions, endorsed by the delegations of all states present. The 
participants expressed their commitment to the goal of a United Europe 
‘throughout whose area the free movement of persons, ideas and goods 
is restored’ and the bringing about of a Charter of Human Rights, a 
Court of Justice, and a European Assembly to institutionalise this 
United Europe. Furthermore, they pledged to give ‘in our homes and in 
public, in our political and religious life, in our professional and trade 
union circles, […] our fullest support to all persons and governments 
working for this lofty cause.’42
 ‘This lofty cause’ was, however, not defined in detail. Although 
it was explicitly stated that a European Federation should be brought 
about, that this federation should get the institutions it needed to 
function with real power and that, therefore, its Member States would 
have to ‘transfer and merge some portion of their sovereign rights’, 
practical short-term measures were not laid down.43 The extent to 
which the individual states needed to ‘transfer’ their sovereignty, and 
the extent to which they would on the other hand remain sovereign 
was not discussed. Thus the pledge that the attending delegations 
gave at the end of the conference remained rather vague and was not 
linked to any direct political consequences; the ambitions were not 
recorded in treaty agreements. Viewed from a different angle, however, 
the proposed plan was in many ways revolutionary and a break with 
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how international affairs had hitherto been arranged on the European 
continent. If the European Federation were to become a reality, many 
affairs arranged until then by the individual states would be taken 
over by federal institutions, invested with supranational powers on 
the basis of which these institutions could decide on behalf of these 
states. Absolute sovereignty of the nation states and cooperation on an 
intergovernmentalist basis would become concepts of the past. In this 
respect, the pledge the Congress subscribed to, was far-reaching. 
Together with the events taking place in international politics 
– i.e. the Cold War becoming manifest and the states of Western-Europe 
struggling to formulate an answer – the Congress of Europe functioned 
as a catalyst for political debates on European integration. The delegates 
of the various states who had been present in The Hague on these 
spring days of 1948, by means of supporting the political resolutions, 
had committed themselves to support the goal of a United Europe in 
their homes and in public, in their political and religious lives. When 
these participants returned to their daily lives and jobs, an active search 
for political and public support for integrating Europe started. 
This chapter will show what this search turned out to be in the 
Netherlands and how it resulted in laying the foundations for the Dutch 
approach to the process of European integration in the years to come. 
1.2  The Notion of European Integration  
Taking Root in the Netherlands
The Second World War had left the Netherlands traumatised. In the five 
years of German occupation (1940-145), 230.000 Dutchmen had met 
their end, 100.000 of whom were Jews. Many more people were scarred 
physically or mentally for the rest of their lives.44 Moreover, the country 
had been ransacked, the production machinery had suffered great 
damage and the public debt had increased tremendously. Apart from the 
physical damage and losses, the war had put an end to deeply cherished 
convictions on the position of the Netherlands in the world and on how 
this position could be safeguarded. More than anything it had made 
clear that the principle of absolute neutrality, that the Netherlands had 
committed itself to in the nineteenth century, could not guarantee the 
safety and well-being of the country. Now that the war was over, this 
realisation had to be given a place in a process of rethinking the guiding 
principles of the international and defence politics of the Netherlands. 
The urgency of this exercise was underlined when soon after the 
war the Netherlands got to suffer another blow that affected the long 
cherished neutrality and striving for good international relations of 
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the Netherlands. On 17 August 1945, the nationalists Soekarno and 
Hatta proclaimed the independence of the Republic of Indonesia 
on the territory that had since the nineteenth century been the 
possession of the Netherlands as the Dutch East Indies. After having 
experienced the humiliation of the breach of the country’s neutrality, 
the thought of losing the colony in the East aroused heavy emotions 
in the Netherlands, both in the public and political domain. ‘Indië 
verloren, rampspoed geboren’ – freely translated: the Indies lost, disaster 
found – was the creed used by the post-war governments of Louis 
Beel (1946-1948) and Willem Drees (1948-1958) in their attempts to 
crush the Indonesian calls for autonomy.45 Losing the colonies, it was 
perceived in the Netherlands, would imply a degradation to ‘the rank of 
Denmark’; it was judged to mean the end of the country’s historically 
obtained international allure.46 
In the midst of these turbulent times of post-war rebuilding, 
the discussion in Western-Europe on European unification arose. 
The concept did not immediately take root in broad layers of the 
Dutch political community, nor in society as a whole. The notion 
of a federative construction between the states of Western-Europe 
was viewed sceptically by those strongly attached to the traditional 
Atlantic orientation of the Netherlands. Both in terms of political and 
trade relations, the Netherlands had a history of looking for partners 
overseas; towards the United Kingdom and the us in particular.47 With 
these states the Netherlands felt related, based on the thought that 
all three were countries that for their prosperity depended on good 
overseas trading relations. This conviction has been reflected in many 
descriptions of the place of the Netherlands in the world and the essence 
of the Dutch culture. Only one example is the remark of Johan Huizinga 
(1872-1945), the father of cultural history in the Netherlands, in one 
of his works on Dutch national culture: ‘We belong on the Atlantic 
side. Our centre of gravity is at sea and across the sea. Our company is 
the western people […].’48 The crucial role of these states in liberating 
the Netherlands of the German occupation, had only contributed to 
this feeling of Atlantic kinship. After the war, the Atlantic orientation 
remained present in the mindset of many who worked in the Dutch 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the international departments of the other 
Ministries and the great trading centres of the country – the captains of 
industry of the port of Rotterdam, for instance – and of those who led 
in politics. Confronted with the concept of European integration – a 
process aimed at integrating the continental part of Western-Europe, 
in which the United States would obviously have no part and the 
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involvement of the United Kingdom being unclear – the Atlanticists in 
the Netherlands assumed a sceptical attitude.49 
Nevertheless, the ideal of a unified Europe struck a sympathetic 
cord with a small intellectual and political vanguard in the Netherlands. 
Those in the Netherlands associated with Dutch pressure groups in 
favour of a united Europe, such as the Dutch ‘Europeans’ Hendrik 
Brugmans and Hans Nord, became the forerunners in a still tender 
public intellectual debate on the future of Europe. They were supported 
in their attempts to stir the public opinion in favour of European 
integration by various political advocates who had declared themselves 
in favour of the notion of European unification. Especially, in PvdA 
circles (Jonkheer Van der Goes van Naters and Alfred Mozer) and within 
the kvp (Jos Serrarens and Maan Sassen for instance), such people were 
to be found. The social-democrats thought that Europe could function, 
socio-economically and culturally, as a bridge between the Soviet-
Union and the United States of America. This theoretical viewpoint 
of the PvdA, known as the theory of the Third Way, propagated that 
Europe should develop into a politically and economically strong and 
independent entity.50 The kvp was primarily guided by moral idealism 
and a fear of communism. After the war, this party sought protection 
for the country in trying to bring about a ‘legal community of nations’. 
Since the effectiveness of the un left much to be desired in this 
respect and the kvp even started to doubt whether this international 
organisation would ever be able to function that way, the party put its 
hopes on initiatives for a European federation.51 
The range of publications that the avant-garde of pro-European 
unity thinkers produced between 1947 and the early 1950s is 
characterized by a content full of fierce and dramatic arguments in 
favour of European integration.52 They had in mind a united Europe 
which was necessary to rescue the states of Western-Europe from 
disaster. Along these lines, references were made in this respect to the 
horrors of the war, but also to the Soviet threat. Europe was presented 
as being in a crisis, and European unification was the sole solution to 
overcome it. These federalist thinkers stressed that in order to prevent 
the decline of the European continent, it definitely had to break with 
the system of sovereign states. From a political point of view this idea 
would have far-reaching consequences. It implied the creation of a 
European government, sufficiently equipped with decision-making 
power without having to consult the Member States.53 In order to create 
an economically prospering United States of Europe, it was necessary 
to introduce one European market, with one European currency. To 
protect the federation against external dangers a common foreign policy 
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should be formulated and a European army should be set up. The legal 
basis of this federation should not be limited to national constitutions. 
In time only a federal constitution, based on the American model, could 
serve as a basis.54
In these early post-war years, the pro-unity thinkers do not seem 
to have been bothered by the problem of the practical workability 
and feasibility of European integration. Remarkably, the fear of 
the potential loss of political sovereignty and independence of the 
Netherlands or worries about the loss of essential values of the Dutch 
culture or identity remained undiscussed. The same held true for 
legal difficulties and the harmonising of different systems of national 
law. These lacunae are reflected by another void in reasoning, namely 
a lack of consideration of if, how and on what basis a European legal, 
economic, political and ‘national’ culture should be brought about 
before a European federation could take root. It raises the impression 
that these thinkers started from the notion that a federation should 
come about first, before attention needed to be paid to its fleshing out. 
Another question not posed was which countries should or should 
not be members of the union. For the reason of preventing war, it 
was considered obvious that Germany could not be left out,55 but 
questions regarding the countries that should be involved and whether 
there would be a geographical border to the European federation were 
ignored.
The grounds for these gaps in the reasoning of these opinion 
makers are difficult to determine. The explanation might be sought in 
the deep conviction that for the sake of the states of Western Europe 
the proposed federation had to be established. Lots of work needed to 
be done and the moment to think of difficulties and all kinds of nuances 
was to be postponed. This to prevent the European project from being 
imperilled before it had even started. Looking at it from an opposite 
position, in the early post war years the notion that the Netherlands 
would be able to survive as an independent state on its own, may 
also have seemed even more of an unrealistic idea; a perspective that 
may have contributed to a less critical attitude towards the concept of 
European federalisation.56 
With their strong focus on the necessity of European unification 
for the states of Western-Europe to overcome their economic, 
moral and political misery, and their disregard of the downsides, the 
federalist thinkers – consciously or subconsciously – followed a long 
Dutch tradition of thinking about international politics. Ever since 
early modern-history, the Netherlands had been guided by a strong 
instrumental international orientation aimed at securing its economic 
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and political interests. The search for trade in the far East and West that 
lay at the basis of the Dutch Golden Age was based on this orientation, 
even when the search for strategic partnerships and the conversion 
to, and international propagation of the principle of neutrality after a 
series of wars in the eighteenth century had financially exhausted the 
country.57 Although both periods markedly differed with regard to 
the policy principle that was focused on (free trade versus neutrality), 
they are alike as far as the basic starting point is concerned: the country 
depended on its relations with the wider world for its economic 
and political well-being.58 Whereas in the seventeenth century the 
Netherlands actively engaged in international contacts from a position 
of economic and political strength, the late eighteenth and nineteenth 
century brought the turn towards striving after good international 
relations from a position of weakness: it was realised that the 
Netherlands was too small to manage affairs on its own. 
From the second half of the nineteenth century onwards free trade 
was inextricably bound to neutrality in the foreign policy mindset 
of the Netherlands and was also internationally propagated.59 The 
more countries would declare themselves neutral, so it was argued, 
the smaller the chance that war would break out and the better the 
international commercial interests of the Netherlands would be 
protected.60 The neutrality of the Netherlands was internationally 
respected and was, around the turn of the century, even underlined 
by the organisation of two international peace conferences (1899 and 
1907) in The Hague. As a result, the Netherlands became the host of 
various international courts and organisations for the development 
of international law.61 The Peace Palace in The Hague, that opened 
its doors in 1913, was the impressive reflection of the internationally 
recognised role of the Netherlands as the staunch supporter of 
neutral arbitration in international conflicts. The inscription on the 
façade of this building – pacis tutela apud judicem –62 referred to the 
wisdom of that seventeenth century Dutch legal thinker Hugo de 
Groot, the universal-thinking man of peace, who had sensed the 
(future) preferences of his country in the field of international politics 
wonderfully well.63 
After 1945, when it had become clear that neutrality could not keep 
the country safe, a process of re-evaluating the Dutch foreign policy 
principles commenced. However, the essential consideration on which 
the neutrality principle had been founded, had been left untouched, 
or had – in fact – only gained strength during the war: the Netherlands 
needed international partners in order to keep itself on its feet. When 
the Dutch federalist thinkers came up with their arguments in favour 
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of European unification founded on the necessity of this process, they 
tuned in on this age-old foreign policy conviction of the Netherlands.64 
In terms of rhetorical theory, they tried to connect to an age-old topos; 
something that would prove to be very effective in the political domain. 
1.3  Political Positioning: the Van der Goes  
van Naters/Serrarens Motion (1948) 
When on 7 May 1948 the Congress of Europe opened, the Netherlands 
had already concluded a first important political debate on the position 
of the country with regard to the plans for European unification. Post 
war elections had brought the kvp and the PvdA – former political 
adversaries – to political cooperation in what was to become a series 
of Catholic-Social coalitions.65 The second of these coalitions, was led 
by the Catholic statesman Louis Beel (kvp). Installed in July 1946 and 
dissolved in August 1948 the first Beel cabinet was mainly preoccupied 
with the question of the decolonisation process of the Dutch East 
Indies.66 However, with the discussions on European unification 
becoming louder in the European and national domain, the threat of 
new international conflict growing and the first cooperation initiatives 
in Western-Europe developing in the form of the draft Treaty of 
Brussels which was to bring about the Western European Union (weu), 
the question whether to unify or not to unify Europe became politically 
relevant for the Netherlands. As a kind of Europan nato avant la lettre, 
the weu was aimed at bringing about a military cooperation between 
Great-Britain, France, Belgium Luxembourg and the Netherlands. By 
signing the treaty, the signatories committed themselves to support 
each other in case any of the contracting parties should fall victim to a 
military attack. Besides, it was laid down that the contracting parties 
would harmonise their economic policies in order to stimulate the 
economic recovery of Europe and that cultural exchange between the 
states would be promoted.67 
On 17 March 1948, the Netherlands, under the Beel cabinet, signed 
the Treaty of Brussels. By doing this, the Netherlands said goodbye to 
its pre-war period of staying neutral in international conflicts. Together 
with the bill that presented the treaty for approval, parliament received 
an explanatory memorandum in which both the ratio behind the 
initiative of the weu and the decision of the government to sign the 
treaty was explained.68 The text is pervaded with the desire to bring 
about an international legal order that would guarantee a peaceful 
coexistence of peoples and that would thus contribute to the wellbeing 
of these peoples.69 Interesting is the rationale, linked to this desire, 
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in which the Netherlands is depicted as the country par excellence to 
benefit from the bringing about of the weu: 
‘ For a country as the Netherlands, whose territory is such an 
exposed part of the European continent, it is […] of utmost 
importance to promote by the development of the international 
organisation, that the possibility of war should be as small 
as possible and that an international organisation, aimed at 
preventing wars, is developed as effectively as possible.’70
The fragment illustrates that the government’s approval of the Treaty 
of Brussels was based on the conviction that the Netherlands, given its 
geo-political position, depended on international agreements for its 
well-being. The necessity of approving this treaty, in other words, was 
linked to the fate of the country of the Netherlands. 
After the presentation of the treaty, in accordance with Dutch 
parliamentary traditions, written reactions of parliament and plenary 
debates in both Houses of the Dutch parliament followed. Firstly, the 
Lower House was to respond. Here many turned out to agree with 
the reasoning of the government. The motivation expressed by the 
various political parties to vote in favour of this treaty shows that there 
was a general consensus among the Dutch political parties that in the 
post-war era a break with the old politics of neutrality was needed and 
that this treaty was a step in the right direction.71 Fear of new dangers 
and attendant consequences for the Netherlands, was the important 
motive in the parliamentary considerations. This, for instance, is shown 
by the contribution of the Member of Parliament (mp) for the liberal 
Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (vvd) Gijsbertus Vonk, who 
presented the treaty as a desirable and necessary first step towards the 
development of a ‘socially and economically joint power that could set 
bounds to the communist aim’.72 In his enthusiasm for the treaty, Vonk 
referred to the credo of the Dutch Union of Utrecht of 1579: ‘United we 
stand’.73
Notwithstanding the general positive parliamentary reception of 
the treaty on the basis of deep belief in the necessity of international 
partnerships, questions came also up in parliament now that 
the long tradition of neutrality was left behind. Although, the 
intergovernmental arrangements proposed in the Treaty of Brussels did 
not come close to the concept of European unification or federalisation 
as it circulated in intellectual debates, the development of this military 
cooperation was in parliament clearly associated with debates on 
this matter as boasted by Churchill and the Congress in The Hague. 
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Regarded by many as a first step towards the ‘development of an 
international legal order’,74 the question was posed how this process 
would develop further. Would more treaties of this kind follow? 
Should a united Europe ultimately come into being? And if so, what 
would this Europe look like? Would typical values and interests of the 
Dutch nation still have a place in this order? With respect to this last 
point it was in particular the Christian parties that wondered whether 
the Christian character of Europe and of the Dutch nation would be 
safeguarded within an increasingly united Europe. In particular, the lack 
of a reference to the guiding role of Christianity for the signatory parties 
in the preamble of the treaty was regretted.75
What bothered these MPs in fact, were crucial questions on the 
extent to which this treaty would introduce a fundamental break with 
the traditional forms of international cooperation that the Netherlands 
had been familiar with for ages. Could the weu be seen to be heralding 
the bringing about of a European federation? And what would such 
a federation exactly imply for the identity of the Dutch political 
community? The fact that these questions were posed, indicates that 
the conceptual discussions on European unification had stirred feelings 
with these parliamentarians that a phase of transition might break in 
the field of foreign policy arrangements, the consequences of which 
were hard to imagine. They show that the step from theoretical concept 
to actual realisation of European unification was not easily conceivable 
for certain political currents in the Netherlands. The establishment 
of the weu could be a first step towards the still mysterious concept 
of European unification, although it could just as well be seen as yet 
another form of intergovernmental cooperation that the Netherlands 
had ages of experiences with. 
In this twilight zone of old and new conceptions of safeguarding 
the international interests of the country, a group of political advocates 
of European federalisation saw a window of opportunity that could be 
used to give fate a hand. Inspired by the ‘All-Parties motion’ that had 
been tabled in the British House of Commons to get – in the build up 
to the Congress of Europe – wide parliamentary support for the idea 
of association of the states of Western Europe,76 political pioneers 
in favour of European integration introduced a draft-motion in the 
parliamentary debate on approval of the weu that would give Dutch 
foreign policy a new direction. The most explicit advocates and name 
givers of this motion were the social-democrat Marinus van der Goes 
van Naters (PvdA) and the Catholic Jos Serrarens (kvp), both of whom 
had taken to federal enthusiasm soon after the war.77 
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When submitting the motion, Van der Goes van Naters started by 
pointing out that the idea of European unity had become increasingly 
common in the years 1947-1948. He explained that the PvdA and kvp 
supported ‘that thought, which has actually become concrete in all 
parties and groups and religious organisations […].’78 He added that the 
time had come to put on record some essential principles stemming 
from this thought. The draft-motion, which was first presented on 18 
March 1948, stated that ‘a lasting union of States in differing functional 
alliances – [in Dutch: doelverbanden] – has become necessary, which 
may grow into supranational entities.’79 With the motion the initiators 
wanted to express their support for letting the Netherlands participate 
‘in a real legal community of democratic states in a federal structure, 
in which power should be assigned to one or more supranational 
organs.’80 The competences of this federal association should lie 
specifically in the fields of monetary and economic policies and defence. 
The motion concluded that the Lower House invited the government 
to assist in the quick construction of such a legal community and its 
organs. This ‘considering the mission of leadership’ that awaited the 
Netherlands ‘in this constructive, supranational work.’81 
By introducing the motion, the initiators cleverly managed to 
adjust the parliamentary agenda to their own political preferences. No 
longer was the approval of the Treaty of Brussels the only nor the most 
important issue at stake in parliament on 18 March 1948. By means of 
the motion, Marinus van der Goes van Naters, Jos Serrarens and those 
who supported them, induced parliament to express its thoughts on 
whether the Dutch political community should or should not support 
political initiatives leading up to ‘a lasting union of States’ in Western-
Europe and even take the lead in it. 
The motion was ambiguous in its wording, leaving a margin of 
interpretation for the various political currents in parliament. Unclear 
concepts such as a ‘union of states’, based on ‘functional associations’ 
that could develop into ‘supranational unities’ were proposed, 
without presenting a clear indication of what this union and these 
associations and unities would entail in everyday political practice. In 
his explanation in the plenary debate Van der Goes van Naters went 
beyond these terms and stated that a ‘true legal community on a federal 
basis’ was the ultimate goal for which competences should be conferred 
on ‘supranational organs’. The latter rendering differs from the first 
in that the aspect of ‘functional associations’ made room for the term 
‘supranational organs’. Both concepts are markedly different in that the 
first calls to mind a picture of sovereign countries deciding to cooperate 
on the basis of mutual interests. The bringing about of supranational 
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organs, on the other hand, presupposed the possibility of conferral 
of national sovereignty on a supranational level of governance. The 
functional concept sounded more or less in keeping with the old way of 
international treaty making, whereas the supranational notion could be 
explained broader. 
The discrepancy between the two descriptions of the objective 
reflects, on the one hand, the ambiguity in and premature character 
of the plans for European unity at the time that this debate took place. 
The initiators of the motion did not have any certainty with regard to 
where these plans would eventually lead to and were thus forced by 
the circumstances to formulate their ideal broadly. On the other hand, 
however, these federal idealist can also be suspected of clever strategic 
thinking. By formulating the motion as a statement of intent, leaving 
the end goal and the terms within which the end goal was to be reached 
unclear, the risk of fierce political resistance was restricted. By staying 
close to concepts of international cooperation that the Dutch political 
community as a whole believed in and was acquainted with, the chances 
of getting the motion approved were maximised. 
The vagueness in the wording of the motion, however, should 
not conceal its political relevance. With the tabling of the Van der 
Goes van Naters/Serrarens motion, the PvdA and the kvp opened 
the political debate in the Dutch parliament on European integration 
in order to sound the political commitment for this process. If this 
motion was adopted, it could be explained as a reflection of the political 
will in the Netherlands for embarking on the experimental road 
towards ‘functional associations’ and/or ‘supranational entities.’ The 
motion – if and when adopted – captured the consensus of the Dutch 
parliament on a cooperative and open attitude towards future initiatives 
with the objective to bring about a ‘legal community of democratic 
states in a federal structure’ in Western-Europe.
Interestingly, despite the fundamental political question it 
entailed, the motion did not lead to any fundamental debate in 
the Dutch Lower House. Support for the motion turned out to be 
widespread. In the debate on it, its multi-interpretability proved 
politically effective. Those in parliament supporting the bringing 
about of a full-dress European federation – first and foremost the 
initiators of the motion and their political friends – enthusiastically 
received the call for supporting the realisation of a federal structure. 
Less federal minded parties remarked, however, that the proposed 
federal associations should only cover those fields of international 
politics that were considered to need federal organisation, areas such 
as economy and defence in which the Netherlands was perceived to 
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depend on international support. Other policy areas in which the 
Netherlands was able to manage affairs on its own should remain based 
on national sovereignty. In the words of the liberal mp Gijsbertus 
Vonk, the Netherlands should be on its guard against the bringing 
about of ‘utopian paper constructions’ that ‘could harm the national 
independence’ of the Dutch state.82 The anti-revolutionary protestant 
mp Sieuwert Bruins Slot (arp) remarked similarly that a focus on the 
functional aspect in the realisation of a European federation should 
prevent Europe from developing in some sort of ‘monistic super state’.83
These and similar comments reveal that for a substantial group 
of diverse parliamentarians the ‘functional’ aspect referred to in the 
motion was decisive in their consideration to support it. Functional 
federal associations that would serve the economic and security 
interests of the Netherlands were welcomed. But bringing about a full-
dress European federation was a different matter. They drew the line at 
the bringing about of what conceptually occurred to them as a ‘super 
state,’ in which the Netherlands no longer had sovereignty of its own. 
The motion Van der Goes van Naters/Serrarens was interpreted by 
these MPs as leaving ample room for this distinction. Approving the 
motion was explained here as politically supporting the bringing about 
of functional federal European associations and at the same time leaving 
room for rejecting a real European federation. The equivocal wording 
of the motion facilitated this distinction and prevented this issue from 
becoming a principle political bone of contention between advocates 
and antagonists of the concept of European federalisation. Interestingly, 
the Dutch parliament as a whole seemed to have been rather satisfied 
with the vague wording of the motion. The initiators were not asked to 
be more specific on their political objective. This may be seen as a clear 
indication of the level of generality that was still accepted by the various 
Dutch political parties in the early instances of debating European 
unification in the political domain. 
In the government, the motion was received with similar 
reservations. The Minister of Internal Affairs, Pim van Boetzelaer van 
Oosterhout (kvp) pointed out that the widely worded instruction for 
government to assist in the realisation of European unity with a federal 
character and based on functional associations, should be limited 
by the insertion of the clause ‘as far as possible and desirable.’84 This 
amendment shows that also on the level of the cabinet it was deemed 
important to keep the political options of the Netherlands open. The 
amendment indicates that the government, like various parliamentary 
parties, welcomed the idea of bringing about functional federal 
associations on a European level that would benefit the interests of 
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the Netherlands. In line with the moderate currents in parliament, it 
refused to commit itself to the bringing about of a European federation 
right away. 
Without any further discussion, the amendment of Van Boetzelaer 
was accepted by the presenters of the motion.85 Subsequently, the 
liberal rightwing party in parliament – the vvd – as well as the 
protestant chu, the anti-revolutionary protestant arp, the Catholic 
kvp and the socialist PvdA, expressed their support for the draft. 
Then, when on 28 April 1948 the Van der Goes van Naters/Serrarens 
motion was put to the vote, an overwhelming majority of 80 to 6 
voted in favour the motion. This vote, in essence, resulted from the 
basic and age-old consensus in broad political circles that international 
partnerships were essential for safeguarding the vital economic and 
security interests of the Netherlands. The idea that the Netherlands 
should take part in functional supranational alliances – and should even 
assume a leading role in it – perfectly befitted Dutch political culture 
in which pro-active internationalism was linked to the continued 
existence of the independent state of the Netherlands. Since the motion 
did not demand a fundamental political choice between ‘functional 
associations’ that would serve the sovereign interests of the Netherland 
and a general ‘federal association’ in which the Netherlands could no 
longer hold on to its sovereignty, it raised no fundamental criticism. 
The general obscurity in the early post war years of what the theoretical 
concept of European unification would exactly imply, and the lack of 
alternatives seen, might have contributed to the broad political support 
it received. Since the process of rebuilding post-war Europe had just 
started and the future of the Netherlands and the continent looked 
uncertain, any scenario contributing to the objective of reconstruction 
was attractive. 
On the same day as the Van der Goes van Naters/Serrarens 
motion was adopted in the Lower House, the Treaty of Brussels on 
the bringing about of the weu came up for vote. It was approved with 
an even greater majority of 82 to 6 in favour. On this issue as well, the 
conviction that the Netherlands needed international partnerships 
– a conviction that seemed to exist rather independent of political 
colour – was decisive. The few votes against in both the vote on the 
motion and the treaty, came from members of the Communistische 
Partij van Nederland (cpn), the Dutch Communist Party, which had 
been founded in 1935. In their view, all initiatives to reach unification 
or even cooperation in Western-Europe should be rejected since they 
were interpreted as a form of capitalist conspiracy; i.e. as an evil reaction 
of capitalist states against the actions of the Soviet Communists, with 
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whom the Dutch cpn associated itself. Approving the establishment of 
the weu, and/or any initiative contributing to the objective of unifying 
Europe, were judged as giving up the country’s sovereignty to ‘a small 
group of people, dollar imperialists and their henchmen.’86 In doing 
this, the cpn was the only group in parliament that did not associate 
European unification with more freedom for the Netherlands, but with 
less. The gap between the mindset of the political majority in which the 
concept of European association was linked to the Netherlands being 
able to safeguard its sovereign interests and the CPN-mindset in which 
such an association was seen as an undesired extradition of Dutch 
sovereignty to international capitalist powers, was too wide for the cpn 
to convince its political opponents. 
Following the decision of the Lower House, on 24 June the Dutch 
Upper House approved the Treaty of Brussels with 25 to 4 votes, 
thereby paving the way for the realisation of the weu. Again, the 
Communists voted against. Although this occurrence was politically 
significant in itself, the real political revolution had taken place in 
relative silence with the adoption of the Van der Goes van Naters/
Serrarens motion on 28 April 1948. This seemingly innocent deal – on 
the face of it, it was of secondary importance compared to the approval 
of an international treaty – would have far-reaching consequences. In 
the years following its approval, the motion would prove to function, 
both politically and rhetorically, as the foundation of what would 
become the Dutch policy on Europe. The political commitment of the 
Dutch parliament and government to vague principles of European 
integration in a time that such integration was not yet practiced 
would soon be explained by advocates of further integration as an 
undivided promise to support the coming into being of supranational 
European institutions such as the European Coal and Steel Community, 
the European Defence Community and the European Economic 
Community to which the Netherlands was considered to ‘transfer’ 
parts of its sovereignty. The policy line, launched with the adoption 
of the Van der Goes van Naters/Serrarens motion would even form a 
political basis for approving a revolutionary amendment of the Dutch 
constitution in 1953. 
1.4  The First Feat: Approving the ecsc (1952) 
Although the resolutions signed by the Congress of Europe had 
been a promising political symbol, the process of realising European 
unification did not have a flying start. Admittedly, in London on 5 May 
1949, the statute that provided for the foundation of the Council of 
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Europe was signed. It was intended to ‘bring closer unity between all 
like-minded countries of Europe.’87 The eleven states that supported 
the initiative were Belgium, Denmark, France, the Irish Republic, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland. They were driven by the shared conviction that ‘the 
pursuit of peace based upon justice and international cooperation is 
vital for the preservation of human society and civilization.’88 The main 
organs of the Council were a Committee of Ministers and a Consultative 
Assembly. As its residence, Strasbourg was chosen. 
After its establishment, the international deliberations within the 
framework of the Council of Europe resulted in a series of international 
conventions, such as the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950), the European Cultural 
Convention (1954) and the European Social Charter (1961). But despite 
these results, it was realised in the participating states soon after its 
establishment that the Council would not have much effect in terms 
of truly integrating the countries of Western Europe, since no national 
sovereignty was conferred on the international level and, for that 
reason, the implementation of the agreements could not be enforced. 
The Council turned out to be no more than another international 
organisation, based on intergovernmental agreements, just like the 
recently established United Nations (1945) and nato (April 1949). 
Notwithstanding the positive effect that these organisations had on 
creating international partnerships, they could not live up to any of 
the supranational or federal ambitions and expectations raised in the 
previous years as a testimony of lofty principles of deep solidarity 
between the states of Western-Europe. Other organisations, such as 
the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (oeec, 1948), 
which tried to set off a process of economic integration, encountered 
insurmountable political dissension between France, Germany and the 
United Kingdom. So, the search for new initiatives kept going. 
In the spring of 1950, two years after the ratification of the Treaty 
of Brussels and only a month before the Cold War conflict in Korea 
broke out, the tide seemed to turn. On 9 May 1950 the French Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Robert Schuman, inspired by an idea of the French 
economist Jean Monnet, presented a concept plan for integrating the 
coal- and steel industries of the various Western-European countries 
under a so called ‘High Authority’ on which the participating countries 
would confer their sovereignty in these sectors.89 The main objective of 
the plan was ‘the elimination of the age-old opposition between France 
and Germany.’90 The sectoral integration in coal and steel production, 
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Schuman predicted, would be a first step from which further integration 
could result. 
The Netherlands and the Schuman Plan 
Even before the plan was officially published, Konrad Adenauer – the 
first Bundeskanzler of the Federal Republic of Germany – assented 
to the plan. With this German approval, a crucial condition for its 
viability was met. Also in the Netherlands the plan was welcomed with 
enthusiasm. In one of the first reactions to the press, the Minister of 
Economic Affairs Jan van den Brink (PvdA), stated that the Schuman 
Plan was a ‘welcome surprise’.91 Entering into sectoral integration of the 
coal and steel industries in order to reach further economic integration 
was considered to be a ‘very realistic path to go’.92 
The initial enthusiasm in the Netherlands for the Schuman 
Plan was damped, however, by the position of the United Kingdom. 
Regarding their country still as a world power, the British did not 
deem it a sensible idea to get involved too strongly in the unification 
initiatives of Western-Europe. Since the country refused to accept 
the principle of transference of sovereignty to the supranational 
governing organ of the ecsc, the High Authority – a strict demand of 
the French – it was clear from the start that the uk would withdraw 
from the negotiations and, by doing that, for the time being also from 
the process of European unification.93 Considering the traditional 
orientation of the Netherlands towards the United Kingdom for its 
foreign policy, this development complicated matters. Stepping into a 
community on which sovereignty would be conferred, together with 
the former arch-enemies France and Germany – both being big political 
powers – raised hesitation within the first Catholic-Socialist cabinet, 
which, led by Willem Drees, had succeeded the Beel cabinet in August 
1948.94 The government welcomed the idea of sectoral integration, 
provided that it was a solution for the German question and of benefit 
for the economic position Netherlands. It, however, preferred to see 
these interests safeguarded within the context of the oeec in which the 
United Kingdom took part. 95 In a European coal and steel community 
in which the uk would not take part, the Netherlands feared a High 
Authority in which France and Germany would run the show and the 
Dutch economic preferences would be thwarted.96 
The ambiguous stance of the Dutch government was reflected 
in the Dutch negotiation strategy. Whereas the Netherlands actively 
engaged in the negotiations in order to make an international agreement 
possible, the national demands were never abandoned. This assertive 
attitude of the Dutch delegation towards the negotiations on the 
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Treaty resulted in the compliance of the other countries with some 
crucial Dutch demands.97 In the Treaty, the supranational element was 
smaller than the drafters of the Schuman Declaration had envisioned. 
The Dutch succeeded in restricting the domain of the High Authority, 
while extending it in favour of the intergovernmental governing 
organ of the coal and steel community – the Council of Ministers.98 It 
illustrates the instrumental focus on national interests that motivated 
the Dutch government – rather than supranational idealism – in the 
process of reaching agreement on the ecsc framework. Eventually, the 
government of the Netherlands agreed to become partner to the treaty. 
On 18 April 1951 then, the treaty establishing a European Coal and Steel 
Community (ecsc) was signed in Paris, by – what would be called 
later – the six Founding Fathers of the new Europe. The Netherlands 
was one of them.99 
Position of the government
In the presentation of the treaty to the Dutch parliament, it stands 
out that the second Catholic-Socialist cabinet (1951-1952) led by prime 
minister Willem Drees (PvdA), which had succeeded the Drees i 
government in March 1951, elaborated extensively on the historical 
background of the treaty.100 It enlarged on the lamentable situation in 
Western-Europe in the early post-war years and the challenge that its 
countries were confronted with of finding a way to durably safeguard 
peace and security. It pointed at the rise of the concept of European 
integration as a way to meet this challenge and the initiative of the ecsc 
should be seen as a first important result that might bring realisation of 
this concept closer. The treaty was at the very least read as an essential 
step in bringing the arch-enemies of Germany and France closer. 101 
The rationale of the Netherlands becoming a party to the 
treaty was placed in this historical context. Strikingly similar to the 
presentation of the weu, the government again pointed out the special 
position of the Netherlands as a reason to go along with the treaty. 
‘Especially for our country, the government claimed, ‘political and 
economic integration of Europe offers, irrespective of disadvantages 
which can be identified, a very attractive perspective […] the purport 
of which far exceeds the disadvantages meant.’102 Although the Dutch 
government was not fully convinced of the future well-functioning of 
the High Authority and feared that despite the preventive measures, 
protectionism might still creep into the ‘common’ market that the Six 
would establish for coal and steel, it was willing to take a chance. The 
economic and security gains that might follow from the treaty for the 
Netherlands were considered greater than any possible downsides.103 
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In other words, the risk that might follow from not taking part in the 
initiative – the possibility of isolation on the continent – was considered 
greater than the hazards resulting from joining. 
By choosing this line of argument, the government positioned 
itself on solid grounds. Presenting the establishment of the ecsc 
as a functional and necessary step on the way to peace and security 
in Western-Europe concurred with the Van der Goes van Naters/
Serrarens motion, which had been adopted by a great parliamentary 
majority two years before. Since then, not much had changed in the 
political composition of parliament and government. The second 
Drees cabinet was a continuation of the first, with support of the same 
parliamentary parties. As long as the functional line as set out by its 
forerunner was followed, parliamentary support for the Drees ii cabinet 
with regard to the approval of the ecsc was likely. Since public opinion 
– as far as such had already developed on the theme of European 
unification – was also still dominated by the protagonists of the ideal of 
European (federal) unity, the government could face parliament with 
confidence.104
Debate in parliament 
In the parliamentary debate on the approval of the ecsc Treaty that 
took place in the autumn of 1951, first of all the effort of the Dutch 
delegation to the negotiations was eulogized. In the written preparation 
of the parliamentary debate it was remarked that: ‘By the way in which 
this delegation has acquitted itself of its task, it has been proved again 
how a small country can contribute significantly to the building of the 
international community. The number of sceptics in our nation, who 
sometimes have their doubts about the Dutch task and potential in 
this field, have been put in the wrong.’105 The majority in the Lower 
House was relieved to see that, after the great humiliation of the Second 
World War in which the Netherlands had become the plaything of 
the occupier, the Netherlands could still join in with some of the great 
powers of Europe. It explicitly applauded the pro-active participation 
of the Dutch government in the process and encouraged a leading and 
stimulating role of the Netherlands. ‘From various quarters it was […] 
remarked,’ thus the parliamentary report on the treaty reads, ‘that it 
would be a very bad example for the European cooperation indeed, if 
the Netherlands were to sit on the fence.’106 
The comment reveals that the ‘taking the lead’ line of reasoning, 
already introduced with the Van der Goes Naters/Serarrens motion, 
was continued after 1948. The success of bringing the European states 
together was linked to a pro-active stance of the Netherlands. Important 
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to note as well is, that in this fragment the parliamentary groups 
supporting it did not distinguish between international community 
building or European cooperation – the terms used in the quote – and 
newer concepts of European unification or integration. The fact that the 
ecsc was described as ‘European cooperation’ might indicate that in 
(certain sections of ) the Dutch Lower House the initiative was not (yet) 
perceived as essentially different from earlier forms of international 
or European cooperation based on international treaty law.107 This 
observation befits the majority focus on joining in and seeking 
partnerships with the countries surrounding the Netherlands. Both 
seem to start from the old foreign policy mindset of the Netherlands 
in which seeking and finding international cooperation was deemed 
essential.
In the plenary debate in parliament, various political parties – the 
kvp, PvdA and chu most clearly – immediately expressed their support 
for the treaty. These parties were convinced that the ecsc Treaty was 
a first step on the way towards a unified Europe and that such a unified 
Europe was absolutely necessary for reasons of self-preservation. 
Marga Klompé, a kvp representative in the Lower House, who in 1956 
would become the first female minister of the Netherlands, stated 
that ‘Europe must become one entity if it wants to keep some sort 
of “independence” and also be able to assure its citizens of a decent 
existence. […].’108 Jan Schmal, mp for the chu, reasoned: ‘Unity or 
downfall, that is the choice we are confronted with.’109 Whereas the 
comment of Klompé concerned the European-level, that of Schmal 
touched the national dimension: ‘What is at stake today is […] a matter 
of a purely existential nature: the future of our country and our people, 
of us and our children, nothing less than that is involved.’110 Although it 
was recognised that it was not at all clear yet where the ecsc would lead 
to and if and how exactly it would benefit the Netherlands – the plan 
was marked as a ‘leap into the dark’ – the alternative of the not coming 
about of (forms of ) sectoral economic integration was seen as even 
more frightening.111 These MPs, although not sure of the consequences, 
were willing to take the risk of joining the ecsc, because they were 
strongly convinced that not joining in such partnership would leave 
both the continent and their country beyond redemption. Again we 
are dealing here with an argument of necessity based on economic and 
security considerations; the argumentative form that had also decided 
the debate in 1948 in favour of the adoption of the motion Van der Goes 
van Naters/Serrarens. Again, it linked up with that age-old consensus: 
the Netherland would not be able to safeguard its wealth and safety 
on its own. On this point, a broad spectrum of political parties could 
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agree and, therefore, there was not much debate on the desirability of 
approval of the ecsc treaty. 
Remarkably, something resembling an argument in favour 
of the European integration process per se only came up when the 
consequence of approving the ecsc were discussed. Was the coal and 
steel community essentially to be seen as a first step leading to European 
federal unity or should it just be considered as another product of 
instrumental internationalism, not to be directly linked to a larger 
supranational ideal? Except for the kvp, which argued emphatically in 
favour of the development of a full-dress European federation,112 some 
of the other parties in parliament were clearly driven by instrumental 
internationalist motives when approving the ecsc initiative. The chu 
and arp openly pleaded for preservation of the national identity and 
sovereignty. The ARP-politician Sieuwert Bruins Slot, for instance, 
stated: ‘Only that which [the national] independence can no longer 
bear […] should be considered for federalisation.’113 Bruins Slot clearly 
did not support the idea of supranationalisation and/or European 
federalisation in general, but was willing to give his vote to European 
federal initiatives as far as the Netherlands needed them for its own 
post-war development. 
It is noteworthy that Bruins Slot, by making his remark, did not 
define the concept of the federalisation of Western-Europe as an all-
or-nothing issue, but as something that could be started and stopped 
along the way, in an instrumental manner, in line with the interests 
of the Netherlands. This definition – at least in theory – clashed with 
an understanding of the concept of European federalisation – held by 
the convinced federalists of the kvp – as something that might start 
with the ecsc, but needed to develop towards a full-dress European 
federation, in which national sovereignty would be left behind. It is 
relevant to establish here that the discrepancy between these diverging 
understandings of what European federalisation was and should be 
and how the initiative of the ecsc was to be seen in this context, was 
never fundamentally debated nor problematised in the parliamentary 
debate on the approval of this treaty. Instead, the political parties in the 
Netherlands agreed to use the designation ‘sui generis’ for the political 
mix-form that was about to emerge from sovereign national states that 
federally arranged their coal and steel industries.114 By doing this, these 
parties – with very diverse political views – served the development 
of a political consensus on the desirability of approval of the ecsc. 
However, something fundamental was also overlooked. By inventing 
a new term that blurred the incompatibilities between the conflicting 
views held in the Dutch parliament on European unification, the 
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political parties of the Netherlands agreed to develop new forms of 
international partnerships without having reached agreement on what 
those partnerships should lead to, let alone what the consequences for 
the Netherlands would be. Thus, a seed of discord was sown, which 
would be there to grow until someone would reap its fruit. 
In contrast with the arp which, despite its fundamental 
objections against the process of European federalisation decided 
to approve certain federally arranged initiatives that benefitted the 
Netherlands, the Communists of the cpn drew a more radical line. This 
party rejected the ecsc because it was against any step that amounted 
to a European federation. Being the only political party taking such 
a radical stance, it had a hard time finding political support. In the 
parliamentary debate on the approval of the ecsc, the cpn tried its luck 
by claiming incompatibility between the Dutch constitution and the 
treaty under discussion. It was the first, but certainly not the last time 
that the national constitutional order was brought up in parliament as a 
possible brake on the process of European integration. 
The constitutional argument of the cpn representatives focused 
on the competence of the Dutch national judge to decide on the 
validity of decisions of the administrative organs of the ecsc – i.e. 
the High Authority and the Council of Ministers. Articles 33-44 of 
the ecsc Treaty were interpreted by the cpn denying the national 
judge this competence. That is why they interpreted the treaty to 
systematically putting aside the national judge; an arrangement that 
was not compatible with article 162 and 163 of the Dutch constitution.115 
Respectively, these articles stated that ‘the judiciary is only held by 
judges, appointed by law […]’ and ‘nobody can be denied the judge 
assigned to him, against his will.’ Basically, this was a complaint against 
the conferral of legal sovereignty by the state of the Netherlands on a 
supranational organ. The question raised by the cpn could be justified 
at least to the extent that, by the installation of a supranational organ the 
decision making power of which went beyond the national judge, was a 
new situation that might well raise constitutional questions.
From defence towards consensus
Already soon, however, it became clear that the cpn stood alone on 
this point. In the written preparations to the plenary debate, a majority 
of parliament had expressed to second the statement that ‘the present 
treaty can in no way be considered contrary to our constitution.’116 
In the plenary debate, it reconfirmed this stance. Supported by the 
parties that had no intention to let their European dream be impeded 
by the Dutch constitution, the Minister of Economic Affairs, Jan van 
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den Brink (kvp), came off well with the argument that according to 
the government the articles of the Dutch constitution, referred to by 
the Communists, were not intended to prohibit ‘the installation, for 
very long-lasting periods of time, of a regular, but specialised judge 
for a special task, certainly not when this installation can be judged 
to have been in complete peace […] [this has been] no subject of 
passionate debate.’117 So by reasoning that the Dutch constitution did 
not explicitly forbid the new situation and no one else had raised the 
matter, any fundamental debate on constitutional obstructions for 
the establishment of the ecsc were averted in 1951. It illustrates that a 
majority of the Dutch political community valued the coming about 
of the coal and steel community to such an extent that it was willing to 
push the question of constitutionality to the background. 
On 31 October 1951, the treaty was adopted in the Lower House 
with 62 votes against 6. All votes against came from cpn members. 
Approval in the Upper House followed on 19 February 1952 with 36 
votes in favour and 2 (cpn) votes against. In the summer of 1952, a 
start was made with the setting up of the ecsc and its administrative 
institutions. 
1.5  The Floodgate Flung Wide Open: 
Constitutional Reform (1953)
Meanwhile, the European reality had already moved forward again. 
Now that establishment of the ecsc was a fact, voices arose that argued 
in favour of starting more initiatives for sectoral integration for the Six 
to overcome various other post-war challenges and gain power. In the 
early 1950s, establishing a European Political and Defence community, 
were proposed. These institutions should enable the member-states to 
gain political power and to take a hard line when necessary. 
While the Netherlands was confronted with the various plans for 
European integration and took part in international negotiations on 
their realisation, fundamental questions on the organisation of the state 
arose. The concept of the conferment of sovereignty on supranational 
executive organs was new. Especially in the areas of political and 
military decision making – traditionally symbolising sovereign 
power and independence of the nation-state – the implementation 
of this principle required a new approach to the traditional concept 
of state-sovereignty. The realisation of the new initiatives for 
European unification then asked for a fundamental debate on how 
supranationalisation was to be brought into agreement with the 
political and legal principles that had been at the basis of the functioning 
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of the Dutch state for centuries. The perfect occasion for such a debate 
arose when in the early 1950s the Dutch government opened a reform 
procedure of the constitution of the Netherlands. 
This process of constitutional reform had more to do with a long 
drawn-out national political conflict on the influence of parliament 
in international treaty making than with the start of the process of 
European unification. After the Napoleonic rule had ended and a 
monarch was installed as head of the Dutch state, the constitutional 
power in international treaty making was left to the sovereign king. 
This arrangement had its origin in a troubled past. The era of the 
Dutch Republic was considered to have shown that the system of 
treaty making in which the contracting power was allocated to the 
States-General, led to immense indolence in international politics.118 
Therefore, when in 1814 the Netherlands was to make a fresh 
constitutional start, it was decided to reduce the role of parliament in 
such matters.119 The new constitutional arrangement concerning treaty 
making only bound the King by the obligation to inform Parliament of 
the treaties he had signed. 
In the century that followed, the States-General objected against 
this arrangement because it deprived both Houses of the possibility 
to exert influence in running international political developments. 
When in parliamentary practice the King’s foreign policy privilege 
was transferred to the government, parliament attempted, by way 
of several constitutional amendments, to gain power in this field.120 
However, without much success. When after the Second World War 
international cooperation expanded and the number of treaties signed 
per year increased threefold, the Dutch parliament insisted – again – by 
means of a process of constitutional reform on greater involvement in 
treaty making procedures.121 The government, led by Willem Drees 
(PvdA), agreed, but without losing sight of its own interest. With ideas 
for European integration taking shape, the coming into existence of ever 
more and far reaching international agreements was to be expected. 
This prospect only increased the interest of the Dutch government in 
keeping its hands free in processes of international treaty making.
Two Constitutional Committees and their recommendations
In order to prepare the constitutional reform, two committees were 
set up to advise the Dutch government. First of all, on 17 April 1950, 
a Constitutional Committee, led by the Roman Catholic politician 
and lawyer Josef van Schaik was set up by Royal Decree. Its task was 
broadly defined as to examine the possibilities for a general revision of 
the constitution, of which the arrangements on foreign affairs was only 
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an element.122 In addition, on the insistence of the Dutch parliament 
that wanted to safeguard its interest, a special Committee was set up 
to investigate the relation between the government and parliament 
concerning foreign affairs.123 It began its work on 25 April 1950 and 
was chaired by Grotius admirer, emeritus Professor of Constitutional 
Law and former judge of the Permanent Court of International Justice 
Willem van Eysinga. Interpreting their respective assignments, both 
Committees were asked to balance democracy – i.e. the parliamentary 
right to control – against the governmental freedom to act in foreign 
affairs as it saw fit. 
Both Committees consisted of professors, policy advisors, 
statesmen and members of parliament who had displayed a special 
interest in matters of international politics or were schooled in legal 
matters. With regard to gearing the activities of both Committees to 
one another, it was agreed that the Van Eysinga Committee would 
advise the Van Schaik Committee on reform of the constitutional 
provisions concerning foreign relations.124 This implied that the latter 
Committee – at least in terms of chronology – had the final say and/or 
could serve as double-check on the Van Eysinga Committee. Obviously, 
in any case, the setting up of two Committees, producing two separate 
reports, came with an important advantage for the Dutch government: 
the recommendations that appealed to the government most could be 
selected for proposal in parliament.
After more than one year of study, the final report of the Van 
Eysinga Committee was presented on 9 July 1951. In the first part of the 
report, Van Eysinga cum suis expounded on how the Committee had 
perceived its task. A balance between two important principles had to 
be found. ‘To preserve the essence of parliamentary democracy’ was 
identified as one,125 the other was the foreign affairs interests of the 
Netherlands. According to the Committee, the practice of developing 
foreign policy through joint efforts of the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
and his diplomats, hidden from parliamentary interference, should be 
adjusted. This so-called ‘secret diplomacy’, associated with the political 
customs of the pre-1914 era, could not be upheld in the post-1945 world, 
with its growing international contacts, touching increasingly on fields 
of economic and defence policy, which had until then been considered 
as domestic affairs.126 Particularly when this process was not subjected 
to democratic control in the nation state, so the Committee realised, 
it would easily lead to an unnoticed erosion of national sovereignty.127 
Since this would negatively affect the democratic legitimacy of the 
development, democratic control on the treaty-making process was 
regarded essential. 
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The Van Eysinga Committee, however, was also of the opinion 
that foreign affairs was still considered to need and deserve a special 
status within the Dutch national democratic order.128 Especially with 
growing international contacts, it expected that ever more frequently 
at international conferences the Dutch government would find itself in 
the position to decide hic et nunc on international matters touching on 
the national interest. Governmental representatives would not have the 
time to consider such decisions long and calmly in the governmental 
haven.129 This view concurred with the Dutch constitutional tradition 
as it had developed since 1814, in which the government held the 
prerogative of being able to act on the international stage with vigour 
and without parliamentary consultations. 
The draft amendments proposed by Van Eysinga cum suis reflected 
the balancing between the two principles. Parliamentary consultation 
after the signing of a treaty was extended. The Committee proposed 
to insert a new Article 60 in the Dutch constitution that stated that all 
treaties should be approved by parliament before they would enter into 
force. With this provision the democratic legitimacy of international 
treaties would be better safeguarded, compared to the situation under 
the constitution in force. In that document it was laid down that only 
solemn [in Dutch: plechtige] treaties would be presented to parliament 
for approval. Since most international agreements that were signed 
by the Dutch government did not meet the formal requirement of a 
solemn treaty, following the old arrangements, they did not need to 
be approved by parliament.130 This confusing and from a democratic 
perspective somewhat arbitrary practice, would belong to the past as far 
as the Van Eysinga Committee was concerned. 
To warrant the independent position of the Minister and his Corps 
Diplomatique, on the other hand, several reservations and exceptions 
to the general rule of parliamentary approval were advised. First of 
all, the Committee explained that, just like in earlier versions of the 
constitution, the responsibility of drafting international treaties should 
remain with the government. Although it was advised to inform 
parliament on important international agreements before government 
would decide on the final text, the Minister of Foreign Affairs remained 
the designated person to assess on a case by case basis to what extent 
‘the national interest allow[ed] dealing with the questions publicly.’131 
This implied that, in the proposal of the Van Eysinga Committee, 
no constitutional power concerning the draft of international 
agreements was granted to the Dutch parliament. Similar to the existing 
constitutional arrangements, government preserved the prerogative to 
assess what was or was not in the interest of the country.
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Subsequently, as listed in the Van Eysinga draft of Article 
60, subsection four, several situations were described in which no 
parliamentary approval, both in the pre- and post-signing phase, was 
needed. These exceptions covered ‘extraordinary cases of a pressing 
character’ that, among other things, needed the continuation of existing 
treaties or concluding short-term treaties without the consequence 
of important monetary obligations.132 Again an important role was 
reserved for the government in identifying such cases with a pressing 
character. Moreover, the procedure of tacit consent was introduced. The 
van Eysinga Committee came up with the formulation that approval of 
parliament was considered to be granted ‘if not within thirty days after 
submitting the treaty, one of the Chambers of the States-General has 
expressed the desire that the treaty be submitted to a decision of the 
States-General.’133 Implementing this procedure as laid down in draft 
Article 60, subsection three, would save time in the treaty-making 
process. This was a favourable condition for the freedom of action of 
government in international politics.
The exceptions listed create the impression that although 
democratisation, and more specifically, participation of parliament 
in the treaty-making process, had been the incentive behind the 
constitutional reform, this goal faded somewhat into the background 
during the process of constitutional reform. A considerable share of 
the changes was aimed at constitutionally warranting the independent 
role of the government and its diplomats. In addition, the Committee 
made recommendations to adjust the Dutch constitution to the post-
war development of increasing international cooperation. It suggested 
to amplify the old article 58 with the principle that the King – i.e. the 
government – fostered the development of the international legal 
order.134 The Committee explained the suggestion as a reflection of 
the thought that the safeguarding of peace needed legal agreements 
between states; a formulation that is clearly reminding of the 
century-old Grotius tradition of the Netherlands. Article 60(a) then, 
provided for the possibility to delegate, under a treaty, competences to 
international organisations. Moreover, and this was crucial, this article 
stated that in case of contradiction with regulations applying in the 
Dutch Kingdom, the binding decisions of such organisation would be 
given priority. In these suggestions, Van Eysinga’s academic beliefs 
were clearly present. They also perfectly matched the topical question 
of the time of how conferment of national sovereignty on supranational 
organisations should be constitutionally reflected. 
When on 11 July 1951 – two days after the Van Eysinga Committee 
had done this – the Van Schaik Committee presented its interim report, 
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it became clear that the line of reform as suggested by Van Eysinga c.s. 
was, in many respects, generally supported.135 Similar to the document 
produced by the Van Eysinga Committee, facilitating international 
treaty-making was more extensively considered than balancing powers 
between government and parliament in the most democratic manner.136 
Some editorial changes were suggested.137 More meaningful are the 
changes recommended by the Van Schaik Committee that concerned 
the content of provisions in the Van Eysinga-draft. Particularly 
interesting are the considerations of Van Schaik c.s. on the suggestion 
of Van Eysinga to introduce a provision arranging that agreements by 
which ‘supranational organs’ would be called into existence, should 
be approved in parliament by two-thirds of the recorded votes. 
This suggestion was dropped by Van Schaik for the reason that its 
introduction would impose too great a constitutional restriction in 
the field of international relations.138 A similar comment was made 
in relation to the initial Van Eysinga draft of Article 58. Although the 
Committee Van Schaik supported the idea of a provision that stated that 
the King should foster the development of the international legal order, 
the original extension ‘as far as possible’ was rejected.139 According to 
the Van Schaik Committee this extension could convey the impression 
that the Netherlands was not wholeheartedly prepared to develop such 
a legal order but would instead hold aloof. And becoming the object of 
such misunderstandings was considered completely undesirable.140 
This comment on preventing misunderstandings concerning the 
priorities and loyalties of the Netherlands reveals what was considered 
to be important in the approach of the Van Schaik Committee. The 
reputation of the Netherlands as the protagonist of the international 
legal order was seen as something to be upheld as a matter of principle. 
Indicating possible limits to this international preference in the text 
of the Dutch constitution was – by definition – judged undesirable. 
Interestingly, the Van Schaik Committee did not consider any desirable 
effects of recording a limitative clause in Article 58. It seems not to have 
reckoned with a situation in which the international legal community 
had been developed to such an extent that a constitutional limit to this 
development would be useful. A situation in which the Netherlands 
would no longer be willing or be able to contribute to the development 
of the international legal community was not discussed. Whether this 
void in reasoning was consciously created – in order to let sleeping dogs 
lie with regard to the early steps towards European unification of which 
the nature and consequences were still unknown – or whether it was 
just not seen as a relevant matter for discussion is difficult to establish. 
But it is clear that constitutionally emphasising the internationalist 
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foreign policy preferences of the Netherlands was given priority over 
any negative side effect that such an explicit international accent might 
have in the long run. In this respect, the Van Schaik Committee went 
further than the Van Eysinga Committee.
In order to bring the goal of an international legal order within 
reach, the Van Schaik Committee proposed to record an article 
that stated explicitly that national powers could be handed over to 
supranational organs. The reason for adding this article must be 
sought in political considerations. Although it was emphasised in 
the interim report that technically speaking the recording of such 
an article was not needed since the ‘old’ Dutch constitution did not 
oppose such a transfer of authority, recording this provision was 
considered desirable. It had become clear, the Committee stated, 
without indicating when and how, that ‘entrusting supranational 
organs with powers is not without reservations generally considered 
as reconcilable with the Constitution.’141 When in the future more and 
further-reaching competences would be granted to such supranational 
organs, the Van Schaik Committee argued in anticipation, questions 
on the constitutionality of that development could be expected.142 
To prevent difficulties of this kind, recording an article of the purport 
described above was advised. Moreover, there was reasoning starting 
from constitutional symbolism. The proposed article would ‘give the 
necessary relief to a legal form of which may be assumed that – given 
the increase in working towards international bonds and integration – it 
will be frequently adopted in times to come.’143 The proposal strongly 
resembled draft Article 60(a) of the Van Eysinga Committee. The only 
significant difference was that, whereas Van Eysinga had used the 
term ‘international organisation’, Van Schaik spoke of ‘supranational 
organisation’; an indication that Van Schaik c.s. more explicitly 
anticipated future developments in the field of European unification.
In the considerations of the Van Schaik Committee a new 
international legal order and the goal of contributing to it were 
presented as a matter of course. The principle of conferring power on 
a supranational level of decision making was presented as a logical 
step resulting from the notion that an international legal order was 
developing, of which the Netherlands would be a part. Support for 
this process by making the constitution ready for this was presented 
as no more than rational. The ostensible logic applied by Van Schaik 
c.s. can, however, be questioned. To what extent – in terms of political 
reality – had an international legal order de facto taken shape in July 
1951? Despite the recent establishment of the un, nato, the Council 
of Europe and deliberations in the national parliaments on a European 
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Coal and Steel Community, it was still not at all clear what such an 
international order would look like. A pending question was to what 
extent Member States would have to give up national power and 
– following from this question – to what extent adjustment of the 
national legal arrangements was desirable. To put it differently, in the 
summer of 1951 it was still uncertain whether an international legal 
order – that is to say a legal order in which nation states would no longer 
set their own rules but were subordinated to inter- and or supranational 
institutions, invested with competences that these states had conferred 
on them – would become a factual reality. The advice of the Van Schaik 
Committee does not reflect this political uncertainty. The development 
of the international legal order was presented as a clear thing, achievable 
by clear means. 
Arranging future matters in international politics through 
supranational organisations was also presented as a matter of course. 
The lack of discussion on this point in both Committees is remarkable, 
just as the fact that without any further discussion in both the Van 
Eysinga and the Van Schaik report, the bottom-up term ‘functional 
associations’ as it had appeared in the Van der Goes van Naters/
Serrarens motion in the spring of 1948, had disappeared in favour of the 
top down concept of ‘supranational organs’. Apparently, the functional 
aspect of handing over competences, was not deemed a necessary 
condition by these Committees. Perhaps, the conceptual difference 
between the two was not even noticed. Interestingly, the supranational 
concept was not further explained in the report. Similarities and 
differences between conferring competences and sovereignty on 
supranational organisations and ‘ordinary’ international cooperation 
through treaty law, in which the signatory party remained essentially 
sovereign – a thing that the Netherlands had practiced for ages – were, 
surprisingly, not discussed. Nor was it clarified why such a shift in 
practicing international politics was needed, to what level national 
competences should or should not be delegated to the supranational 
level and why this had to be constitutionally anticipated upon. The Van 
Schaik Committee seemed to perceive it as an inevitability that ‘in the 
future further-reaching competences will be assigned to supranational 
organs.’144 This firm wording, which left no room for dwelling on 
uncertainties as to the extent of supranationalisation, almost gave the 
constitutional reform as proposed by Van Schaik c.s. the character of a 
declaration of intent, making clear that the Netherlands was preparing 
for a supranational future, regardless of what this would look like 
exactly. The constitution was deployed to reach this political goal. 
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The position of the government
Of the two committee proposals, the version drafted by Van Schaik 
and his committee members benefitted the independence of the 
government in international affairs most clearly and, moreover, 
facilitated the coming into existence of a new international legal 
order. Generally speaking, it can be observed that the Drees cabinet 
favoured the design and wording of this report. On 1 December 1951, the 
government presented its draft reform of the constitutional chapter on 
foreign affairs to parliament. In the explanatory memorandum of the 
Bill of approval, it observed: 
‘ Neither the Government nor the States-General [the Dutch 
Lower and Upper House] would want to create a situation by 
which – in order to achieve more Parliamentary involvement – in 
the future the Netherlands would find itself in the international 
world more at a disadvantage in negotiations with fellow parties, 
because of time consuming and lengthy delays in decision making 
on the Dutch side […] On the basis of this consideration it will 
be of importance for the Government and the States-General 
to envelop with firm safeguards the principle of involvement of 
the States-General in the coming about of all [emphasis original] 
agreements, no matter in what form or by what name, so that 
quick and efficient Dutch action on the international stage is 
guaranteed.’145 
The fragment reveals the priorities of the Dutch government in this 
process of constitutional reform. Parliamentary participation was seen 
as valuable, but not at all costs. When it came to the crunch, freedom to 
act in foreign affairs – i.e. being able to act quickly and efficiently when 
a situation in international politics asked for it – needed to prevail over 
acting according to the common procedures of parliamentary control 
that were more time-consuming. 
Seen from a rhetorical point of view, the government created a 
rhetorical dissociation.146 Theoretically, in a parliamentary democracy 
upholding the separation of powers, parliamentary control was 
essential for the democratic functioning of the polity. The request of 
the government to parliament to give up this fundamental democratic 
right – at least to a certain extent – in case international treaty making 
was at stake, clashed with this view. Thus a conflict seemed to develop 
between paying lip service to the principle of democratic control, while 
denying its importance when international politics was concerned. 
The government cleverly resolved the threat of such a conflict by 
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dissociating processes in national and in international politics as 
essentially different. Procedures of international negotiation and 
democratic control, so it was stated, did not go together. This notion 
was sustained by the pragmatic argument that the interests of the 
Netherlands would be best served if the Dutch parliament were to 
yield its rights. Interestingly, the interests of the Netherlands and how 
these would be served exactly by yielding parliamentary control were 
not explicated. Still, the government daringly presented itself as their 
natural guardian. It was implied that parliament and parliamentary 
control were obstructive to serving the country in the field of 
international politics.
The constitutional amendments proposed by the government 
reflected the idea that parliament was subordinated to the government 
in treaty making. First of all, the prerogative of the government to 
sign international treaties without consultation of parliament was 
not meddled with. In addition, it was explicitly laid down in Article 
58 of the Dutch constitution that the King – in political practice the 
government – should foster the development of the international legal 
order: 
 (58): ‘The King is the supreme director of foreign relations. He 
promotes the development of the international legal order.’147
The proposal to record this article was a telling sign that the government 
desired to embrace the striving for international partnerships as a 
defining constitutional trait for the Netherlands.
At first sight, the proposed Article 60 that stated that all treaties 
should be approved by Parliament before they would enter into force, 
seemed a significant gesture towards the Dutch parliament: 
 (60): ‘Agreements with other Powers and with international 
organisations are concluded by or with authorization of the King 
and, as far as required by the agreement, ratified by the King.
 The agreements are submitted to the States-General as soon as 
possible; they are not ratified and do not enter into force until after 
having been approved by the States-General. […]’148
With the recording of this general principle an essential strengthening 
of the position of parliament in that process was guaranteed compared 
to the previous arrangements.149 However, one look at the subsections 
of article 60 changes that perspective. Subsections (a) and (b) of article 
60 respectively defined that under certain conditions the approval 
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of parliament could be given silently and that under certain other 
conditions approval was not at all needed:
 (60a): ‘Approval is supposed to have been granted, if not within 
thirty days after submitting the agreement the wish has been 
expressed by or on behalf of one of the Houses of the States-
General, that the agreement will be submitted to the judgment of 
the States-General, or if both Houses of the States-General before 
expiration of this term declare that no judgment is required.’150 
(60b): ‘The approval is not required:
a.  if an agreement is concerned, for which this has been laid down 
by law; 
b.  if the agreement exclusively concerns the implementation or 
extension of an agreement which has been approved, as far as 
the States-General on approval have made no reservations on 
this; 
c.  if the agreement does not impose important financial 
obligations on the Kingdom and has been concluded for one 
year at the most;
d.  if in exceptional cases of a pressing nature the interest of the 
Kingdom requires, that the agreement enters into force without 
delay.  
An agreement, as meant under d. is still subjected for approval 
of the States-General, if within thirty days after submission 
of the agreement by or on behalf of one of the Houses of the 
States-General the wish to that end is expressed. If the States-
General withhold their approval of the agreement, it will be 
discontinued as soon as possible.’151
Thus, the government made up for the essential freedoms it had seemed 
to yield.
The freedom of the government was further safeguarded – and 
in a more groundbreaking manner – when in addition to the earlier 
proposals, on 23 January 1952, the introduction of a new subsection 
(c) was proposed. The idea for the article was directly related to 
developments in the field of European integration. Plans for the 
development of a European Defence Community asked for far-reaching 
transference of power in an area previously considered the stronghold 
of national sovereignty. Hitherto, the Dutch constitutional provisions 
concerning defence had concentrated on the military protection of the 
national domain and on national conscription. With the government 
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the question arose how the creation of a European army would relate 
to the Dutch Constitution.152 When it referred this question to the 
Royal Committee Van Schaik, the latter advised the introduction of an 
additional article to prevent future difficulties.153 This article provided 
that: 
‘ In the interest of the development of the international legal order 
there can be a departure from provisions of the Constitution. In 
such a case approval of the agreement does not ensue but by a 
verdict of the States-General with two-thirds of the votes cast in 
each of the Chambers.’154 
Article 60, subsection (c) catches the eye for several reasons. It 
stands out in the first place because of the procedure it set out in case 
an international agreement deviated from the Dutch constitution. 
Then, the international agreement had to be endorsed by a two-
thirds majority in both the Lower and the Upper House. Whereas 
this might seem a special and heavy procedure, it was a light formula 
in comparison to the process of constitutional reform as prescribed 
by the Dutch constitution. Constitutional reform in the Netherlands 
had until then involved two readings, with elections in between and 
approval by two-thirds of the recorded votes in both Houses in the 
second reading.155 The newly proposed article 60, subsection (c) enabled 
the government to accept international treaties that violated the 
Dutch constitution without completing a procedure of constitutional 
reform. In doing this, the provision benefitted the development of 
an international legal order more than it advantaged the ability of 
parliament – let alone the Dutch people! – to control the government in 
far-reaching international decisions. 
In its letter to parliament in which the government accounted 
for the introduction of the article, practical considerations stand 
out again. The government stated that it ‘[is] aware of the fact that 
growing international cooperation may make it necessary in certain 
cases of international agreements to deviate […] from constitutional 
regulations. Delaying the bringing about of the agreements in 
question until an amendment to the Constitution has come about, 
is impermissible from a practical point of view.’ Here a fundamental 
notion was explicated. It was argued that traditional procedures of 
constitutional reform would take too much time and that, therefore, 
a simplified procedure to deviate from the constitution should be 
adopted. In stating this, the government testified of its conviction that, 
for practical reasons, procedures to warrant the democratic functioning 
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of the state of the Netherlands as recorded in constitutional procedures 
could and should (!) be brushed aside when international treaty-
making was at stake.156 The Netherlands was considered to gain to such 
an extent from international agreements, that sacrifices in the field 
of democratic procedures were admissible. What was not considered 
in the letter of the government was the fact that, by withdrawing 
controlling power when an international agreement touched upon the 
national constitution, the introduction of article 60(c), might imply the 
risk for the Dutch parliament and people of losing sight of what exactly 
happened in the field of European integration.
Internationally the introduction of the article was observed with 
both wonderment and admiration. In reaction to article 60(c) being 
brought up for approval in the Dutch parliament, the New York Times 
published an article with the telling title ‘Leading the Way’.157 Here, 
the introduction of article 60c was depicted as ‘a historic precedent 
the importance of which can hardly be overestimated.’ Compared 
in an international context, the proposal of the Dutch government 
was unique. Although other countries in Western-Europe were also 
involved in setting up the ecsc and edc, the Netherlands was the first 
to constitutionally anticipate its position in a growing supranational 
order. And, compared to other countries that adjusted their national 
legal orders to the process of European integration, the Netherlands 
went much further. No other country opened the doors as wide as the 
Netherlands in 1953 in the sense that treaty law received precedence 
of the national constitutional order.158 The typical political and 
constitutional culture of the Netherlands might be explanative here. 
Ever since early modern times, international partnerships, facilitated 
by international treaty making, had been a priority in the foreign policy 
of the Netherlands. Since 1814, the Dutch political community had 
gone along with the wish of the Dutch government to act relatively 
independently of parliament in foreign affairs. Special constitutional 
procedures had protected this independence. A strong orientation on 
developing international partnerships, combined with a constitutional 
culture in which facilitating the government in treaty making had 
become the starting point, can contribute to an understanding of how 
the Dutch government had come to the unique set up of article 60(c).159 
Other proposals of the government worth mentioning were 
Article 60, subsections (d),(e) and (f ). The first two respectively 
regulated the acceding to and termination of international treaties, and 
their announcement and binding force: 
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 (60d): ‘For accession to and cancellation of agreements the 
provisions of the three preceding articles apply.’160
 
 (60e) ‘Agreements are only binding on citizens as far as they have 
been published. The law lays down regulations concerning the 
publication.’161
Article 60, subsection (f ), provided that competences could be assigned 
to international institutions: 
‘ Organisations under international law can by, or by virtue of an 
agreement be assigned powers of legislation, administration and 
jurisdiction. […]’162
Similar to Article 58, this article was instrumental in the development 
of an international legal order rather than enhancing the involvement of 
the Dutch parliament in foreign affairs.
Position of the government 
In presenting its proposals to parliament, the main aim of the 
government was to convince the Lower and the Upper House of the 
content of the complete draft reform on the constitutional chapter 
on foreign affairs. A main constraint to the debate was that on one 
crucial point the interest of the government on the one hand and of 
parliament on the other essentially differed. Parliament had asked 
for a constitutional reform in order to enhance its power in the field 
of international affairs. As observed above, however, the articles as 
proposed by the government were, in fact, largely aimed at retaining 
independence of the Dutch government in these matters. A conflict of 
interests seemed at hand. 
The obvious link between the draft reform and the process 
of European integration, however, enhanced the chances of the 
government for shepherding the draft undamaged through parliament. 
The parliamentary party of the kvp, for instance, fiercely favoured 
the idea of European integration and therefore might be willing to 
push the demand of parliamentary control into the background. For 
the same reason, finding support of the PvdA seemed within reach, in 
particular because Marinus van der Goes van Naters, a leading PvdA-
representative and advocate of a federalist Europe, had taken part in the 
deliberations of the Van Schaik Committee. Fierce opposition against 
the proposed reform, on the other hand, could be expected from the 
ultra-left. The cpn opposed the idea of European unity as a matter 
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of principle. Support of this party for a constitutional amendment, 
obviously aimed at facilitating this process, was unlikely. 
Between the positions of kvp and PvdA on the one hand, and the 
cpn on the other, there was a broad gamut of more moderate parties 
that could be expected to take a more ambiguous stand in the debate. 
This range of liberal and Christian-democratic parties might well have 
serious concerns with regard to the role of parliament in procedures 
of international treaty-making, while at the same time sincerely 
appreciating the draft for how it could contribute to bringing about 
European partnerships. Their vote in favour of the reform was decisive 
for the government in order to get the two-thirds majority in the two 
readings necessary for this constitutional amendment to take effect. 
Debate in parliament 
Immediately after the start of the debate in the Lower House on 13 
March 1952, parliamentary concerns on the element of parliamentary 
control turned out to be widespread. The social-democratic mp Jaap 
Burger (PvdA), who, trained as a lawyer, had been a member of the more 
moderate Van Eysinga Committee, was the first to express his concerns. 
He displayed a sharp eye for what the exceptions to the general rule of 
approval (article 60, subsection (b)) implied in terms of the slackening 
of parliamentary control. In the new situation Dutch society ‘especially 
for extraordinary and urgent cases, especially for the most serious cases’ 
could be bound by international agreements ‘without Parliament, 
not to mention the Dutch nation, knowing anything about it. Secret 
diplomacy in optima forma can resurge again in this way.’163 In the 
PvdA view, this draft provision essentially signified a step backwards in 
parliamentary influence in international treaty making. 
Another example of criticism, concentrating on the issue of 
democratic control, came from the Communist senator, Cor Geugjes 
(cpn), who took issue with the fact that parliament was still not 
involved in the drafting phase of international treaties. The States-
General, he claimed, were bound hand and foot once the text of 
international agreements had been agreed upon. This was all the 
more true since the Lower House had no right of amendment as far as 
international agreements were concerned. Upholding the procedure 
of parliamentary approval after signing, would leave parliament in 
a paradoxical situation: ‘The Constitutional Committee has already 
pointed out that not all agreements can be discontinued immediately. 
[…] the States-General will be confronted with a fait accompli and will 
have to put up with an agreement which they will disapprove of in the 
end.’164 
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Other MPs accepted the structure of what has also been called 
‘repressive’ parliamentary control – another term for the ex post 
approval of treaties – but opposed the introduction of silent approval 
in article 60(a). The liberal expert on constitutional law, Pieter Oud 
(vvd), expected ‘severe difficulties’ and agreed with the comment of the 
anti-revolutionary Sieuwert Bruins Slot (arp), that the article needed 
an extension that described the way by which both the Lower and 
the Upper House could express their wish to submit an international 
agreement to the explicit judgement of the States-General.165 Apart 
from these procedural concerns, however, both Oud and Bruins Slot 
still approved of the introduction of the principle of silent approval. 
Oud explained his stance from the consideration that ‘in practice 
we may need this [principle of silent approval],’166 This comment is 
interesting, since it shows that Oud regarded the constitutional reform 
as an act of anticipation, whilst being in expectation of a new situation 
in which new manners of decision making ‘may’ be needed. In other 
words, Oud was willing to accept the introduction of new decision 
making procedures in the field of treaty making because he expected 
this field to change in the near future. Remarkably, the perceived 
purport of this change was not at all elaborated on by Oud. Although 
his remark probably refers to plans for European integration, Oud was 
not explicit on this point. 
This leads to an important observation. So far, the criticism of 
the various MPs was aimed at the persisting lack of involvement of 
parliament in the drafting and approval phase of the treaty making 
process. This in itself, however, was no news. Already since 1814, the 
Dutch parliament had been dissatisfied with its democratic power in 
this field. The new element that made this fundamental discussion on 
the democratic powers of parliament in the early 1950s more interesting 
than ever before, was that the Netherlands was on the verge of entering 
into far-reaching European treaties, by which parts of the national 
sovereignty would be conferred on the European level. The stake in the 
game of foreign policy was even higher, now that the government was 
about to embark on a process with an unknown destination – maybe 
even a European federation. Remarkably, however, this crucial element 
was not immediately brought up by the MPs in the parliamentary 
debate. Whereas they focused emphatically on the aspect of democracy, 
the new element of European integration did not figure prominently in 
the parliamentary contributions to the debate. 
This, however, changed when the value of the Dutch constitution 
came under debate in an extensive and fundamental sub-debate on the 
introduction of Article 60, subsection (c). As explained above, if and 
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when this article would be approved, henceforth a single two-thirds 
majority could decide on the approval of an international treaty, that – 
once it would enter into force – could operate de facto as an amendment 
of the national constitution.
 The cpn held the strongest principles and practical objections 
against this article. Joop van Santen, one of the cpn senators, referred 
to the Van Schaik Committee as the ‘Coup d’état Committee’.167 His 
political associate and colleague, Cor Geugjes, was mainly concerned 
with determining whether or not a certain international agreement 
deviated from the constitution. It was not merely a theoretical 
exploration, he argued, to imagine a situation in which the government 
would be of the opinion that a certain international agreement did not 
deviate from the Dutch constitution and would consequently present 
parliament with a draft bill of approval that did not need the approval of 
a two-thirds majority but of a regular one only. It was, however, quite 
possible that the agreement in question actually deviated profoundly 
from the constitution. When and if parliament would realise this 
in time, it had the power to propose an amendment to the bill of 
approval.168 However, this amendment could again be rejected by an 
ordinary majority. In such a case it could happen that even ‘if in the 
Lower House the greatest minority possible were to be of the opinion 
that the agreement in question was contrary to the Constitution’ such 
an agreement could be approved with the ‘smallest majority possible’.169 
Although the scenario presented by Geugjes at first sight might occur 
a bit far-fetched, his analysis of how the reform could eventually work, 
meticulously showed how parliament, in the new situation, when in 
fact crucial matters were at stake, could be led up the garden path. 
And even worse things could happen, Geugjes argued. Together 
with the introduction of the principle of silent approval as laid down in 
Article 60(a) and the exceptions as laid down in Article 60b, application 
of Article 60(c) could lead to more undemocratic practices. When the 
government would be of the opinion that an agreement did not deviate 
from the constitution it was allowed to decide, in accordance with 
Articles 60(a) and 60(b) subsection (d), not to present the agreement 
to parliament and let it take effect without approval. In such a situation 
the Netherlands would end up with an international agreement, that 
contradicted the Dutch constitution. And without the knowledge 
of the States-General, it would enter into force. How to deal with 
an international agreement, Geugjes wondered, for which Article 
60(b), subsection (d), had been applied, when the States-General had 
abstained from approval and in relation to which the States-General in 
hindsight declared that it deviated from the constitution? According 
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to the draft reform such an agreement should be ended. However, 
not prior to the moment such a thing could be done in accordance 
with the provisions of the agreement concerned. This would leave 
the Netherlands in the awkward position that it was bound by an 
agreement that: 1) deviated from the constitution; 2) according to 
which, theoretically, all sorts of powers could be conferred on non-
national organs; 3) would have been rejected by parliament; and 4); 
nevertheless, would not be ended by the government and would remain 
in force.170 Such a scenario flouted all democratic principles that the 
Dutch state said it upheld in the sense that the will of parliament would 
be bypassed. 
Also MPs from more moderate political currents saw similar 
dangers in article 60(c). The leading Catholic Carl Romme feared a 
situation in which opinion was divided on whether an agreement did or 
did not deviate from the constitution. This difference of opinion could 
occur between government and parliament but also between the Upper 
and the Lower House. In both situations the approval procedure would 
be heavily impeded.171 Sieuwert Bruins Slot (arp) raised the question 
on how and by whom deviation should be determined.172 He wondered 
whether in the preparation phase of the treaty the primacy of signalling 
deviation lay with the government or with parliament. This was left 
unclear in the draft reform. This was a situation deemed undesirable by 
Bruins Slot. 
What becomes clear from these comments is that the 
constitutional amendment led to contention in the Dutch parliament. 
Article 60(c) led to the core of the conflicting interests – independence 
versus control – between the government and parliament. On a deeper 
level, the discontent with this article seems to have been based on 
the existence of diverging conceptions of the value of the national 
constitution. The parliamentary critics of Article 60(c) preferred to see 
the national constitution as the immovable foundation of the Dutch 
democracy, which should not be lightly dealt with. If the possibility of 
deviation from the constitution was going to be recorded in the Dutch 
constitution, this concept of an inviolable constitution that protected 
the nation-state against unstable and undemocratic influences, was in 
danger. As a consequence it would lose its status of the absolute legal 
foundation of the nation-state and would degenerate, so it was feared, 
into ‘Johnny’s scribbling-pad’ in which one could write or delete 
whatever and as much at will.173 
This realisation also brought the dimension of European 
integration to the fore. In essence, the introduction of article 60, 
subsection (c) in the new Dutch constitution signified that the 
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Netherlands opened its constitutional gates for ‘foreign’ law. The 
traditional protective and identifying function that a national 
constitution and the stringent procedures concerning its amendment 
could fulfil vis-à-vis foreign powers – both on an internal and an 
external level – was deliberately eroded by the introduction of this 
article.174 In parliament, opposition arose against this innovative 
principle. The senator Reint de Vos van Steenwijk of the liberal party 
vvd emphasised that, whereas he agreed as a matter of course that the 
Netherlands should strive for ‘a certain manner of cooperation between 
the peoples of Europe’, he also believed that in this development certain 
limits should be respected.175 These limits were exceeded with this plan 
for constitutional reform: 
‘ There are principles, laid down in the Constitution, from which 
there should be no deviation. If the government should be of the 
opinion that it is inevitable to do this, this should be considered 
carefully and be done as laid down in the constitution itself in case 
of an amendment.’176 
Charles Welter, the leader of the Katholiek Nationale Partij (knp, the 
Catholic National Party) – a splinter group of the Catholic Peoples 
Party kvp – feared violation of the constitution as well and spoke 
of ‘harakiri of an independent country’. He particularly found fault 
with the prematurity of the regulation: ‘[…] our constitutional rights 
and freedoms of the people are restricted or put aside for the sake of 
international organs, [whereas] it has not even been considered in what 
way these organs themselves will at the time be subjected to control.’177 
The cpn was the most explicit in its objections. In the Lower House 
the Communist mp and former carpenter Henk Gortzak stated ‘that 
the constitution should be a thing by which the rights of the people 
are guaranteed, something that cannot be given up just like that.’178 
According to his colleague Geugjes in the Upper House, article 60, 
subsection (c) would be ‘the Trojan horse of the constitution’ from 
which ‘at any desired moment an article of the constitution can be 
razed.’179 
Interesting observations can be made on how the concepts 
of international cooperation, European unification and a national 
constitution were perceived by these debaters. De Vos van Steenwijk 
(vvd) started his criticism by affirming his commitment to the 
greater goal as presented by government as the main reason for the 
introduction of article 60, subsection (c): stimulating the bringing 
about of an international legal order. To him, this was a valuable goal in 
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itself that was not contested. At the same time however, he thought that 
a firm national constitution was needed in order to define and protect 
important national values. Welter (knp) and Geugjes (cpn), two 
political critics of European integration, were the only ones to explicitly 
associate the national constitution with the ‘freedoms’ and ‘rights’ of a 
people. To them, opening up this document for changes following from 
international treaties implied renouncing these freedoms and rights. 
These men perceived the national constitution to function as a wall 
against undesired international influence in case international decisions 
and Dutch interests would collide. 
Although the notion of European integration was not explicitly 
involved in the analyses of these men, it becomes clear from their 
remarks that European unification, to the extent that the Netherlands 
would no longer be free to decide on its own rights and freedoms, 
was not welcomed. These contributions of representatives of the 
vvd, arp, knp and cpn therefore show, that in the early years of 
the 1950s, the interpretation of the notion of European integration 
– how would a unified Europe take shape in practice? And should any 
limits be observed? – was still contested among these parties. The 
metaphors used by these politicians in their speeches to convince their 
colleagues of the self-destroying power of the proposed articles are 
telling. Expressions as ‘harakiri of an independent country’ and ‘the 
Trojan horse of the constitution’ articulate the deep distrust that was 
felt against the introduction of Article 60, subsection (c). Implicitly, 
the national domain, protected by the national constitution, was 
depicted as a safe haven whereas the world outside of it was rhetorically 
represented as hostile and intrusive. 
It stands out that the arguments of these critics and the approach 
suggested – i.e. withdrawing behind the constitutional dikes – could be 
at odds with the old preference of a political majority of taking a pro-
active, cooperative and progressive stance in international politics. As 
had become clear already in the debates on the weu and the escs, after 
the traumatic breaking of Dutch neutrality in the Second World War 
and the enormous damage that the war had caused, a parliamentary 
majority deemed it more important than ever to seek for a new alliance 
with international partners. In its rebuttal of the strictures of these 
faultfinders, the Dutch government could and would make use of these 
sentiments. 
From defence towards consensus
The government reacted to the criticisms in the debate, by using 
different lines of reasoning to invalidate the arguments of the critical 
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MPs. Confronted with the comments of the parliamentarians Burger, 
Geugjes, Oud, Bruins Slot and others, that too little power was allotted 
to parliament, the government put forward in defence the general rule 
of approval as laid down in article 60. With the introduction of this 
provision, which according to the government had been overlooked 
by the MPs, the participation of parliament in the field of treaty-
making had ipso jure increased. Again referring implicitly to the special 
character of the practice of international politics, it was added that it 
was unavoidable that ‘to this rule certain exceptions were permitted.’180 
In short, this was a reconfirmation of the value cherished by the 
government that vigour and efficiency in foreign affairs should prevail 
over democratic control in constitutional matters. 
More clarifying, and also more effective was the other line of 
defence based on metaphors, working at a meta-level and aimed at 
convincing the parliamentary opposition of the dawn of a new era 
that asked for an adjusted constitution and a ditto understanding of 
the constitutional concept. Already in the written preparation to the 
parliamentary debate, the government rejected the comments of the 
critical MPs, basing itself on considerations of national sovereignty 
being irrelevant and out of date now that a new era was breaking. In 
the post-war situation, it was argued, the paper-guard of the nation 
state should no longer function as an armour; it should be opened for 
change. Protecting national independence through a constitution that 
functioned as an ‘impenetrable armour of sovereignty’ [in Dutch: een 
ondoordringbaar pantser van souvereiniteit] was no longer an option 
for a small country that was continuously considered to need the 
international community in order to survive.181 The topos of the small 
country that needed partners for protection – an image that the Dutch 
political community had been familiar with for long – was launched 
again in an ultimate attempt to convince the critical opposition. 
The crucial question of why this constitutional openness should be 
implemented at the cost of democratic control was smartly left out of 
consideration. 
Throughout the process of approval of the constitutional reform 
– both in its first and second reading – this became a leading line of 
defence in the contributions to the debate of the government. The 
speech of the Minister of Interior Affairs Louis Beel in the Lower House 
on 14 March 1952 may serve as a typical example. ‘The present-day 
generation has the moral duty [sic!] to labour for a new international 
legal order […]’, he commenced. 182 This statement is interesting from 
a rhetorical point of view is, firstly, because Beel appealed to a moral 
obligation of parliament. Not only was it desirable that the Netherlands 
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would devote itself to the task of developing the international legal 
order, it had also an ethical obligation to do so. This pathos-rich 
remark seems to have been aimed at connecting to the old, historically 
developed political consensus existing in parliament, that the 
Netherlands could and should make a difference when the international 
legal order was at stake. It was presented as the natural and only right 
thing to do. To all this, Beel added an important new factor, namely 
that in the post-war situation – i.e. the new era – this constant in Dutch 
foreign policy would demand sacrifices: ‘This new international legal 
order is growing, but its birth involves many sacrifices. […] We shall 
have to renounce many things we have been familiar with all our 
lives.’183 Subsequently, he completed his argument by the remark that: 
‘our Constitution will undoubtedly lose value.’184 Thus, step by step, 
by associating traditional internationalism of the Netherlands with a 
post-war obligation of further developing the international legal order 
and, consequently, with the dwindling importance of the national 
constitution, the constitutional reform as proposed by the government 
was presented as the right thing to do. 
The missing element in Beel’s argument was how the process 
of European integration as it had started to develop in the early years 
of the 1950s, exactly related to the tradition of internationalism that 
the Netherlands had been familiar with in the centuries before. Beel 
presented this new process as being in line with, or even resulting from 
the international orientation that the Netherlands identified with. 
This, however, was in contradiction with the fundamental changes 
that the constitutional reform introduced. Indeed, contributing to 
the international order had been a priority before. However, never 
before had the government been given permission to deviate from 
the Dutch constitution in concluding international treaties, without 
passing through a traditional process of constitutional reform typified 
by democratic safeguards. Beel passed over this crucial point in his 
considerations. 
But a parliamentary majority did not seem to mind. Beel’s ideas 
met with explicit approval from important sections in parliament. 
Beel’s party, the kvp, supported the idea that the Netherlands should 
overcome its degradation to the periphery of international politics by 
assuming a leading role in the post-war process of building a new legal 
order. Referring to the motion, introduced and adopted by the Lower 
House in 1948, which had been explicitly aimed at the promotion of 
the realisation of the new international legal order, the Catholic mp Jos 
Serrarens expressed his joy at the draft constitutional reform in the first 
reading phase as follows: 
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‘ It is a good thing that we are one of the first countries to settle this 
matter explicitly. We have to uphold a still young tradition. […] 
Four years ago, with great unanimity, we have already declared 
ourselves in favour of international communities of a new form. 
So it is fully in line with this development that we provide for this 
in more detail.’185
Compared to the argument as presented by Beel, it stands out that 
Serrarens chose to base his argument on a specific act of parliament, of 
four years earlier: the adoption of the motion Van der Goes van Naters/
Serrarens of 1948. Interestingly, this declaration of intent to contribute 
to ‘a real legal community of democratic states in a federal structure, 
in which power should be assigned to one or more supranational 
organs’ was presented here as the starting point of a tradition that 
should be upheld. In rhetorical terms, Serrarens applied an argument of 
succession: approval of the motion in 1948 was presented as sufficient 
reason to approve of the constitutional reform, because – in Serrarens’ 
perception – the latter served the goal as it had been set by the first.186 
This view of the constitutional reform served as the essential 
basis on which Serrarens tried to reach approval amongst the 
parliamentarians that opposed the reform in first instance. He tried to 
enforce his argument of succession by invoking a series of values that he 
presumed to be shared by a majority in parliament. As can be deduced 
from the quote, the values on which the KVP-spokesman built his 
argument were that anticipatingly settling matters was a good thing, 
that it was good for the Netherlands to take the lead, that building a new 
international community was necessary and that this building was in 
line with Dutch traditions which needed to be upheld. In particular 
the rhetorical emphasis on the first two of these values appear to have 
been an attempt to link up with prominent topoi in the mindset of the 
political elite of the land of Grotius.
The effectiveness of Serrarens’ rhetorical attempt to convince 
his parliamentary audience to regard the constitutional reform as a 
means to reach the goal of a new international community, can only 
be ascertained from the reaction of the parliamentary audience in the 
debate. Serrarens’ rhetorical goal would only have been achieved if his 
line of argument resulted in an agreement between him and (a majority 
of ) his audience on the possible motives of action, their pertinence 
and their probability in a given context.187 In particular the pertinence 
of his argument was challenged by antagonists of the constitutional 
reform. Whereas Serrarens’ constitutional conception was supported 
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by some,188 the fierce arguments in favour of an inviolable national 
constitution as cited earlier in this section, show that Serrarens might 
have underestimated the essential dissension that existed within 
parliament on this point. 
It is all the more interesting, however, that other elements from 
Serrarens’ line of reasoning, met with great approval. The image of 
an international legal order that was developing and the pioneer role 
that was reserved for Grotius’ descendants, were broadly accepted. 
Although it was contested if, how, and to what extent such a legal order 
had in fact developed already, the idea that the Netherlands should take 
a leading role in extending it, was widely embraced. The contribution 
of the influential senator for the chu, Rommert Pollema, shows that 
for this party, the retrieval of a prominent role of the Netherlands on 
the world stage – a role that befitted the historically grown ideas of a 
political majority on how to serve the interests of the country – was 
valued over any doubts that existed with regard to the constitutional 
reform as proposed by the government. Recovering the national 
honour after the humiliation of the war was a crucial element in his 
considerations:
‘ The concept of an international legal order, which is repeatedly 
mentioned in the government’s proposal, is in our view 
something fluid.[…]. But […] nevertheless, our party has decided 
to give its vote to the government’s proposal[…] [we] hope that 
the result of our common effort may be that the Netherlands will 
not be the victim of the international legal order but will hold a 
creditable, independent position in it’189
The kvp also voted in favour of the constitutional reform because it was 
considered as a means to reach the objective of an international legal 
community; an objective to which the kvp adhered greatly: 
‘ [they] [the MPs of the kvp] accept this draft, […] especially 
because they see it as a symptom of the growing international 
legal order and expect it, when it has been agreed to, to stimulate 
that growth vigorously. 190 
In the contribution of Jaap Burger, the prominent leader of the social-
democrats in the Lower House, the same fundamental attitude towards 
the constitutional reform is recognized. 
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‘ […] here it is expressed in our Constitution, that even our national 
community is no more than a means to a goal, a higher goal. 
May that thought permeate into our social, cultural and spiritual 
life and also in other relations and associations, in order that, 
rather than the organizational associations by which the aim is 
sought after, the aim itself [in the view of Burger: international 
integration, whether in a Benelux, European or Atlantic context] 
gets pride of place.’191
In emphasising the importance of the development of a new 
international legal order and the role of the proposed constitutional 
reform in establishing that goal, these parliamentarians chose to push 
the issue of parliamentary control to the background. No longer was 
parliamentary control the essential issue of the constitutional reform, 
but the creation of an international legal order, considered necessary for 
the further existence and post-war reconstruction of the Netherlands; 
an objective for which the introduction of the new constitutional 
articles were considered important, if not crucial. This objective 
motivated many in parliament to vote in favour of the constitutional 
reform. 
The arp remained persistent in focusing on the democratic 
procedures. In the first reading, this party insisted on amendment of 
Article 60(c). It refused to let this article become a general permission 
to deviate from the constitution in international agreements, whenever 
government would feel like it. An editorial change was proposed and 
adopted with a large majority. No longer did the contested article open 
with the provision that ‘in the interest of the international legal order 
there may be a departure from the constitution’, but stated instead 
that ‘if the development of the international legal order should require 
it, there may be a deviation from the constitution.’192 This subtle 
rephrasing, considered by the arp to provide a stricter condition for 
deviation from the constitution, led this party to vote in favour of the 
proposed constitutional reform in matters concerning foreign affairs. 
Also other parties in the Lower House, among which the vvd and 
the kvp, insisted on editorial amendments. As a consequence, it was 
among other things laid down in article 60(a) that the request of one 
fifth of the constitutional number of one of both Houses would be 
sufficient to demand that an agreement signed by government would 
be presented to parliament for explicit approval.193 And in Article 
60(b) it was recorded that in case provisions of the constitution were 
deviated from, parliamentary approval – whether explicitly or tacitly 
given – was obligatory. Jos Serrarens (kvp) insisted on the explicit 
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recording of the primacy of international law over national law.194 
Eventually, this was laid down in a new Article 60(d), reading ‘that 
legal regulations in force within the realm do not apply in case they 
are incompatible with international treaties.’195 It was another crucial 
element in constitutionally fortifying the international orientation of 
the Netherlands, added to the constitutional reform rather last minute 
and without much debate. 
Except for this final amendment, most amendments were clearly 
aimed at strengthening the democratic position of parliament. Their 
submission in itself, is a clear indication that the concerns on the effect 
of the constitutional reform for the parliamentary ability to control the 
government, were tenacious. In the light of these persistent concerns, 
it is all the more telling that on 19 March 1952, bill 2374 that proposed 
constitutional reform concerning the provision on foreign affairs was 
in the first reading adopted in the Lower House by a majority of 72 to 
10. In balancing the concerns regarding democracy and the benefits of 
the constitutional order in developing an international order, the latter 
consideration had been given priority by a large majority in parliament. 
Predictably, the dissenting votes came from the ranks of the cpn and of 
the small conservative Calvinist party of the Staatkundig Gereformeerde 
Partij (sgp) in the Lower House. The latter had played a minor role 
in the parliamentary debate, but – similar to the cpn – opposed 
the conferral of sovereignty on a supranational level on ideological 
grounds.196 
In the Upper House, on 7 May 1952, the bill was passed with a 
majority of 44 to 5 votes. Here, the opposition was composed of CPN-
members and – surprisingly – two liberal vvd senators. This party was 
divided amongst itself. The liberal senators Louwes and De Vos van 
Steenwijk remained principally against the handing over of national 
powers to an international legal order that was in their view vague 
and far from concrete. However, within the vvd they represented a 
minority. In respectively December 1952 and May 1953 the divisions in 
the second reading in the Lower and Upper House ended respectively in 
66 and 37 votes in favour, against 6 and 4 negative votes: the communist 
and liberal strongholds of resistance had not been convinced. Following 
the approval, the articles previously indicated with numbers 60-60(g) 
were recorded in the Dutch constitution as articles 60-67.
Thus, in the Netherlands in 1953 the principle of an inviolable 
constitution was sacrificed for the uncertain principle of the 
development of an international legal order. By its vote in favour of 
the reform, the Dutch political majority in parliament expressed that 
it was willing to sacrifice the notion of a constitution as an ‘armour of 
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sovereignty’. By doing this, also a fundamental democratic safeguard 
was sacrificed: a process of a second reading in case an international 
treaty would interfere with the Dutch constitutional order. In exchange 
for yielding this democratic safeguard, the Netherlands also gained a 
new characteristic. With the constitutional reform of 1953, the Dutch 
political community fundamentally defined itself as an open polity. It 
was the point of departure from which the Netherlands would approach 
the process of European integration in the years to come. 
However, In 1953, it was still hard to imagine what kinds of results 
or difficulties this would lead to. The development of an international 
legal order – let alone the concept of European integration – was still 
in its infancy. The qualitative difference between the concepts of 
international/European cooperation and integration was not yet clear. 
Many parliamentary debates on the transference of sovereignty were 
still to come. Only time would tell how the constitutional reform of 
1953 would function in the parliamentary practice of the Netherlands 
as a catalyst for moving further towards a unified Europe. In hindsight, 
however, one thing is clear: with the constitutional reform of 1953, the 







‘ In the constitutional revision of 1953 we have explicitly laid down  
the power to do this.’ 
 
Pieter Oud197
2.1  Introduction 
While the Dutch parliament was discussing the proposal for a 
constitutional revision, the leaders of the Six were already one step 
ahead. On 27 May 1952, they signed the Treaty establishing the 
European Defence Community (edc). Prompted by the start of the 
Korean War in 1950, Western Europe and the United States (us) 
had increasingly felt the need to set up a common European defence 
organisation against a possible Soviet attack. Driven simultaneously by 
the desire to control the military development of the German Federal 
Republic, the French government came up with the Pleven Plan (1950) 
– called after its author, prime minister René Pleven – to strengthen the 
military power of the states of Western Europe. It served as the basis for 
the edc. 
With the ecsc installed and the edc Treaty signed, the 
development of the idea of European integration gained momentum. 
A link was presupposed between the notion of integration in defence 
matters – historically a policy area strongly associated with national 
political sovereignty – and political integration. Therefore, while the 
establishment of the edc was being debated, plans for establishing 
a European Political Community (epc) came up as well.198 A setback 
for the progress of European integration occurred, however, when in 
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August 1954 it turned out that the French parliament refused to ratify 
the edc Treaty.199 Irrespective of the exact French considerations, this 
rejection implied that the plans for the establishment of the edc and 
epc were shelved for the time being. However, the desire for further 
integration was not tempered. Throughout Europe advocates of 
European integration reacted to the échec of the edc and epc with a re-
launch of the ideal of European integration.200 
In April 1955 Johan Willem Beyen, a former Dutch banker 
who was convinced of the advantages of European integration for 
the Netherlands and who had been appointed Minister of Foreign 
Affairs in September 1952, presented his plan for the establishment 
of a European Economic Union to the governments of Belgium 
and Luxemburg. Together, the three Benelux countries agreed on a 
proposal for the establishment of a Common Market and an atomic 
pool, led by ‘common authorities’.201 At the Messina Conference of 
June 1955 important elements from the ‘Benelux-memorandum’, 
were adopted by the Six.202 Europe’s founding fathers agreed to pursue 
further economic integration in order to bring European unification 
closer. From this agreement, the Treaties Establishing the European 
Economic Community (eec) and Euratom developed. Signed by the 
Six on 25 March 1957 in Rome, these Treaties went down in history as 
the Treaties of Rome. In the various initiatives for European unification 
that followed the establishment of the ecsc, the Netherlands took 
a supportive stance. With Beyen taking the initiative for reaching 
agreement on economic integration, the Netherlands could even be seen 
a leading pioneer.
The years between the coming into effect of the constitutional 
revision in the Netherlands and the approval of the Treaties of Rome, 
were crucial for defining the Dutch approach towards the process of 
European integration. The parliamentary debates on the edc and 
the Treaties of Rome show how the Dutch political community 
consolidated its approach towards the process of European integration 
as it had been initiated with the motion Van der Goes van Naters/
Serrarans (1948), the approval of the ecsc Treaty (1952) and the 
constitutional revision (1953). In the new phase, the majority consensus 
on the instrumentality of European unification for the vital interests of 
the Netherlands was further built on. The consideration that sacrificing 
state sovereignty would pay off in terms of economic and security gains 
remained central in the considerations of a parliamentary majority 
when voting in favour of new steps towards unification. It reveals that 
a political majority still viewed the process of European integration 
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as a foreign policy project, aimed at guaranteeing the interests of the 
Netherlands.
A striking new element in the line of argumentation of this 
majority was that the decisions made in favour of European integration 
in the previous years, were – in themselves – reasons for approving new 
steps. Thus, a dynamism was cranked up in which new steps in the 
process were justified on the basis of earlier actions. It turned out to be 
an effective strategy for bringing the process of European integration 
further, but it also came with a risk. By making new developments 
towards integration self-evident on the basis of previous steps, the 
Dutch political community to an important extent refrained from 
thoroughly debating and reflecting on the nature of the process of 
European integration and the consequences that it would ultimately 
entail for the Netherlands as a sovereign country on the international 
stage. 
2.2  Defining the Scope of Article 63:  
Debating the edc (1953) 
The edc, with its focus on European cooperation in matters of 
defence, was designed to be complementary to organisations, such 
as the un, nato and weu, which had also been established to 
maintain international peace.203 The latter organisations were typically 
intergovernmental in character. In these institutions the decision 
making power ultimately rested with the Member States, whereas 
the edc was to function primarily as a supranational institution. In 
addition to an intergovernmental Council of Ministers, the Community 
would consist of a supranational executive commission, joint armed 
forces and a common budget.204 The supranational set up presupposed 
the transfer of national sovereignty in military affairs.
Position of the government
On behalf of the Netherlands, the liberal Minister of Foreign Affairs 
in the second Drees cabinet, Dirk Stikker, had signed the edc Treaty 
in 1952. Elections in June, led to the swearing in of the third Drees 
cabinet (1952-1956) in September 1952, in which the arp replaced the 
vvd. As Stikker’s successor, Johan Willem Beyen became responsible 
for European Affairs. For two reasons, his position was rather curious. 
Firstly, he was not affiliated with any political party in the Netherlands. 
Secondly, he needed to tolerate another Minister next to him, since 
matters concerning Benelux and bilateral matters were left to the second 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, the eccentric Roman-Catholic former 
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diplomat Joseph Luns (kvp). Differences in character, fields of interests 
and views on international politics – Beyen was considered a true 
European, whereas Luns has been characterised as an Atlanticist pur 
sang – were reasons why these two did not get on very well together.205 
In the edc debate, Beyen became the central person speaking on behalf 
of the government. 
 In line with its positioning in the debate on the ecsc, the Dutch 
government accounted for its signing of the edc Treaty more in 
instrumentalist than in idealist terms.206 Rich integrationist rhetoric 
cannot be found in their reasoning. The cabinet regarded the edc Treaty 
first and foremost as a means of controlling German rearmament; a 
thing that was deemed necessary for the defence of Western Europe 
against a Soviet invasion. An added benefit of controlled rearmament 
of Germany was that it was expected to remove the tension between 
the historical rivals Germany and France. Because of this stabilising 
effect for the relations in Western Europe the Drees cabinet advised 
parliament to approve the Treaty.207 In line with what it had argued 
in relation to the establishment of the ecsc, the cabinet presented 
participation in the edc as vital for the safety of the small country of 
the Netherlands: ‘For our safety we have to rely on the help of others 
and are […] compelled to associate with others.’208
 In addition to this argument of necessity, founded here on safety 
considerations, the government depicted support for the treaty as 
being in line with earlier decisions on grounds of security when the 
Netherlands had joined the international defence initiatives of the 
weu and nato. It was an argument of consistency, which was further 
elaborated on. Historical preferences of the Netherlands were referred 
to in order to convince parliament that approving the edc Treaty was 
the right thing to do. ‘Ever since the Napoleonic wars’, the government 
stated, ‘Dutch foreign policies have been firmly aimed at cultivating the 
best of relations with the Great Powers of Western Europe.’209 In this 
way, the topos of the land of Grotius was applied in order to convince 
parliament of the value of the edc. Any possible qualitative difference 
between the supranational, integrative characteristics of the edc on the 
one hand, and the intergovernmental, cooperative nature of nato and 
the weu on the other, which would have showed the weakness of the 
consistency argument, was not put forward. 
At the same time consistency with the stance of the Benelux-
partners was propagated.210 Since Belgium and Luxemburg – ‘countries 
with which we are striving with persistence and with conviction for 
an ever closer political and economic union’ intended to join the edc, 
the government argued, the Netherlands should join as well in order 
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not to harm the Benelux-pact.211 The government did not enter into 
the fact that political and economic unification in a Benelux-context – a 
framework in which three relatively small countries pursued similar 
goals – was something completely different from taking part in a 
defence community with political powers such as France and Germany. 
The latter further-reaching and experimental partnership was indeed 
presented as to logically befit the objectives of the first. 
As far as the political set up of parliament was concerned, the 
government did not need to anticipate fierce resistance. The centre of 
political power still lay with the PvdA and kvp; parties that both held 
a distinct preference for European integration and together made up 
60% of the seats in the Lower House.212 In the ranks of the chu, the 
vvd – both coalition parties – and also in the arp, some additional 
supporters of the concept of European unification could be found. 
Besides, in its positive evaluation of the edc initiative, the third Drees 
cabinet knew itself supported in the public intellectual debate in which 
advocates of European federalisation still set the tone. From 1953 to 1957 
onwards – very similar to the years 1948-1953 – the Europe-idealists 
of the first hour continued preaching their gospel of the benefit and 
necessity of a united Europe.213 They welcomed the edc as a step 
on the way towards this goal. The few critics who pointed out the 
shortcomings of the integration process – for instance, the absence 
of the uk, the long preferred partner of the Netherlands in matters of 
foreign affairs – would not greatly influence the tendency of the debate. 
And classic nationalist positions remained absent in the Dutch public 
intellectual debate on European integration.214
Yet the government – following from the constitutional revision 
that had recently been approved – had to reckon with one possible 
barrier to a quick approval of the edc Treaty. Now that the new articles 
in the constitution had come into effect and in case a parliamentary 
majority would find that the provisions of a treaty were at variance with 
the constitution of the Netherlands, the treaty at stake – in accordance 
with Article 63 of the Constitution (draft Article 60(c)) – needed to be 
approved with a special, i.e. a two-thirds majority. In political practice, 
however, such a complicated approval procedure was not preferable 
for the government, which, in its capacity as a signatory party to the 
treaty, had an interest in a quick and simple approval. Thus, after the 
constitutional amendment of 1953, a situation arose in which it was 
beneficial to the government to convince parliament that the provisions 
of a treaty did not deviate from the national constitution, in order to 
guarantee a simple approval procedure in accordance with Article 60, 
subsection 2 of the Dutch constitution.215 
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In the case of the edc Treaty, the government had already lost 
this battle before the plenary debate in parliament had even started out. 
Despite the initial proposal of the government to approve the treaty via 
the simple procedure of Article 60, subsection 2, it was, under pressure 
of parliament, forced to reconsider this position in the course of the 
preparation for the parliamentary debate.216 The articles 194 and 195 
of the Dutch Constitution (1953) regulated military service for Dutch 
citizens in the Netherlands. According to a parliamentary majority 
these provisions did not cover the existence of a European army and, 
moreover, they were explained as to prohibit compulsory military 
service in an army not belonging to the Dutch armed forces.217 For that 
reason, parliament deemed it essential to get a two-thirds majority on 
board before the edc Treaty could enter into force.
Debate in parliament
In the Lower House the plenary debate on the edc Treaty took place on 
22 and 23 July 1953. Already in the written preparations to the debate, a 
considerable part of parliament had agreed on the need of strengthening 
military cooperation in Western Europe and getting Germany militarily 
on its feet again. As far as the plans for the edc were in accordance with 
these goals, the initiative was immediately welcomed by these MPs.218 
Similar to the view of the government, they perceived the edc as a 
necessity, essentially contributing to the political and economic well-
being of the Netherlands.219 A small country, it was reasoned, depended 
on stable international relations;220 a thing that the edc, as a step 
forward in the process of European integration, would fundamentally 
add to.221 
This line of reasoning shows that the process of European 
integration and the edc as an element of it, was regarded as a strategy 
to reach mutually benefiting agreements with international partners. 
At this point in time, still no clear distinction was made between 
‘regular’ intergovernmental agreements and an accord such as the edc 
requiring the signatory parties to transfer (parts of ) their sovereignty 
to a supranational level of governance. This is illustrated by the way 
these MPs dealt with the counter-arguments. Refutations concerning 
the dangers for a small country to sacrifice its sovereignty and to put 
itself in the hands of a defence community dominated by bigger powers, 
were brushed aside with the argument that steps contributing the 
federalisation of Europe would bring strong legal safeguards for the 
Netherlands.222 In other words, these MPs started from the supposition 
that within a unified Europe the tendency of the big powers of Europe 
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to dominate could be restrained by treaty law, leaving the Netherlands 
more influential than when staying independent. 
Many of the outright supporters of the treaty were PvdA and 
kvp members. These parties held the most explicit federal views with 
regard to the completion of the integration process. But also large parts 
of the vvd, chu and arp tended towards a pro-integration attitude 
as a matter of principle. Only a small group of MPs rejected the tenor 
of the treaty immediately and unequivocally because of fundamental 
objections against the notion of European integration. Pieter 
Gerbrandy, the anti-revolutionary critic of the integration process, 
stood ill-disposed towards the transfer of state sovereignty in general, 
and towards military sovereignty in particular. Not only would the 
Netherlands lose control of its army, he contended, also the ‘national 
character of the state, the way it had developed in the course of history’ 
would be affected.223 The Dutch entering into a military alliance in 
which traditional overseas allies of the Netherlands – such as the United 
Kingdom, but also Norway and Denmark – would not take part was, in 
Gerbrandy’s view, a ‘corrosion of the marrow of the Dutch State.’224 He 
represented the traditional position of having a national army under its 
command as a basic condition for the sovereign state of the Netherlands 
to be respected as such. 
In addition to Gerbrandy and in accordance with their position 
in the debates on the ecsc and the process of constitutional revision, 
the Communist MPs opposed the establishment of the edc. Whereas 
the advocates of the treaty presented the edc as a necessary means for 
safeguarding the security and independence of the Netherlands, the 
cpn framed the edc in terms of a new occupation. To this party it was 
‘nothing else but camouflage of the rehabilitated Nazi-Wehrmacht.’225 
The Communist MPs also argued that the rearmament of Germany, 
supported by the usa, would produce a reverse effect, inevitably 
leading to a new French-German war ‘in which the Netherlands will be 
the battlefield.’226 Not very surprisingly, this view found little response 
in the broader circles of parliament, which had generally agreed that the 
edc was rather to be seen as the creation of an ally than as an enemy. 
In an ultimate attempt to convince the other parties in parliament 
of the need to get rid of the treaty, the Communist opposition stepped 
into the breach for the preservation of what it presented as essential 
constitutional values of the Netherlands. In doing this, the cpn brought 
the new Article 63 of the Dutch constitution again up for discussion. 
What was the scope of this article? What did it actually imply? Did it 
cover all deviations from the Dutch constitution or only some? The 
answer to these questions could only be found by exploring the limits 
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of its applicability in parliamentary practice; a thing that the cpn was 
most willing to do. 
In the Communist view, approval of the edc signified the 
unconstitutional removal of essential elements of Dutch sovereignty. 
This became particularly concrete in the changes that the treaty 
proposed with regard to the parliamentary right to approve the national 
defence budget. Under the treaty the competence to decide on the edc 
budget as a whole, and on the contributions of the individual Member 
States, lay with the Council of Ministers. The decision making power of 
this intergovernmental body within the supranational edc would make 
decent control of the national parliaments on these matters impossible. 
For the Communists this signified not a deviation from the Dutch 
constitution, covered by the new Article 63 of the Dutch Constitution, 
but a blunt violation of the essence of state sovereignty and the 
parliamentary right to approve the national budget.227 Implicit in this 
argument was an understanding of the constitutional reform of 1953 as a 
vehicle for the transfer of a certain elements of national sovereignty, but 
certainly not as a carte blanche. 
Already in May 1953, during the last Upper House meeting on 
approval of the constitutional revision, the Communist senator Cor 
Geugjes had commented that the draft of the edc Treaty seemed to 
conflict with earlier promises of the Dutch government to parliament. 
In reference to a statement of Minister Dirk Stikker on the edc 
negotiations in February 1952, Geugjes pointed out that Stikker had 
said that: “the Netherlands will remain sovereign on the budget of 
Defence.”228 He was disappointed to see that the content of the draft 
treaty showed a different reality, namely that: ‘it shall be incumbent 
upon the government of each Member State to ensure the inclusion of 
the amount determined as its contribution in its budget.’229 Effectively, 
Geugjes concluded, this heralded the end of the parliamentary right to 
approve the budget.230 On 22 July 1953, Geugjes’ colleague in the Lower 
House, Gerben Wagenaar, repeated this argument.231 On this basis, the 
cpn advised the Lower House to vote against the Treaty.
Explicit support for the Communist observation came from the 
knp. Charles Welter rephrased it as an important diminishing ‘of the 
exertion of one of the most important rights which in democratically 
governed countries has been granted to the representatives of the 
people.’232 In his objections against the treaty Welter even went 
beyond the cpn. He reminded the House of the constitutional 
stipulation – added rather last minute to Article 63 by means of the 
amendment proposed by the arp – 233 that laid down that deviation 
from the Constitution was legitimate only in case the development of 
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the international legal order required that. With regard to the Bill of 
approval of the edc Treaty, the question could be raised whether one 
could speak of a deviation required by the international legal order? 
‘What legal order?’, thus Welter argued. ‘I do not know that legal order. 
That legal order is still to come, it does not exist yet. And if there is no 
legal order, how can one speak of a development of a legal order that 
does not exist?’234 Building on this observation, Welter reached the 
conclusion that the Bill of approval concerning the edc Treaty was not 
covered by Article 63 of the Dutch Constitution: ‘To say the very least, 
it is at great variance with it.’235 
The objections of Geugjes, Wagenaar and Welter indicate that, in 
spite of the fact that Article 63 had been approved by a parliamentary 
majority and was now recorded in the Dutch Constitution, the exact 
interpretation of the provision was still contested. The rationale of the 
Dutch government for proposing the article at the time of amendment 
of the constitution had been to facilitate its freedom to decide and act in 
the practice of international treaty making. After this article had entered 
into force, the Dutch constitution could not form an unwelcome 
obstruction in the process of European integration. Or so it had been 
expected. Now it turned out that even after the approval of Article 
63, the political adversaries of unification in Western-Europe found 
a way to question the compatibility of this process with the Dutch 
constitution. They claimed that Article 63 could not be understood as 
to make all deviations from the Dutch constitution irrelevant. Their 
viewpoint was that certain deviations – such as the departure from the 
right of the national parliament to approve the defence budget – were so 
sweeping that they should not be possible. In other words, their striving 
for re-determining the meaning and scope of Article 63 was opened. 
Re-defining its basic terms, such as ‘international legal order’ and 
‘requires’, was proposed, in order to support this objective. 
From defence towards consensus 
The reactions of the government and the rest of parliament to 
the objections of the cpn and knp made immediately clear that 
these parties would lose out in the debate. In reaction to Welter’s 
interpretation of the requirement-stipulation in Article 63, Minister 
Beyen sardonically remarked ‘I had not thought of that one.’236 In an 
argument that took the international legal order and the constitutional 
debates of 1953 as faits accomplis, he made clear that he viewed it as 
plain nonsense to claim that an international legal order did not exist 
or had not been developed and could therefore not require anything: 
‘If development of the international legal order does not exist, there is 
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nothing more to say. Then I do not understand why we have been busy 
with that amendment of the Constitution [and] why we have gathered 
here […].’237 Moreover, Beyen stated that Wagenaar’s stance, that the 
edc Treaty conflicted with the constitution was not valid. Before the 
constitutional revision of 1953 the handing over of sovereignty might 
have signified an insurmountable break with the constitution. Now, 
Article 63 filled the gap.238
The diverging views of Beyen and his opponents reveal a 
fundamental difference in their respective observations of what had 
happened – both on the European stage and in the Dutch constitution – 
in the years before. In the eyes of the first the developing international 
legal order was a reality. The debate on the establishment of the edc 
was itself an indication of it, just like the recent implementation of 
the constitutional reform. As far as Charles Welter was concerned, 
however, the international legal order existed only to the extent that 
the Dutch parliament chose it to exist. It could be called a halt to if and 
when the Dutch government and parliament decided to do so. It should 
be called a halt to in case it threatened the sovereign legal order of the 
Netherlands. And, if matters depended upon him, it would be called a 
halt to here.
The discussion clearly shows how in 1953 diverging political 
wishes with regard to the process of European unification were crucial 
for the perception on the political agenda. For those hesitant to bring 
about an international legal order, Charles Welter most certainly had 
a lead when he referred to the ‘requirement’-condition laid down 
in Article 63, as a viable reason for not approving the treaty. Indeed, 
whether the development of such a legal order required deviation 
from the Dutch constitutional articles dealing with military affairs, 
was not necessarily obvious. In the setting of the Dutch parliament 
of 1953, however, such a question did not find fertile ground. A basic 
consensus existed with a parliamentary majority that the design of 
the edc complemented the earlier policy decisions on the road to 
European integration, such as the ecsc and the Van de Goes van 
Naters/Serrarens motion, and should therefore be approved. Moreover, 
Dutch participation was deemed crucial for strategic considerations 
of international politics and security. The necessity and consistency 
argument, to put it differently, were sufficient to find consent. 
As far as the constitutionality of the treaty was concerned, it was 
contentedly diagnosed by a parliamentary majority that – by foresight – 
the Netherlands, through the recent addition of Articles 63 and 67 in 
the Constitution, had already made arrangements for the transference 
of sovereignty and for international treaties that conflicted with the 
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national constitution.239 Any further discussion on the constitutionality 
of the treaty was considered superfluous. More than merely implying 
the approval of the edc Treaty, a majority taking this position shows 
that the constitutional reform found its interpretation in parliamentary 
practice here. By taking this stance, it actually – and this was crucial – 
agreed to interpret Articles 63 and 67 of the Dutch constitution as to 
make it impossible for a treaty contributing to the international legal 
order to violate the Dutch constitution in such a way that it should be 
rejected for that reason. Since these articles, in principle, legitimated 
all conceivable deviations from the Dutch constitution, all treaties 
benefiting the international order – regardless of their constitutional 
implications – could be brought up for approval under these articles. 
What was not paid attention to, however, was that this 
interpretation also implied that determining whether or not an 
international treaty deviated from the Dutch constitution became 
irrelevant if not practically impossible. Since all deviations were 
henceforth defendable as long as they were – by a simple majority – 
perceived to be contributing to the international legal order, no treaty 
could ever be rejected on grounds of violating the Dutch constitution. 
This gave the government a nearly endless freedom in international 
negotiations and in the results it could bring home to parliament. 
The Klompé amendment
Notwithstanding this majority agreement on the broad interpretation 
of Article 63, supporters of the edc Treaty in parliament were also 
cautious. In order not to allow Article 63 to develop into a carte blanche, 
a significant restriction, working in favour of parliamentary control, was 
imposed on the government. According to MPs of kvp, vvd and arp, 
the democratic character of the Defence Community left much to be 
desired as many decisions were left to the competence of the Council of 
Ministers, or even to nato, the latter being the bigger military alliance 
in which the edc would take part. 240 Although the establishment of 
an edc parliament was foreseen in the treaty, its competence to control 
the Council of Ministers was deemed unsatisfactory.241 An important 
objection was – and here the supporters of the treaty even joined the 
Communists – that the disappearance of parliamentary participation 
in the settling of the national defence budget was not compensated 
for on the European level; a functional supranational parliament with 
sufficient democratic competences was lacking.242 
In particular, the coming into being of so called ‘implementation 
agreements’ [in Dutch: uitvoeringsovereenkomsten], once the treaty 
had been approved, caused frowning eyebrows with many Dutch 
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MPs. In the setup of the edc, the supranational organisation itself 
– its executive organ – would be invested with the power to decide 
on the future functioning of the edc by devising agreements on how 
the Treaty needed to be implemented. If these agreements were not 
explicitly subjected to the control of the national parliament, the 
Dutch parliamentarians worried, the edc was given a free hand in the 
obligations it imposed on the Netherlands. In order to prevent such 
an undesired situation, the prominent mp for the kvp and member of 
the ecsc Assemblée, Marga Klompé, introduced an amendment for 
approval in the Lower House. This ‘Klompé amendment’ suggested 
the insertion of an article in the Dutch Bill of Approval on the edc 
Treaty that stated that in case the implementation of the Treaty needed 
the conclusion of further agreements, these agreements should be 
presented for approval to the States-General.243
In fact, this amendment was a restriction in the sense of the new 
Article 62, subsection b of the Dutch constitution, which stated that 
approval of the States-General was not required ‘if the agreement 
exclusively concerns the implementation or extension of an agreement 
which has been approved, as far as the States-General on approval 
have made no reservations on this.’ The rationale of the proposal 
was to prevent parliamentary approval of the treaty as a whole from 
automatically implying approval of implementation agreements 
resulting from it. In an extreme case such an implementation agreement 
resulting from the treaty could in its turn deviate from the constitution. 
In order for parliament not to lose sight of the effects of the edc Treaty, 
an extra guarantee for parliamentary control was asked for. The Klompé 
amendment was intended to establish such a control mechanism.244 
Not surprisingly, the Dutch government – supported by the PvdA 
and chu – strongly advised against the adoption of the amendment. In 
line with the debates on the constitutional reform, it argued – again – 
that freedom of action was indispensible for government in case 
international politics was at stake. Curtailing this freedom, would 
hamper the ability of the government to strive after the interests of 
the country or in the words of Prime-Minister Willem Drees: ‘the 
Government will find itself in a difficult position with regard to certain 
agreements, when it has to take the view that the national interest 
requires an immediate decision and that therefore the Government 
must go its own way.’245 This instrumental argument of necessity for 
freedom of the government, strikingly started again from the notion 
that the government, in first instance, determined what exactly was in 
the interest of the Netherland. The national parliament was to be heard 
on this only later. 
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A second, but related reason for Drees to dissuade parliament from 
adopting the amendment was the fear of the creation of a precedent. 
With regard to the implementation of future international or European 
treaties, the government did not applaud the idea of such restrictions. 
Hendrik Tilanus, leader of the chu in parliament, supported Drees. 
He warned against parliamentary obstruction of the well-functioning 
of the newly designed supranational institution. He expressed the fear 
that adoption of the amendment would lead to various unwished for 
legal difficulties, impeding the well functioning of the edc and the 
integration process as a whole.246 Again, it stands out that the national 
parliament was presented as an obstruction rather than a patron for the 
interests of the Netherlands.
Drees and his followers, however, did not find strong enough 
support. Although a broad political spectrum agreed on the necessity or 
even parliamentary obligation of approving the edc Treaty because of 
the conviction that the post-war era asked for a supranational approach 
in defence,247 abandoning the amendment was judged to be a bridge 
too far. A majority in parliament turned out to draw the line with what 
had seemed an almost unrestrained trust in the government to serve 
the interests of the Netherlands abroad, at the point that this trust 
implied that new international (implementation ) agreements would 
not even be presented to parliament. A supporting line of argument for 
adopting the amendment was found in the practical consideration that 
the suggestion of Klompé would not hamper the functioning of the 
edc as much as feared by Drees and Tilanus. Delays, especially in urgent 
cases, the supporters of the amendment reasoned, could be prevented 
through the application of the tacit consent clause as it had recently 
been laid down in Article 61 of the Dutch Constitution.248 
On 23 July 1953 the Klompé amendment was adopted by the 
Lower House with 54 to 31 votes.249 Most of the negative votes were 
produced by the PvdA, which had rejected the amendment from the 
start, together with some from the chu. With the adoption of the 
amendment, in the particular case of the edc Treaty the scope of Article 
63 was redefined in favour of parliamentary control. Deviating from the 
national constitution was allowed, but the national parliament should 
not be deprived of its right to judge all international agreements before 
they would enter into force. The edc Treaty was voted on immediately 
after the adoption of the Klompé amendment. In the Lower House, it 
was supported by a majority of 75 to 11. Only the cpn, sgp and Pieter 
Gerbrandy (arp) voted against.250 Approval of the treaty in the Upper 
House, followed on 20 January 1954. The vote resulted in a 36 to 4 
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majority in favour.251 Thus, the required two-thirds majority for the 
edc Treaty was reached in both Houses.
With the approval of the edc Treaty the Dutch political 
community continued the pro-European integration policy it had 
pursued since the adoption of the motion Van der Goes van Naters/
Serrarens (1948) and which has been supported by the constitutional 
revision of 1953. The signing and approval of the treaty was first and 
foremost the product of instrumental reasoning: participation of the 
Netherlands was perceived as a necessity for the continued security 
and well-being of the Netherlands. Moreover, it was considered to be 
consistent – and therefore approvable – with the earlier choices of the 
Netherlands in favour of military integration in a Benelux and a broader 
international context. So in addition to necessity, policy consistency 
was also a consideration in the mindset of the parliamentary majority to 
continue on its pro-European course. 
Both lines of argument illustrate that, instead of being perceived 
as a completely new and experimental concept, coming with 
real and relevant risks, the process of European integration was 
presented and accepted by a political majority as a continuation of 
what the Netherlands had ages of experience with: instrumental 
internationalism. Although it was acknowledged that the means 
were new – never before had the Netherlands joined in supranational 
organisations on which it conferred military sovereignty – the ground-
breaking character of the integration process was never discussed 
as such. It stands out that a broad majority in the Dutch parliament 
was gladly willing to hand over national sovereignty and national 
parliamentary control as long as this would pay off in terms of economic 
and political security for the Netherlands. This way of thinking, in 
which there was hardly any room for the fundamental objections of the 
cpn, sgp and the like, based on considerations of national sovereignty, 
befitted the land of Grotius that had a long tradition of believing that 
the sovereignty of the Dutch state was only there as long as it was 
granted by the international community.
The parliamentary debate on approval of the edc Treaty is 
particularly interesting in shedding light on the extent to which the 
political majority was willing to yield its control on the national 
constitution – considered in many other countries a strong symbol 
and safeguard of national legal sovereignty –252 in order for the edc to 
get off the ground. A majority of the Dutch parliament was ready to 
interpret the Article 63 as allowing a departure from its right to control 
the national defence budget. In fact, by doing so, it voluntarily yielded 
this right. It strikingly shows how the early post-war determination of 
91
the Dutch parliament to strengthen its democratic competences in the 
field of treaty making gave way in favour of the coming into being of a 
new European institution. It is indicative of the strong belief, existent 
with a firm parliamentary majority, in the benefits of the still very new 
and unpredictable process of European integration. To be sure, the 
tabling and approval of the Klompé amendment, shows that democratic 
concerns were still present. The explicit attention for the parliamentary 
right of approval of implementation agreements following from 
the edc Treaty, however, could not alter the fact that an important 
safeguard for strong democratic control had been given away by directly 
opening up the Dutch constitutional order for international treaty law 
by means of Article 63. 
2.3  Submission to Progressive Integration:  
the Treaties of Rome (1957)
With the elimination of the bill of approval of the treaty from the 
French parliamentary agenda in August 1954, the history of the edc 
ended different from what the Dutch parliament had anticipated. 
Consequently, at least for the time being, it kept its say on the national 
military budget. This development was not mourned about in Dutch 
governmental circles. The Drees cabinet had never univocally embraced 
the notion of losing its sovereignty in this matter. It had only accepted 
it as necessary consequence of serving its international economic and 
political interest. Eventually, the rearming of the Federal Republic of 
Germany and its accession to nato – two of the main objectives of 
the edc Treaty – were arranged after all through an amendment of the 
Brussels Pact of 1948.253 With the dropping of edc plans, intentions for 
establishing a European Political Community (epc) to form a political 
equivalent of the edc, also faded away. 
But the wish for new integration initiatives remained. The ever 
more daunting international political situation, as has been referred 
to in the introduction of this chapter, only fuelled the minds of the 
European political elites. When halfway the 1950s the Benelux-
memorandum initiated by Johan Willem Beyen cranked up a ‘rélance 
européenne’, new chances for integration developed. After a series 
of negotiations, and the drafting of the Spaak-report (1956)254 these 
chances materialised in the signing of the Treaties Establishing the 
European Economic Community (eec) and Euratom in Rome on 25 
March 1957. 
By means of the eec Treaty, cooperation and harmonisation in 
the ECSC-field of the heavy industries was to be supplemented by 
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integration in areas such as customs duties, tariffs and agriculture. 
This implied that the scope of European activities would be largely 
extended, touching upon policy areas such as social affairs, migration 
and agriculture; fields that had until then been strongly characterised 
by national traditions. In fact, the Rome treaties expressed the joint 
ambition of the Six to integrate also in fields not directly related to the 
economy. The much cited preamble of the eec Treaty, stating that the 
treaty functioned as the foundation of ‘an ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe’, is a clear indication in this direction. To effectuate 
these ambitions, new European institutions, invested with exclusive 
powers, would be set up. This implied that, after having transferred 
such powers to the High Authority of the ecsc, the Member States 
again needed to delegate parts of their sovereign competences to the 
European or ‘communitarian’ level of governance. 
The eec Treaty introduced a framework for further integration, 
but the impact of the document depended on decisions of future leaders 
of the Community. The exact scope of power of the newly designed 
institutions was therefore not immediately clear. Nevertheless it was 
agreed that the eec would have a controlling assemblée and an executive 
Commission at its disposal. In this context, it was agreed that, for the 
time being, the assemblée would have an advisory function, which 
implied a lack of real legislative power, and would not be directly 
elected. Via the Council of Ministers – again similar to the edc design – 
the governments of the Member States would stay involved in the 
decision making process of the European Community, but only in 
those areas that had not already been assigned to the Commission. It is 
important to note that it was laid down in the eec Treaty that after a 
start-up phase, as of 1970 the intergovernmentally organised Council of 
Ministers would start to decide by means of qualified majority voting 
(qmv). The Council of Ministers would thus over time develop into a 
supranational organ.
Whereas the eec Treaty so far followed the institutional design 
of the ecsc and the edc, it went further on one important point: 
the European Court of Justice (ecj) would be invested with greater 
authority. Under the ecsc Treaty, the task of the court had been to keep 
a watchful eye on the lawfulness of the actions of the High Authority of 
the ecsc. After approval of the Treaties of Rome, the ecj would also be 
competent to watch over an unequivocal interpretation of the law of the 
European Communities. Article 177 of the eec Treaty laid down that: 
‘ the Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary 
rulings concerning: 
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a.  the interpretation of the Treaty;
b.  the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the 
Community;
c.  the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act 
of the Council, where those statutes so provide.’ 
This provision furthermore stated that if a question of interpretation 
of the eec Treaty emerged before a national court or tribunal, it could 
refer this question to the ecj for a preliminary ruling thereon. It also 
stated that if ‘any such question’ was raised ‘in a case pending before a 
court or tribunal of a Member State, against whose decisions there is no 
judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the 
matter before the Court of Justice.’ In essence, Article 177 potentially 
turned the ecj into a sort of pre-Constitutional Court of the European 
Communities.255 How far its competences would actually reach, could 
only become clear in time, but the potential integrative power of the ecj 
was there as soon as the article entered into force. 
Thus, the institutional changes in the Treaties of Rome implied 
significant consequences for the legal and political organisation of 
the Six. Although these states – until then sovereign lord and master 
in most policy areas – continued to exist, the Rome Treaties would 
unite them into one, bigger political community for which separate 
legislative, executive, and judicial powers were laid down. Seen 
from this perspective, the signing of the Treaties of Rome in 1957 
can be marked as a crucial moment of redefinition for the political 
communities of the Member States. Again, the national political 
communities of the Six were asked to consider their European 
aspirations and national sovereignty. How this was done by the political 
elite of the Netherlands, is the subject of this section. The focus will 
pre-dominantly be on the eec Treaty. It affected the Dutch polity 
widely in the fields of politics, economy, and law. The Euratom Treaty, 
that was exclusively aimed at unifying European policies in the field of 
nuclear energy, was far less controversial.256 Therefore, the public and 
parliamentary discussions on this new step in the process of European 
unification primarily focused on the eec agreements.
The position of the government
The Dutch government responsible for the signing of the Treaties 
of Rome and for presenting them to the Dutch parliament was the 
fourth and last government led by Willem Drees (1956-1958). Again it 
consisted of representatives of the still influential and pro-European 
kvp and PvdA and of the two Protestant-Christian parties of the arp 
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and chu. This time the complete office of the Minister of Foreign 
affairs was offered to Joseph Luns. He was to hold this post until 
1971. As the first person responsible for foreign affairs, he acted as the 
primary defender of the new treaties in the plenary debate. Other 
members of the government, increasingly accountable for parts of 
Dutch European policy at the time, were the State Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs responsible for European Affairs, Ernst van der Beugel (PvdA), 
the Minister of Economic Affairs, Jelle Zijlstra (arp), and the Minister 
of Agriculture, Sicco Mansholt (PvdA).257 These men contributed to 
the debate when policy aspects of their specific field of activity were 
discussed. 
In the explanatory memorandum, the government explicitly 
linked the development of the eec Treaty to the instrumental pro-
unification line that the Dutch government had set in motion shortly 
after the Second World War.258 The treaty and its provisions were 
presented as a logical continuation of the policy line launched with the 
establishment of the ecsc, the failed attempts to found the edc and 
the epc, and the recent plan for a rélance of the European integration 
project. Yet, the eec was presented as essentially different from the 
previous moves in the sense that it was a decisive step in the process. 
According to the government, approval of the eec Treaty meant ‘that 
a return is not possible any longer and that the only question which 
is left is how long it will take before the ultimate goal will have been 
reached.’259 The government stated that the ambition to develop a 
federation or confederation as it had been laid down in the edc Treaty 
had inspired the development of the eec and Euratom.260 But how 
that ambition related to the actual result in the Treaties was not made 
explicit. On the details of the final goal the Dutch government was not 
very explicit. Interestingly, it appears to have interpreted the objective 
of an ‘ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’ as to imply ‘the 
strengthening of the political ties between the Member States.’261 It 
underlines the basic attitude of the successive Drees governments in 
which the process of European integration was essentially still seen as 
a means for reaching cooperation between national states, and not as a 
process of moving towards one statelike association. The fourth Drees 
cabinet spoke of merging of economic interests, ongoing deliberations 
and the inevitable growth of solidarity and unity in Europe, but did not 
put a federal or otherwise constitutional label on the future objective.262 
This is not really to be wondered at, however, when it is considered 
that the Drees cabinet did not perceive the process as dealing with the 
formation of a new European political identity.
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The necessity argument, based on economic and safety 
considerations, remained central. Similar to the ecsc and the edc 
Treaty, approval of the eec Treaty was presented as a ‘necessary 
and welcome step […] on the way to European unity […].’263 It was 
presented as a vital condition for the survival of Europe as a whole. It 
would contribute to solving the historical rivalry between France and 
Germany, to strengthening the voice of Europe in international politics 
and to normalising the relations between Germany and the rest of the 
Member States.264 In doing so, the Treaty would also serve specific 
Dutch interests. The removal of trade barriers, the government stated, 
would open up new potential markets for Dutch trade and industry 
sectors, which was considered essential for the development of the 
Netherlands: ‘In particular for the Dutch economy, whose prosperity, 
more than any other country, is so pre-eminently dependent 
on its export, the widening of its own market is of fundamental 
importance.’265 In addition, it was argued, that certain Dutch sectors of 
trade and industry would also be able to profit from the higher degree of 
specialisation that would occur in a larger market. 
It stands out in these arguments that, again, the Netherlands 
was singled out as a country depending – more than others – on 
good international relations for its economic well-being. Whereas 
the government admitted that the exact consequences of economic 
integration for the Netherlands were unpredictable – much depended 
on how the different sectors of trade and industry would respond to 
the new possibilities and to the policies that the institutions of the 
Community would pursue – the trust in the positive effects of joining 
a European economic partnership was great.266 This line of argument 
shows once again that the government approached the process of 
European integration as instrumental to supporting particular interests 
of the Netherlands. There was no reasoning in favour of an integrated 
Europe per se. 
Since, in accordance with the Dutch constitutional arrangements, 
the government had independently – without parliamentary 
consultation – negotiated on and signed the eec treaty, much depended 
on the parliamentary debate on approval, in case such a debate was 
called for. Before the representatives of the Dutch people, the result of 
months of preparations and deliberations of government officials would 
be validated or rejected. It was to the advantage of the government 
that the coalition partners of the PvdA and kvp were generally 
enthusiastic about new steps in the process of European integration. 
Their vote in favour of the treaty could be counted on. The position 
of the parliamentary parties of the arp and chu was different. Both 
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supported the idea of a peaceful European legal order that was expected 
to follow from integration, but worried, on the other hand, that 
transferring too much sovereignty to the European level, uncontrolled 
and too quickly, would not be in the interest of the Netherlands.267 In 
the ranks of both parties there were zealous supporters next to devoted 
opponents. The prime-minister of the war cabinet and now one of the 
most prominent ARP-members, Pieter Gerbrandy, for instance, proved 
to be more and more critical of the process of European integration.268 
Therefore, opposition could be expected from these parties in the 
plenary debate. The same held true for the opposition parties in 
parliament, such as the liberal vvd – in the 1950s internally divided on 
the European question – and the distinctly anti-European Communist 
cpn and the Christian-conservative sgp. These parties opposed the 
Treaty fiercely. 
The government also needed to reckon with another form of 
protest that had hitherto largely been lacking. Notwithstanding the 
still ardent pleas of Dutch intellectual believers in the process of 
European integration,269 the Treaties of Rome – the eec Treaty in 
particular – were the first products of European integration to result 
in overt protest from influential sections of the Dutch society. Despite 
the positive economic effects predicted to follow from the eec Treaty, 
the Dutch trade and industry sector, especially the leaders of industry 
and commerce in the Rotterdam region, feared an economic setback 
in the form of a deterioration of the Dutch trading position.270 The 
details of these worries will be discussed later, but it is relevant to notice 
here that the existence of this public criticism, at least to some extent, 
influenced the course of the debate. The concerns were expressed by 
parliamentarians and were shared by the government.
A third difficulty for the government on the road to getting 
the treaty approved stemmed from the implementation of the 
constitutional reform in 1953, in particular the introduction of Article 
63. Again, similar to the approval procedure of the edc, it was in the 
interest of the government to convince parliament that the provisions 
of the eec Treaty did not conflict with the Dutch constitution and 
could therefore be approved by a regular parliamentary majority. Since 
the eec did not as explicitly conflict with the Dutch constitution as the 
edc had done, the government took the plunge. In the Bill of Approval, 
the Treaty was presented as to be approved by a simple majority in 
accordance with Article 60, subsection 2 of the Dutch constitution.271 
On this point, however, the Dutch Council of State [in Dutch: Raad van 
State] – the highest advisory organ on legal matters of the Netherlands, 
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which was consulted before treaties were sent to parliament – 
immediately blew the whistle on the Dutch government.272 
On the eec Treaty, the Council of State remarked that: ‘the Treaty 
itself and the accompanying conferment of national competence on 
international organisations imply deviations from the constitution.’273 
For that reason, it argued that Article 63 of the constitution should be 
applied. This would signify that approval of the treaty could only be 
given with a special two-thirds majority of the votes in parliament. 
The advice was based on two arguments. In the first place the Council 
considered that certain provisions in the eec Treaty dealing with 
the abolition of mutual trading tariffs and restrictions, held out 
the prospect of considerable changes in the implementation phase 
of the treaty without the involvement of the national parliaments. 
Although this might be considered necessary from an organisational 
point of view, the Council observed, it also implied a break with 
Article 60, subsection 2 of the Dutch Constitution, which stated that 
all international agreements should be presented to parliament for 
ratification. Secondly, Article 177 of the eec Treaty was interpreted by 
the Dutch Council of State as affecting the independence of the national 
judge. This was deemed a breach with the Dutch constitution since ‘for 
a party concerned this may mean that he is denied the judge assigned 
to him by Dutch law (Article 170, subsection 1 of the Constitution [of 
1953]).’274 This objection resembled the complaint of the Communists 
with regard to the Court of the ecsc.275 In 1951, the cpn had – without 
success – already argued that the independent position of the European 
court threatened the legal protection and certainty of Dutch citizens on 
the national level. With the authority of the European Court of Justice 
extended through the Treaties of Rome, the Council of State apparently 
considered this risk to become more real. 
The government had an interest in a quick approval of the eec 
Treaty. Following the Article 63 procedure was undesirably severe 
when compared to the lighter procedure of Article 60, subsection 2. 
In this context, it stands out that the government decided to disregard 
the recommendation of the Council of State. With regard to the first 
argument of the Council the government reminded parliament of the 
approval of the ecsc Treaty, which had been approved under the old 
constitution and which had not been considered a deviation from 
the national Constitution, although it contained similar provisions. 
The government claimed that the recent introduction of Article 60, 
subsection 2 in the Constitution could hardly be understood as to ‘bring 
all articles of the treaty with afore-mentioned intent under the effect 
of the present Article 63 of the Constitution.’276 This line of reasoning 
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was clearly aimed at withdrawing the treaty in question from the new 
constitutional arrangements because the new regulation did not come 
in handy here. 
In reaction to the second objection of the Council on Article 177 
of the eec Treaty, the cabinet similarly rebutted that the ecsc Treaty 
contained a similar clause, namely Article 41. With regard to that treaty 
no such discussion had emerged. Moreover, the government stated 
that eventually it ‘[remains] for the national judge to decide […] in the 
case.’277 Therefore, the government deemed it hard to see how Article 
177 could be interpreted as to imply ‘being denied the judge the law 
assigns to him’278 Ultimately then, in the view of the government the 
conclusion could only be that the eec Treaty should be approved by 
a simple majority, in accordance with Article 60, subsection 2 of the 
Dutch constitution. 
Although the constitutional system left room for putting aside the 
advice of the Council of State since its advice is not formally binding, 
the fact that the government did so in this particular case, its clear 
interest in the approval procedure of Article 60, subsection 2 and its 
rather selective ‘shopping’ in the new constitutional arrangements raise 
the question on the political motives of the government behind these 
semi-logical arguments. The minutes of the meeting of the cabinet 
of 1 July 1950 offer a fascinating view of the considerations of Drees 
cum suis. In response to a question of the prime-minister whether the 
cabinet had not better decide to go along with the advice of the Council 
of State after all, the State Secretary of Foreign Affairs Ernst van der 
Beugel (PvdA) argued that this would set an undesired precedent for 
the approval of future European treaties.279 To this, Minister Zijlstra 
of Economic Affairs (arp) added that he was not sure whether a two-
thirds majority for the eec Treaty could be secured in the Upper 
House.280 Therefore, in order for the government to be assured of the 
parliamentary approval of the eec Treaty, both men advised to stick to 
the approval procedure as laid down in article 60, subsection 2. These 
observations plainly show how pragmatic political considerations in 
favour of approval of the eec Treaty and future European Treaties were 
present in the minds of the members of the Drees iv cabinet and put 
prominently before pure constitutional reasoning. This underlines the 
vision that the government had already explicated when proposing 
the draft constitutional amendment to parliament in 1952: when the 
international interests of the Netherlands were considered to be at 
stake, strong and extensive procedures of democratic control needed to 
give ground. 
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At the time of the parliamentary debate on the Rome Treaties – in 
contrast to the post-1980 era – advice of the Council of State and the 
governmental reactions to it were not made public.281 This implied – at 
least formally – that only the government and the Council itself knew of 
the discussion on the constitutionality of the eec Treaty as it had been 
taking place between them. It is worth mentioning here that nowhere 
in the governmental communications to parliament a single word 
can be found on the advice of the Council of State, which had judged 
differently from the government in this matter of constitutionality. 
It raises the impression that in its presentation of the eec Treaty to 
parliament the Dutch government started from the old wisdom that 
what the eye does not see, the heart does not grieve over.
Debate in parliament 
The plenary debate on both Treaties of Rome was scheduled for 
October 1957. It took the Lower House no less than four days of debate 
– twice the time reserved for most debates – to decide on their approval. 
It illustrates the size and complexity of the treaties and the importance 
attached to them. 
From the start of the approval procedure, it was clear that a 
majority of the Dutch MPs would support the coming into being of 
the eec.282 In the interim report that was drawn up by a preparatory 
parliamentary committee it was already stated that a great number of 
MPs of diverse political parties declared ‘[forthwith] that in their view 
the treaties ought to approved.’283 This statement was reflected in the 
opening speeches of various spokesmen in the plenary debate in which 
the importance of approval of the treaty was emphasised.284 
It stands out that the consensus on the approval of the treaty 
was built on the conviction that the eec would yield the Netherlands 
economic growth. At the same time it rested on the negative belief that 
not approving the treaty would leave the Netherlands in undesired 
economic and political arrears compared to its European partners. Cees 
Hazenbosch (arp), for instance, accounted for his approval of the eec 
and that of many of his political friends on the following grounds: ‘We 
do that […] because we clearly see both the politically and economically 
possible value, also for our country; negatively speaking we do that, 
because rejection would bring us both politically and economically 
in an impossible position.’285 These arguments, both positive and 
negative, reveal the two sides of the instrumental mindset with which 
the political majority approached the process of European integration. 
Approval of the eec Treaty was considered by a political majority 
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– again – as an economic and political necessity, in order to safeguard 
fundamental Dutch interests. 
With a smaller group anxiety existed. The comprehensiveness 
of the eec agreement and the open end of the process of European 
integration made various parliamentarians wonder where approval 
would eventually lead to. They felt uncomfortable, supporting a treaty 
of which the economic and political consequences were incalculable. 
Telling indications of this are the metaphors used by these MPs to 
characterise the treaty, making clear the awareness that a new and 
more intimate phase in the strengthening of European relations was 
entered into, from which going back would not be simple. Pieter 
Gerbrandy opposed the treaty until the end, stating that he refused 
to come together with Germany under one roof in a ‘kind of house’ 
and the Catholic spokesman on legal matters, Karel van Rijckevorsel, 
referred to the treaty as an ‘indissoluble marriage’.286 And there was 
also the reference to a characterization introduced by the banker and 
chairman of the Rotterdam Chamber of Commerce, Karel van der 
Mandele, in an article in Economische Statistische Berichten (Economic 
Statistical Reports) of 20 March 1957, of a ‘a leap in the dark’.287 In the 
parliamentary discussion of 1 October 1957 the orthodox-protestant 
minister Pieter Zandt was the first in parliament to qualify the treaty as 
such. Subsequently, in the course of the debate this classification was 
adopted and repeatedly used by various critics of the treaty.288 Thus 
the ‘leap into the dark’ characterisation became a leading metaphor for 
those who had their doubts about the Netherlands embarking on this 
new form of European integration. 
To a great extent the concerns of the critical MPs were 
economically inspired. It stands out that they repeatedly associated the 
concept of a single European market with economic protectionism. 
Those opposing the treaty foresaw rising prices of food, raw materials 
and semi-manufactured products. Furthermore, when compared to 
the external tariff the Benelux applied, the external tariffs for trading 
outside the Economic Community would increase.289 This was deemed 
disastrous for the interests of Dutch trade and industry in Indonesia, 
the Netherlands’ former colony. MPs of the liberal vvd and the chu, 
but also various MPs from the generally pro-European kvp, warned of 
the danger that the Economic Community might easily develop into a 
protectionist ‘continental bloc surrounded by a tariff wall’.290 
This fear of creating a protectionist European bloc went deeper 
than merely the negative economic consequences foreseen. It was 
rooted in a feeling of breaking with some of the most fundamental 
traits that had characterised the trade policies of the land of Grotius 
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for hundreds of years: liberalism and free trade overseas. According to 
Herman van Leeuwen, the financial spokesman of the vvd, ‘we’, the 
Dutch, did not belong ‘by virtue nor by our tradition, mentality and 
position’ in a continental bloc disposed to protectionism.291 The Dutch, 
he explained, would not feel happy when cut off by the walls of the 
Euromarket.292 
Various parliamentarians agreed and sketched a representation of 
the Netherlands not compatible with a treaty as it had been presented 
to them. The country should remain an open country that prospered in 
open relations with the rest of the world.293 This line of argument was 
rhetorically coloured by the chu parliamentarian Franz Lichtenauer, 
who as a secretary had close links with the Chamber of Commerce 
in Rotterdam, and Herman Hellema, an anti-revolutionary tax 
specialist. These financial experts called to mind the prosperity that 
international trade, especially overseas, had brought the Netherlands 
in past centuries. Images from days long past such as the explorations 
of Prince Hendrik de Zeevaarder (1820-1879) – Hendrik the Navigator, 
a younger brother of King Willem iii – and the prospering Dutch trade 
in the Hanzesteden, were called to mind. It was pointed out that Europe 
in general, and the Netherlands in particular, had always depended for 
its prospering trade upon overseas territories.294 Protectionism and 
high external tariffs, such as foreseen by the eec Treaty, could not be 
reconciled with this tradition. 
Important support for the protectionist criticism came from 
the ‘little-Europe’ critics. Following the Dutch historian Pieter 
Geyl who had started his criticism on ‘little Europe’ in articles and 
polemics halfway the 1950s,295 parliamentary criticism against the 
Europe of the Six grew. Marcus Bakker, a hard-line communist mp 
who seized every opportunity to repudiate the process of European 
integration, feared that with the adoption of the eec Treaty a bloc 
of six of the approximately thirty states on the European continent 
would be institutionalised and would be directed against countries 
such as the United Kingdom and Scandinavia.296 Here a second, for 
the Netherlands, delicate issue was raised. The Dutch traditional 
predilection for Atlantic partnerships both in the fields of economy 
and politics, was not easy to reconcile with a process of European 
integration in which the United Kingdom and other powers overseas 
would not take part. Bakker’s words on little-Europe and anti-
protectionist criticism in general, struck a sympathetic chord. Various 
MPs did not oppose the eec as such, but thought that it should admit 
more members – the United Kingdom being the first to become 
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one – and develop, not in the direction of a protectionist bloc, but as a 
partner in a larger free-trade zone.297 
A third historical reason for fearing a protectionist bloc of the Six, 
related also to the Dutch preference for Atlantic partnership, was the 
small country-perspective. MPs of various political denominations 
argued that, for a small country such as the Netherlands, giving up 
state responsibilities was a risk.298 Exemplary of this viewpoint was 
the distinction that Pieter Gerbrandy (arp) introduced in his speech 
to parliament between big and small states. Whereas the European 
integration process, characterised by delegating sovereignty, could 
be seen as ‘an experiment’ for big states, for the Netherlands and its 
‘small and law-abiding people’ it was a more serious matter.299 Based on 
historical experience, he referred to the dependence of the Netherlands 
in international affairs on the goodwill of greater powers, such as 
Germany and France. By reciting a wartime poem of the Dutch poet 
Anton van Duinkerken, recalling the trauma of Dutch serfdom during 
the German occupation, the former Prime Minister argued that the 
Netherlands should not give away its sovereignty too lightly: 
‘Nederlandsch is: een verleden  (‘[Being] Dutch is: a past) 
dat ons rechten heeft geborgd.  (that has secured us rights.)
Waar wij fier vooruit mee treden  (With which we proudly step forward)
 door ‘t geledene onbezorgd.  (not worried by the suffering of the past.)
Wordt een beet’re tijd geboren,  (When better times are born,)
achter ‘t woeden van de strijd.  (after the furies of the struggle)
Laat dan aan de wereld hooren:  (Let the world know then:)
Dat gij Nederlanders zijt.’ 300 (That you are Dutchmen’)
Gebrandy, in sum, argued that a small country such as the Netherlands 
should think twice before devoting itself to the construction of a 
protectionist bloc, ruled by greater powers such as France and Germany 
without the certainty that its interests were protected by an internal 
balance of power. Contrary to those arguing that the Dutch needed to 
join the eec, Gerbrandy in fact claimed that economic and political 
independence was the best guarantee for serving the vital interests 
of the Netherlands. It was a dissonant sound, hard to bear, in the ears 
of a political majority with an unshakeable belief in the benefits of 
internationalism.
From defence towards consensus
In defence against these criticisms, representatives of the government 
supported by their political confederates, put in an effort to convince 
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the critics of approving the treaty. In answer to the qualification of the 
treaty as ‘a leap in the dark’, the government came up with a converse 
metaphor. It admitted that the future of the Europe of the Six was 
unclear, but instead of framing it in terms of darkness it chose a lighter 
approach: ‘We now find ourselves in many ways in the dark and the 
treaty then rather means a transition to the dawn that may introduce 
the light.’301 Trust in a good result was propagated by Joseph Luns: ‘The 
road will often be difficult […] but it leads irresistibly to a new shaping 
of society among the European States, which offers the guarantee for 
a healthy and vital Europe, in which the Netherlands will occupy an 
honourable place.’302 It befitted the majority consensus in parliament 
that in order to achieve a better future, the treaty should be accepted 
despite the unpredictable consequences it might imply.
The metaphor was rhetorically further exploited by the Minister 
of Economic Affairs Jelle Zijlstra. He pictured the current situation for 
the Netherlands as being on the upper floor of a ‘smouldering house’. 
A jump into the safety-net of the firemen on the ground, a telling 
reference to the eec Treaty, was the best advice he had.303 Particularly 
interesting is Zijlstra’s added comment that the jump was needed, ‘even 
if it hurts.’304 The fruit of economic integration – the well-being and 
continued existence of the Netherlands – could only be reaped, Zijlstra 
claimed, after a price – the yielding of (parts of ) national economic 
sovereignty – was paid first. 
In broad political circles, Zijlstra’s reasoning found assent. 
Charles Welter (kvp), for instance, argued approvingly: ‘[…] the point 
is not whether the advantages of a common market will in the long 
run offset the absence or the reduction of free trade, [the point is] no 
longer our tomatoes and our butter, but [the point is] the existence of 
the Netherlands, the upholding of a tolerable existence for the whole 
nation.’305 In Welter’s perception, after the loss of the East Indies in 
1949, the Netherlands had definitely become too small to maintain 
its independent status. If so, he deemed it better to become a member 
of the eec by its own will, on the basis of equality, than to become 
a satellite, both in the field of politics and economy, of a German 
or Anglo-Saxon bloc; a scenario Welter feared in case European 
integration would not materialise.306 
This paradoxical argument in favour of voluntarily yielding 
national sovereignty in order to remain independent was based on 
the familiar topos, deeply rooted in the mindset of the Dutch political 
community. In order to maintain its position, Welter reasoned, the 
Netherlands had to rely on international partnerships, preferably based 
on treaty law. It was a powerful rhetorical instrument in the hands of 
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advocates of the treaty. To many the spectre of becoming a plaything 
in the hands of bigger powers was a motive for approving the treaty. 
The speeches of MPs from various political currents speak volumes 
in this regard. The farmer’s son, Barend Biesheuvel (arp), advocated 
approval of the treaty since the protectionist dangers threatening the 
Dutch agricultural sector ‘are greater without the treaty than with 
the treaty.’307 In an ad consequentiam argument, Pieter Oud (vvd) 
wondered loudly and cryptically ‘What if the treaty does not get its 
approval in the Chamber. What would be the consequence then!’308 
Elias Verkerk (arp) explained pragmatically: 
‘ Preservation and development of the country’s characteristics is 
in the last resort the only argument to smooth down the borders. 
We are concerned here with our contribution to the common 
cause, but by contributing we [italics added] are at stake. Only 
when I think of that, I am prepared to consider exchanging the not 
always very clear situation of 1957 for the moderate and meagre 
market regulations for the future.’309 
The comment of senator Herman Hellema (arp) strikingly summarised 
the various comments above: ‘we think that the great objective is worth 
taking these risks.’310 The nature of this ‘great objective’, however, was 
not further specified. 
Karel van Rijckevorsel (kvp) and Marcus Bakker (cpn) were 
among the few who rejected the alleged dangers of not approving 
the eec treaty as nonsense and a senseless basis for approval.311 The 
latter was the only one to pragmatically remark that a Dutch rejection 
would nullify the treaty rather than isolate the Netherlands.312 His 
call, however, did not find hearing. Again, this approach was too rigid 
a break with the widespread conviction that joining international 
partnerships would benefit the interests of the Netherlands. 
What was structurally not talked about in the parliamentary 
debate on the eec Treaty was what the eec would eventually develop 
into. European integration as a concept was still not dwelled upon. In 
that regard, the great benefits that were expected of the eec remained 
vague. In sketching the objective of economic integration in Europe, 
Foreign Minister Luns, who cannot be considered to have been a 
great idealist with regard to the process of European integration, did 
not get further than a ‘new shaping of society among the European 
states.’313 And although the Dutch MPs were well aware that the 
implementation of the eec might affect the national preferences in 
economic policies, the political consequences of accepting the treaty 
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were not systematically considered. Neither the government, nor 
the parliamentary parties supporting it, elaborated on or questioned 
the exact meaning of the objective of ‘an ever closer union among 
the peoples of Europe’ as it was laid down in the preamble of the eec 
Treaty. A political majority did not wonder if, how or to what extent 
their preferred strategy of instrumental internationalism – hitherto 
employed in more traditional forms of international cooperation – 
could be successfully applied to the process of supranationalisation 
among the Six. A process characterised by the new and quite 
revolutionary element of conferring national sovereignty to 
supranational organs. 
The national constitution deployed as an ultimate remedy
Confronted with a large majority that was willing to approve the eec 
Treaty on the basis of instrumental considerations and not prepared to 
go along with attempts of Van Rijckevorsel (kvp) and Bakker (cpn) of 
downplaying the effects of rejecting the treaty, the antagonists of the 
eec needed to think of other ways to convince their colleague MPs. 
The old issue of the undemocratic nature of international 
treaty making lent itself to this end. In the preliminary report it had 
already been expressed that a number of parliamentarians felt that 
the significance of the document at stake did not justify the hasty and 
opaque procedure in which the treaty had come about.314 The interim 
report spoke of the disappointment with parliamentarians – not further 
specified – that the Dutch trade and industry sectors had not been 
consulted in the drafting process of the eec Treaty before the Dutch 
government had put its signature.315 Now that these sectors had clearly 
uttered their reserves with regard to the acceptance of a European 
initiative, it was argued that, from a democratic point of view, a serious 
consideration of these objections would have been necessary.316 The 
remonstrance of the government that such a consultation would 
have delayed the process and as a consequence would have spoiled 
the ‘favourable political momentum’ for the signing of the treaty by 
Germany and France, was sceptically received.317
The issue reveals that the freedom the government claimed in 
international treaty making was still delicate. The significance and 
expected impact of the eec Treaty was considered greater than the 
earlier results of the process of European unifications. Where the 
process would eventually lead to was unclear. As a result, various MPs 
from the ranks of the arp, vvd, cpn and chu, worried that some of 
the core principles of the political organisation of the country were 
in danger of being sacrificed in the process of European integration. 
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In their interpretation, discussing the eec was not merely a case 
of international treaty making, but also a matter of great national 
constitutional relevance. Although the concept of conferring 
sovereignty on a higher European authority had been introduced 
already with the ecsc Treaty and the revision of the Dutch constitution 
of 1953 had made it explicitly possible, the debate on approval of the 
eec Treaty shows that this concept was still contested. The political 
antagonists of the process of European integration tried to convince 
their fellow MPs that the transference of sovereignty should end where 
the constitutional competences of parliament – i.e. involvement in 
legislative procedures and the right to control the government – began. 
They, so it would turn out, found the constitutional reform of 1953 on 
their way. 
The war-time Prime Minister, Pieter Gerbrandy (arp), took the 
lead in the debate. The integrating dynamism that was expected to be 
boosted by the establishment of the eec, was his focus of concern. 
Via the eec Treaty, not only sovereign rights could be affected by 
international regulations, as had also been the case with traditional 
treaty law, but also important rights attached to sovereignty were 
delegated now: ‘delegated in such a way that the delegating power 
itself does not know any more what will be done with that right, with 
that power.’318 Gerbrandy wondered why the government had opted 
for direct delegation to the community level of sovereignty, instead of 
choosing for a traditional treaty in which cooperating states designed 
rules that could be changed and improved in the course of time? The 
government had agreed on a procedure that deprived parliament of its 
control of laws originating from the treaty, once parliamentary approval 
of the treaty itself had been given. In this design, Gerbrandy feared that 
the Netherlands and, in particular, the Dutch parliament would lose 
fundamental controlling and co-legislative competences without the 
ability to compensate for this loss of power on the European level.319 
In short, the Dutch political community would be stripped of its 
essential authority, which, according to the ARP-politician, signified a 
‘constitutional monstrosity.’320 
Gerbrandy’s worry essentially concerned the democratic 
competences of the Dutch parliament, i.e. the right to control the 
executive. He sharply and correctly observed that the eec Treaty 
was a novelty in that it not only imposed mutual obligations on the 
signatory states (as had been the case in regular treaty law), but also 
direct obligations on citizens of the national political community. 
These ‘provisions generally binding the citizens’ [in Dutch: de burgers 
algemeen verplichtende bepalingen] were in fact provisions with a 
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legislative, substantive character, or as the vvd senator and former 
Professor in Civil Law Geert de Grooth put it: ‘In fact, they are laws; 
they bind all citizens, even to a larger extent than the actual laws do, 
because they have force of law, according to the Constitution, to render 
inoperative laws that already exist.321 Here, De Grooth referred to the 
introduction of Article 65 in the Dutch Constitution of 1953 that stated 
that ‘Legal statutory regulations within the Realm do not apply if 
these are not compatible with agreements made public either before or 
after the coming into being of the regulations […].’ The fact that these 
substantive law provisions were designed by the government – the 
executive branch – and in the Netherlands only presented à prendre ou 
à laisser to parliament – the controlling branch that had a co-legislative 
function – was, from a democratic point of view objectionable. Since 
parliamentary control in the drafting phase of the treaty had not been 
provided for by the Dutch government, Gerbrandy (arp) and De 
Grooth (vvd) held the signing of the eec Treaty to be a flouting of 
fundamental democratic principles. Not surprisingly, the most explicit 
antagonists of the concept of European integration – the Communists – 
also joined in this protest. 
At the root of this argument was an understanding of the concept 
of the nation state as the inviolable bearer of the sovereignty of the 
political community. The notion of parliamentary control being only 
effective within a sovereign state was a second supposition. This was 
clearly expressed in the following statement of Gerbrandy: ‘The State 
is different from all other associations by its sovereignty, the quality to 
speak the last word with authority and power; in our western States 
– and I say this with emphasis – under control of parliaments.’322 His 
avant la lettre-complaint about a developing democratic deficit between 
a European level of governance and the Member States was supported 
by Gerrit Vixseboxse (chu), who stated that the eec Treaty would 
severely harm ‘the main bulwark of western democracy’, namely the 
principle of democratic control.323 
In an ultimate attempt to press home his claims, Gerbrandy 
brought up the subject of the relation between the eec treaty and 
the Dutch constitution and the befitting approval procedure. He 
argued that it was not constitutionally justifiable that substantive 
law, resulting from a treaty, would not be structurally presented to 
parliament for approval. In his view it conflicted with the ‘spirit of 
our Constitution!’324 From a rhetorical point of view, a common 
dissociation lay at the root of his claim. Gerbrandy divided the 
constitution into two levels. The first was the level of the literal text, 
containing the constitutional provisions. The other level contained ‘the 
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spirit’ of the constitution, i.e. the way the articles should be read and/or 
were intended. 
On the level of the literal text, Gebrandy seemed well aware that 
the constitutional change of 1953 had removed some elements of the 
legislative and controlling competences of the national parliament in 
favour of the European level of decision making. His flight towards 
the level of intention comes across as an ultimate attempt to convince 
parliament that the eec Treaty broke with principles that defined the 
Dutch state and that it should therefore be rejected; a view that was, 
since the explicit (re)definition of these principles in 1953, difficult to 
uphold on the basis of the literal text of the Dutch constitution. 
A weak element of Gerbrandy’s argument was that the spirit of the 
constitution was hard to pin-point. Gerbrandy himself did not succeed 
in making it more tangible, since he did not attempt to give meaning 
to this concept. In spite of this vagueness, however, considerable time 
and effort was spent on refuting Gerbrandy’s argument. The ARP-
parliamentarian had broached a delicate issue. In the preparation 
leading up to the constitutional revision of 1953 and again in a process 
of technical fine-tuning of these changes in 1956,325 consensus had been 
reached on the literal text of the constitutional chapter on foreign affairs 
and the presumed working of the articles in the future. An important 
step in reaching agreement on the interpretation of the new articles had 
been taken already in the debate on the approval of the edc. Moreover, 
a parliamentary majority had already agreed to the observation of the 
government that there were no incompatibilities between the text of 
the eec Treaty and the Dutch constitution.326 Now, all of a sudden 
this consensus was challenged again and it was argued that the most 
fundamental law of the Netherlands allowed multiple interpretations. 
Again, a lively debate began on the question which competences the 
Dutch parliament had yielded when international treaty making was at 
stake and which competences it could still claim.
The prominent liberal statesman and constitutional expert Pieter 
Oud was the first to launch an attack against Gerbrandy. He started 
with a plea that the character of the eec Treaty was essentially not very 
different from traditional treaty law. Oud emphasised that the latter 
had always encompassed the transference of sovereignty to a higher 
level of government. Seen from this perspective the eec Treaty was 
nothing more than just another exponent of international cooperation; 
a form of internationalism that the Dutch had been acquainted with 
for ages. Secondly, implicitly referring to Article 67 of the constitution, 
Oud contested Gerbrandy’s claim that transference of sovereignty 
to a European level of governance, without consulting parliament, 
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conflicted with the Dutch constitution: ‘We have expressly entered into 
our Constitution that legislative, governing and judicial competences 
can be assigned to international organisations. […] I do not understand 
how it can be said now: “you act contrary to the Constitution.”’327
Oud’s first comment was not countered by Gerbrandy. Viewed 
with the benefit of historical distance, this seems an opportunity 
lost, since it would not have been difficult to take the edge off this 
argument. Indeed traditional treaty law and treaty making in the 
process of European integration were alike in that both forms asked for 
the transference of national competences. But the two forms differed 
on a crucial point. In traditional processes of international cooperation 
the higher level of governance was invested with power that its 
signatory powers transferred, but this power was not self-executing. 
Every bit of sovereignty transferred to the common level was to be 
authorised by the signatory parties. This mechanism, however, did not 
apply to the process of European integration. Here a common level of 
governance was created that was not only invested with sovereignty 
yielded by the signatory states, it was also given the competence to 
use this sovereignty to deepen existing competences and to develop 
new ones. The treaty provisions directly binding the Dutch citizens 
were one example, just like the interpretative competence of the ecj 
as laid down in Article 177 and the implementation agreements that 
would follow from the treaty. A competing governing and legislative 
power was established with drastic consequences for the Dutch 
legislator, the citizens and the constitutional order as a whole. Seen 
from this perspective, Gerbrandy could have easily countered the first 
argument by stating that the transference of the sovereignty required, 
was extended much further than had been the case with traditional 
treaty making. However, he did not do so. An explanation might be 
that Gerbrandy himself did not (yet) clearly see the difference between 
the two forms of developing international partnerships. Although his 
interventions in the debate show that, at least intuitively, Gerbrandy 
knew that the eec Treaty was different – in kind – compared to earlier 
international agreements, it might well be that because of the lack 
of experience with such a process of supranationalisation and the 
unpredictability of its effects, Gerbrandy was not able to pin point the 
conceptual difference sharply and to put Oud in his place. 
Instead, Gerbrandy only rebutted – repeating his claim – that 
whereas the procedure applied by the government might not be 
verbatim a violation of the Dutch constitution, in his view it certainly 
was a breach of the spirit of the constitution.328 Oud replied in a classic 
post hoc ergo propter hoc way of reasoning: ‘It is not contrary to the 
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spirit of the Constitution at all. Before 1953 one could have wondered 
if it was contrary to the spirit of the Constitution. In the constitutional 
revision of 1953 we have explicitly laid down the power to do this. This 
may be considered inappropriate or wrong, that is all very well, but in 
my view there is not any inconsistency with the Constitution.’329
By stating this, Oud implicitly emphasised the central problem. 
Interpreting the constitution to one’s own taste was not a problem as 
longs as this document floated up in the air, above everyday politics and 
without the consequences of everyday reality. But now that the Dutch 
parliament as a whole needed to decide on the eec Treaty and both 
advocates and opponents legitimised their view via the constitution, 
a decisive explanation of the articles in question seemed again highly 
relevant. The ‘real’ spirit of the constitution, in other words, needed to 
be determined. 
Parliamentary support for Oud’s view far outweighed the backing 
of Gerbrandy’s position. Supported by the complete PvdA party, 
Minister Luns put Gerbrandy in his proper place. The fait accompli 
line of Luns’s reasoning, deployed to reject Gerbrandy’s view, is 
fascinating. Approval of the Treaties of Rome, of which the eec Treaty 
was an integral part, Luns stated, was no more than a consolidation 
and broadening of the choice to establish the European Coal and Steel 
Community. In a time in which Article 67 of the constitution had been 
accepted, in which the Coal and Steel-statute had been adopted and 
in which, although not put in force, the EDC-treaty had come about, 
Gerbrandy could not seriously insist that by signing and approving 
the eec Treaty government broke new ground.330 According to Luns, 
the Netherlands had already made a fundamental choice in favour of a 
‘special solidarity’ with the other five Member States with the approval 
of the ecsc. Now the consequences of this choice, i.e. the development 
of the eec, had to be accepted as well.331 Taking the same line, the 
European-minded Van der Goes van Naters remarked cleverly that by 
approving the ECSC-Treaty and the constitutional changes of 1953, 
Gerbrandy and his party had assisted in creating the possibility to confer 
Dutch executive and parliamentary competences on higher organs.332 
‘We made that choice very intentionally and there is no question of 
any drama whatsoever.’333 The ship had sailed five years earlier, was the 
message rendered to Gerbrandy and there was no return now. 
Remarkably, this connection of succession between the approval 
of the ecsc and the signing of the government of the eec Treaty was 
not challenged in parliament. A rejection of the argument could have 
been based on the observation that the scope and competence of the 
eec reached much further than could ever have been foreseen at the 
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time the ecsc and the constitutional reform had been approved. Such 
a consideration was, however, not heard in the debate. Considering 
the broad parliamentary consensus on the intrinsic value of striving 
for European integration, one may wonder how much effect such an 
argument would have had, if it had been applied. In 1957, a political 
majority in the Netherlands was more than willing to see the successive 
European treaties and decisions to facilitate their implementation 
as logically and necessarily resulting from each other. This majority 
was consciously building on a unified Europe – regardless of how this 
process would eventually turn out – and was willing to sacrifice national 
sovereignty for this purpose. 
Given the lack of backing Gerbrandy received,334 the observation 
seems justified that, on a substantive level, consensus existed among 
the parliamentary majority that the treaty, its approval procedure and 
the autonomous effect it introduced, did not go against the text nor 
the spirit of the Dutch constitution. In fact, consensus was established 
here on its spirit and the general interpretation of the constitutional 
reform of 1953. A political majority showed itself again eager to accept 
an interpretation of the new constitutional arrangement that confirmed 
the open attitude of the Netherlands’ political order towards the process 
of European integration. This implied that it was willing to explain 
the relevant articles of the Dutch constitution in such a way that the 
Netherlands and its political organisation – from a constitutional point 
of view – needed to clear the way for the European institutions to 
develop.
The Klompé amendment revisited 
Notwithstanding the widespread consensus on the compatibility of 
the eec Treaty with the Dutch Constitution, the Dutch parliament 
put a condition on its approval. Similar to the Klompé amendment 
that was introduced in relation to the edc Treaty, Pieter Blaisse (kvp), 
wanted consultation of the parliament with regard to future legislation 
that would stem from the eec Treaty. The amendment that he and 
his co-signatories of three of the four coalition parties (kvp, chu, 
arp) introduced, asked for the insertion of an extra article in the Bill 
of Approval that laid down that, if for the implementation of the eec 
Treaty further agreements were concluded, these would have to be 
submitted for approval of the States-General.335 
The amendment indicates that a concern about completely losing 
sight and control of what was decided on the European level, was 
still present in parliament. Moreover, the amendment illustrates that 
its submitters realised that they had embarked on an experimental 
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journey of which the future consequences could hardly be foreseen. 
The coming into existence of the eec was welcomed in principle, 
just like the fact that the Treaty would be executed autonomously on 
the basis of implementation agreements. Yielding a carte blanche to 
Europe, however, was considered of such consequence that it should 
be prevented: ‘[…] on approval of the treaty a free hand will have 
been given for a period of 15 years, in order to conclude all kinds of 
implementation agreements among the Member-States. We very 
much appreciate […] that such agreements are made dependent on our 
approval.’336 The amendment found assent in a wide parliamentary 
circle, also with those parliamentarians that had been critical of the 
treaty in the first place. The amendment, for instance, befitted the view 
of Karel van Rijckevorsel – one of the few kvp critics of the Treaties 
of Rome – who had proposed a transitional phase of a terminable 
engagement before an indissoluble European marriage was entered 
into.337 
In the government, however, the Blaisse amendment – similar 
to its predecessor formulated by Klompé – was met with fierce 
protest. It regarded the condition as an objectionable obstacle to the 
freedom of the government to act on the international stage. Prime 
Minister Drees was concerned with the delays that extra parliamentary 
consultation would produce.338 The argument that an amendment of 
this import undermined the negotiating position of the Netherlands 
was also dug up again.339 In sum, the objection was that negotiating 
on the international stage (of which the European stage was seen as an 
integral part), in accordance with Dutch interests, presupposed a Dutch 
parliament that was not too strict in the understanding of its task as a 
co-legislative and controlling organ. 
Marinus van der Goes van Naters (PvdA) supported the 
governmental objections, albeit with somewhat different 
considerations: 
‘ The delaying aspect does not play such an important part for me, 
but what does for me and my friends is that this reversal of these 
communal agreements to the national Parliaments frustrates […] 
the development of European internal lawmaking. […] [It] is a 
kind of defeatism, which I consider incredible and dangerous for 
the further development to an international and supranational 
parliamentary control.’340 
A staunch federalist, Van der Goes van Naters spoke of European 
internal lawmaking, ignoring that legislation made in the European 
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institutions would not stay on some sort of abstract European level, 
but would flow back to the Member States. For him this national level 
of control was redundant, since, within his conception of a European 
federation, full parliamentary control was to be established on the 
European level. Here, however, he was far ahead of the European 
political reality and of many of his fellow MPs. With the ratification 
of the eec Treaty, a head start would be made with creating a 
European political community, but a parliamentary democracy as it 
had developed on the national level, that pre-supposed a European 
parliament with full legislative power, still seemed light-years away. 
More towards the end of the debate in the Lower House, Van 
der Goes van Naters emphasised his stance again by presenting 
the amendment proposed by Blaisse as ‘seen from an evolutionary 
perspective, putting the cart before the horse.’341 The fait accompli-
argument – an argument of succession in the terms of Perelman – was 
used again. His view was that the Dutch parliament had in fact – by its 
decision to support the motion Van der Goes van Naters/Serrarens 
in 1948 and by its approval of the ECSC-Treaty and the constitutional 
revision of 1953 – already given up its co-legislative power when it 
came to the development of European laws. Confronting it with its 
approval of previous political steps, Van der Goes van Naters tried to 
convince parliament that power was claimed here that had already been, 
voluntarily, yielded and should not be claimed back. 
The arguments as put forward by Van der Goes van Naters did not 
elicit much response in parliament, let alone endorsement. Support for 
the amendment remained widespread. In defending it, Pieter Blaisse 
and co-signatories stood firm. The argument of delay was countered 
by the consideration that approval of the implementation agreements 
by tacit consent – as made possible by the introduction of article 61 in 
the Dutch constitution in 1953 – could solve this problem. Thus, delays 
could be prevented in most cases.342 The reasoning in this rebuttal is 
exemplary for how the drafters of amendment approached the process 
of European integration. Instead of remonstrating that some delay 
in the approval procedure was to be preferred to the complete loss of 
parliamentary involvement in European legislative processes, – this line 
of thought would have been perfectly defendable from the perspective 
of national democracy – Blaisse c.s. chose to argue that such a delay 
could be prevented by following the speedier option of approval by tacit 
consent. It illustrates the disposition of a political majority that was 
very concerned about missing the European boat, while not worrying 
too much about a transparent and extensive approval procedure on the 
national level, in which all pros and cons could pass in review. 
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On 4 October the Blaisse-Amendment was passed with 85 to 
45 votes. All votes against were, similar to the vote on the Klompé 
amendment, produced by the PvdA. Eventually then, 4 October 1957, an 
overwhelming majority of 115 to 12 of the representatives in the Lower 
House approved of the European Economic Community. Definite 
approval followed in December of that year when in the Upper House 
support was reconfirmed by a majority of 46 to 4 voting in favour of 
the treaty.343 The coalition parties kvp en arp produced one negative 
vote each in the Lower House. Not surprisingly Karel van Rijckevorsel 
and Pieter Gerbrandy were responsible. In the Upper House, two of the 
seven vvd senators, Geert de Grooth and Anthonie Molenaar, and in 
the Lower House the liberal mp Herman van Leeuwen,344 voted against 
the treaty. The other negative votes in this House came from the cpn 
and the sgp. 
Although a political majority seems to have been well aware 
that the eec Treaty implied a decisive step in the process of European 
integration, it treated its approval as if it considered it no more than the 
confirmation of a path and a goal that had already been decided on, or as 
a logical result stemming from it. It was demonstrated in this chapter 
that, from the outset of the debate, a parliamentary majority perceived 
the eec Treaty as being in line with the European integration policy 
that it had committed itself to since 1948. 
Instrumental considerations were important in adopting the 
eec Treaty. Similar to the initiatives of the ecsc and edc, joining the 
eec was judged necessary in order to safeguard the vital economic and 
political interests of the Netherlands. On a more fundamental level, the 
approval can be ascribed to the willingness of a parliamentary majority 
to strip the state of the Netherlands of certain nation-state prerogatives 
in order to guarantee the continued existence of the country. In other 
words, the transference of sovereignty to a European executive was 
deemed necessary in order to prevent worse. This willingness resulted 
from the deeply rooted conviction, that the Netherlands was too 
small to survive without the support of international partners. In 
this conviction the fundamental paradox guiding the Netherlands 
in its approach to the process of European integration in these years 
becomes clear: in order to preserve the Netherlands and the identity 
of the Dutch polity, the country needed to become part of a bigger 
entity, i.e. eec. The firm belief that the Netherlands would not be able 
to survive on its own also explains the fait accompli lines of reasoning 
in the parliamentary debate. In fact, to the various speakers their basic 
assumption were self-evident and therefore not to be discussed or 
questioned. 
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The various lines of argument met in the sub-debate that 
arose on the interpretation of the recent amendment of the Dutch 
constitution. When Gerbrandy tried to restrict the purport of the 
articles introduced in 1953 by means of the artifice of dissociating the 
spirit of the constitution from its wording, he was virtually jeered 
off the platform by his colleague MPs. The reactions made clear that a 
great majority explicitly desired to interpret the constitutional reform 
as making possible in the process of international treaty making the 
transference of sovereignty and the renouncement of legislative and 
controlling competences. These possibilities were perceived to have 
been constitutionally settled in 1953; as if they were faits accomplis, not 
to be reconsidered. By doing this, a parliamentary majority confirmed 
its view that the identity of the Dutch polity should be characterised 
by openness towards the outside world. The isolating or national 
integrative effect that a national constitution traditionally had was 
dismissed in favour of this fundamental openness. 
The discrepancy between the little criticism of parliament vis-à-
vis the constitutionality of the eec Treaty and the severe doubts of the 
Council of State and Pieter Gerbrandy in this matter is conspicuous. 
It shows that within the broader spectrum of the Dutch political 
community at the time of the adoption of the eec Treaty there was 
no consensus on either the interpretation of the new constitutional 
articles nor on the open identity of the Dutch polity. The fact that 
both government and a political majority explicitly turned a deaf ear 
to these objections is indicative of the hierarchy in desires and values 
that a political majority preferred: proceeding with the process of 
European integration was the main concern, not be frustrated by rigid 
constitutional or democratic reasoning. It again confirms the priority of 
openness that this majority held. 
One limit was, however, heeded. The adoption of the Blaisse-
amendment indicates that a majority of the Dutch parliament did 
not feel comfortable with the role of Europe as an independent 
legislator, not controlled at all by the national parliaments. 
Parliamentary participation from the national level in the coming 
about of implementation agreements was deemed essential. Here, a 
last important observation must be made. The concern of parliament 
on the self-executing effect of the treaty indicates that it was aware 
that European integration would proceed beyond the level of the 
arrangements as had been laid down in the treaty text. Yet, remarkably 
little attention was paid in the debate to the future perspectives of 
European integration and its eventual consequences for the Dutch 
state. Thus, fundamental state competences were conferred on a 
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European level of governance without having a clear picture of how 
and to what purpose these competences would be applied and to what 
extent the Netherlands would still have a say in this. The history of 
European integration would show that this would have far-reaching 
consequences. The eec became a fait accompli on which a powerful and 
competent Europe could be built. The floodgate had been flung wide 
already in 1953, but the approval of the eec Treaty in 1957 was an open 
invitation for the tide to rise. 
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‘[…] [we] also liked to be seen as one of the champions of further 




Way leads on to way.346 A good illustration of these words of the 
American poet Robert Frost is found in the history of ratification of the 
Treaties of Rome and the developments that followed in its aftermath. 
With the implementation of the provisions of these Treaties in the 
national judicial domain of the Six, questions concerning interpretation 
started to rise among national legal experts.347 In order to solve these 
questions uniformly and consistently throughout the eec, Article 177 of 
the eec Treaty offered the means by which such legal questions could 
be referred to the ecj, in order to elicit a ‘preliminary ruling.’ After such 
a preliminary ruling had been given, the national courts could finish 
the case on the basis of the ECJ’s interpretation. Throughout Europe, 
after that treaty entered into force on 1 January 1958, the introduction 
of this system aroused the attention of lawyers with a special interest in 
international law and the new system of European law that was still in 
its infancy. 
Dutch lawyers, in particular those of the Dutch branch of the 
Fédération Internationale pour le Droit Européen (fide, the European 
Lawyers’ Association), actively searched for ways to exploit the chances 
offered by Article 177.348 On 21 May 1962 one of its members, the 






with Hans Stibbe, name giver of the famous Stibbe law firm, took a 
chance when defending the Dutch transport company Van Gend & 
Loos before the Tariefcommissie, the Dutch tax court. They argued that 
the government of the Netherlands infringed on Article 12 of the EEC-
Treaty, by holding on to agreements between the Benelux countries, as 
laid down in the Brussels Protocol (25 July 1958), which implied a rise 
of customs tariffs.349 The argument on which they built their case was 
that Article 12 of the eec Treaty should be understood as to have direct 
effect, which would mean that the transport company Van Gend & 
Loos could directly rely on this article in its refusal to comply with the 
provisions of the Brussels Protocol.350 
Although the Netherlands had recorded the principle of direct 
effect in its national constitution in 1956 and the primacy of treaty 
provisions over national law had been decided on in 1953 already, the 
Dutch tax authorities, confronted with this case, claimed there had 
not been unlawful tariff increases and that the transport company Van 
Gend en Loos could not rely on the direct effect of Article 12 of the eec 
Treaty. The tax authorities were supported in their stance by the Dutch, 
Belgian and German governments, all involved in this cross-border 
legal dispute. They believed that the eec Treaty should be interpreted 
as a regular treaty, falling within traditional international law. In their 
interpretation, any alleged infringement of the treaty by a Member 
State could be submitted to the judgment of the ecj on the initiative 
of another Member State or of the Commission, but never by national 
citizens before a national court.351 We like to be our own master in our 
own house, was the stance in Brussels, Bonn and The Hague.352
The history of European law took a decisive turn when the Dutch 
tax court, on the basis of Article 177 of the eec Treaty, decided to refer 
this question on interpretation of Article 12 to the ecj for a preliminary 
ruling. It was crucial that the question of direct effect ‘was removed 
from national constitutional law and laid in the hand of the Court of 
Justice.’353 A true legal revolution occurred when the ecj, presided by 
the Dutch judge Andréas Donner, decided, firstly, that it was competent 
to rule in the matter and, secondly, that Article 12 had direct effect 
indeed.354 As the basis for this conclusion, key elements from the text of 
the eec Treaty were presented. The Court argued that: 
‘ The objective of the eec Treaty, which is to establish a Common 
Market, the functioning of which is of direct concern to interested 
parties in the Community, implies that this Treaty is more than an 
agreement [italics added] which merely creates mutual obligations 
between the contracting states. This view is confirmed by the 
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preamble to the Treaty which refers not only to governments but 
to peoples.’ 
After having emphasised the special character of the treaty, following 
from the fact that in the preamble the ‘peoples’ of the Six were explicitly 
referred to, the Court then ultimately reached the conclusion:
‘ […] that the Community constitutes a new legal order of 
international law for the benefit of which the states have limited 
their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the 
subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their 
nationals.’
Thus, the ecj equalled the creation of a common market in only a few 
sentences with establishing a ‘new legal order.’355 The decision on the 
actual legal dispute in the Van Gend & Loos-case was remitted to the 
national judge. Access to community law, the ecj judges stated, would 
not imply that the ecj would open its doors for national citizens, but 
that the national judge should observe compliance with Community 
Law. Henceforth every national judge was a European judge at the same 
time, and therefore obliged to apply the European rules in his own 
court or tribunal. Moreover, every individual taking part in economic 
life – from entrepreneur to consumer – could henceforth legally force a 
Member State to comply with these rules.356 
The case demonstrates how constitutional elements, latently 
present in the eec Treaty, were decisive in creating a European legal 
order. It has been argued that by its decision, the ecj judges ‘turned 
the [Rome] Treaties into a potential bill of rights for Member State 
citizens.’357 Beyond doubt, the decision of the Court can be marked 
as a legal innovation in which the ecj, by applying the method of a 
constitutional court, effectively introduced a form of constitutional 
dynamism in the process of European integration.358 A mechanism for 
developing a body of European federal law was introduced that could 
be developed further – on condition that the Six accepted the legal 
authority of the ecj – without political involvement of the Member 
States.359 
Interestingly, despite the initial resistance of the Dutch authorities 
against this interpretation of the eec Treaty, the judgment in the Van 
Gend en Loos case did not arouse much debate in the Netherlands. Once 
the ruling was there, it was accepted as ‘a normal consequence of what 
we had decided. […] Our Constitution did not oppose that. […] There 
was a […] consensus with the government, scholars and the parliament 
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concerning the fact that we had to go along with this.’360 One year later, 
in 1964, the ecj referred to its Van Gend en Loos decision, when it ruled 
that the new legal order that the Six had called into being was supreme 
vis-à-vis their individual national legal orders.361 With this decision the 
principle of supremacy of Community law was added to the principle 
of direct effect. A clear message was rendered to the Member States. 
By ratifying the Treaties of Rome the Six had joined in a new game 
with a powerful new player. The ecj was willing to take a pioneer 
role in building a truly integrated Europe in which the playing field 
of the Member States was set by a European Commission, a European 
Parliament and a European Court of Justice.
Apart from the rapid legal maturing that the process of European 
integration underwent in the years after 1957, also in various policy 
fields the propelling effects of the Treaties of Rome soon became 
noticeable. The former Dutch Minister of Agriculture Sicco Mansholt, 
who, in 1958, became the first Dutch European Commissioner, made a 
flying start with the development of common principles for agricultural 
policy.362 As a result, in 1963, the Common Agricultural Policy (cap) 
was put into effect. In the field of trade policy, the dismantling of 
custom tariffs between the Six was started and a common external tariff 
was introduced. In 1968 a European customs union was established. In 
addition, trade agreements between the eec and third countries were 
concluded and between 1964 and 1967 the eec took part as a party in the 
Kennedy-round of the gatt negotiations. These occasions marked and 
confirmed the development and international recognition of the eec as 
a new, autonomous entity on the world stage. 
On a crucial point, however, the Six remained divided after the 
Treaties of Rome had entered into force. Although they had agreed 
in principle that ‘an ever closer union ‘was to come about, political 
integration remained a source of disagreement. As soon as ideas for 
integration affected policy fields traditionally representing the political 
autonomy of the nation-state – foreign policy, defence, social services, 
culture, etcetera – the Member States became wary of moving along. 
They feared a loss of influence in policy areas crucially intertwined with 
national interests. 
A typical illustration of this tendency is found in the political 
behaviour of Charles de Gaulle, who was installed as the first President 
of the Fifth French Republic on 8 January 1959 and who became a key 
actor in the continuous fight about political integration of the Six in 
the 1960s. Driven by the ambition to re-establish the old hegemonic 
lustre of France, supranationalisation in general or building a European 
federation in particular, did not fit the ambitions of the French 
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general. Soon after his coming to power, it became clear that de Gaulle 
would work for a European Political ‘Union’ of a more traditional 
intergovernmentalist design, strongly resting on the political power 
of a Franco-German partnership. The French proposals for such a 
Union – the Fouchet-Plans i (1961) and ii (1962), named after the 
French diplomat Christian Fouchet – testify of this intergovernmental 
preference just like the famous press conference of 15 May 1962 in which 
de Gaulle stated: 
‘ […] la patrie est un élément humain, sentimental, alors que c’est 
sur des éléments d’action, d’autorité, de responsabilité qu’on peut 
construire l’Europe. Quels éléments? Eh bien, les Etats! […] J’ai 
déjà dit et je répète, qu’à l’heure qu’il est, il ne peut y avoir d’autre 
Europe possible que celle des Etats, en dehors naturellement des 
mythes, des fictions, des parades.’363
Little was to come of de Gaulle’s ambitions however, without the 
approval of his five European partners who did not see their specific 
national interests served by the French proposals. Eventually, therefore, 
both Fouchet-Plans were rejected by the other eec members, leading to 
stagnation of the talks on political integration. In 1965 this stagnation 
turned into outright crisis when Charles de Gaulle decided to cold-
shoulder the eec by having France no longer take part in negotiations 
between the Six. 
The direct occasion for – what has been called – the French 
‘empty chair policy’ was the request of the Commission of the eec 
– in line with the agreements of the eec Treaty – to gradually replace 
the system of decision making with unanimity in the Council of 
Ministers by the system of qualified majority voting. The French 
boycott of further negotiations was aimed at frustrating the transition 
to this supranational form of decision-making that ran counter to 
the intergovernmental plans of de Gaulle. The other members felt 
it as a blow to the fragile solidarity that had been developing at the 
European negotiation table since the signing of the ecsc Treaty. In 
the Netherlands, for instance, the action of de Gaulle was perceived as 
a serious violation of the mutual trust that the Six had been building. 
One of the former Foreign Ministers of the Netherlands, Bernard 
Bot, who worked in Brussels at the Permanent Representation of the 
Netherlands to the European Communities at the time of the empty 
chair crisis, recollected: ‘We had committed ourselves tremendously 
[to the integration process]. When one Member State then […] [took] 
[…] advantage of a particular situation it was felt as a serious breach.’364 
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From the point of view of the supranationally-inclined Dutch, the 
obstructionist attitude of de Gaulle, in which the French interests 
were explicitly put before the common interests of the Six, was a form 
of treason. In political and diplomatic circles in the Netherlands, it 
contributed to an atmosphere of increasing distrust of the continental, 
non-Atlantic French.365 
The crisis lasted for seven months. Eventually, France returned to 
its seat in the Council of Ministers in January 1966. The determination 
of the Five not to allow the eec to be broken up by de Gaulle had 
successfully forced the latter back to the negotiation table. Ultimately, 
being left in isolation, while the Five moved ahead in making plans 
for further integration, had been considered worse by France than 
continuing negotiations. Yet, de Gaulle succeeded in extorting a 
compromise in which France’s wishes were, at least partly, met. On 
30 January 1966 the Luxembourg Compromise – an ‘agreement to 
disagree’ – was signed by the Six. It provided that: 
‘ Where, in the case of decisions which may be taken by majority 
vote on a proposal of the Commission, very important interests of 
one or more partners are at stake, the members of the Council will 
endeavour, within a reasonable time, to reach solutions which can 
be adopted by all the members of the Council while respecting 
their mutual interests and those of the Community.’366 
It was recorded that the French delegation held this to mean that 
when very important interests were at stake, the discussion should be 
continued until a unanimous agreement had been reached. Although 
the Six could not reach concurrence on what should be done in 
case such an agreement could not be reached, they agreed ‘that this 
divergence’ should ‘not prevent the Community’s work being resumed 
in accordance with the normal procedure.’367 In fact, the compromise 
signified a strong intergovernmentalist check in European decision-
making. It was a sacrifice, made by the Five, to hold the eec together. 
The Netherlands, a country that strongly believed in the national 
benefits of a supranational future, was one of them. 
In the Sixties, in addition to the issue of political integration, the 
objective of expanding the eec – as had explicitly been laid down in, 
respectively, Articles 237 and 205 of the eec and Euratom Treaties – led 
to disagreements among the Six as well.368 The first French veto in 1963 
on the application of the United Kingdom for accession to the European 
Communities made this incontestably clear. In a notorious press 
conference of 14 January 1963, de Gaulle explicitly played the identity 
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card. He claimed that the Atlantic character of the United-Kingdom 
would not go well with the continental character of the Europe of 
the Six: ‘England in effect is insular […] she has in all her doings very 
marked and very original habits and traditions.’369 This comment 
is significant, since it was one of the first times that differences in 
character between the countries of Europe were explicitly framed as a 
limitation to the process of European integration. 
De Gaulle, however, failed to flesh out his identity concern. 
Questions on how the uk did exactly differ from the Six, or, viewed 
from an opposite angle, what the continental Six really had in common 
in terms of habits and traditions were not asked nor answered. 
Therefore, the remark could hardly conceal his real concern: the fear 
of the loss of French influence in case the uk would join the European 
Communities as a member. In 1967 de Gaulle vetoed against British 
entry for a second time. 
Similar to de Gaulle’s intergovernmentalist conception of 
Europe, the continental picture that the French leader sketched, did 
not appeal to the Netherlands either. On the contrary, being ranged 
in a continental tradition by France, was no less than a spectre for 
the Dutch, who indeed felt more connected with the Atlantic uk. 
From the outset of the European integration process, consensus had 
existed with both the Dutch political and intellectual elite that the 
Netherlands should strive for openness in the process of European 
integration, characterised by the possibility of other countries to join 
in. Especially accession of the uk had consistently been seen as crucial 
in order to create an Atlantic counterweight against dreaded German 
and French power play. The attitude of Charles de Gaulle in this matter 
was diametrically opposed to the Dutch wishes and ideals and therefore 
raised anxiety in the Netherlands about the future of Europe and the 
position of the Netherlands in it. 
This anxiety was an important motivation behind the Dutch 
attitude and actions in the process of European integration between 
1957 and 1979. Broadly speaking, in these years, the approach of the 
Netherlands can be characterised by the pursuit of progressive European 
integration, aimed at safeguarding the interests of the Netherlands. In 
order to reach this objective, supranationalisation, or the ‘deepening’ 
of the integration process, was sought after. By initiating a diplomatic 
proposal for a merger of the executives organs of the various European 
institutions (the Merger Treaty of 1965) and working towards direct 
elections of the European Parliament (ep, 1979) the Netherlands tried 
to effectuate a supranational Europe in which the stronger political 
powers among the Six – France in the first place – could be curbed. 
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Secondly, the accession of new members to the eec – the ‘widening’ of 
the integration process – was insisted on. The eventual accession of the 
United Kingdom to the European Communities in 1973 was celebrated 
in the Dutch parliament as a great success. It was seen by a political 
majority as to positively contribute to the course that the Netherlands 
had plotted since 1948: an open process of European integration in 
which the country’s economic (trade) and political interests (a new 
balance of powers) would be secured. 
The conviction that supranational European integration would 
economically and politically benefit the Netherlands, was again at 
the root of the Dutch strivings. This instrumental internationalist 
approach, which had characterised Dutch foreign policy since early 
modern history can be recognised in the Dutch strategy of moving 
towards a unified Europe: the Netherlands tried to use the European 
partnership as a means to reach its international political and economic 
objectives. Compared to the long tested and familiar strategy of 
instrumental internationalism, there was one fundamental difference 
with the new version of ‘instrumental supranationalism’, which was 
not yet recognised, let alone problematised by the Dutch political 
majority.370 As has been emphasised before, internationalisation 
through treaty law had been a relative unequivocal game in which 
bi- or multilateral agreements rather straightforwardly reflected what 
was mutually yielded and received, whereas the result of the process of 
supranationalisation was much more elusive and unclear. 
The self-propelling dynamics of this process – of which the Van 
Gend en Loos and, not much later, the Costa v enel judgments would 
turn out to be only a foretaste – made it hard for the individual Member 
States to control either the course of the process or its outcome. Any 
control on meticulously steering it into a politically desired direction, 
would therefore turn out to be illusory. It is contended here that even 
more potentially problematic than the oversimplified expectations 
with which the process of European integration was approached by 
the Netherlands, was the blind spot that followed from it. A blind 
spot which deprived a great part of the political elite of its view on the 
importance of a broad democratic legitimatisation of this process of 
building a European political community. 
3.2  An Instrumental Merger? (1966)
Although the Rome Treaties had provided for one Court and one 
Parliamentary Assemblée for the ecsc, eec and Euratom, the three 
communities had still kept their separate executive organs in the 
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form of three executive Commissions and Councils of Ministers. Not 
surprisingly, in everyday practice this fragmented organisation came 
with the drawback of inconsistent and inefficient decision-making. 
Soon after the entering into force of the treaties, Dutch parliamentarians 
had already signalled this, at first sight, rather superficial organisational 
flaw. In 1959, they were among the first to suggest a merger of the 
three executives in order to improve the functioning of the European 
Communities.371 
In May and June 1960, the Presidents of the three European 
Commissions – the influential Dutch diplomat Dirk Spierenburg was 
one of them – also called for such a merger. In a plenary parliamentary 
debate in the Netherlands in July 1960 the desirability of such a merger 
was again emphasised by representatives of the various mainstream 
pro-European parties. It stands out that the merger was not only viewed 
as to improve the functioning of the ecsc, eec and Euratom, but that 
it was also considered to contribute to the supranationalisation of the 
integration process as a whole and was therefore advisable. In other 
words, these parliamentarians argued in favour of the merger not 
solely or even primarily for organisational reasons, but for the deeper 
structural effects they believed it would have. As they saw it, the 
strengthening of the European executive power would result in a call 
for a stronger legislative and controlling power, i.e. a stronger European 
Parliament (ep). In their view, it was needed to diminish influence 
of the individual governments and thus to underline the process of 
supranationalisation.372 
In reaction to the calls for a merger on the level of the European 
executives and the accompanying encouraging reactions in the 
parliament of the Netherlands, the De Quay government (1959-1963) 
– a coalition of the kvp, vvd, arp and chu, led by Jan de Quay (kvp) – 
set to work to draft a proposal for the merger of the executive organs 
of the ecsc, the eec and Euratom. A first proposal for such a merger 
was presented to the Councils of Ministers of the three European 
Communities on 27 June 1961. Disagreement among the Six on the 
Fouchet-plans, however, slackened the decision making process on this 
‘Merger Treaty’. After this period of stagnation the discussion on the 
merger based on the Dutch proposal was resumed in 1963. Eventually, 
after having reached agreement on the last details in March 1965, the 
Treaty establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the 
European Communities (hereafter Merger Treaty) was signed by the Six 
on 8 April 1965. The first amendment to the Treaties of Rome was a fact. 
The Merger Treaty established a single Council with a rotating 
presidency every six months.373 The parameters of this first reform of 
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the eec Treaty have been interpreted as to have been very much set 
by de Gaulle’s France: this country decided the speed and the content 
of the reform and made sure to limit the effects.374 The number of 
Commission members, for instance, was set at nine, instead of the 
fourteen wanted by the smaller Member States.375 Moreover, efforts of 
the Netherlands to use the occasion in order to open the question on the 
scope of tasks of the Parliamentary Assembly were blocked by France as 
being too political. And although qmv voting was extended to certain 
areas, decision making by unanimity remained the standard; a clear 
signal that the instrumentalist supranational desires of the Netherlands 
were still far from being realised.376 
Position of the government
In November 1965, in the midst of the empty chair crisis, the newly 
inaugurated cabinet led by Jo Cals (kvp) (1965-1966), consisting of 
members of the kvp, arp and PvdA, presented the Merger Treaty to 
the Dutch parliament.377 It was eager to get the treaty approved there, 
all the more so since the agreement was the result of a Dutch initiative. 
Since the government did not consider the approval of the treaty to 
touch on national constitutional provisions in any special way – the 
parliamentary discussions of the 1950s had clearly rendered the message 
that such a special connection was not to be demonstrated easily 
anyway – it was presented to parliament for approval in accordance 
with the regular procedure of Article 60, subsection 2 of the Dutch 
Constitution. Needless to say, this procedure benefitted the Dutch 
government in terms of the (simple) majority needed for approval 
compared to the Article 63 procedure that should formally be run in 
case deviation from the Constitution was established. 
In the explanatory memorandum, consistent with the view of 
parliament since 1959, the government did not present the merger as a 
goal in itself, but as a means to reach supranational European decision 
making. This was considered to benefit the interests Community, 
and thus also those of the Netherlands. Focusing on the role of the 
Commission, the government stated: ‘By centralising the powers […] 
into one Council and by a more efficient organisation of the executive 
services under one and the same management, the actual influence 
of the Commission in the institutional establishment may increase 
especially vis-à-vis the Council of Ministers.’378 ‘One supranational 
authority’ would emerge that ‘will look after the interest of the 
Communities as a whole.’379 With these words, the Cals government 
showed its supranational perception of Europe, while at the same 
time clearly positioning itself against de Gaulle’s intergovernmentalist 
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conception. The comment, furthermore, reveals the trust that the 
government had in a Commission that would let the common interests 
of the Six – in whatever way these may be defined – prevail over the 
diverging wishes of the individual Member States. Building on this 
observation, the governmental perception of the Commission and its 
role reveals the presupposition that establishing strong supranational 
European institutions would benefit the position of the Netherlands. 
Viewed against the background of the French insistence on two 
Commissioners for the larger three Member States and only one 
Commissioner for each Benelux country, however, the Dutch trust in a 
‘neutral’ Commission comes across as premature or maybe even naive. 
Continuing its plea in favour of the merger, the government 
emphasised the conditional relation between the merger and the 
strengthening of the European Parliament. It presented the merger as a 
necessary condition for giving the ep more power. This was, in its turn, 
perceived by the Dutch government as an essential pillar for the process 
of European unification.380 The merger was thus presented as to set off a 
chain reaction in the desired direction of supranationalisation. 
The goals of the merger as presented by the government closely 
matched the considerations of the political advocates of such a merger 
as expressed already since 1959. Ever since, the stance of the kvp, 
arp and PvdA on European integration in general, and the merger in 
particular, had not fundamentally changed.381 Within these parties 
the ideal of (federal) European unification was still propagated and 
supranationalisation of the European institutions and decision making 
procedures were seen as a necessary condition.382 Since these three 
coalition parties held a majority of more than seventy per cent in 
parliament, the government could anticipate a smooth approval of the 
merger.
And yet, since the approval of the Treaties of Rome in 1957, the 
parliamentary opposition against progressive European integration 
had grown. The Gerefomeerd Politiek Verbond (gpv, Reformed 
Political Alliance), established in 1963, just like the sgp opposed the 
development of a European ‘mammoth state’ because it cherished the 
independence of the Dutch state as a gift of God.383 Also new in the 
group of political parties that were critical of the process of European 
integration was the Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij (psp, Pacifist 
Socialist Party), founded in 1957. With regard to European integration 
it was initially neither a fervent advocate nor a fierce antagonist; the 
psp simply had other priorities. As far as the unification of Europe 
was concerned, it held the view that capitalist interest groups should 
not be given the chance to gain economic and political power via the 
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European institutions.384 Europe, in other words should be social 
or Europe should not be at all. The entry of the psp into the Dutch 
parliament signified a strengthening of the anti-capitalist protest against 
European integration as had been expressed by the cpn from the start 
of the European integration process. Still, however, the parliamentary 
opposition to the process of European integration was too small to 
break the consensus among its principle protagonists. 
Outside the political domain, the stagnation – in terms of 
reaching new landmarks385 – that the process of European political 
integration was experiencing under influence of the politics of de 
Gaulle, was reflected in what was written on it. His first veto against 
British accession in 1963 and the icy diplomatic relations that followed, 
had caused doubts among Dutch public intellectuals about where 
the process of European integration would lead to and whether 
supranationalisation was really to be expected. Although the vanguard 
of the European federalists of the 1950s remained dominant in 
publishing on European integration, frustration started to filter through 
in the public intellectual debate; a more critical note began to develop in 
the Netherlands that raised difficult questions regarding the feasibility 
and borders of European unity.386 For the continuation of the story it is 
important to keep in mind that the parliamentary debate on the Merger 
Treaty took place against the background of these growing doubts on, 
mainly, the feasibility of far-reaching supranationalisation. 
Debate in parliament
When in the early summer and autumn of 1966 the Merger Treaty was 
up for debate in the Dutch parliament – in the Lower and Upper Houses, 
respectively just before and in the midst of the empty chair crisis – it 
was welcomed by many. In the plenary debate, only the psp explicitly 
expressed itself against the treaty because it feared that the merger 
would enhance the character of the eec as an economic, anti-socialist 
power.387 Throughout the debate the focus on the supranationalising 
effect of the merger was strikingly present. Discontentment with a 
political majority concerning the still largely intergovernmentalist 
functioning of the eec fanned the hope with this majority that the 
merger would force a breakthrough towards a more supranational set 
up. Supranationalisation – it has been demonstrated in the preceding – 
was believed to benefit the position of the Netherlands as compared 
to the intergovernmentalist model that Charles de Gaulle publicly 
propagated. 
Remarkably, however, the fundamental consensus with the 
majority that the merger should be approved was accompanied by 
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uncertainty and scepticism on its actual effects. Expressions such as ‘for 
heaven’s sake our fiat to this deal, although we do ask ourselves if we 
will gain much from it’ and ‘it is a poor whole, but it certainly turns out 
to be the least unreasonable thing achievable’ indicate that the motive 
for approving the treaty was rooted in concerns of what would happen 
if it was not approved rather than sheer enthusiasm of the agreement 
itself.388 Essentially, these utterances reveal that the conditional logic 
between the merger and supranationalisation that the government had 
referred to was not taken for granted. The obstructionist attitude of 
France in the process of European integration made parliamentarians 
wonder whether the merger was a sufficient guarantee for the 
development of European integration into a supranationalist direction. 
What if, after ratification of the Merger Treaty, in the process of 
appointing a new European Commission, de Gaulle would insist on 
replacing the President of the European Commission Walter Hallstein, 
who had manned the post of president of the eec Commission since 
1957 and who was held in high esteem by the Dutch parliamentary 
majority for his ‘pro-European’ stance? Or what if France would 
replace its Commissioners Robert Marjolin and Henri Rochereau by 
more nationalistically inclined specimens at the rotation round of the 
European Commission, scheduled for 1967? The merger of executives 
could be effected, but if a supranationalist future was not to be extorted, 
its practical effects could not but disappoint.389 
By raising these questions, parliament opened its eyes for the 
tacit assumption with which it had until then approached the concept 
of the merger. The questions show that it had become aware that the 
agreement itself was after all not a guarantee of a supranational future 
that the Netherlands strived after for instrumental reasons, since it 
did not imply any formal obligation for the Six to make come true 
Dutch preferences, such as declaring supranationalisation the main 
organisational principle of the Communities, let alone an obligation 
to strengthen the ep. Since the five European partners had their own 
interests to reckon with, just like the Commission and the ep, it was 
likely that these partners would pursue their own, diverging goals that 
would cause a dynamics difficult to be controlled by the Netherlands. 
The Dutch parliament was wary of gambling on a premise – i.e. the 
supranationalising effect of the merger – that would only prove its 
worth over time.
From defence towards consensus
Confronted with these concerns, the Dutch government chose a 
rhetorical line of defence that anticipated the majority consensus that 
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supranationalisation was essential and simultaneously confirmed the 
gut feeling existing with many parliamentary advocates of European 
integration that without the merger the chances for the eec to develop 
into a supranational entity were indeed smaller than with this treaty on 
it. In the words of the Foreign Minister: 
‘ I fear that when no progress is made and the merger of the 
executives does not come about, then the moment comes 
that a government at a certain time will have to declare here 
in this Chamber, that the European Commission has turned 
into a commission of executors of the will of the individual 
governments and that all emphasis, counter to the intentions and 
the treaty itself, will be laid with the Council of Ministers, which, 
according to the Government and undoubtedly also according to 
the Chamber, will be very unwelcome’390
It was a smart intervention befitting the conviction of the parties 
in favour of European integration that if nothing was done, the 
Netherlands would certainly come off badly in a Europe run by the 
most powerful governments of the Six, whereas the merger offered a 
window of opportunity towards a better future in which the political 
and economic power would be more proportionately divided. 
Notwithstanding the attractiveness of this thought for large parts 
of the parliament, it did not immediately give in. In order to emphasise 
their concerns and to raise the awareness with the government of its 
responsibility for a supranational future to follow after the merger, a 
group of MPs of the coalition parties kvp, arp, and PvdA introduced 
a motion in which they called on the government to stand up for the 
objective of supranationalisation before ratifying the treaty: 
‘The Lower House […] expresses its confidence that the 
Government will not lodge the ratification documents before having 
got the greatest assurance possible, that the commission in its new 
composition offers sufficient guarantees for a well-balanced communal 
[i.e. supranational] development of the European Communities.’391
Making the best of the bargain, the Cals government, through 
Minister Luns, expressed its willingness to accept the motion which 
– obviously – did not imply any concrete actions that the government 
could be judged on in the long run.392 It was telling then for the deep 
belief that the Dutch political majority cherished with regard to the 
absolute necessity of progressive European integration that the merger 
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of the three executives was approved by a large majority, even despite 
doubts on its effects. On 21 June 1966, after only one round of debate, 
the Merger Treaty was adopted in the Lower House without a voting by 
call. Approval in the Senate followed on 25 October. 
Decisive for its approval was the consideration that without this 
new step in European integration the Gaullist focus on French interests 
was certainly not to be broken, whereas the merger might give more 
power to the European institutions and thus shift the balance to the 
protection of the community interests; a development of which the 
Netherlands was considered to profit. By choosing the flight forwards, 
or in other words, by tightening the European bonds, the Dutch 
political elite hoped to outsmart the French domination. In doing 
this, it knowingly gambled in its support of progressive European 
integration on a, for the Netherlands, future beneficial course of the 
process. This gamble made a pro-active attitude of the Netherlands 
in the continuation of the process of European integration more 
important than ever. 
3.3  High Expectations of the uk Accession (1972)
The vetoes of de Gaulle put on two British requests for accession to the 
European Communities caused spirits to fall to an absolute low in the 
Netherlands. The former Director-General of European Cooperation 
(1978-1986) of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs Herman 
Posthumus Meyjes, who worked as a civil servant at the time of the 
French vetoes, keeps lively memories of the unsuccessful negotiations 
on English accession: ‘I have seen grown men cry. It was that 
dramatic.’393 Another former civil servant of the Foreign Ministry, the 
later Professor of International Organisations (1963-1976) and Judge in 
the ecj (1990-2000), Jos Kapteyn, similarly recollects: ‘The [first] veto 
of De Gaulle had caused a sort of trauma.’394 Never had the realisation 
of expansion of the European Communities towards the Atlantic – a 
thing that had been wished by the Dutch political community since the 
start of the integration process – seemed so far away. But the late 1960s 
brought reversal. 
In January 1969, the resignation of Charles de Gaulle brought 
Georges Pompidou to power.395 Although Pompidou could not be 
accused of keeping a strong integrationist, supranationalist, let alone 
federalist attitude towards the process of European integration, it was 
clear that a new political and diplomatic latitude arose, now that de 
Gaulle had left the Élysée.396 While he agreed with de Gaulle that the 
reality of the nation states was not to be denied, for Pompidou Europe 
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was a necessity. Therefore, new goals could be set and debates on old 
goals could be re-opened. For the Netherlands it meant a new chance of 
fulfilment of its long cherished wish of British accession. 
In the second half of 1969, when the presidency of the Council 
of the European Communities was held by the Netherlands, the issue 
was put high on the agenda. The organisation of a European Summit 
in The Hague on 1 and 2 December 1969 was seized as an opportunity 
to discuss the European priorities of the Netherlands: the renunciation 
of the Luxembourg Compromise making possible the extension of 
supranational decision making,397 the widening of the competences 
of the European parliament and direct elections of this parliament 
(both also for reasons of supranationalisation) and the accession of 
four candidate members who had applied for membership in the early 
1960s: Norway, Denmark, Ireland and – of the greatest concern to the 
Netherlands – the United Kingdom.398
In the Dutch parliament, the political majority in favour of far-
reaching European integration held high expectations of the summit. 
The occasion was considered to be a chance for breaking with the ten 
years of Europe-disappointment. Hans van Mierlo – the political leader 
of Democraten’66 (Democrats ’66 or, briefly, D’66), a new party in 
parliament 399 – with a great sense of pathos declaimed that ‘the moment 
of truth’ had been reached with regard to the question whether the 
full implementation of the Treaties of Rome would be possible.400 
Revealing his concerns on the gap between the supranational ideal and 
the still largely intergovernmentalist political reality between the Six 
from, Van Mierlo spoke of a ‘test-case’: ‘are [we] able to determine our 
identity, the identity of the Six. Who is going to negotiate with whom. 
Will they be the Six, as they should be under the [eec] Treaty, or is it 
the Six as they are?’401 When it was eventually agreed at the summit 
that new proposals for political unification would be formulated and 
that negotiations on the accession of the candidate members would 
be opened, the pro-European parties in the Dutch parliament showed 
themselves satisfied with the result.402 
With regard to the issue of accession, the Six soon succeeded in 
making a step. The preparations for negotiating the accession of the 
new Member States started soon after the turn of the year. It marked the 
beginning of a new phase in the process of European integration. No 
longer was the focus solely on the bringing about of an internal market, 
but attention shifted to community building in a broader sense. The 
formulation of common criteria for accession by the Six – new members 
should, among other things, uphold a democratic order and respect 
human rights – presupposed agreement among the eec members, on a 
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fundamental level, on what connected them; not necessarily a sinecure 
after a decade of discord. On 30 June 1970 the actual negotiations 
with the four candidates commenced. After one year, in the summer 
of 1971, agreement between the United Kingdom and the Six was 
reached. Again six months later, on 22 January 1972, Norway, Denmark, 
Ireland and the United Kingdom signed the Final Act concerning the 
instruments of accession. 
The agreement started from the concepts laid down in the 
preamble and the provisions of the Treaties of Rome.403 The application 
of the candidate members, the preamble of the accession treaty reveals, 
had been considered by the Six from their determination ‘to construct 
an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’ and the identical 
articles 237 of the eec Treaty and 205 of the Euratom Treaty that 
stated that ‘any European state may apply to become a member of the 
Community.’ In these provisions, the term ‘European’ was not further, 
geographically or otherwise, specified or delimited, implying that a 
broad – or perhaps better to say: conceptually vague – understanding 
of Europe was upheld by the Member States. The implications of 
increasing diversity within the European Communities for future 
chances of further integration were not considered. Since the four 
candidate members had applied for membership and the governing 
institutions of the European Communities had ‘declared [themselves] 
in favour of accession’, on the level of European formalities nothing was 
in the way of the entry of the new Member States.404 The next step was 
the national parliaments to give their approval.
Position of the government
In June 1972, the Biesheuvel i government (1971-1972) presented to 
parliament the draft bill for approving the accession of the four new 
members. Again the procedure of Article 60, subsection 2 of the Dutch 
constitution was proposed.405 This indicates that the government did 
not see, or intended to see, any special relation between the accession 
treaty and the Dutch constitution. This perspective, again, benefitted 
the government in terms of a less stringent approval procedure. It 
would not be challenged in parliament, which is especially noteworthy 
considering the ‘enabling provision’ recorded in the Dutch bill of 
approval that authorised the government to conclude additional 
agreements with the acceding countries without the need to consult 
parliament.406 
The Biesheuvel i cabinet was a variegated coalition. Led by 
Barend Biesheuvel (arp), it was composed of representatives of the 
kvp, vvd, arp, chu and, newcomer in the political landscape, DS’70. 
134
This Democratic-Socialist party, founded in 1970, had split of off the 
PvdA.407 Whereas the latter, under influence of a process of party 
renewal, had nuanced its stance on European integration towards the 
position of the psp – pro-European, but only to the extent that the 
process had to lead to a socialist and democratic Europe408 – DS’70 had 
more in general a pro-European integration attitude. When in August 
1972 the first Biesheuvel cabinet fell, the interim-cabinet Biesheuvel ii 
took office. This minority government, consisting of the same parties as 
Biesheuvel i minus DS’70, stayed on until March 1973; two months after 
the United Kingdom had formally become a member of the European 
Communities. 
As far as the composition of the government was concerned, 
a relevant change had occurred with the replacement in 1971 of the 
diplomatic heavyweight Joseph Luns (kvp) by Norbert Schmelzer 
(kvp). Already early in his life, Schmelzer had become enthusiastic 
about the ideal of a European federation.409 This ambitious politician 
was more in favour of European integration than the Atlantically 
inclined diplomat Luns and took delight in letting his officials in the 
Dutch department of Foreign Affairs work on long term prospects, 
European integration being one of them.410 In his task of coordinating 
and implementing Dutch foreign policy he was supported by his State 
Secretary for European Affairs, Tjerk Westerterp (kvp), who had been 
active earlier as a journalist and a European official. Both Schmelzer and 
Westerterp remained in office during the two successive Biesheuvel 
governments. 
In the explanatory memorandum defending the accession 
of the four new members, the Dutch government presented four 
arguments. It successively presented an argument of consistency, an 
argument emphasising the necessity of the accession in order to reach 
the objective of supranational unity, an argument based on identity 
considerations and, lastly, a purely economic instrumentalist argument. 
Starting off with the argument of consistency, it set forth its view on 
the connection between the longer existing ambitions of the Dutch 
political community to expand the European Communities with new 
members and the decision on accession that was under discussion. 
‘By signing the Treaty on the accession of Denmark, Ireland, Norway 
and the United Kingdom’, the government stated, ‘a very important 
objective of Dutch foreign policy has been achieved.’411 It was an 
argument of policy consistency, rendering the message to parliament 
that the decision to be taken was no more than the realisation of an 
objective that had been set earlier. 
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Secondly, the accession was claimed to be a necessary condition 
on the way to European integration, which was defined here by the 
government as: ‘abolishing outdated dividing lines and the starting 
of a process of economic and, eventually, also political unification.’412 
The use of the word ‘outdated’ shows that the government aimed to 
convince parliament that a new time had come that left no room for 
the old concept of national sovereignty. Implicitly, the government 
presented approval of the accession as the only right thing to do. 
The government did not elaborate in detail on what unification 
should look like and what it would imply for the political independence 
of the Netherlands. Yet, at certain instances in the presentation of the 
treaty to parliament, the government took an advance on its hopes 
and expectations for the future course of the integration process. 
Similar to the Merger Treaty, the accession of the new Member States 
was presented by the Dutch cabinet as a necessary means to bring 
supranationalisation closer. In the explanatory memorandum it stated 
that: ‘In an enlarged community, more than ever, there will certainly 
be a strong need of a strong European Commission that can act as the 
driving force of the integration process and which can contribute to 
the prevalence of the interest of the community as a whole over the 
interests of the Member States, also over those of the big ones. [italics 
added]’413 
Again a central role in the process of supranationalisation 
was assigned to the European Commission that was deemed an 
important instrument in bringing supranationalisation closer by 
counterbalancing the wills and interests of the big states. Implicitly, 
again, the Netherlands was portrayed as a small state, the interests of 
which were very often not in line with those of the bigger Member 
States and therefore needed the protection of the Community. The 
main premise of the government seems to have been that the structure 
of strong European Communities, ruled by strong community 
institutions ‘[makes] it possible […] that decisions concerning us are not 
taken without us, but that we can influence from within the course of 
events in Europe.’414 In the logic of the Dutch government, expanding 
the European Communities was a necessary condition to bring about 
the desirable balanced supranational structure. The chances of these 
structures to really develop, possible disadvantages and dangers for a 
small state in a supranational community, or additional conditions for 
such a Community to function in favour of the Netherlands, were not 
entered into.
Apart from the arguments of policy consistency and necessity 
in favour of supranationalisation a third reason for accession of the 
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candidate members was given. It was based on an identity claim 
in which a form of, what might be called, mental kinship between 
the Netherlands and the acceding countries, was said to exist. In 
the explanatory memorandum, the government stated that ‘The 
expectation [seems] justified that involving in the work of the 
Communities, democratic, outward looking countries, mentally 
related [in Dutch: mentaal verwant] to the Netherlands, will 
positively influence the substance of the policies of the Community 
and discourage the coming into existence of an inward looking 
European nationalism.’415 Although it was not explained by the 
Dutch administration, the reference to an ‘inward looking European 
nationalism’ probably referred to the French desire for fencing 
the Communities in and governing them through the method of 
intergovernmentalism. For many in parliament – representatives of a 
country since the seventeenth century striving for, what we could call, 
‘outward looking internationalism’, especially in foreign affairs – the 
French conception of an integrated Europe was no less than a spectre. 
A ‘geschlossener Handelsstaat’ as Johann Fichte had foreseen in the 
early 19th century, was the metaphor used by mp Piet Jongeling (gpv) 
to reject the French ideal of Europe; a pregnant statement considering 
Fichte’s link with the ideology of German romantic nationalism.416 In 
some of the more traditional official circles in the Netherlands, during 
the hey-days of Charles de Gaulle, the term ‘club of rotten pears’ had 
come into use to indicate an eec that was dominated by the continental 
and protectionist vision of the French.417 By means of expanding the 
Community with states and peoples, considered to be attracted by 
‘Dutch’ viewpoints such as free trade and non-continentalism, the 
much detested French feathers could finally be cast off. Or at least, so it 
was hoped. 
The government’s fourth, and final, argument concerned the 
economic advantages of the accession. It claimed that in a Europe of 
Ten, the Netherlands would, geographically, have a more, central 
position, yielding the country the position of ‘junction of connections’ 
which would benefit the Dutch economy.418 Fully in line with the 
long-existing Atlantic preferences of the Netherlands, the accession 
of England was given special consideration in comparison to the 
accession of the other Member States. Ever since the establishment 
of the European Free Trade Association (efta, 1960) of which the 
United Kingdom had been a founding member, trading with England 
had been difficult.419 Setting its own trading tariffs, this association de 
facto competed with the eec on the world market. With the accession 
of England to the eec, the Dutch government argued, the barriers that 
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had severely hampered trade relations between the Netherlands and 
this country since 1960, would be lifted. England would join the tariff 
system of the European market, which directly benefited the export 
of Dutch agricultural products.420 Adding to this that from times 
immemorial Dutch trade had maintained contacts with England and 
that a language barrier was for that reason considered practically absent, 
the government stated cheerfully: ‘Compared to its eec competitors 
[so much for thinking in terms of ‘common interests’!] a certain lead 
for Dutch business on the English market may be expected then.’421 
Thus, an instrumental argument of economic benefit was added to the 
necessity argument of supranationalisation, de-Frenchification or even 
‘Dutchification’ of the eec and the argument of policy consistency. All 
this shows that instrumental reasoning from a national perspective 
was crucial in the approach of the Dutch government to the process 
of European integration. It chose for deepening and expanding 
the European Communities because this would contribute to the 
international power of the Netherlands. Merging for self-preservation; 
a paradoxical concept that functioned only because and as long as the 
Communities were perceived as an extension of the Netherlands and its 
interests. 
The government was eager to admit that not all problems would 
immediately be solved with the accession of the four candidates. Or 
rather, new problems would arise. In contrast with the fundamental 
assumption of the political majority that a bigger and stronger Europe 
would mean more international influence for the Netherlands, it was 
at some point even considered that the relative political importance of 
the Netherlands might also decrease considerably within an expanded 
eec of ten Member States. The Dutch interests and those of the new 
Member States, for instance, would presumably not always coincide; 
a thing that might complicate the decision making process within the 
European Community. Acknowledging these risks and difficulties, 
the government nevertheless called on parliament to vote in favour of 
the accession, arguing that ‘the general and long-term advantages so 
much surpass in importance the risks mentioned.’422 It reasoned that 
these problems would be solved over time, since a strong European 
Commission would eventually result from the expansion. Then, it was 
assumed, a supranational European Community would develop in 
which interstate conflicts of interests would no longer rule; for, indeed, 
in a strong Community, the Community interest – which was generally 
believed to naturally coincide with the interests of the Netherlands – 
would prevail. Again, the consideration shows the preoccupation of 
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the Dutch political mainstream with the positive effects of European 
integration for the Dutch nation-state.
Considering the long-standing Dutch consensus on the 
desirability of expansion of the eec and a large political majority 
still advocating progressive European integration, it was likely 
that the government would find support for the accession treaty in 
parliament. Support also came from non-political circles. Various 
public intellectuals in the Netherlands, such as Pieter Geyl, had since 
the mid-1950s also argued in favour of accession of more European 
countries, the United Kingdom in particular: ‘If we want to find unity 
in Europe in freedom, then it is absurd to leave out England that three 
times – the last time most gloriously – threw itself into the breach for 
the freedom of Europe.’423 As usual, criticism could be expected of the 
‘by nature’ Europe-critical parties of the cpn, psp, gpv and sgp.424 
The general objections of the first two, ultra left parties had remained 
unaltered: the integration process benefitted large industrial concerns 
more than the man in the street as the process was too much anti-
Communist and pro-American inspired and the eec tended towards 
the formation of a capitalist bloc rather than being a truly, socially 
oriented, internationalist initiative. The conservative Protestant parties 
were still clear in that they kept seeing the sovereign nation-state as the 
ordering element in international politics and were, consequently, not 
supportive of anything that would strengthen and deepen the process 
of European integration. The Biesheuvel i cabinet could therefore not 
reckon with their support for the accession. 
Relatively new in the political opposition was the Politieke Partij 
Radicalen (Political Radical Party, ppr), founded in 1968 as the result of 
a split-off of the kvp and arp. Its political spearheads were traditional 
‘left’ themes of the 1970s such as development aid, environment, 
disarmament and the realisation of a democratic economy. European 
integration was not a part of that. For that reason – and because of 
its minor size – the ppr was no direct danger to the parliamentary 
consensus on expansion.
Debate in parliament
Referring to the ‘volumes’ of parliamentary documents of the 1960s, 
in which the Dutch parliament had consistently, but in vain, advocated 
expansion of the Communities, it was already observed in the written 
preparations to the debate that: ‘In the opinion of a very wide majority 
[…] [the accession treaty at issue] is an essential element, not to say 
the pinnacle of the development which was set in with the Schuman-
declaration of 1950 […].425
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In the subsequent plenary debate the coalition partners of the 
kvp, arp and chu and also the opposition party DS’70 once again 
made clear that they saw the expansion – in line with the argument of 
the government on policy consistency – as the realisation of one of the 
objectives of Dutch foreign policy.426 The most interesting part of this 
remark is that the integration of Europe and the steps in this process 
were still described as part of the foreign policy of the Netherlands. It 
shows that in the early 1970s the political majority in the Netherlands 
in essence still perceived the process of European integration as a form 
of international cooperation between national Member States and 
had little eye for the fact that by the entering into force of the Treaties 
of Rome and the creation of the beginnings of a European legal order 
that had followed, the first seeds of a European polity – existing more 
or less autonomously – had begun to sprout. Although this majority 
strove after supranationalisation, its utterances in parliament show that 
there was still little awareness of what this might eventually lead to: a 
European polity that could not be controlled on the national level. 
In addition to the policy consistency line of reasoning, the identity 
argument of the government also found assent in parliament. In 
particular the accession of the United Kingdom was appreciated for that 
reason, being a nation kindred to the Netherlands. Berkhouwer (vvd) 
even spoke of including ‘European people’ [in Dutch: Europese mensen], 
‘with whom we, the Dutch, traditionally have strong relationships, 
who are spiritually and materially akin and with whose cultures we 
have always enriched ourselves.’427 By referring to age old connections 
between the uk and the Netherlands, the liberal mp enforced this claim. 
The kvp expressed the kinship between the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands – the two naval powers of the seventeenth century – in 
concrete terms. The uk was, just like ‘us’, the people of the Netherland, 
‘less continentally orientated than many other countries’.428 The 
Roman Catholic senator Pieter van Meeuwen – a thing quite remarkable 
since the accession of the Anglican uk would by no means strengthen 
the share of Roman Catholics in Europe – had similarly claimed in 
1967 that a ‘good European’ should not look inwards. As he saw it, 
the European ideal reached beyond the continent and therefore the 
Dutch eyes should be directed overseas.429 This perception of an ideal 
European mindset based on national preferences was shared by many 
in the Dutch parliament who principally opposed a unified Europe 
confined to the Six which might develop into a closed power block. The 
secular vvd and Catholic kvp were unanimous in their opinion that 
accession of the new Member States was needed to enhance this non-
continental and open character of the integration process. 
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More than anything else, these considerations show what the 
parties hoped and desired the process of European integration to yield: 
a non-closed, non-continental and non-protectionist community in 
which the Netherlands would be surrounded by likeminded partners. 
When these negatively phrased characteristics are reversed into their 
positive opposites it becomes all the more clear that the Netherlands 
wished the European Communities to be open, Atlantically inclined 
and to respect free trade. Thus, a striking match again becomes visible 
between the perception of the Dutch mainstream political parties of 
what European unity should be and the time-honoured foreign policy 
preferences of the Netherlands. European integration was approached 
by these men and women as being not essentially different from the 
instrumental international partnerships that the Netherlands had 
concluded in its history before 1945. The element of sovereignty 
transference that markedly distinguished the integration process 
from all previous international partnerships that the Netherlands had 
hitherto taken part in, was not paid much attention to. 
In fact, it seems that the perception of the MPs of where this 
process would lead to was still rather vague. The considerations 
of Berkhouwer and the kvp politicians on the characteristics of ‘a 
European people’ show that their conceptions were not well defined 
yet. Berkhouwer initially spoke of a ‘European people’ as if the peoples 
on the European continent were a natural unity, but by subsequently 
emphasising a special kinship between the English and the Dutch, not 
shared by other European partners, the notion of one European people 
was undermined. The kvp claim that the uk should accede because, 
together with the Netherlands, it made up a special non-continental 
part of Europe, further enhances the picture of a culturally divided 
Europe instead of showing a natural cultural connection between its 
members. 
Notwithstanding the support for the consistency and identity 
claims of the government, there were voices in the political majority 
in favour of accession that called in question the reasoning that the 
accession of the uk would lead to more supranationalisation. It was 
common knowledge that the uk was reluctant – to say the least – 
towards the transference of political sovereignty to a European level of 
governance. This had already been noted in the Netherlands years before 
agreement had been reached on the conditions for its accession. In 1969, 
for instance, the prominent mp and Member of the European Parliament 
(mep), Henk Vredeling (PvdA), had observed that English pragmatism 
to sign the acquis communautaire, should not be miss-interpreted as 
a fiat for supranational strengthening of the European Communities. 
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‘The supranational set-up is, as is common knowledge’, Vredeling 
argued, ‘a very difficult issue for the English […] In some degree this 
will have to be extorted from the English government.’430 Still not 
convinced of English commitment on this point in 1972, the paladins of 
a supranational and/or federal European entity expressed their concern 
on the effects of the accession of the uk for the supranational ambitions 
of the Netherlands. They made clear that the Netherlands should do its 
utmost to realise this form of integration, irrespective of the English 
ambitions. 
With regard to this concern, the pro-accession parties in 
parliament let themselves easily satisfy by the soothing words of the 
Dutch government that the English signature on the European Treaties 
was a first important indication that the supranational dream was still 
feasible.431 It illustrates the extent to which these parties were willing 
to absorb uncertainties and ambiguities in the process of European 
integration in order not to let these uncertainties be in the way of 
moving on.432 This indifference towards the fundamental differences 
between the Dutch (supranational) and uk (intergovernmental) wish 
for the future of Europe raises the question why the Dutch parliament 
had been so fiercely set against the intergovernmentalism of the French 
whereas that of the uk was – for the time being – accepted? Less kinship 
and deep mistrust of French politics and French political leadership 
and, on the other hand, affinity with the uk as far as economic interests 
were concerned, were the main ground for this inconsistency in Dutch 
European reasoning. Entry of the United Kingdom into the eec was 
deemed necessary in the first place. Supranationalisation was a concern 
for later then. To this end, the British intergovernmental whims and 
its late 1960s economic policies that had affected the Netherlands 
negatively, were overlooked.433
In the plenary debate on the accession, the critics of European 
integration campaigned against the convictions and assumptions of 
the pro-accession camp. In the written preparations to it, several MPs 
(not referred to by name) attacked the central premise, upheld by the 
political majority, that the accession of the new members – the uk 
in particular – would benefit the Dutch economy and would really 
shift the balance of power in the Community with a consequent 
advantage for the Netherlands. A monetary crisis that hit the countries 
of Western Europe in 1971 leading to great fluctuations in the value of 
the various European currencies – the British pound not in the least – 
made these MPs wonder whether accession of England would really 
benefit the Dutch economy.434 In fact, these parliamentarians argued 
that the recent economic difficulties and interstate quarrels on how to 
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solve these problems showed that fundamental differences between 
the states of Western Europe were not reconcilable and therefore 
integration according to the EEC-model would unavoidably fail. More 
than anything, they claimed, these economic troubles revealed – once 
again – that the development of the eec depended on the big and strong 
powers; Germany, France and, possibly soon, also the uk. The smaller 
and weaker states and the protection of their interests, so it was argued, 
would be eclipsed by the whims of the big and powerful ones. It was 
high time, these critical MPs concluded, that the Netherlands became 
captain of its own soul again by abandoning European integration as 
one of the main goals of its foreign policy.435 
In this argument again the topos of the Netherlands being a 
small state was central. However, instead of connecting it to the 
need for international partnerships as the pro-European integration 
majority tended to do, these critical MPs linked it to the importance of 
remaining independent. They did not perceive European integration as 
a safeguard for guaranteeing the interests of the Dutch state, but rather 
as a process that deprived the nation-state of one of its most valuable 
traits: its sovereignty. In other words, they did not concur with the 
assumption of the political advocates of European integration that 
supranationalisation was solely to be seen as a win-win game.
In the plenary debate, the Protestant-conservative parties, the gpv 
most emphatically, proceeded with their attack on the fundamental 
premises underlying the claims of advocates of the accession. In their 
view, the government of the Netherlands and the political majority 
in parliament made a fundamental mistake when believing that the 
process of European integration as it had developed since the late 1940s 
would in practice also lead to the desired supranationalisation. Bart 
Verbrugh, the second gpv man in parliament after its widely respected 
political leader Pieter Jongeling, opposed the viability of a European 
supranational, or federal union in an international political reality 
ruled by nation-states and their individual interests. He emphasised 
that the natural bond between a people and their state was an essential 
connection that would be lacking within a politically unified Europe. 
This resulted in a remarkable avant la lettre phrasing of a theoretical 
viewpoint, very similar to the scholarly ‘no demos thesis’ that would 
become popular, both abroad and in the Netherlands, in the late 
1990s:436 
‘ Most people have struck root in these states some way. They feel 
bound to very simple realities: a home, a horizon and a social 
climate. Or to put it less commonplace, I would say that in the 
143
Netherlands there is a bond with a historic House of Orange, the 
Queen, a church, a quantity of literature in the Dutch language. 
[…] I fear that concentrating too much on an imaginary Europe 
will remove the soul from the nations of our continent without 
a new soul getting into Europe. It has been said before: making 
agreements on cucumbers and jute threads does not build a living 
state. For that, faith is needed and a public philosophy that has 
roots.’437
And the process of European integration, the argument concluded, 
lacked such a rooted philosophy. 
To the firm belief of the sgp and gpv, the politics of Charles 
de Gaulle and the economic setbacks of the early 1970s had shown 
that the reality of international politics was still determined by the 
ambitions and interests of independent states. To them claims of 
the development of a political European community were nothing 
else than hollow phrases that veiled the political reality. In order to 
support this statement, Verbrugh introduced a dissociation in which 
the political reality was disconnected from the political ideal: ‘For the 
real Europe [italics added] still is a Europe of national states.’438 With 
the pursuance of the ideal of European unity, the Netherlands would be 
deceived; eventually political practice would show that the small state 
of the Netherlands would need to dance attendance on the big powers 
of Germany, France and England.439 With this argument the critical 
parties once again meddled with the logics applied by the advocates of 
European integration in which the process was pictured to have only 
positive effects for the Netherlands. 
Apart from the political majority ignoring the disputability of 
its own logics, the thing that annoyed the MPs of the gpv and sgp 
equally, was the consistency argument as applied by the government 
in convincing parliament of new steps towards European unity. Ever 
more often, with the approval of every new European initiative, 
the Netherlands’ ratification of the ecsc, edc and Rome Treaties 
was framed as a plain authorisation for proceeding with the process 
of European integration; a spin that was fiercely contested by the 
conservative Christian parties. The governmental presentation of the 
Dutch path towards European supranational unity as a ‘line of march’440 
leading to an indisputable end goal, or as a ‘motor strategy’441 was 
criticised: ‘Such a strategy does not make a nice impression. People 
want to be able to make a choice and do not want to hear: take care, you 
have to, otherwise a dreadful accident will happen.’442 
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And in the view of the critics, a choice still existed. With the 
preambles of the Rome Treaties in his hand, the sgp representative 
Henk van Rossum enumerated the ratified goals of the European 
Communities: ‘common action to ensure economic and social progress 
of their countries; removal of existing impediments; gradual lifting 
of restrictions in international trade by common trade policies; 
confirmation of alliance with the overseas countries and ensuring their 
prosperity.’443 Subsequently he concluded: ‘I do not read that to exactly 
mean a political unity. Nor […] a federation.’444 In this way, after the line 
of argument had been questioned that presupposed only positive effects 
of deepening and widening of the European Communities, here the 
consistency argument was undermined. Whereas both the Council of 
Europe and a Dutch political majority claimed that with the ratification 
of the Treaties of Rome the Netherlands had taken on the obligation 
to expand and deepen the eec, Van Rossum revealed that – from 
his perspective – also another, less far-reaching and less compelling 
interpretation was possible. 
Ironically, the Protestant-conservative parties would ultimately 
decide to support the accession, precisely because of their doubts about 
the desirability and inevitability of progressive economic and political 
integration. As in the early 1970s the integration was still confined 
to the economic level – a form of integration that did not bother the 
Protestant-conservatives so much, since it was considered not be in 
conflict with the fundamentals of Dutch political sovereignty – they 
saw no harm in stretching the borders of marketplace Europe a bit. Bart 
Verbrugh phrased it pragmatically: ‘In principle it makes no difference 
if in that cooperation there are six or ten countries involved.’445 It is 
telling that Verbrugh chose the term of cooperation here, instead of 
integration. The Protestant-conservatives saw no harm in far-reaching 
economic cooperation which would most definitely benefit Dutch 
export; the Netherlands had successfully practiced international 
economic cooperation for ages. Political integration, defined as the 
merging of the Netherlands into a bigger political entity that would 
involve conferment of political sovereignty on a supranational level of 
governance, however, they still fiercely opposed. 
Although at the time, this Christian-conservative criticism 
of the integration process was only shared by a small minority of 
the Dutch parliament, it should be noted that this was not the case 
within Dutch society as a whole. The Dutch political parties were not 
primarily elected on their European politics and therefore the (mis)
match between their views on European integration and the wishes 
of the Dutch electorate could not easily be determined. Especially not 
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since the Dutch people had not been given any say in the process of 
European integration. The extent to which the European views of the 
various political parties were in keeping with the popular will would 
only become clear over time, when Europe started to grow and make 
itself more felt in daily practice and the European political agenda’s of 
the national parties would by consequence become more important for 
them. 
From defence towards consensus
Unpleasantly surprised, the Dutch government responded 
pugnaciously to the critical attack on the instrumental premise of the 
accession in which it was claimed that the small states would eventually 
be overrun by the bigger ones. It rebutted that the critics themselves 
started from a misconception. ‘For it [is assumed]’, the government 
explained, ‘that there is […] a general conflict of interests between the 
two categories. Apart from the question what […] should be considered 
“strong” and “weak” countries, it should be pointed out that conflicts 
of interest in the Community differ from case to case.’446 
Inconsistent with its earlier claims on the weak position of 
the Netherlands vis-à-vis powers such as France and Germany, 
the government here denied the existence of a permanent and 
insurmountable gap between strong (big) and weak (small) states, in 
order to reject the possibility of domination of the strong big ones. It 
reveals the rhetorical squirming the government was prepared to use 
in order to guarantee headway in the process of European integration 
now that the parliamentary opposition meddled with the fundamental 
presuppositions that the Dutch approach was built on. Subsequently 
– adding to the inconsistency – the government, implicitly confirming 
the weakness of the Netherlands, claimed that, as far as protection 
against dominance of one or more of the Member States needed to be 
guaranteed, this assurance needed to be found in further integration: 
‘European integration, led by strong European institutions [is] the best 
guarantee against that. Without integration only the law of the jungle 
will prevail, with all its attendant dangers.’447 The government claimed 
that the mutual differences between the Six and the new Member 
States would turn out to be less powerful than the unity of the whole. 
Eventually the interest of the community as a whole should and would 
prevail over the differences in interests among the Member States. 
Given the fact that this positive ‘sum of the parts’ prediction could 
not be based on evidence – the outcome of the integration process was 
unclear – it evidently was part of a rhetorical strategy by which the 
parliamentary audience was tempted to reconfirm their support for 
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the premise that European integration was absolutely essential for the 
well-being of the Netherlands. Again, the Dutch national interests were 
adduced as the ultimate reason for going along with the integration 
process. This was a thing remarkably paradoxical when seen in 
relation to the government’s simultaneous prophecy that self-centred 
nationalistic reasoning would ultimately become history as the process 
of European integration proceeded. 
The way the government, in its call for further integration, 
smartly turned an – in Perelman’s terms – argument of succession 
into a pragmatic (instrumental) argument, deserves special attention. 
Although the existence of a general, continuous conflict of interests 
between the big and small members of the eec was initially contested, 
an argument for further integration was subsequently sought in exactly 
such a conflict of interests. In other words, a solution for a problem 
following from the eec model, was found in further developing and 
extending this model instead of rejecting it. It is again a paradox that 
logically results from the basic paradox that had guided the Netherlands 
in its European course since 1948: in order to survive as a state the 
Netherlands should merge into a European entity in which the national 
state would ultimately become – at least to a certain extent– irrelevant. 
The rhetorical technique by which the process of integration was 
presented as the solution for a problem that this same process created, 
was seized upon at various points in the defence of government. 
With regard to, for instance, the prolonged complaints of the left-
wing parties in parliament that further integration would only lead to 
further concentration of power in the hands a few industrial concerns 
and to negative consequences for wage labourers, farmers and small 
tradesmen, the government advised a stronger European Commission 
and ep, that would respectively supervise and control the coming 
about and observance of European competition rules.448 Again, further 
integration was presented as the solution for a problem that might in 
fact be the consequence of integration. 
After having dealt with the criticism on the instrumental 
reasoning that underlay the support of the government for the 
accession, the Protestant-conservative attack on the consistency 
argument needed to be dealt with. It stands out that the Dutch 
government tactfully manoeuvred around the contested point. The 
(probably) too hazardous questions of political necessity, desirability 
or inevitability of a European federation were not entered into. 
Instead, the government put an effort into convincing the Protestant-
conservative parties that the positive consequences of the realisation 
of such a federation would in the end outweigh their sad expectations. 
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So in fact, the consistency argument was turned into an instrumental 
argument in an attempt to convince the critics; it illustrates the trust 
of the Dutch government in the wide parliamentary appreciation of 
instrumental reasoning in the process of European integration. 
In reaction to the anxiety of the Protestant-conservatives with 
regard to the loss of Dutch national characteristics in the process of 
supranationalising or federalising Europe, the government assumed a 
comforting role. In reference to a comment of Bart Verbrugh (gpv) that 
the realisation of a European federation would endanger the existence 
of the Dutch monarchy, the State Secretary of European affairs, 
Westerterp, stated that also in a European federation the states would 
be able to decide on certain crucial policy-areas. For that reason he did 
not see how the Dutch Royal House would be affected.449 The Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Norbert Schmelzer, responded in a similar manner 
to Verbrugh and Van Rossum (sgp): ‘[…] such a [federal] community 
does not necessarily [sic!] mean that the national identity, the national 
character, the language, etc. are threatened’450 Schmelzer’s statement 
raises questions in a context in which the government’s aim was the 
development of a politically integrated, supranational Europe. What 
limits or conditions should exactly be observed in the integration 
process in order to not let the national identity be threatened? And did 
the other Five feel the same? The Netherlands would not be able to set 
the rules of the federal game all by itself. However, such key questions 
were not entered into. 
It is striking that the Dutch government saw that fear of 
losing defining elements of the political and cultural identity of the 
Netherlands was the essence of the Protestant-conservative anxieties. 
As far as Minister Schmelzer and State Secretary Westerterp reacted 
to these concerns, the worries were taken seriously. Yet, the crucial 
element in the arguments of Verbrugh and Van Rossum – i.e. that the 
teleology of supranationalisation followed by the government was in 
essence a rhetorical construct and not a compulsory reality that the 
Netherlands was obliged to follow – was not entered into. Apparently, 
the objective was beyond discussion for the administration led by 
prime minister Barend Biesheuvel. Seen from this perspective, the 
replies of Westerterp and Schmelzer were not much more than – to put 
it popularly – an attempt to keep the holes plugged. 
And the reactions show it was experienced exactly this way by 
the Protestant-conservative MPs. Dissatisfied with the government’s 
reaction, Henk van Rossum commented that both Westerterp and 
Schmelzer had neglected the fundamental point, namely ‘that we are 
sliding down to greater competences of supranational organs, as if that 
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should be seen as an irreversible process. I do not believe that yet.’451 
Bart Verbrugh articulated the crux of the matter more academically: 
‘ I thought it very disappointing that the Minister adopted – of 
all things – that which I oppose, i.e. pointing out simplistically 
a political community as a consequence of an economic 
community and of a customs union. He alleged: those are the 
consequences. I believe that starting out like that implies laying 
material foundations for a European political union. The political 
community results from it; that, exactly, is my great objection.452 
Van Rossum and Verbrugh claimed that by treating the process of 
supranationalisation as an inevitability, effectively and principally 
agreed on by a range of pro-integration votes of the Dutch parliament 
since the adoption of the motion Van der Goes van Naters/Serrarens 
(1948), the process was pushed through, whereas the fundamental 
assumptions underlying the Dutch political support for European 
supranational integration were withdrawn from further conceptual 
debate. 
Here the Protestant-conservatives referred to a fundamental 
element in the approach of the Dutch government in advocating the 
accession of the new members, the uk in particular. The tendency of 
successive Dutch governments to present the Dutch approval of earlier 
agreements on European integration as a basis for further integration, 
yielded the process a teleological aura. This led to disregard for the fact 
that proceeding on the way towards European integration was nothing 
else than a political choice based on political preferences, convictions, 
and assumptions held by a political majority. It is the same point that 
Henk van Rossum (sgp) had made when he claimed that the preambles 
of the Rome Treaties did not inevitably lead to political integration. 
Certainly, they portrayed ‘an ever closer union’ as the ultimate 
goal and, indeed, called for other people to join in the efforts of the 
Communities, but they did not prescribe in any way a supranational or 
federal political unity. 
The observation of the Christian-conservative ‘faultfinders’, 
however, did not alter the fact that a parliamentary majority in favour 
of European integration still liked the earlier agreements on European 
integration to function as a basis or even a catalyst for new steps; a 
majority by which the government knew itself supported. For that 
reason the government could conclude its riposte against the objections 
in parliament with confidence: ‘the Government is of the opinion that 
there is no reason whatsoever to give up the European integration as 
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one of the main objectives of Dutch foreign policy. […] it does not see 
that it should abandon any support to expansion of the eec.’453 
On 14 September 1972 a new step in the process was taken when 
the Dutch Lower House – without a voting by call – gave its consent 
to accession to the eec of Denmark, Ireland, Norway and the United 
Kingdom. Approval in the Upper House followed on 14 November of 
that same year. In the minutes of the meeting in the Lower House it was 
recorded that the MPs of the cpn and psp had voted against the treaty. 
The same was done in the Upper House for the cpn senators. 
In between the Dutch parliamentary voting rounds, on 25 
September 1972, a referendum in Norway revealed that the Norwegian 
people expressed themselves against the entry of their country into 
the European Communities. The Norwegian government thereupon 
decided to abandon the idea of accession, much to the disappointment 
of the Dutch political centre.454 From 1 January 1973 onwards, the 
European Communities proceeded as the Europe of the Nine. 
Compared to the considerations on the Merger Treaty it stands out 
that – again – both the government and a majority in parliament started 
from the central notion that progressive European integration would 
be in the interest of the Netherlands. With the accession of the new 
members, the process of European integration was considered to receive 
a more open, non-protectionist, non-French and more Atlantic nature 
and thus was believed to get more in line with the Dutch traditional 
foreign and economic policy preferences. The supranationalisation 
of the European institutes that was considered to follow from the 
accession was also believed to favour the Netherlands. A strong 
European Commission and Parliament, so it was argued, would 
neutralise the differences in interests between big and small states and 
would thus benefit the small states. 
These lines of argument show that the majority vote in favour of 
the accession was aimed at strengthening the international position 
of the Netherlands. The existence of the basic paradox that had guided 
the Netherlands in its policy on European integration since 1948 was 
again reconfirmed: in order to preserve the state of the Netherlands it 
was directed by its political elite to merge into a united Europe. What 
was not reckoned with or elaborated on was that, with the development 
of an ‘ever closer union’, governed by strong European institutions, 
the Netherlands might ultimately lose influence on the course of the 
process, even to the extent that the sovereign state of the Netherlands 
might no longer be claimed to exist. If and how the process of European 
integration would in such an advanced stage still work in favour of the 
Netherlands could not be foreseen. 
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Confronted with the arguments of the political parties critical of 
European integration who seriously called into question that European 
integration would work in favour of the Netherlands, the government 
– supported by the political majority – chose to look away. Potential 
uncertainties and downsides that were raised by the critics were 
soothed down with the argument that further integration would solve 
them. It shows that by 1972, the Dutch political majority had started 
to believe in its own teleological European ideal to such an extent that 
any fundamental debate on the essential assumptions was judged 
superfluous. 
3.4  Pursuing a Strong and Directly  
Elected ep (1977)
In Article 138, subsection 3 of the eec Treaty (1957) it had been laid 
down that in the process of building European unity a directly elected 
European assembly should eventually develop.455 In due time, the 
Council of Ministers were to set the date for its election.456 From 
1958 onwards – the year that the three representative assemblies of 
the European Communities had merged into one Parliamentary 
Assemblée – the states and institutions involved in the process of 
European integration had quarrelled about the why’s and when’s of 
such elections.
The representatives in Strasbourg, for instance, consistently 
argued for the Assembly to become a real parliament (i.e. a European 
equivalent of the national houses of representatives), for the 
competences of the ep to be stretched and the connection between the 
representatives and those whom they represented to be strengthened 
by means of direct elections. As a part of their mission, in March 
1962, these members themselves decided to formally rename the 
parliamentary assembly ‘European Parliament’ (ep); a rhetorical coup 
of great importance in the process of developing an ever closer union 
through which the parliament factually expressed that ‘even though 
we do not have the electorate yet, because of the mere promise we have 
transcended the class of meetings of national parliamentarians we are 
familiar with such as for instance nato and the Council of Europe.’457 
The Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) were supported 
in their striving by the European Commission which had a general 
interest in the strengthening of the European institutions: a powerful 
supranational ep was considered to stimulate the coming into being 
of a powerful supranational executive. A consistent majority of the 
Dutch parliament and the successive Dutch governments of the 1960s 
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and 1970s also supported the idea of a stronger and directly elected ep. 
It was considered to be an essential element of a strong supranational 
Europe; a form – the previous sections have shown – from which the 
Netherlands would benefit optimally, since it believed to have a greater 
say in a supranational community in which the Member States would 
have declared themselves equals than in a lose intergovernmental 
cooperative alliance in which the big states would still call the tune. 
However, the French president Charles de Gaulle (1959-1969), 
but also his successors Georges Pompidou (1969-1974) and Valérie 
Giscard d’Estaing (1974-1981), held the opposite view: important parts 
of the power of the European communities should remain rested with 
the national governments. A strong European Parliament, invested 
with real legislative powers – the presumption was that as soon as 
direct elections would be held, the call for power of the ep would also 
increase – was not very compatible with their intergovernmental 
conception of European unity. For years, the French refused to use 
the term ‘European parliament’ instead of Parliamentary Assemblée, 
because they saw it as a source of dangerous misunderstandings. 
A ‘European parliament’, they reasoned, presupposed a ‘European 
people’; a concept that according to the intergovernmentally-inclined 
French politicians did not exist.458 Also with regard to the objective of 
realising direct elections, France remained a principal obstructionist. 
Years went by in which these diverging positions precluded a 
decision in the Council of Ministers on the matter of direct elections. 
A breakthrough in the deadlock was reached at the European Council, 
held in Paris on 9 and 10 December 1974, where the opposite stances of 
the Netherlands and France unexpectedly turned out to be a chance for 
realising direct elections of the ep after all. On this occasion, the recently 
elected French leader Giscard d’Estaing expressed that he was willing to 
agree with direct elections for the ep in exchange for institutionalising 
the European Council; the intergovernmental forum for discussion 
and decision making of leaders of the Member States (such as the one 
in Paris in 1974) that had hitherto been held on an ad hoc basis in order 
to discuss and enforce decisions on current issues. In fact, this proposal 
signified the resurrection of classical diplomacy within the framework 
of the process of European integration.459 Exactly for that reason, the 
Netherlands – both the government and parliament – held fundamental 
objections against the formalisation of bringing about such an 
intergovernmental organ. The forum would potentially increase 
intergovernmental decision-making in the European Communities 
and this ran counter to the Dutch supranational preferences. It would 
moreover meddle with the unwritten Dutch constitutional rule that the 
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prime-minister was only a primus inter pares and could not claim the 
privilege to decide in European affairs on behalf of his colleagues, the 
Foreign Minister in particular, since only the Minister-President would 
be invited to the European Council. 
Despite these objections, however, the Dutch government, led by 
the social-democrat Joop den Uyl (PvdA), did not resist the proposal 
of Giscard d’Estaing that suddenly brought the long desired objective 
of direct elections of the ep in sight.460 The Dutch were convinced 
that, in the long run, direct elections of the ep would significantly 
contribute to supranationalisation of the European Communities. The 
establishment of the European Council was perceived as a temporary 
necessary evil. Eventually, the Nine agreed in Paris that direct elections 
should take place in or after 1978. On 20 September 1976 the Decision 
and Act ‘concerning the election of the representatives of the Assembly 
by direct universal suffrage’ was signed, which in the Netherlands was 
held to have the status of an international agreement that needed to be 
approved by parliament like any other treaty.461 
With the introduction of direct elections, the amount of seats in 
the ep was to be increased from 198 to 410, of which the Netherlands 
would henceforth hold 25 compared to 14 in the old situation. It 
signified a decrease of the Dutch share of almost 1% in the total amount 
of seats. An important change in the functioning of the parliament, 
relevant for the Netherlands, was that under Article 5 of the Act, the 
system of a double membership of an mp of both the national and the 
European parliament was still possible but could no longer be held 
to be obligatory. By consequence, the state of the Netherlands was 
not allowed any longer to uphold the system of a compulsory double 
mandate of the parliamentarians that were returned to the European 
parliament.462 This change in regulations broke the strong connection 
that had, as a result of the double mandate, up until then existed 
between the Dutch representatives of the national parliament and the 
European parliament. 
Position of the government
In the Den Uyl cabinet the office of Foreign Minister was held by the 
human rights specialist Max van der Stoel (PvdA). One of the early 
Dutch specialists of European Law, Laurens Jan Brinkhorst (D’66), 
was appointed as his State Secretary, mainly responsible for European 
Affairs. The arp politician Willem de Gaay Fortman became the 
Minister of the Interior. These three members of the government 
presented the draft Bill of approval on the European Act on direct 
elections of the ep to the Dutch parliament on 25 February 1977. In 
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the explanatory memorandum the government expressed its joy on 
the realisation of a European agreement on direct elections of the 
ep for three particular reasons. Firstly, these elections were praised 
because the government believed them to break the vicious circle 
of a European parliament without extensive competences because 
it was not democratically chosen and vice versa. Secondly, and very 
important since it heralded a new element in the Dutch political debates 
on European integration, there was the argument of involving the 
Dutch citizen in the process. Without entering into the causes, the 
government observed that the involvement of national citizens in the 
process of European integration had, until then, left much to be desired. 
This was a problem not only because the ‘élan’ of the integration process 
was in danger of decline, but also since the national citizen was to an 
ever greater extent affected by this process: ‘[the European] legal order 
[is getting] increasingly interwoven […] with the national legal order 
and as a consequence citizens [are] increasingly affected by Community 
regulations.’463 This interesting remark reveals that the government 
was aware that, as a consequence of the growing intertwining of the 
two legal orders, – the result of the previous European Treaties and ecj 
rulings such as Van Gend en Loos en Costa-enel– the need had increased 
for a stronger democratic legitimisation of the process of European 
integration. 
A third and last reason for the government to applaud the 
organisation of direct elections was that it believed that only through 
direct elections the ep could develop into a full-fledged European 
parliament with corresponding competences. This argument seems to 
be closely connected to, or even overlapping, the first argument. The 
bottom-line was that a strong, well-functioning ep was considered 
essential for the development of a strong, well-functioning democratic 
Europe. The working of the parliamentary democracy on a national 
level was taken as an example: ‘Principles of democracy are central 
in all the Member States of the Community and nothing would 
be more obvious than that the same holds good in the European 
Communities.’464 This comment speaks volumes on the conception of a 
unified Europe of the Den Uyl government. It shows, most importantly, 
how the organisational principles of the nation state were taken as the 
conceptual starting point for the construction of a supranational entity. 
Logically extrapolating this thought, this implied that, ultimately, 
a united Europe was imagined to become a fully sovereign layer of 
government, ruled by its own sovereign institutions. The political 
complexity of establishing such a new sovereign entity, strongly 
intertwined with the order of the nation-state as it had come into 
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being in the 19th century, and yet independent of it, was not elaborated 
on. As has been shown in the previous sections, this is illustrative of 
the mindset of the Dutch governmental elite with which European 
integration was approached as a manageable process, that could be 
steered in a, for the Netherlands, desired direction and in which the 
possible downsides were not dwelled upon. A mindset, it should be 
noted, that until then had not been proven wrong, since, between 
1948 and 1979, the European Community had – slowly but steadily – 
developed indeed in the direction that a Dutch political majority had in 
mind. For its shortcomings coming to light, so it would turn out, a new 
decade needed to break.
Since the Decision and Act on Elections by Direct Suffrage was 
again not considered incompatible with the Dutch constitution in any 
regard, Den Uyl’s government presented it to the Dutch parliament for 
approval in accordance with the procedure as laid down in Article 60, 
subsection 2 of the Dutch constitution. An approval procedure that had 
by now become the standard and was not very likely to lead to heated 
discussion in parliament. 
In general, heated discussions in parliament seemed improbable. 
The political relations in the Dutch parliament with regard to the 
process of European integration were still largely the same as earlier 
in the 1970s. The coalition partners of the PvdA, kvp, arp, ppr and 
D’66 were, without exception, still in favour of a further, supranational 
development and organisation of the European institutions. Their 
support for direct elections could be counted on. Also the opposition 
parties of the vvd and chu were still among the proponents of 
further European integration. For the rest, the political opposition was 
composed of the critics of European integration of the cpn, psp, gpv 
and sgp; with only 7 of 150 seats in the Lower House a weak political 
segment. 
Notwithstanding the persistent support for European integration 
of large sections in parliament, signs of a shift of opinion can be 
observed in the public intellectual debate on this process, however. 
During the 1960s and 1970s the public debate on European integration 
in the Netherlands was increasingly characterised by gloominess. 
Gaullism, oil crises and economic recession had shown that in times 
of difficulties the members still tended to withdraw behind the safe 
fence of the nation state. Although the ideal of a truly united Europe 
was not abandoned by Dutch thinkers on the subject, disappointments 
on the path to this ideal had led to a more sceptical attitude.465 In the 
course of 1970s and beyond, this scepticism resulted in the rise of a 
group of public intellectuals that started to turn their backs on the 
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federal ideal and argued instead in favour of European integration 
of a more intergovernmental character. In other words, a spirit of 
intergovernmentalism seemed to be abroad.466 The direct elections 
of the ep as a step towards a more supranational Europe, ran counter 
to this tendency. However, since public intellectual criticism on 
the European ideal was not yet overpowering, there was no strong 
resistance against the proposal of direct elections. The public 
intellectual advocates of such elections propagated the view to see it as a 
means to renew the enthusiasm for the process of European integration 
in Dutch society. So despite the shifting tendency in the public 
intellectual debate, going by the dominant positive sounds with which 
the proposal for direct elections was welcomed, the government did not 
need to reckon with fierce public protest on its presentation of the plan. 
Debate in parliament
In June 1977, the parliamentary debate on the Dutch Bill of Approval 
concerning the Decision and Act on Direct Elections took place in 
both the Lower and Upper House. From the outset of the discussion it 
was clear that a majority of the Dutch parliament would endorse the 
bill indeed. For years already, this majority had argued in favour of a 
stronger European Parliament with a mandate and real competences. 
In fact, it had been one of its main motivations behind the merger of 
the three executives in 1965. In addition, during the debate on approval 
of accession of the four latest Member States, the Vredeling motion, 
proposed by Henk Vredeling (PvdA), had called for setting a term 
for the organisation of direct elections of the ep.467 For this reason it 
is not surprising that during the debate, various MPs expressed their 
feeling that the organisation of direct elections was nothing more 
than performing ‘a duty that had already existed for a long time.’468 
Moreover, similar to the reasoning of the government, also among 
pro-integration parliamentarians the idea had taken root that for a 
true democratically legitimate European community to develop, the 
European citizens needed to be involved in the process. It is hard to 
accurately pin point how and since when this idea had taken root in the 
Dutch parliament. Clear, however, is that the mp Eef Verwoert (DS’70), 
for instance, observed that the European Movement and similar 
organisations that had been set up to encourage enthusiasm for the 
integration process in the Netherlands, had failed in their task and, for 
that reason, other means needed to be employed:
‘ However much regard I have for the activities of the European 
Movement, it has still continued to stay an elitist company. It has 
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worked intensively on the deepening of the European idea, but 
in doing so has nevertheless found insufficient response in large 
sections of Dutch society.’469
This feeling was also expressed by the recurrent call in the Dutch 
parliament in these years for improvement of the visibility of the 
process by, for instance, gradually removing the customs signs at the 
border-crossings or launching a uniform European passport: ‘it is only 
a minimal indication for people, who in that way consequently see 
that something has been done.’470 The advocates of further integration 
viewed the organisation of direct elections of the ep as an initiative 
that would also contribute to this goal. This emphasis on the lack of 
visibility of the integration process for the Dutch people is striking, 
given the fact that in the previous decades these parties had supported 
the development of approval procedures that to a great extent withdrew 
new European treaties from any fundamental debate in and outside 
parliament. 
In addition to the considerations of democratisation, a stronger 
involvement of the national citizens was also emphasised for reasons 
of supranationalisation. In order to make a success of that process, 
involvement of the national populations could not be neglected. 
The majority view in parliament was that a truly supranational level 
of governance presupposed a full dress supranational parliament. 
Such a parliament in its turn presupposed a connection between the 
representatives and those who were represented. A change of mentality 
had to be brought about with the Dutch people: ‘People must learn to 
think supranationally.’471 Direct elections were seen as a means in this 
process.
A striking lack of criticism existed amongst the Dutch political 
majority with regard to the concept of direct elections. The mainstream 
political parties shared a conception of a unified Europe of which a 
directly elected parliament was an essential part. The lack of any debate 
as regards contents contrasts sharply with the sometimes extensive 
discussions on what comes across as relatively simple organisational 
details, such as the day on which the direct elections would be 
organised, the moment at which the results would be made public and 
the exact voting procedure.472 This focus on small details perfectly fits 
the leaning towards European integration in which the grand questions 
were considered to have been answered and in which the objectives 
were clear and the showdown between the Member States needed to 
focus on influence concerning organisational preferences. 
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Nor did the principal opponents of progressive European 
integration put forward much on the logics of democratisation and 
supranationalisation as applied by the proponents. One of the few 
examples of a rebuttal – albeit rather implicit – of the democratisation 
line of argument was the comment of Bart Verbrugh (gpv): ‘[…] now 
we get a Europe of the parliamentarians. When shall we get a Europe 
of the people?’473 This – again – was an avant la lettre form of the no 
demos thesis that would become better known in the 1990s. Instead 
of logically linking direct elections to involvement of the national 
citizens in the integration project, as done by advocates of the elections, 
Verbrugh thought that the desired involvement and direct elections 
were essentially different. A Europe of technocrats, he claimed, whether 
directly elected or not, was not the same as a Europe with which people 
felt connected. Although not the most convincing argument since the 
same be claimed with regard to the Dutch elections and democratic 
representation, Verbrugh’s comment was in essence an attack on the 
premise that a directly elected parliament yielded a democratic Europe. 
In addition, in order to undermine the claim of supranationalisation 
through direct elections, the gpv brought forward the fact that both 
France, the uk and Denmark were notorious for not wanting the ep to 
get many competences: ‘For neither the French, nor the English, nor the 
Danes are in any way in favour of a substantial control of the European 
Parliament and that is why that substantial control will not come 
about.’474
The real spice, however, was brought to the debate when all 
of a sudden and contrary to the majority consensus that the Act at 
stake could be approved in accordance with Article 60, subsection 
2 of the Dutch constitution, the Communists questioned whether 
direct election of the ep was compatible with the Dutch constitution. 
Marcus Bakker started by claiming that direct elections for the ep were 
in conflict with Article 88 of the Dutch constitution in which it was 
stated that ‘the States-General represent the whole Dutch nation.’ 
Based on this provision, the Dutch people as a whole, Bakker claimed, 
were competent to elect their representation. But following Dutch 
constitutional logic, he argued, only one representation could be 
chosen, because the people of the Netherlands had only one mandate 
to give. Here, a conflict with the introduction of direct elections 
arose: ‘If these elections take place, the Dutch will elect two kinds of 
representation. […] That is to say that, from that moment on, the Dutch 
nation gives away two mandates.’475 According to Bakker, this was a 
political problem and not a merely academic one. Ultimately, the giving 
of two separate mandates – one to the Dutch States-General and one 
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to the Dutch representation in Europe – could result in conflict. Bakker 
clarified his stance with a typically Communist spectre: 
‘ It is possible that a majority of the Dutch Euro-MP’s will take 
a view which boils down to supporting measures or decisions 
which amount to […] German power building, whereas the Dutch 
Parliament thinks or acts to the contrary. The question is then, 
who has got the real mandate of the Dutch people.’476 
His argument was dictated by the abolishment of the practice that, 
since the establishment of the ecsc and eec Assemblies, the Dutch 
representatives in the ep also had a seat in the national parliament. This 
had implied that in their work on the European level the Dutch MEPs 
were directly connected to the national political level. The oath with 
which these parliamentarians had pledged allegiance to the King and 
the Dutch constitution at their installation in the Dutch parliament 
solemnly confirmed the connection between the Dutch M(E)Ps and 
their state, no matter what other post they held. The abolishment of this 
compulsory double parliamentary membership then would lead to a 
crucial change in this relation between the Dutch political community 
and the constitutional principles of the Netherlands. Henceforth, the 
connection that had existed between Dutch MEPs and the national 
parliamentary representation of the Dutch people, would no longer 
exist. This was the basis on which the cpn could build its argument on 
the development of tension between the constitutional foundation of 
the parliamentary democracy in the Netherlands and the organisation 
of direct elections of the ep. 
Throughout the parliamentary debate, cpn representatives 
insisted on the unconstitutionality of the proposed elections in order 
to advise against approval.477 They argued that instead of serving the 
democratic system on the European level, the net result of the elections 
would be the sapping and subordination of the Dutch democracy. 478 
It was an attack on the premises that bringing about a supranational 
democratic order would go hand in hand with positive results for the 
Netherlands and had no critical constitutional implications. The party 
was supported in its viewpoint by the gpv and the psp.479
Bakker added that direct elections were improperly applied in 
the process of European integration. In the history of developing 
states, parliaments had been established to balance the power of the 
administration. In the process of European integration, however, a 
parliament and, moreover, electoral suffrage was used as an instrument 
to bring about a political union: ‘suffrage [is] as it were put in to serve 
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another process’480 Bakker’s complaint touched upon the core of the 
political strategy of instrumental supranationalism. Inspired by his 
political preferences, he claimed that the Dutch constitution should 
function as a brake on this strategy. The Communist received support of 
Bart Verbrugh who echoed this objection from his gpv background.481
From defence towards consensus
Not surprisingly, those in parliament and government who believed in 
instrumental supranationalism had no intention to let these protests 
interfere with their political goals. Hans van Mierlo, mp on behalf of 
D66, countered Bakker on his constitutional interpretation via the legal 
logic of in- and exclusiveness of the Dutch constitutional document. 
In his opinion the Dutch constitution did not articulate that the people 
of the Netherlands, as a whole, had only one mandate to give to a 
representative body: ‘What the Constitution says is that, when the 
Dutch people elect the national parliament, it is theirs by mandate. It 
does not exclude a verdict of the Dutch as a whole on another issue.’482 
In this way, Van Mierlo created a dissociation in which the distribution 
of mandates to representatives of the Dutch people, in accordance with 
Article 88 of the Dutch constitution, was disconnected from any further 
condition on its exclusiveness. It was an attempt to stretch the purport 
of the Constitution by arguing that it did not prohibit things that had 
not explicitly been laid down in its text and simultaneously passing 
over the underlying political question that Bakker had broached: 
the desirability of a constitutional brake on the process of European 
integration. 
The State Secretary on European Affairs Laurens Jan Brinkhorst 
(D66) sided with his party member Van Mierlo on the technicality of 
non-exclusiveness of the Dutch constitution, but also went further. By 
elaborating on the political intention of the constitutional legislator 
[in Dutch: de grondwetgever] of 1953, he lifted the interpretation of 
Article 88 to an entirely new level: ‘For he [the constitutional legislator 
of 1953] did not intend the constitution to be the highest authority, 
but wanted to give it a place within the framework of an international 
legal order.’483 On the basis of Article 63, in which the possibility to 
deviate from the constitution was laid down and Article 67 that stated 
that national competences in the field of legislature, governance and 
the judiciary could be conferred on international organisations, he 
proclaimed that it was in the tradition of the Dutch society to view, in 
the pursuance of an international legal order, the national legal order as 
a function of the international legal order.484 Further interpreting the 
change of 1953, it followed from the internal logic of the constitutional 
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system that parliament ‘since it loses powers in the national context 
[…] the national electorate can positively be given the mandate to elect 
a European representation.’485 Pressing home his claims, Brinkhorst 
stated that: 
‘ I [am not able] to see, why essentially there is a difference between 
the situation in which we have the electorate choose both the 
Provincial [Councils] and the Lower House, and the situation 
in which the same people elect the Lower House as well as 
representatives of the European Parliament.’486 
Brinkhorst presented the matters as self-evident. In his view, the 
constitutional reform of 1953 was to be interpreted as subordinating 
the Dutch polity to an international legal order. As a consequence, he 
claimed, the transference of sovereignty to this international legal order 
was legitimate, and so was correcting the democratic deficit that this 
transference implied by directly electing a new representation on the 
European level. In Brinkhorst’s view, the Dutch constitution welcomed 
– or even demanded – this development rather than obstructed it. It 
immediately stands out that this line of constitutional interpretation 
perfectly befitted the political objective that Brinkhorst and his party 
strove after: paving the way for a unified Europe. Considerations that 
might hinder this political goal, such as the notion of stronger national 
democratic control by parliament that had inspired the constitutional 
reform of 1953, were not addressed. The consequences of the preferred 
constitutional interpretation for the democratic influence of the Dutch 
people in the process of European integration was not at all considered 
in Brinkhorst’s contribution. Nor was the notion that his view 
represented only one interpretation of the Dutch constitution and that 
the essence of the dispute between the cpn and D’66 precisely went 
back to contestation on how to interpret the Dutch constitution. Here, 
Brinkhorst made effective use of the inviolable character of the Dutch 
constitutional articles on international treaty making as they had been 
treated in parliament since 1953. 
Arguments and images that strengthened the desirability, 
necessity or obviousness of bringing about a federally integrated 
European order, were magnified by Brinkhorst. A typical example in his 
plea is the analogy that he constructed of elections for the European and 
Dutch Lower House and the elections for the Dutch Provincial Councils 
and the Lower House. With this analogy Brinkhorst in fact expressed 
his political desire to view European integration as a process in which 
the Dutch Lower House related to the European Parliament, the same 
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way as the Dutch Provincial Councils related to the Lower House in 
the Netherlands. The analogy rested on the starting point that the 
organisation of the Netherlands could be compared with, or translated 
into the organisation of a united Europe. In other words, Brinkhorst 
showed his hand in the sense that he and his political allies strove after 
a European order, based on the organisational principles of the nation-
state, in which the European level of governance would to a large extent 
determine the competences of the national level; a unified Europe, to 
put it differently, as a supra-nation-state. Fundamental questions on the 
validity of this logic were not entered into. Was European integration 
truly to be compared to the process of organising the Dutch state? In 
the 19th century, Johan Thorbecke and his followers had been able to 
set the political relations between the various governmental levels 
themselves. A thing that would not be possible within a European 
order in which the Netherlands would not call the tune all by itself; a 
historical difference with significant implications which was not taken 
into consideration by Brinkhorst. 
The fact that the State Secretary allowed himself this much 
openness on such a – judged with historical distance – revolutionary 
goal can only be explained from the general consensus with a political 
majority in these years on the importance and need of pursuing such a 
far-reaching European unity. Three decennia later, a similar statement of 
a member of the government would not have passed the Dutch Lower 
House this easily. 
The rhetorical technique applied by Brinkhorst, supported the 
effectiveness of his claim. Again, a liaison of succession, was turned 
into a pragmatic argument. To put it less abstract: the problem of a 
lack of democratic control, following from the process of conferring 
sovereignty on the European level, was suggested to be solved 
through bringing European integration further. In fact, rather than 
the one development logically or necessarily leading to the other, 
however, Brinkhorst’s words show that the Dutch government 
allowed democratisation – i.e. direct elections – to result from the 
de jure creation of a European political community. In doing that, 
the substantive fundament of this political community was further 
fortified. Viewed from this perspective, again the approach of Laurens 
Jan Brinkhorst to the Dutch constitution testified of his political 
preference in favour of European integration and at the same time 
effectively contributed to this goal. 
Following from the broad political consensus that existed in 
parliament regarding both the objective of European integration 
– although no detailed conceptual consensus existed, a general federal 
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perspective was still supported among the political mainstream – and 
the instrumental function of the Dutch constitution in this process, 
Brinkhorst’s claims were not repudiated nor questioned by the political 
majority. More than that, they were embraced, just like the Act on 
direct elections of the ep by universal suffrage, without a voting by call. 
On 22 and 28 June 1977 it was passed in respectively the Dutch Lower 
and Upper House. The Euro-sceptics of the cpn, gpv, psp and sgp, 
who voted against the Act, did not have a chance. The political will to 
achieve European integration eliminated the constitutional argument 
in advance; a situation that Hans van Mierlo worded aptly. The process 
of European integration was, as he saw it, a transition in which hitherto 
strange and not existing procedures needed to be applied in order 
to reach the ultimate goal; a remarkable comment for a member of 
the party usually passionately pleading in favour of full democratic 
transparency: 
‘ That Europe cannot come into existence […] but in a kind of 
half-light, in which there will be constant tensions between the 
Europe that has not come about yet but that is in the making and 
the components from which it originates. […] Indeed, by way of 
half-vague situations in which logic and the consistency of the 
familiar existing order are devalued for the benefit of the coming 
into being of the new order. That has to be accepted.’ 487 
Van Mierlo touched the heart of the matter when he pointed out 
that this acceptation depended on political preferences: ‘The more 
you get convinced that Europe must come about, the more you tend 
to accept the resulting frictions with the national existing order.’488 
In order to bring a united Europe closer, a majority in the Dutch 
parliament was indeed willing to sacrifice the direct connection that 
had hitherto existed between the national MPs, and those representing 
the Netherlands in the European parliament, They did not want the 
national constitution to function as a brake in the process of European 
integration. On the contrary, they were determined to make a good 
pace. 
In the Netherlands the first direct elections of the ep took place on 
7 June 1979. The turnout was 58.1%; disappointingly low according to 
the Dutch political establishment. Up until this very day, however, this 
turnout has never been equalled. It is one of the elements contributing 
to the notion that the process of European integration suffers from a 
democratic deficit. In this respect, the introduction of direct elections 
for the ep has not brought the major positive effects it was expected 
163
to bring. Until today this is grist to the mill of the Dutch critics of the 
process of European integration who explain this poor turnout as a sign 
that the Dutch have still not warmed to the idea of a politically unified 
Europe. 
For the advocates of progressive European integration, however, 
the advantage of the new arrangements was that, with setting up 
direct elections for the ep, the pre-federal institutional framework 
of the European Communities was strengthened again. Step by step 
the reality of a truly supranational Europe, pursued by the Dutch 
political mainstream because it believed it to serve the interests of 
the Netherlands, came closer. Moreover, with the approval of direct 
European elections in the Netherlands, another constitutional hurdle 
to the realisation of this goal had been levelled: with a large majority, 
parliament had rejected the interpretation that the Dutch people had 
only one democratic mandate to give away. A leading argument was 
found in the ‘intent of the constitutional legislator’ of 1953. By accepting 
this argument, the Dutch political majority moved further along the 
path of making sacrosanct the constitutional changes of the early 1950s. 
Simultaneously the seed was planted – which was not fundamentally 
nor widely protested against! – that the Netherlands was to a unified 
Europe as the Dutch provinces were to the Netherlands. Thus, in the 
Netherlands the way for new steps towards a federal, or an even more 
than federal Europe, had been paved. 
The Dutch approach towards the various developments in the 
process of European integration between 1964 and 1979 was based 
then on the strategy of instrumental supranationalism. This strategy 
implied that supranationalisation of European institutions and 
decision-making procedures were strived after, as it was considered to 
benefit the Netherlands politically and economically. The merger of the 
executives (1965) was pushed by the Netherlands since it was believed 
to strengthen the European executive power. This in itself was deemed 
beneficial because stronger European institutions were considered to 
go at the expense of the ability of France to dominate the integration 
process. With the accession of four new members in 1973 – the uk in 
particular – a long cherished wish of the Netherlands was fulfilled. This 
accession was considered to be of advantage to the Netherlands both 
economically and politically. Entry of the uk into the eec was – again – 
considered to imply the strengthening of a counterweight against 
the domination of the French protectionists and to contribute to the 
Atlantic preferences of the Netherlands. 
The introduction of direct elections to the ep, similar to the 
merger, was considered to stimulate the necessary supranationalisation. 
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The democratising effect of such direct elections was applauded because 
it would legitimise the process of European integration. The political 
elite of the Netherlands had increasingly begun to worry about the 
lack of involvement and interest of the Dutch people in the integration 
process. In their belief, a truly supranational community could not 
develop without involvement of the citizens of the Member States. 
Direct elections to the European Parliament were considered a means to 
stimulate both that involvement and, indirectly, supranationalisation. 
The main premise behind the instrumental supranationalist 
philosophy in parliament was that in a supranational Europe 
the influence of a small country would be greater than in an 
intergovernmental set-up. Within a supranational structure, as the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Norbert Schmelzer had put it, European 
decisions affecting the Netherlands would not be taken without the 
Netherlands. Instead, the Netherlands, so it was reasoned, would have 
influence on the European course of events from within.489 To put it 
sharper: the mindset of the Dutch political majority was built around 
the notion that the power of the European Communities was in inverse 
proportion to the influence that the big, politically strong members 
could exert individually. 
This line of thinking speaks volumes about the way the 
Netherlands perceived itself as an agent on the European stage. The 
Dutch political elite in majority agreed that the Netherlands was a tiny, 
weak player, running the risk of becoming a puppet of the bigger powers 
of Europe. To prevent this from happening, the European integration 
strategy of the Netherlands was aimed at creating a balance in which the 
differences in power between the various agents were smoothed away. 
This notion, in its turn, reveals the trust of the Dutch political elite in 
European agreements, in the functioning of the European institutions 
and the eventual prevailing of the common interest in a supranational 
Europe. Indeed, the political majority seemed convinced that such a 
common interest could be defined and recognised by the nine members 
of the European communities and its prevalence guaranteed by their 
mutual agreements. Even more remarkable is the belief that seemed 
to have taken root, that this common interest would match the Dutch 
preferences, regardless the issue at stake or the specific historical 
circumstances. 
In the various parliamentary debates it stands out that 
doubts, the possible downsides or unintended consequences of 
supranationalisation did not get much attention. By strengthening 
the supranational ties, the participants would become ever more 
interconnected in the process of European integration. An alternative 
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way of looking at the process therefore – in the Dutch political spectrum 
the ultra left (cpn, psp) and the Protestant-conservatives represented 
this view in their own respective ways – was, that the Netherlands 
surrendered to an ever more fundamental extent to other states, France 
in particular, which it fundamentally mistrusted. In comparison to the 
majority view, this reasoning started from the premise that a unified 
Europe would still be composed of individual nation states, driven by 
individual national interests. In essence, they rejected the notion of the 
development of one European polity which encompassed the various 
national polities. 
The political majority, however, remained fundamentally 
unsusceptible to such forms of counter reasoning. Throughout the 
period 1964-1979, instrumental supranationalist considerations 
defined its thinking and actions in the process of European integration. 
Although it is hard to pin-point the origins of this persistent strategic 
consensus, the correspondence between instrumental internationalism 
– with which the Netherlands had a long history of experience – and the 
new concept of instrumental supranationalism remains striking. Ever 
since the seventeenth century the foreign policy of the Netherlands 
had been characterised by a belief that the country, for its own sake, 
needed to balance the differences in power between itself and bigger 
and stronger political powers in order to secure its vital interests. A 
trust in international legal arrangements in order to secure the national 
interests was characteristic of the Land of Grotius. Confronted with 
ideas for European integration, it can be observed that these historically 
developed foreign policy reflexes cropped up again; the process of 
European integration – which had since 1948 been viewed as a central 
goal of Dutch foreign policy – was taken in hand with the well-tried 
strategy that had for many years dominated Dutch foreign policy. 
The interpretation of the Dutch constitutional articles dealing with 
international treaty making concerning European unification was made 
a sacrosanct tenet in order for this strategy to be executed through far-
reaching European agreements in which state sovereignty was yielded.
The one to one, and rather uncritical application of the traditional 
foreign policy strategy of the Netherlands to European integration, is 
indicative of the conceptual frivolity with which the Dutch political 
mainstream threw itself into the process. As has been pointed out 
already, its attitude in all this was based on considerations of national 
survival; a notion that relates paradoxically to the federal objective that 
it aimed for since in a European federation the political sovereign state 
of the Netherlands would de jure no longer exist.490 Consequently, so 
it would turn out, the integration process could in the long run not 
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be captured in familiar nation-state notions such as foreign policy, 
international agreements, exchange of interests, big and small powers 
and the like. Supranationalisation implied that a whole new dimension 
would be added to both the national and the international political 
perspective of the Member States. A dimension, the implications of 




First Cracks in  
the Consensus
1979 — 1986
‘ The policy on Europe is self-evident. […] The Dutch interest in  
the common market is so obvious that everything contributing to 
maintenance and strengthening of the eec deserves our support in 
principle. […] [Generally speaking] we can rely on our pro-community 
instinct. Nor is this a controversial matter in our domestic policy.’ 
 
Herman Posthumus Meyjes (1979)491
4.1  Introduction
As emphasised by the quotation of the Dutch Director General of 
European Affairs, Herman Posthumus Meyjes, the Dutch political elite 
and top officials entered the 1980s in an atmosphere of confidence with 
regard to the process of European integration. In the previous decade, 
two of the country’s most dearest wishes with regard to the process 
of European integration had been fulfilled: accession of the uk and the 
institutionalisation of direct elections for the ep. Although doubts and 
criticism had grown among certain intellectuals and smaller political 
parties, by now, the conviction that going along with the process of 
European integration contributed to the economic and political well-
being of the Netherlands, was solidly rooted with the Dutch political 
mainstream an considered as a matter of course.
This confidence found its reflection in the process of reform that 
the Dutch constitution went through in the early 1980s. In this process, 
the text was simplified by handing over a number of constitutional 
issues to the legislator (deconstitutionalisation).492 Moreover, the 
wording of the constitution was modernised and adjusted to the 
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constitutional relations as they had developed over time. Where the 
word ‘King’ had in fact indicated ‘the government’, for instance, the 
latter term henceforth replaced the first. 
A constitutional change that catches the eye most was the 
adding of a new first chapter that recorded a series of basic rights of the 
citizens of the Netherlands. Since 1945 the Netherlands had become 
a party to a series of international human rights agreements such as 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (udhr, 1948) and the 
European Convention on Human Rights (echr, 1950).493 The monistic 
constitutional culture of the Netherlands in which Articles 63 and 65 
provided that those international treaty provisions directly protected 
Dutch citizens, had since the early post-war years guaranteed these basic 
rights. The reason of the government for adding a chapter with basic 
rights to the national constitution, despite the existence of international 
safeguards, was that it thought that: ‘It is true that international and 
national law are in continuous interaction and mutually support each 
other, but have, nevertheless, a function of their own. It is our judgment 
that fusing them together should not be our aim.’ It added that: ‘national 
rights […] provide more specified guarantees, deemed of special 
importance in the country’s own jurisdiction.’494 These remarks reveal 
the introduction of an interesting nuance in the government’s view 
of European integration. Whereas since 1953 the notion had prevailed 
that the process should be given ample room, in particular from a 
constitutional point of view, after three decades now a restriction to 
that thought was introduced in the sense that certain limits should 
be considered in order to protect specific national guarantees, needed 
within a particular national context. In this regard, it was a change in 
the message, propagated without much nuance for a long time, that 
progressive European integration would serve the Netherlands in all 
respects.
Examples of such specific guarantees that were explicitly recorded 
in the constitution of 1983 were the right of petition and the right of 
demonstration. Other fundamental human rights, already expressed in 
the echr, such as the right to life and the prohibition of torture, were 
not separately recorded in the Dutch constitution. It shows that the 
government viewed the international legal order as complementary to 
the legal order of the Netherlands but also – and more importantly – as 
a separate order that could (and should!) not come in place of the Dutch 
legal protection of specific basic rights. Considering the constitutional 
history of the Netherlands since the early 1950s this issue is of the 
highest importance. For the first time, after thirty years of deliberately 
intertwining the Dutch constitutional and the international and 
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European legal orders, such prudence in keeping the international 
and national legal orders separate was openly displayed by a Dutch 
government. After thirty years of constitutional openness, in other 
words, the Netherlands closed a little.
The constitutional chapter on foreign affairs as it had been 
designed in 1953 was also brought up for revision. Although the 
government had no intention of changing the purport of this chapter 
– the proposal of the government was primarily a cosmetic update – in 
the parliamentary debate running up to this constitutional reform, the 
constitution was subjected to a parliamentary re-interpretation, the 
political relevance of which can hardly be overestimated.495 
This process of re-interpretation started when on 18 March 1980 
a motion was introduced by D66, the cda – a new party that was the 
result of a merger of kvp, chu and arp – and the vvd.496 In the run 
up to this day, the first of these political parties – now captained by 
the outspoken advocate of a European federation, the former State 
Secretary Laurens Jan Brinkhorst – had worked hard to convince the 
government to explicitly lay down in the Dutch constitution the effects 
of the process of European integration for the national legal order. 
It argued that the Dutch constitution should ‘make mention of the 
perspective of progressive European integration’ and, more specifically, 
‘that the Netherlands had become part of a wider, European legal 
order’.497 Moreover, D’66 suggested that it should be established, that 
in case of doubt, the provisions of the Dutch constitution should be 
interpreted as to advance the process of European integration.498 
This suggestion to redefine the meaning of the Dutch constitution 
in favour of ongoing European integration – a suggestion that confirmed 
the interpretation as it had developed since 1953, but which went also 
further – was daring. Even more unequivocally than in 1953, such a 
provision would turn the Dutch constitution into a vehicle for the 
political goal of creating a unified Europe, as pursued by a stable political 
majority in the Netherlands. If this proposal was adopted, the advocates 
of further European integration would benefit from it, since future 
discussions on the constitutionality of European Treaties would largely 
become superfluous.
When the government failed to come up with this proposal, 
Brinkhorst himself put pen to paper and drafted a parliamentary 
motion for which he had found support with prominent cda and 
vvd representatives.499 The reaction of the government was far 
from enthusiastic. The Van Agt government – a coalition of vvd and 
cda, led by Dries van Agt (cda) – judged it problematic to record 
such a general note on the interpretation of the constitution and the 
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provisions on foreign affairs: ‘We would not be able to subscribe to such 
a conclusion in its generality.’500 It warned parliament about too general 
a formulation of this constitutional fiat for the process of European 
integration.501 ‘Should in case of doubt, in all possible circumstances, 
the Constitution be explained in favour of the European integration 
process?’, the Minister of Internal Affairs, Hans Wiegel (vvd), 
wondered.502 
In this context it should be observed that since 1953 the situation 
had changed to such an extent that (sections of ) the Dutch parliament 
were willing to go further than the government thought sensible 
in yielding their power of control of every step towards European 
integration. In an attempt to tone down the motion, Wiegel argued 
in favour of the insertion of the word ‘unnecessarily’ which would 
change its formulation into: ‘that in case of doubt, provisions of the 
Constitution should be explained in such a way that the European 
integration process is not unnecessarily [italics added] hindered by it.’503 
This small revision, would give the government and parliament more 
room for appraisal on a case by case basis of various political interests, 
instead of letting progressive European integration prevail as a matter of 
course. 
Indeed, the suggestion effectively signified a fundamental 
modification in the intent of the motion. The phrasing as proposed by 
Wiegel, implied that it should still be established by government and 
parliament on a case by case basis, whether the process of European 
integration was necessarily or unnecessarily hindered. Such a case by 
case judgement would take more time than the categorical procedure 
that Brinkhorst proposed and was more complex, considering the 
intangible, multi-interpretable nature of both qualifications.504 On the 
other hand, Wiegel’s suggestion would contribute to the parliamentary 
grip on the process of European integration. Indicative for the trust 
that the initiators of the motion put in the positive outcomes of the 
integration process and the blind-eye they tended to turn to possible 
unexpected turns in the process that might prove their expectations 
wrong, the initiators of the motion refused to go along with this 
editorial change. 
On 24 April 1980 cda, vvd and D66, without much further 
debate, adopted the wording ‘that in case of doubt, provisions of the 
Constitution should be explained in such a way that the European 
integration process is not hindered by it’ by a vote by ‘sitting and 
standing’, i.e. the Dutch equivalent of a show of hands.505 Although a 
considerable number of political parties declared themselves against 
its adoption – cpn, sgp, gpv, psp, and also the PvdA – a standard 
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interpretation of the Dutch constitution in favour of progressive 
European integration was decided on by the numerical predominance 
of the supporters of its initiators. Departing from the notion of Dutch 
constitutional openness vis-à-vis international treaty making, as 
introduced in 1953 and which by now had reached an almost sacrosanct 
status, the three succeeded in stretching it further. The Brinkhorst 
motion offered an answer to all complex constitutional questions 
that might be raised in the course of further European integration. 
As far as the exact relation between European treaties and the Dutch 
constitution could after 1953 still have functioned as a procedural brake 
in the process, this barrier was levelled now: the political advocates of 
progressive integration could henceforth invoke the Brinkhorst motion 
as the argument to approve any new step despite its constitutional 
effects for the Netherlands.506 
The adoption of the motion is surprising when seen in relation 
to the constitutional reform that was proposed and carried in the 
Netherlands in the early 1980s. On the one hand, the introduction 
of a new chapter recording the basic rights of Dutch citizens was 
suggested in order to emphasise a series of specific guarantees within 
the national context, whereas, on the other hand, a motion was adopted 
in parliament which reconfirmed and fortified the old doctrine of the 
precedence of a European legal order regardless of the situation. It is an 
indication of a latent ambiguousness, present but not explicitly noticed 
in the political domain, with regard to the fruits and costs of European 
integration. Clearly, still a large political majority believed in the use 
and necessity of progressive legal integration and supranationalisation, 
but at the same time the notion was made explicit that for certain 
guarantees citizens remained dependent on the national legal order. 
The Brinkhorst motion was adopted in a year in which the 
prospects of the integration process were – to say the least – uncertain. 
The turn of the decennium had been marked by a revival of Cold War 
tensions,507 a second oil crisis and a new economic recession with high 
unemployment rates hitting Europe in the early 1980s.508 The economic 
depression made it meticulously clear that when it came to the crunch, 
the eec Member States tended to slip into ‘the national reflex’ – i.e. they 
tended to return to national economic and political protectionism – 
instead of showing themselves willing and able to formulate a common 
reaction.509 The ‘We are simply asking to have our money back’-policy 
of the British conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (1979-
1990) showed in unveiled terms that solidarity among the Member 
States of the eec – a pillar on which the integration process rested – had 
its limits. In 1983, the French and American economists Michel Albert 
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and James Ball even concluded that from an internal market point 
of view it was more in line with reality to speak of the non-existing 
Europe –‘le non-Europe’– than to applaud what had been achieved in the 
Community in economic policy.510 The term ‘euro sclerosis’ – a word 
stemming from the 1970s as a reference to the disillusionment about 
the (economic) stagnation of the integration process – was ever more 
frequently used to describe the state of affairs in the process of European 
integration.511
The headstrong and obstructionist position assumed by one of the 
Nine European heads of state frustrated the Netherlands in particular, 
since the small country had hoped and counted on the uk accession to 
bring positive geo-political effects. Thatcher’s demands confronted the 
Netherlands with the fact that within the European Communities the 
big powers still determined the course of affairs. As was to be expected 
of the Dutch political majority passionately in favour of progressive 
European integration, this reality was not explained – as is shown by 
political debates of the early 1980s – as a reason for calling the process 
to a halt, but, on the contrary, as an extra motivation for moving along. 
And new chances for moving along developed indeed. 
Already in 1975 and 1977 Greece, Spain and Portugal respectively 
had submitted their requests for becoming Community members. The 
three countries were similar in that all of them experienced a process 
of political transition from a dictatorial regime into a democratic 
political order.512 Entering the process of European integration as 
relatively poor countries in political transition, it was clear that the new 
Mediterranean Member States would economically benefit more from 
their membership than the European Communities as a whole. Geo-
politically, however, including the states was considered convenient, for 
the Nine believed their accession would increase the power of the eec 
vis-à-vis the Soviet empire which started to show important signs of 
weakening.513 Moreover, another geographic widening of the integration 
process was held to benefit the credibility of the Community, as it 
confirmed the invitation of the 1957 preamble of the eec Treaty for 
other peoples to share in the efforts and blessings of building a united 
Europe based on peace and liberty. After long years of negotiation on 
the exact arrangements, Greece entered the Communities in 1981. Spain 
and Portugal followed in 1986.
Apart from this geographical modification, the 1980s brought 
the issue of economic and political integration to the European agenda 
again. The first attempts for bringing about political integration 
dated back to the Fouchet-plans of the early 1960s. In 1970, following 
the Davignon report, the eec members had agreed to devise their 
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foreign policy together.514 Notwithstanding the symbolic and political 
relevance of this decision – it formalised the ambition of the Six to 
develop a common identity in the field of foreign policy – ten years 
later the conclusion could only be that still little had come about in 
terms of foreign policy integration. Diverging ambitions and interests 
had kept the Member States divided on how and to what extent a 
common view could be phrased in this policy area. But the desire for 
political integration was still unabatedly felt, as is shown by the various 
initiatives launched to this end during the first half of the 1980s and 
ultimately resulting in the signing of the Single European Act (sea) in 
February 1986. 
The parliamentary debates in the Netherlands on the accession of 
Greece, Spain and Portugal and the sea confirm the picture of a Dutch 
political majority that had decided to proceed with supranational 
European integration without bothering too much about possible 
downsides or unintended consequences. As far as uncertainties and 
possible negative implications of the latest developments in European 
integration were touched on in the debate, they were still played down. 
An important change with regard to previous periods, as in 
particular the section on the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal 
will demonstrate, is that between 1979 and 1992 the familiar lines of 
arguments – i.e. the arguments of economic and political necessity and 
of policy consistency – no longer sufficed. Increasing heterogeneity, 
combined with the ever further-reaching character of the European 
arrangements and the persisting inclination of the European Member 
States to let their own interests prevail, slowly awakened an awareness 
in sections of parliament and Dutch society at large that the positive 
outcome of supranationalisation could not simply be counted on. 
The complexity of the European integration process as it started to 
reveal itself in the 1980s and the doubts and questions it brought 
about, required new arguments and rhetorical strategies in order to be 
reasoned away. It can be interpreted as an early sign that the majority 
consensus that progressive European integration would most certainly 
contribute to the well-being of the Netherlands, started to get under 
pressure. 
4.2  Dealing with Aliens:  
Expanding the eec to Southern Europe
The Treaty on the accession of Greece to the European Economic 
Community and the European Atomic Energy Community (28 May 
1979) and its sequel on Spain and Portugal (12 June 1985) were similar 
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in design and wording.515 The preambles of both Treaties started with a 
reference to the motive underlying the process of European integration 
as it had been laid down in the preamble of the Treaties of Rome: the 
determination of the Member States to ‘in the spirit of those Treaties 
[…] construct an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.’516 
Thus, the ultimate objective of uniting the various European peoples 
– and not only the heads of state and governments – in a European 
Union was reconfirmed. As far as the legality of a possible entry of the 
three countries into both communities was concerned, articles 237 of 
the eec Treaty and 205 of the Euratom Treaty were referred to. These 
identical articles stated explicitly that ‘any European state may apply to 
become a member of the Community […].’ Keeping all options open for 
the future, the term ‘European’ was in these provisions still not further 
specified or delimited. 
The position of the government
In the Netherlands, the first Van Agt cabinet (1977-1981) approved of 
the accession of Greece. The agreement on Spain and Portugal was 
signed by the cda-vvd administration that succeeded it and which 
was led by the Christian-Democrat, Ruud Lubbers (1982-1986). Both 
treaties were presented to parliament to be approved by a simple 
parliamentary majority in accordance with Article 60, subsection 2 
(Greece) respectively – in its renumbered, post-1983 version – Article 
91, subsection 1 (Spain and Portugal) of the Dutch constitution.517 
Similar to the previous expansions of the European Communities, the 
government did not spend any extra word on the relation between both 
accessions and the Dutch constitution; a fact that neither the Dutch 
parliament nor the Dutch Council of State, for that matter, objected 
against.518 It again underlines that the Dutch constitutional procedures 
with respect to European treaty making, as they had been designed in 
1953 and reconfirmed and stretched further in 1983, had become the rule 
to the extent that they were not questioned. 
Similar to arguments presented in favour of the previous 
accession, in both explanatory memoranda a first line of argument dealt 
with the economic and geo-political benefits of accession of the new 
members. In particular with regard to Spain – to Greece and Portugal to 
a lesser extent – the potential of a new market was praised. The highly 
protected Spanish market would open up within an eec context; a 
development expected to lead to important new sales potentials in the 
Dutch fields of trade, industry, fishery and agriculture.519 With regard to 
Spain and Portugal, the government claimed in particular that accession 
was needed to guarantee long term stability on the Iberian Peninsula; 
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a thing that was beneficial for the stability, and therefore also for the 
economic prosperity of the European Communities as a whole.520 
Another line of argument – again the government followed 
the pattern of the previous round of accession – focused on policy 
consistency. Once more this line of thought was fleshed out in two 
ways. The first focused on the European ideal and loyalties stemming 
from the Rome Treaties. The second concentrated on consistency in the 
Dutch way of dealing with the integration process. With regard to the 
first category, the government kept close to the wording in the original 
texts of the accession treaties. In the explanatory memorandum it 
argued that ‘a positive view’ vis-à-vis the requests for accession befitted:
‘ the political objective in the preamble of the eec treaty in which 
the Member States expressed their determination “to lay the 
foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe 
[…] by thus pooling their resources to preserve and strengthen 
peace and liberty, and calling upon the other peoples of Europe 
who share their ideal to join in their efforts.”’521
With these words, the pact between the Netherlands on the one hand 
and the European Communities on the other, going back to 1957, was 
emphasised and, most importantly, the accession of new Member States 
was presented as the mere fulfilment of this old promise. Via a reference 
to the association agreement between the European Communities and 
Greece, concluded in 1961, the promise-is-debt argument gathered even 
more weight. Article 72 of that association agreement, the government 
pointed out, had explicitly mentioned the prospect of full accession 
to the Communities.522 It implied that agreeing to the accession – now 
that this country indicated that it desired to commit itself to the acquis 
communautaire – was the mere consequence of this old agreement. 
In addition, the second variant of the policy consistency argument 
in which the ‘Dutch way’ of dealing with Europe was referred to, 
was spun out. In line with the Dutch foreign policy tradition of 
internationally propagating peace and democratic stability through 
the rule of law, the accession of the candidate members was praised as 
highly important for removing the political isolation these countries 
had found themselves in as a consequence of the political transition 
they experienced. More specifically in line with the Dutch policy on 
European integration in the years before, it was called to memory that 
when the Six had agreed on the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the 
United Kingdom in 1972, the Dutch government had then stated that: 
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‘ It [the government] does not necessarily [see] the present 
increase in the number of members as the last. There are 
other neighbouring countries after all, whose accession, at the 
present moment not to be foreseen, could become an issue. The 
democratic character of potential new candidates for accession 
will be decisive when judging their application.’523 
Now that new democracies presented themselves for membership 
it would be no more than consistent, the government claimed, to 
act in line with this way of reasoning. Thus, the option for future 
developments, which had explicitly been kept open in the previous 
round of accession, was now effectively deployed by the Dutch 
government. Moreover, it was emphasised that in earlier years an open 
attitude towards new members had also been at the root of the Dutch 
support for a Community with a fundamentally open character.524 
Rejection of the accession therefore ‘would be completely against the 
fundamental Dutch views on European integration.’525 In the case of 
Spain and Portugal the comment sufficed that entry of these countries 
to the European Communities underlined the Dutch view of the 
Communities as being open in principle. 
In both types of policy consistency-arguments the Dutch 
government created a rhetorical link between the political decision on 
approval of accession of the new Member States and older decisions 
in favour of progressive European integration. At the root of these 
associations was a linear understanding of the process of European 
integration, the future of which had been decided on in 1957 and 1972 
and which should develop accordingly. Also the Dutch political attitude 
towards this process was presented as a constant, not bound by time 
and changing circumstances. The basis for such a linear presentation 
was found in historical treaties and legislation. The arguments 
illustrate how a political fiction of consensus on European Treaties and 
legislation originating from these Treaties, were deployed to construct 
a reality in which the Dutch political community was said to be bound 
– both legally and morally – to agree to a new step in the process. New, 
successive steps in the integration process became justifiable as soon 
as the text of an earlier agreement left room for or advised such steps 
and, subsequently, these steps were justified on the basis of these earlier 
agreements; another classic example of what Perelman has called an 
argument of succession.526 
The self-starting dynamics of the ongoing integration process, 
based on what was presented as a legal obligation, could in practice 
be easily called a halt to by the eec Member States. A clear, later 
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illustration is the question of Turkish accession to the European 
Union that, despite association via the Ankara Agreement (1963) and 
its additional protocol (1970), is still obstructed by the political will of 
the eu Member States. Following the logic of agreements of the Dutch 
government in the Greek case, Turkey – internationally acknowledged 
as a democratic country – should have been offered full membership 
status not too long after its application in 1987. But until today (2012), 
both in the Netherlands and on the Community level, political 
objections regarding the country’s human rights policy are considered 
more important than the fundamentally open character of the eu to 
democratic candidate members. This observation adds relevance to 
the question what the ‘ever closer union’ formula in the 1957 preamble 
actually required from the Member States in terms of political and legal 
obligations. Were, in the end, political preferences of the Member States 
in favour or against accession not of greater importance than some paper 
agreements on an ever closer union? 
What the Greek, Spanish and Portuguese cases show, is that 
when a political preference in favour of accession existed, quasi-logical 
arguments for its approval could be found in these agreements. Indeed, 
these agreements might even be presented as a legal obligation to 
do so. In the Dutch explanatory memoranda on Greek, Spanish and 
Portuguese accession, for instance, the ‘ever closer union’-concept 
– in fact not a clear concept at all– was applied as being self-evident. 
Fundamental questions such as whether there was a limit to the 
number of countries that could join and what competences the union 
would ultimately have, were disregarded. The same holds true for the 
fundamental Dutch views on European integration. In the explanatory 
memoranda these ‘fundamental views’ are specified as no more than 
encompassing a fundamental preference for an ‘open’ community – 
a rather abstract and multi-interpretable notion. The government, 
however, used it as a topos – a commonplace – to convince parliament 
that admission of the three candidate members represented an old, 
well-established consensus within the Dutch political community 
that suited the Dutch identity of the polity. It is an indication that the 
government reckoned on finding consensus in parliament on this issue. 
Considering the composition of the Dutch parliament at the 
time of both approval debates, this political assessment is not to be 
wondered at. Both the Van Agt and Lubbers i government consisted of 
members of the cda and the vvd. Being the product of a merger of the 
three pro-European Christian parties of the Dutch post-war political 
spectrum, the former held a view generally in favour of progressive 
European integration. The parliamentary section of the vvd – since 
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the start of the process consistently characterised by a strong pro-
integration camp – could also be counted on. Together these parties 
held, under the respective governments, 51,3% and 52,7% of the seats 
in the Dutch Lower House.527 Adding to this majority the PvdA and 
D66 – both hitherto generally in favour of the widening of the European 
Communities – a majority in parliament seemed within easy reach. 
The continuing existence of a stable majority in parliament in 
favour of further, broader and deeper integration did not match the 
development of a critical current in the Dutch public intellectual debate. 
Having observed that the European Member States in the early 1980s 
remained divided on political integration, the intellectual debate on 
European integration in the Netherlands kept concentrating on the 
failure of the European leaders to bring about such an integration. Well-
known in the Netherlands in the 1970s and ’80s were the commentaries 
in the Dutch newspaper nrc Handelsblad in which the columnist 
Jerôme Heldring systematically emphasised the persistence of the 
nation state.528 
Difficulties encountered in the field of political practice 
concerning Europe, gave rise to – what has been called – 
‘euroscepticism’ or ‘eurosclerosis’; the rise of scepticism in the wider 
debate on European integration in the Netherlands and the increase of 
doubts whether the process was really feasible and desirable. In 1977, 
the Dutch Social Economic Council had already published a report on 
the economic and political difficulties to be expected from the accession 
of Greece, Spain and Portugal; a publication that the Dutch Council of 
State explicitly asked attention for in its respective recommendations to 
the government.529 In the 1980s, the rise of euroscepticism led the D66 
mp Laurens Jan Brinkhorst – an ardent advocate of the supranational 
ideal himself – to conclude that in the Netherlands ‘Only a few ever 
warmed to the idea of a policy with an identity of its own. For many 
it [Europe] is only a geographical notion. […] We simply do not see 
European unity with the emotions of someone who gets a new country 
of adoption.’530
This is a most striking remark, coming from the man who in the 
same year chose the forward flight by presenting a motion to parliament 
that subjected the interpretation of the Dutch constitution to the 
political objective of progressive European integration. It indicates that 
although it was noted on the political level that the support in Dutch 
society for the creation of a European polity – as far as it had existed in 
earlier years531– showed signs of foundering, the political elite did not 
feel the need to adjust its own agenda. On the contrary, the growing 
resistance might have motivated Brinkhorst to take his move in order 
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to secure the political goal of progressive European integration his 
party had. More generally it seems that although the public opinion on 
Europe at the time of the accession of new members might have become 
more sceptic, this was not necessarily an impediment for the approval 
in parliament of the accession of the new candidate members. 
Debate in parliament 
From the late 1970s onwards, scattered throughout parliamentary 
debates on foreign policy and European affairs, arguments in favour 
and against the accession of the three Mediterranean states can be 
found. It shows that in the Dutch parliament these accessions were 
not regarded as unequivocally positive as the accession of the United 
Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark had been in 1973. In 1978, for instance, 
the liberal vvd senator Hendrik Jan Louwes warned of an all too hasty 
and ill-considered admission. Since the accession of Denmark, Ireland 
and the uk, the eec had blossomed into a community of 320 million 
inhabitants; an enlargement of 60% in comparison to the Europe of 
the Six. A new expansion at a moment when the integration process 
on an institutional level was still far from completed, Louwes feared, 
would only undermine the supranational objective.532 The deprived 
economic state of the candidate Member States was considered an extra 
difficulty. Louwes thus negatively linked the objective of widening of 
the Communities to the process of deepening European integration; the 
first being presented as not necessarily contributing to, but hampering 
the latter. In the previous round of accessions, although doubts on 
the conditional relation had already existed, widening the European 
Communities had in broad circles been presented as a necessary 
condition for institutional deepening. Disappointment in what the 
previous round of accession had yielded in this regard, most probably 
contributed to the switch in perspective. 
Notwithstanding the doubts cast on the new accessions, 
still numerous MPs from the vvd, cda, PvdA and D66 argued in 
their favour. A range of familiar arguments passed in review in the 
Lower House, of which the one on policy consistency was the most 
prominent. The Christian-democrat senator Wim Vergeer, for example, 
reasoned that the Netherlands should approve steps that were in 
line with what had been laid down in the Rome treaties in 1957. He 
considered an open attitude to newcomers in line with both the eec 
Treaty and the traditional Dutch emphasis on the open character of 
the European Communities. Many MPs of the four parties mentioned, 
stressed that the eec was not, and should not be a closed form of 
cooperation. The distinction between an open and closed community 
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as it was applied here, had the same function as the distinction present 
in the previous round of accessions. The political mainstream felt 
comfortable with the idea of ‘openness’, which in their perception 
implied freedom, a well-functioning European market, and balancing 
the power of the Member States, whereas ‘closed’ – i.e. not open to new 
members – was associated with being locked up in a protectionist eec 
in which the great powers called the tune. Such an exclusiveness, in 
other words, went counter to everything the Dutch, with their foreign 
policy, had worked for in the past. The conceptual difficulty of pursuing 
an open eec – of course the question could be raised how and to what 
extent the building of an ever closer community related to the ideal of 
openness – was not given any thought. 
In the policy consistency-line of argument, economic or political 
disadvantages that might follow from the accessions were of minor 
importance; something that contributed to the force of that argument 
since many in parliament were not very convinced that economic 
benefits would directly follow from accession of the three deprived 
Mediterranean states. Only the vvd specifically mentioned the 
economic advantages of Spanish accession for the Dutch economy as a 
reason for approving the entry.533 Compared to the case of the accession 
of Denmark, Ireland and the uk this was quite a difference, since in that 
discussion the expected economic and political advantages had bound 
many MPs in their positive evaluation. 
A new argumentative line, hitherto not this explicitly heard, 
was that the admission of Greece, Spain and Portugal was crucial for 
the development of democracy in these countries.534 With regard to 
Greece, the vvd, cda, the PvdA and D66 expressed the conviction 
that accession of Greece was in line with the principle laid down in 
the eec and Euratom treaties, that new democracies, interested in 
accession, should be given that opportunity.535 With regard to the 
accession of Spain and Portugal, a central argument in favour was found 
in the missionary consideration that accession was needed for these 
countries to get out of their political isolation.536 The presentation of 
the accession as a means of promoting democratisation throughout 
the continent offered its political advocates a new, strong rhetorical 
trump in pleading in favour of progressive European integration. The 
notion of assisting countries that experienced a democratic transition 
suited an old political consensus of the role of the Dutch in the wider 
world: Grotius’ descendants as loyal contributors to the coming about 
of an international legal order. As has been observed earlier, the small 
country derived elements of its sense of self from this notion and, 
more importantly, it was accepted in broad political circles as a fact 
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that a strong international legal order was a necessary safeguard for 
the economic and political well-being of the state of the Netherlands. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, this new rationale for approving accession 
found assent with large parts of parliament. Even the usually critical ppr 
agreed with – what could be explained even – as a socialist idea of letting 
deprived countries share in the political and economic well-being of the 
European Communities.537 
By embracing the democratisation argument, the Dutch political 
mainstream stretched further the ‘objective’ that the Netherlands 
strived after by means of European integration. Whereas during the first 
post war years the notions of Nie Wieder Krieg and economic recovery 
had functioned as primary arguments in political pleas in favour of 
European integration and the 1960s and 1970s had added free trade and 
reaching a political balance of power as important rationales, the early 
1980s brought to the fore the motivation of promoting democracy 
internationally. The growing range of arguments implicitly adds to 
our understanding of the identity the Dutch polity. The various Dutch 
rationales for progressive European integration reveal the priorities 
of the Dutch political majority in pursuing European unity: striving 
for national security, economic well-being and international political 
stability. Priorities, in other words, deeply rooted in the country’s 
political culture. And priorities, it should be noted, that reveal the 
‘nationalist’ motives with which this country had embarked on the 
internationalist, later supranationalist path. 
Political parties like the cpn, psp and the Protestant-conservatives 
had never endorsed European integration as the right tool to safeguard 
the economic and political well-being of the Netherlands. They also 
rejected the various arguments that were brought forward in favour 
of accession of the three Mediterranean states. The cpn opposed the 
democratisation argument by taking the stance that the European 
Communities should not interfere then in the internal political 
development of Greece, Spain and Portugal. It shows that this party 
still viewed the process of European integration as a foreign affairs 
undertaking, that should not meddle with the national spheres of 
influences of the Member States. The psp had no belief in the positive 
effects of opening up the Communities for three new members, but 
claimed on the contrary, that the accession of the new members would 
only enhance the block-like character of the Communities vis-à-vis the 
outside world. The gpv, rpf and sgp envisioned progressive European 
integration rather as a threat to the well-being of the Netherlands than 
a safeguard. Their most pressing concerns focused on all kinds of hardly 
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foreseeable policy problems that the entry of the new members might 
lead to.538 
What these parties had in common was that instead of 
emphasising the bond or connection between the Nine of the eec and 
the candidate members, they underlined their mutual differences. The 
rhetorical function of their attacks was to point out the incompatibility 
of diverging interests in an ever more diverse eec. The adversaries 
of wider and deeper European integration broached a delicate issue 
here. Emphasising the difference between the candidate members 
and the Nine ran counter to the thought of ‘an ever closer union’ in 
which the dissimilarities of the Member States were supposed to be 
pushed, increasingly in time, into the background in favour of the 
common objective. The advocates of accession of Greece, Spain and 
Portugal, however, could not turn their heads in denial. To them it was 
clear that with the accession of the candidate members the European 
Community accepted, in certain regards, alien elements and – maybe 
most importantly – differing in many respects from the Netherlands. 
The absence of any reference to a connection on the level of identity 
between the Netherlands and the candidates – a prominent argument 
in the defence of the government of the uk accession – is an important 
sign. But also more explicitly, the lack of any connection in terms 
of history, culture and identity was expressed. Even the Minister of 
Finance in the Den Uyl cabinet, Fons van der Stee (kvp), had remarked 
in 1976 already that: ‘If it comes to the ideal of the United States of 
Europe, then I say ( …) Greece does not belong there. With all respect 
and esteem, this country’s economy and culture do not go with the 
north-western European maritime culture that we know.’539 More in 
general, the minutes of the meetings in the Dutch parliament show 
that Greece, for instance, was – in comparison to the older members – 
perceived to be behind in the fields of political and economic stability.540 
In the Dutch parliamentary and diplomatic debates it was questioned 
how these arrears would affect the (in)ability of the country to meet the 
financial and political obligations following from eec membership: 
‘ [Charles] Rutten [the then Permanent Representative of the 
Netherlands with the eec] was very much against Greek 
accession. He said […] you admit countries that, with regard to the 
internal market, are not able to take on all kinds of obligations, let 
alone comply with them. So […] we should not do that.’541 
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In short, it was feared that accession of the country might interfere 
with the existing political and economic standards and values shared 
by the Nine; an alliance that hitherto consisted – for the greater part – 
of relatively wealthy countries situated roughly, apart from Italy, in 
the northwest of the continent. Comments like the one above speak 
volumes on how Greece was seen in relation to the Nine: as an alien 
element. Viewed in the light of the recent (2012), European wide, 
political commotion regarding the Greek-government debt crisis, 
the comment even gets more fascinating. Distrust of how the Greek 
authorities ruled their country and economy and discussions on how 
this related to the standards that the other European Member States 
upheld, turn out to be over thirty years old. This observation places the 
current, seemingly new debates on the place of Greece in the European 
integration process in a more historical light and shows that the 
relative economic stability in the eec and Euro zone, in the 1990s and 
first years of the new millennium, was not at all self-evident. Besides, 
the comments confirm that the Dutch saw themselves as a part of a 
‘north-western European maritime culture’ that they liked to see as 
the dominant culture within the European Communities. Conceptual 
difficulties such as, for instance, how France and Italy – not necessarily 
‘paragons’ of this culture – suited this picture, were not brought up for 
debate. It once again confirms the uncritical attitude with which the 
Dutch political mainstream approached its own ideas on European 
integration. 
In addition to the economic effects of Greek accession, the human 
rights policy of the country was viewed with suspicion. The Greek-
Turkish conflict regarding Cyprus was a difficulty to be considered 
and, just like the Greek refusal to recognise Israel – a country with 
which the Community as a whole, and the Netherlands in particular 
maintained good relations – had to be diplomatically dealt with before 
Greece could join the eec. Moreover, the country’s policy on human 
rights was viewed with Argus’ eyes. Two concrete issues that bothered 
various MPs in the Dutch parliament were the Greek practice of 
imprisoning conscientious objectors – a political hot-topic in the 1970s 
and 1980s – and the refusal of the country to recognise the individual 
right of petition before the European Commission on Human Rights 
in Strasbourg.542 Especially in PvdA circles the human rights issues 
were a source of concern. This is illustrated by various comments in the 
parliamentary meetings on Greek accession, which explicitly called for 
a process of European integration, based on international solidarity and 
respect for human rights.543 Referring to the topos that the Netherlands 
was the country par excellence – ‘Nederland Gidsland’ [guiding 
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others on their ways] – to point out to Greece that it should revise its 
human rights policy before entering the eec, the PvdA called on the 
government: ‘The Netherlands are recognised and rated as a country 
standing up for civil rights. I hope the Government will not betray the 
trust the Greek conscientious objectors have put in the Netherlands.’544 
The social-democrat party received support from the Protestant-
conservative sgp. Their party-prominent, Henk van Rossum, pointed 
out that it would be inconsistent of the Netherlands to boast of its 
moral high ground and to condemn others for their human rights 
breaches, while it was now decided to permit such a country to do that 
by permitting access to the European Communities.545 Typically, both 
MPs, despite their rather different political preferences, shared the 
opinion that the Netherlands should play a special part in the eec when 
it came to standing firm and upholding human rights standards; a part 
that the Netherlands tended to claim when acting on the international 
stage since the late nineteenth century. It confirms the observation that, 
as far as the Dutch political elite agreed on the objective of European 
integration, it perceived it as a means to reaffirm the country’s national 
foreign policy objectives. 
Underlying the various comments regarding differences in the 
fields of economy, politics and human rights, was the anxiety that 
the accession of Greece might undermine the coherence and strength 
of the acquis communautaire; a development that could impede 
progressive European integration in general and the supranational route 
in particular. Interestingly, both the advocates and the opponents of 
supranationalisation alike, expected the accession to have a negative 
influence on further integration. There was, in other words, consensus 
that the accession of Greece signified the entering of a heterogeneous 
element into the relatively homogeneous European order created by 
endless rounds of negotiations. Both camps agreed that this accession 
might hamper further integration in particular on the political level. 
The two camps, however, made an opposite assessment of the 
consequences. The Protestant-conservative antagonists of further 
integration, liked the Greek accession to function as a brake in the 
development of a European federation. As far as this would not 
spontaneously be the case, they tried to stimulate such a brake-function 
by operating strategically in the parliamentary debate. The gpv leader 
Bart Verbrugh held out the carrot of approval of the accession in 
exchange for rejection of the federal ideal by the Dutch government: 
‘In the European confederal structure, which is more or less existing 
now, my party acquiesces in the accession of Greece, not in a federation, 
however. The new, too heterogeneous element which Greece brings in, 
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would in those circumstances probably lead to making inroads upon 
our freedom.’546 The comment stands out, firstly, because it shows 
that in the perspective of the gpv the European integration had by 
now progressed to such an extent that a confederal structure could 
be recognised. Secondly, it indicates how the striding along of the 
process of European integration brought the question of compatibility 
of economic and political integration to the fore. Ever since the start 
of the European integration, those who were the motor behind the 
process had held out the prospect of economic merging to be followed 
by political integration. But now that the Communities were about 
to become more heterogeneous as far as the political and economical 
culture of its members were concerned, political antagonists seized 
the rhetorical opportunity to point to the unfeasibility of political 
integration. 
The relevance of the issue they broached was underlined by the 
concerns of advocates of further integration. Notwithstanding their 
position at the other end of the political spectrum, MPs promoting the 
accession also feared the ‘watering-down’ of European agreements that 
might follow from the accession.547 In particular, they feared the hard-
won first steps towards a common foreign policy and further political 
integration to suffer from Greek accession. In the debate, they aimed at 
guarantees to safeguard further political integration once Greece had 
been admitted. An example is the attempt of the D’66 mp Laurens Jan 
Brinkhorst to elicit a statement from the Dutch government on what 
Greek accession implied for the prospects of political integration: ‘It 
would be unacceptable if the main political lines decided on by the 
Community, would not be accepted by Greece.’548 Brinkhorst played 
for high stakes here. Implicit in his remark is the admission that, from 
a political perspective, the accession of Greece was more complex 
than the accessions of 1972. Instead of consequently lowering down 
his European ambitions, however, he raised the stakes by calling on 
the government to emphasise the absolute necessity of sticking to the 
plans for political integration, also when Greece would have become a 
member.
Through emphasising the political elements in the acquis 
communautaire signed by the new Member State, the advocates of 
further supranationalisation hoped to avert that Greek accession 
would result in the renunciation of their ideal of European political 
integration. This observation is of great significance. For the first time 
in the history of the process of European integration, the parliamentary 
advocates of progressive European integration of D’66, PvdA, cda, 
and vvd showed that they clearly and explicitly realised that the ideal 
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of a homogeneous European order in which the members committed 
themselves to unequivocal policy lines might be hard to reconcile 
with the growing diversity that would follow from the accession of 
new members. But instead of concluding that the European ambitions 
should be adjusted, or withdrawing in conceptual deliberations on 
how to reconcile widening of the Communities with deepening, the 
political advocates of the accession kept a strong focus on realising the 
goal they had set a long time ago: developing a supranational, preferably 
federal, European unity. In Brinkhorst’s remark the Dutch government 
was addressed as being responsible for emphasising the importance of 
Greek embracement of this objective in the negotiation process. No 
attention was paid to the fact that the Dutch government was now only 
one power among ten and could impossibly be a decisive factor in how 
Greece would interpret and deal with the European treaty framework 
once it had become a member. In fact, with the composition of the 
Communities getting more diverse, the relative importance of the 
Dutch say in the process would only decrease. This very fundamental 
matter, however, was not entered into. Instead the dogmatic Dutch 
approach of negotiating pro-actively in order to steer the agreements in 
the ‘right’ direction was promoted. 
The same argumentation patterns can be observed in the debates 
on the accession of the other two Mediterranean states. With the 
accession of Spain and Portugal, a few years after Greece, heterogeneity 
was to grow further. In parliament, this was widely acknowledged. 
Similar to the parliamentary debate on Greek accession, the perceived 
‘otherness’ of these southern countries led to worries on how typical 
national (party) political preferences and values could be safeguarded 
in an ever more diverse European framework. Again the PvdA asked 
for explicit guarantees that conscientious objectors were dealt with 
according to European human rights standards.549 The advocates of 
progressive European integration again feared the accession to result in 
the watering-down of the integration process.550 Once again, they urged 
the government to insist on the full commitment of the new members 
to common European viewpoints, as becomes clear from the comment 
of the liberal mp Frans Weisglas on the required Spanish recognition 
of the state of Israel before Spain would enter the eec: ‘Spain should 
realise that in the political domain something should be given after all, 
in exchange for the joys that possibly come with EEC-membership.’551
The remark that, in the end, Spain was supposed to make 
sacrifices in exchange for the benefits accompanying eec membership 
is interesting since it raises the question of whether such a trade-off 
had also applied for the Netherlands. What had this country sacrificed 
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in exchange for a place within the European Communities? Since 1948 
the traditional understanding of political and legal state sovereignty 
had been eroded. The successive treaties establishing the escs, edc, 
eec, the Merger and the installation of a European Court of Justice, a 
European Council and Commission and a directly elected European 
Parliament had tied the Netherlands in all kinds of ways, not only to the 
other European members, but also to a new governmental level that had 
power of its own. Remarkably, however, the political majority in the 
Netherlands did not seem to associate this development with having 
become unfree, or unpleasantly constrained. On the contrary, until 
then a large part of the political majority seemed to approach European 
integration as a means for the Netherlands to become more free and to 
dispose itself of all kinds of constraints that came with being a small 
country surrounded by big powers. What the Netherlands, in other 
words, lacked in terms of de facto sovereignty as a consequence of its 
geo-political characteristics, was tried to be made up for by binding 
the sovereignty of other states through European agreements. The fact 
that, in return, the Netherlands had to yield state sovereignty that it 
had de jure possessed, was neither perceived – nor felt – as a loss by this 
majority.
The perception of European integration as a win-win strategy did 
not find believers among the Protestant-conservative minority in the 
Netherlands. Their strong attachment to state sovereignty stemmed 
from their view that the sovereign state had the duty of guarding 
minority rights. These had been hard-won in the previous century and 
safeguarded by the Dutch constitution in provisions such as Article 
23, which guaranteed this minority the equal treatment and financing 
of public and denominational education.552 Progressive European 
integration and allowing in new, and worse, Catholic members were 
experienced by this minority as a potential threat to their group 
identity and sovereignty. This is illustrated by Meindert Leerling, 
leader of the Protestant-conservative rpf, who called for a guarantee 
of the government that the predominantly Catholic countries were 
fully to respect the right of freedom of religion: ‘[…] reformational and 
evangelical Christians in those countries form, in terms of percentage, a 
small minority. Do these Christians also very concretely have the same 
social prospects as Roman Catholics?’553 
Once again – similar to the Greek case – growing diversity in the 
Community was an argument for those in parliament who rejected 
progressive European integration, to emphasise their particular 
rejection of political integration. Gert Schutte (gpv) called on the 
government to express clearly that ‘certainly with the accession of 
188
Spain and Portugal […] the old federative idea of the fifties [has] lost 
every real meaning.’554 Also the radically right Centrum-Democraten 
(Central Democrats, henceforth cd), established in 1984, led by Hans 
Janmaat and opposing the process of European integration, thought 
the weakening of the political and economic coherence within the 
European Communities to be the logical consequence of expansion.555 
By going into the history of rivalry between the Netherlands and 
Spain, Henk van Rossum (sgp) accounted for the sgp rejection of 
any further political integration after Spain had acceded. With a 
great sense of pathos, Van Rossum contended that the ‘Eighty Years’ 
War’ (1586-1648) between the Netherlands and Spain had left deep 
marks in the Dutch nation.556 As he saw it, Spain’s accession into the 
European Communities meant that the Netherlands would be unified 
in the European framework with a third former tyrant; the other two 
being France and Germany. Whereas the sgp did not see much harm 
in economic cooperation with Spain, and was for that reason willing 
to allow this country to accede to the European market, the party 
argued that the political sovereignty of the Netherlands – historically 
successively regained from Spain, France and Germany – should be 
cherished. 
Though completely out of line with the majority opinion in 
parliament and politically not effective at the time, these remarks 
indicate that within the Dutch political community a minority existed 
that actually thought this way. And this minority did not plan to rest 
until its message had been heard. 
From defence towards consensus
Opposing this minority, however, a parliamentary majority in favour of 
progressive economic and political European integration stuck to their 
guns and did not want the concerns about the growing heterogeneity 
and its consequences to get in the way of the accession of either Greece, 
or Spain and Portugal. Nor did this majority like these accessions to get 
in the way of their ideal of further political integration. 
For that reason, after all concerns had been uttered, the 
contributions of many MPs, supported by the members of the 
government, were aimed at pointing out why the accessions should 
be approved anyway. To that end, negative consequences that might 
result from the accessions were ironed out and the differences between 
the Netherlands on the one hand, and the candidate Member States 
on the other, were reduced. This, however, turned out not to be an 
easy task. Whereas the approval of the uk accession had been easy to 
defend, also from an identity point of view – a sense of mental, cultural 
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and economic kinship with the uk was widely felt in parliament – the 
Dutch MPs had to reach deep in their rhetorical pockets in order to 
make a reasonable case for Dutch-Greek, -Spanish and -Portuguese 
connectedness as a reason to endorse the accession of these countries. 
This is shown by their pathos rich pleas. In reaction to remarks 
on the ‘otherness’ of Greece, Ans van der Werf-Terpstra (cda), for 
instance, a Catholic senator from the province of Friesland contended 
that without a doubt Greece deserved a place in the process of 
integration since it was – and had always been – an essential part of 
European civilisation, or even the womb out of which it had grown: 
‘ Once I read in a travel book: “Europe ends in Greece with jagged 
frayed foothills”, but in my memory the road runs exactly the 
other way round; Greece lay at the beginning of Europe. It is there 
still. Greece the cradle of our civilisation.’557 
She added that instead of mistrusting the country, pride of a possible 
Greek partnership was a more proper attitude to be assumed by the 
Nine, and the Netherlands in particular:
‘ […] that Greece, battle-weary by age-long wars, always risen from 
its ashes […] in 1975 put in an official application for accession 
[…] not as a goal in itself, but to go with us one common way, 
to realise ideals, to promote interests and to work hard for a 
democratic, just, international economic order. That Greece, I 
think, should have had from the Netherlands a somewhat more 
enthusiastic welcome as a partner indeed.’558
By referring to Greece as a partner of the Netherlands in reaching a 
democratic and just international order, any dissimilarities between 
the policy preferences of both countries were rhetorically shoved into 
the background. It must be noted though, that Van der Werf-Terpstra 
spoke in terms of an ‘international economic [italics added] order’; from 
a rhetorical perspective a smart focus since a discussion on essential 
differences between the countries was less relevant in case ‘only’ 
integration in the market sector was concerned. The message rendered 
by Van der Werf-Terpstra on the solidarity and connection between 
Greece and the Netherlands was supported by the liberal senator Jan 
Baas who emphasised that ‘the rich history of Greece is also embedded 
in our culture.’559 
Wim Meijer, mp for the PvdA, showed a similar conviction with 
regard to Spain and Portugal by simply stating that these states belonged 
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to Western-Europe.560 Against the argument of historic rivalry between 
Spain and the Netherlands, that had been brought up by Van Rossum 
(sgp), the cda representative Joost van Iersel objected with a different 
interpretation of that time in history. Instead of concentrating on 
the elements that had divided these countries, Van Iersel chose to 
concentrate on historic episodes that marked a connection between 
them. Both the Netherlands and Spain, Van Iersel pointed out, had 
experienced their golden age, more or less at the same time, followed 
by economic decline and the loss of cultural influence.561 Although this 
remark lacked any relevance with regard to the issue of accession, Van 
Iersel smartly employed it as a stepping stone to a historical narrative, 
that underlined the historical bond between the Netherlands and 
countries of the Iberian Peninsula: 
‘ In the days of the Eighty Years’ War, Spain and Portugal together 
formed a double-monarchy. When as a result trade with Lisbon 
declined, Dutch merchants increasingly began to sail the seas 
of the world in search of spices and raw materials. So because 
of Spain and Portugal’s doing, the foundation was laid for the 
illustrious role of the United East India Company, which for ages 
[…] played an important role in providing prosperity for our 
country.’562 
The argument was in fact, that the Netherlands was indebted to Spain 
and Portugal for their contribution – albeit indirectly – to Dutch culture 
and wealth.
Van Iersel’s fellow party member, Ans van der Werf-Terpstra 
chose a similar line of reasoning in the Senate. In reference to the 
Portuguese nobleman in Spanish service, who was responsible for 
the construction of the dykes in Friesland in the sixteenth century, 
she pointed out that she had been raised with gratitude to the 
Spanish. Of the statue, put up in Harlingen – the birthplace of Van 
der Werf-Terpstra – in honour of Caspar di Robles, she claimed to 
have lively memories: ‘During many festivities in our town I joined 
dances while the castanets clattered and this Portuguese Spaniard 
focused his watchful eye on the four points of the compass to keep 
us from disasters.’563 To this anecdote she added subtly that ‘the 
history of mutual solidarity does not begin just now.’ This in order 
to subsequently propagate her political view that ‘Not in the narrow-
minded attitude of the “big brother” we want to welcome Spain and 
Portugal, but in the way of cordial friendship, trust and sympathy.’564
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What these various historical arguments have in common is that 
all were couched in the form of a narrative; a rhetorical instrument in 
which a certain interpretation of the past is proposed in order to read 
a certain situation in the present and to legitimise a certain action.565 
The narratives constructed here point to a history in which the 
Netherlands and the acceding countries were positively connected. By 
pointing to the common history, the parliamentary advocates of the 
accessions tried to reduce the differences between the Netherlands and 
the acceding countries as they were experienced in the present. This 
in an attempt to convince the critics that approval of the accession was 
the only right thing to do. To an outsider, the overplayed narratives 
– in particular those of Ans van der Werf-Terpstra – come across as 
farfetched and somewhat artificial.566 The mobilisation of heavier 
rhetorical artillery can be interpreted as an indication that the advocates 
of European unification realised that, this time, political consensus on 
the accession lacked the casualness of 1972 and more was needed to hold 
a political majority on board. 
Strikingly absent in these narratives are clear-cut ideas on how to 
practically overcome any difficulties and discrepancies in the present 
between how a political majority in the Netherlands envisioned the 
continuation of the process of European integration and what the 
effects of the accession of the new members would be. These were 
not easy to explain away. The strategy of the Van Agt and Lubbers 
governments was to acknowledge the difficulties foreseen, but to 
point out at the same time that these were to be solved in the course of 
further integration. Earlier cabinets had demonstrated its effectiveness. 
In order to allay existing worries on the future of foreign policy- and 
further political integration after Greek accession, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Chris Van der Klaauw (vvd), for instance, emphasised 
that there had been talks with the Greek delegation regarding political 
cooperation and integration. However, procedural technicalities and 
arguments should be dealt with after the joining of Greece was a fact; 
before that, only the accession to the official community Treaties – of 
which the epc was not a part yet – was the issue at stake.567 On the 
accession of Spain and Portugal as well, the government recognised that 
practical difficulties were manifold and would need to be discussed. 
Again, however, it was advised to shelve these questions for the time 
being and to decide on the accession on the basis of more fundamental 
ideals and principles: 
‘ Also for this cabinet the dominant fact remains, that the accession 
of Spain and Portugal has got everything to do with our notion of 
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a free, democratic and economically cooperating Europe. […] Also 
against that notion must be balanced very practical and, viewed 
apart, true problems that come up when we infinitely have to 
debate fish, wine and olives.’568 
This advice did not fall on deaf ears among the many advocates of 
further integration who did not intend to let any practical difficulties 
interfere with their desire to proceed in the process. 
The conviction that regardless of all the difficulties the three 
candidates should accede, was again pressed home in the debate by 
claims that appealed to historical obligations and policy consistency; 
claims that also had been made at the outset of the debate. Applying the 
rhetorical technique of creating a liaison of succession, representatives 
of cda and PvdA argued that the accession of Spain and Portugal was 
nothing more than fulfilling an old promise, laid down in the Treaties 
of Rome.569 The cda, with the words of the mp Joost van Iersel, 
even spoke of a ‘historical imperative’;570 yet another firm rhetorical 
intervention that confirms that the accessions at stake were more 
problematic than those of the early ‘70s. In addition to the imperative 
alleged to stem from the basic European treaties (in fact one of many 
interpretations possible), also the imperative stemming from Dutch 
policy consistency was referred to again. It was emphasised once more 
that ever since the start of the early years of European integration, the 
Netherlands had declared itself in favour of widening and deepening 
of that process. Now the Netherlands had to put its money where its 
mouth was.571 In line with earlier debates, this political principle and 
where it would lead to in the long run (did it, for instance, mean that 
in theory Northern African countries, or Turkey or Belarus could 
also join in the integration process?) was not critically questioned by 
the advocates of accession. For the time being, conceptual difficulties 
were left aside in order not to hamper or delay further integration. The 
sacrosanct character of the Dutch European policy as it had developed in 
the previous decennia before was further built on. 
In the spring of 1980 the entry of Greece into the eec was 
approved without a voting by call.572 Only the psp and Farmer Party 
– together holding two of 150 seats in the Lower House and two of 
the 75 seats in the Upper House – are registered to have voted against 
the accession. The autumn of 1985 brought the approval of Spanish 
and Portuguese accession.573 This time, the cd and psp voted against. 
The overwhelming majorities with which the three accessions were 
approved show that their political advocates had succeeded in keeping 
the ranks closed. In this regard the firm rhetorical interventions had 
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served their goal. Ironically, however, the success of the political 
advocates in forcing through the accessions, despite existing doubts 
on how the new members would relate to the European order, might 
also contribute to the undermining of their ultimate objective. With 
the approval of the accessions, the Europe of the Nine as it had hitherto 
existed, gave way to a more heterogeneous composition, with among 
them the relatively poor countries of Greece, Spain and Portugal. 
The parliamentary debate on the second round of expansion of 
the European Communities clearly brings to light the fundamental 
paradox that the Dutch political community was faced with. A 
political majority favoured a concept of European integration in which 
homogeneity among the Member States could be upheld. In the eyes of 
the proponents the project could only become successful if it were to be 
deepened and expanded, but at the same time, they embraced further 
diversification. There was friction between, on the one hand, the wish 
of the Netherlands to internationalise, and, on the other hand, the 
wish to be part of a homogeneous order of governance whose decisions 
would benefit the interest of the country in a one-dimensional 
way. During the 1980s, the parliamentary advocates succeeded into 
convincing themselves that both objectives would eventually be served 
by the process of European integration. 
Doubts – both in- and outside parliament – remained on whether 
these new members would be able to meet the eec treaty obligations. 
Subdued in parliament for the time being, they did not disappear. This 
at a time when the European Communities were on the threshold of 
an enormous forward step in political integration. Leaping forward 
while in parliament and diplomatic circles and Dutch society at large, a 
gut feeling of doubt was swelling regarding the tenability of solidarity 
between the European members, were early indications of a dangerous 
cocktail in the making. 
4.3  Silently Passing another Watershed: 
Adopting the sea (1986)
Following the two expansions, on the European level of decision 
making the focus was shifted to the institutional strengthening of the 
European Communities. Since the start of the 1980s, an institutional 
change had hung over the market. Stemming from the conviction that 
gearing into one another of the foreign policies of the Member States 
was needed in order for the Community and its members to be able 
to deal adequately with the East-West confrontation, the German and 
Italian Foreign Ministers – Hans-Dietrich Genscher (1927-) and Emilio 
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Colombo (1920-) – had in 1981 developed a joint initiative to trigger a 
common foreign policy. This Genscher/Colombo plan had consisted of 
a declaration of intent, endorsed by the eec Member States, committing 
them to move towards a European Union. It buttressed the role of the 
Council and the European Parliament in the area of foreign policy and 
advised greater use of the decision making principle of qmv – replacing 
decision making by unanimity – within the Council of ministers.574 
After negotiations, the initiative eventually resulted in the signing 
of the Solemn Declaration on European Union (Stuttgart, June 1983) 
by the (then) ten Member States.575 The Stuttgart Declaration stands 
out because it referred to the ‘democratic peoples of Europe’ as a basis 
for legitimising new steps in the process of European integration. 
Literally it was stated that ‘the European idea, the results achieved 
in the fields of economic integration and political co-operation, and 
the need for new developments’ corresponded to the wishes of those 
democratic peoples, ‘for whom the European Parliament, elected 
by universal suffrage, is an indispensable means of expression.’576 
Thus, the introduction of direct elections of the ep was presented as 
an instrument through which the peoples of the European Member 
States had given their mandate for further integration. By implication, 
the national citizens of the Member States were referred to as the 
constituents of a European polity. Such rhetoric lifted the integration 
process from the sphere of an intergovernmental foreign policy 
undertaking to the level of supranational polity making. 
Because of its declaratory character, the Stuttgart declaration 
needed no formal approval in the Member States and would in political 
practice not directly lead to breakthroughs in the integration process. 
Notwithstanding these restrictions, the document offered a perfect 
basis to build on for new proposals for further integration that could 
take the Stuttgart statements as a minimum basis of consensus.577 
Altiero Spinelli (1907-1986), a convinced European federalist of the 
first hour and mep (1979-1983), was the first to initiate the development 
of the Stuttgart Declaration into a more firm political agreement. The 
‘Draft-Treaty Establishing the European Union’ that he designed with 
like-minded spirits from the ep was adopted by an ad hoc committee 
of representatives of the Member State governments, established at the 
European Council of Fontainebleau (June 1984). The chairman of this 
committee, the Irish senator James Dooge (1922-2010), recommended 
negotiations on a new treaty. Parallel to this development, the then 
President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors (1925-), worked 
on what has become known as Lord Cockfield’s White Paper, in which 
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a plan for the completion of the European internal market was laid 
down.578 
Inspired by these various proposals for institutional change, it 
was proposed at the European Council of June 1985 in Milan to convene 
an Intergovernmental Conference (igc) to be opened under the 
chairmanship of Luxemburg in September 1985. The igc was officially 
closed under Dutch Chairmanship in The Hague on 28 February 1986, 
with the signing of the Single European Act (sea) by Denmark, Greece 
and Italy following the example of the other nine Member States that 
had done so on 17 February.579 Again the Netherlands had succeeded 
in contributing to the further development of the European order. 
The Dutch chairmanship had resulted in the first in-depth alteration 
of the Treaties of Rome, which, with the formal introduction in the 
acquis communautaire of foreign policy cooperation, the term ‘Internal 
Market’ and the proclamation of the objective of a European Union, 
potentially contributed significantly to the contours of a European 
political entity. 
A central objective of the sea was the deepening of European 
integration in order to ‘complete’ the European Common Market 
– a term that was replaced in the treaty by the term ‘Internal 
Market’. Because of the apparent focus on economic integration, the 
fundamental importance of the treaty is easily underestimated. In the 
sea many impulses to advance to a full-dress European Union – an, 
in all respects, supranational layer of European governance above the 
national level, to be reached in Maastricht in 1992 – were given. An 
important indication is the conceptual shift from a ‘common market’ 
to an ‘internal market’, in which the mutual borders would no longer 
exist. This change reveals a shift in perspective from a community 
based on the national territories of the Member States, to a community 
encompassing these territories. Another, more explicit sign is the 
preamble of the sea, stating the objective of the Twelve to be the 
transformation of the European Communities into one European 
Union.580 Thus, the treaty started where the Stuttgart Declaration 
(1983) had ended. Another indication of the great political relevance of 
the sea was the focus on formally institutionalising a common foreign 
policy. Ever since 1957, the members of the European Communities had 
struggled with political integration, in which foreign policy had been a 
major obstacle. The preamble of the sea made mention of the resolve 
of the Member States to implement the European Union on the basis 
of ‘European co-operation […] in the sphere of foreign policy’ and to 
invest the Union, to this end, ‘with the necessary means of action.’581 
Title iii of the Treaty was fully dedicated to this objective. Although a 
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common foreign policy was discussed in terms of co-operation and not 
in terms of integration – a clear sign that the Member States were wary 
to yield their sovereignty in this area – the fact that Europe would get a 
role – and instruments! – in foreign policy shows a step in the transition 
towards a European order that became ever more statelike. 
It is particularly noteworthy that the sea was the first official 
European treaty in which the process of European integration was 
explicitly stated to correspond to the will of the peoples of the Member 
States. In imitation of the Stuttgart Declaration, the sea spoke of the 
‘European idea’ consisting both of ‘economic integration’ and ‘political 
co-operation’, to ‘correspond to the wishes of the democratic peoples 
of Europe, for whom the European Parliament, elected by universal 
suffrage, is an indispensable means of expression.’582 Just like in the 
Stuttgart Declaration, the election of the ep by the nationals of the 
Member States was presented as to democratically legitimise new steps 
in the process of European integration. The remark can therefore be read 
as to suggest the existence of popular sovereignty on a European level, 
implying the existence of a European polity.
This brings us to the great historical relevance of the sea. Officially 
proclaiming the realisation of a Union as the objective, including the 
field of foreign policy, the signing of the sea marked a crucial transition 
in the process of European integration. Formally casting off the limits 
of economic sectorial integration, the path to political integration was 
officially opened. On the basis of the wishes of the national peoples 
– perceived to be cognizable through direct elections of the ep – the 
Twelve legitimised their step. Implicitly, also the future objective of a 
European Union, announced in the sea, was legitimised beforehand. 
By presupposing a relation of democratic legitimation between 
the sovereign peoples of the Member States and the realisation 
of a European Union, so it can be argued, the sea contributed to 
constitutionalising such a Union before it was even there. By suggesting 
that the relation of the peoples of the Member States to the European 
level of governance was comparable to that of a national sovereign 
people to its national government a crucial rhetorical leap to building 
a European federation was taken. The decision of early 1986 that the 
European institution would henceforth go adorned with the blue 
and yellow twelve starred banner only contributed to the aura of the 
existence of a European polity that encompassed the various national 
polities it consisted of. 
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Position of the government
What stands out immediately in the official documents in the 
Netherlands concerning the sea is that the Dutch government did 
not present it as a decisive step on the way to a more statelike Europe. 
On the contrary, the second Lubbers administration dealt with the 
document as if it concerned a stopover, not to be dwelled on, on 
the way to something bigger and more important. Striking is the 
focus on economic integration. In the Queen’s speech of September 
1986, the document was introduced as ‘a stimulus […] for quicker 
decision-making, especially aimed at the coming about of the Internal 
Market.’583 The political and symbolic importance of the treaty was 
not dilated upon. In the explanatory memorandum, the transition 
from the common market to – in the rather technocratic words of 
the government – ‘the single geographical, economic space without 
internal borders’, to be realised by 1992, was referred to as ‘the most 
important material decision’ that the igc had taken with regard to 
the eec Treaty.584 This change was expected to come with various 
positive economic consequences, such as higher employment rates 
and the strengthening of the economic position of the Economic 
Community.585 
It is typical and telling for how the Dutch government approached 
the process of European integration, that the government did not 
enter into the substantial political relevance of the conceptual shift of 
a common to an internal market, or even brought it up as a question. 
The effects of increasingly statelike European Communities – soon to 
be the European Union – for the sovereign powers of the Netherlands 
were not elaborated on. The democratic connection between the people 
of the Netherlands and a European level of governance, presupposed 
in the preamble of the sea, was not clarified nor were the implications 
of the development of the European Union for the constitutional 
relation between the Dutch people and its representation entered into. 
In fact, any special relation, let alone friction, between the new treaty 
and the Dutch constitution was – again– not considered to exist. This 
is illustrated by the presentation of the sea to parliament for approval 
with a simple majority, in accordance with Article 91, subsection 1 – the 
former Article 60, subsection 2 – of the Dutch constitution.586 
Instead of emphasising the new perspective that the sea added 
to the relation between the European and the national level, the Dutch 
government focused on the continuation that the treaty brought, in 
the light of the objectives in the field of European integration set since 
1957. The transition of a common market to an internal market was 
linked to the intention to develop the European Communities into a 
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European Union; the ultimate objective as had been laid down in the 
Stuttgart Declaration (1983) and subsequent documents on the future 
of the Communities. On the element of foreign policy cooperation, 
the Dutch government only remarked that fifteen years of trying 
to reach agreement on a common approach in this policy area were 
now embedded in the framework of pursuing the objective of the 
European Union.587 The government did not enter into the democratic 
legitimation on the national level of this common foreign policy. It 
was stated that such a policy should be based on democratic principles 
and the observance of law and human rights, but in the explanatory 
memorandum it remained unclear if and how national parliaments 
would be involved in formulating the common foreign policy 
principles. 
The fact that the government did not go into the fundamental 
political importance of the new phase in European integration marked 
by the sea, can be either explained by a blind spot with the Dutch 
government for its crucial political implications or by intentional 
‘light’ political framing in order not to raise concerns or objections 
in parliament. The first option seems more likely, especially when 
some of the general qualifications of the treaty by the government are 
considered. 
In its general judgement on the sea it qualified the treaty as 
a ‘relatively satisfactory’ compromise. For the Dutch cabinet its 
downsides were the limited extension of the method of Qualified 
Majority Voting (qmv) – the Dutch government ‘would have liked the 
use of an ampler measure’ in the use of this supranational method of 
decision making – and the fact that enlargement of the competences 
of the European Parliament had not been reached. These remarks 
show how the Dutch governmental elite interpreted the concept 
of ‘supranationalisation’. It measured the extent to which this ideal 
was reached on the basis of the instances in which qmv was applied 
in the Council and the involvement of the ep in European decision 
making. For the crucial rhetorical and symbolic steps towards 
supranationalisation it had no eye. This suited a political culture in 
which the national constitution had been deprived of its safeguards 
against an incoming tide of treaty law in the assumption that this would 
benefit the country. In this country, for which internationalisation was 
and had always been one of the most prominent existential features, 
constitutive statelike rhetoric was not taken all too seriously. 
Outside the political arena, however, the political relevance 
of the progress made in the field of European integration did not go 
unnoticed. The Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy 
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(wrr) passed some critical comments on the new treaty. 588 In its 
report De Onvoltooide Europese Integratie (‘The Incomplete European 
integration’) that was sent to the government in March 1986, the 
Council argued that: ‘While here in the Netherlands we are deliberating 
upon the desirability of a fourth layer of government, this layer has 
come into being above us almost unnoticed. Its effects are spreading 
steadily and make themselves felt, sometimes by surprise, in policy 
areas at first sight considered far away from the economic integration 
process.’589 It is an interesting remark, since it was the first time that the 
far- reaching implications of the European integration process for the 
political sovereignty of the Netherlands were pointed out this sharply 
in the public intellectual debate. 
The comment gets even more relevant when it is put beside 
contributions to the Dutch intellectual debate on European integration 
in the second half of the 1980s. In ever more of them, the downsides 
of and disappointment with the process of European integration were 
discussed.590 It led Hans Nord, co-founder of the Dutch branch of the 
movement of European federalists (bef), to express his disillusionment 
on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the European Movement 
in the Netherlands in 1987: ‘European unification has not become 
what we, in 1947, hoped it was going to be […] European integration 
has become bureaucratic. It is done because it has to be done. But 
enthusiasm, no, nobody is enthusiastic anymore’.591 Looking back 
on these years, the Dutch diplomat and in later years, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Bernard Bot, also keeps memories of the foundering 
enthusiasm for the process of European integration after the mid 1980s: 
‘The more [the integration] progressed, a tendency developed counter 
to it. The first went increasingly in the [direction] of a European market 
and, on the other hand, there was a stance [of] a decreasing belief, or 
increasing nationalism.’592
In parliament, however, still a non-hesitant political majority in 
favour of European integration was found. This continuing consensus 
on the wish for further integration was reflected in the parliamentary 
debate on the approval of the sea.
Debate in parliament 
The cda and vvd, the coalition parties, together with the PvdA and 
D66 welcomed the sea as another step on the way to their ideal of 
European integration.593 These parties would approve the sea because 
they considered further integration ‘necessary’; the return of the old 
necessity argument although it stands out that this time little effort 
was made to flesh out the basis for the need for further integration.594 
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It is striking that the intention to approve came despite the many 
shortcomings that these parties also observed in the treaty and which 
were central in their contribution to the discussion of the document.595 
In line with the comments of the government on the treaty, in the 
conception of ‘supranationalisation’ of these parties, the sea fell short 
with regard to qmv decision making in the Council – which had only 
been introduced in a limited number of policy areas – and involvement 
of the ep. 596 The latter shortcoming was mainly stressed by the cda, 
PvdA and D66. In their view, a continued weak position of the ep 
implied a fundamental problem from the perspective of democratic 
control. Confronted with an institutionalised Council that, albeit 
only in particular policy areas, could decide by qmv, the national 
parliaments were, according to these parties, increasingly in danger of 
losing their hold on the process of European integration. In this they 
were supported by the Dutch Council of State that had indicated it to be 
one of its greatest points of concern.597 
The ppr brought up the concern about democracy as well. 
This party explicitly stated that it feared the coming into existence 
of a ‘Europe without citizens ( …) a centralistic monster, mocking 
Montesquieu’s separation of powers.’598 It stressed that it did not 
oppose the integration process in itself, but its tendency to develop 
the institute of the Council into: ‘a water head of powers […] planted 
on a democratically insufficiently equipped body in the form of the 
European Parliament.’599 The fact that both the Council of State and 
the European Parliament had also been very critical with regard to the 
democratic aspect, had convinced the ppr that it should vote against the 
Treaty. 600 
The concerns about the grip of the national parliament on the 
process of European integration indicate that these parties were aware 
that in the process of European integration, power until then exerted 
on the national level, was leaking to a level of governance that was not 
sufficiently democratically compensated for. It implies that these parties 
saw that ‘Europe’ as a political power was growing. The wish of these 
various political parties for stronger parliamentary control comes across 
as a logical reaction. The fact that they primarily looked for democratic 
compensation on a European level, pleaded for more integration (more 
qmv decision making and a stronger ep) instead of less and did not 
scrutinise their own role, however, is typical. This can only be explained 
from their characteristic understanding of supranationalisation and 
the role of the Netherlands in it. In the post-1953 mindset, in which 
these parties had functioned for more than thirty years already, the 
national domain was rightly and desirably considered subservient to 
201
the supranational, i.e. European level of governance. Telling for how 
the Dutch political mainstream tended to strengthen its grip, was 
the motion proposed by the PvdA, cda and D66 that asked for the 
commitment of the government to ‘to do its utmost’ to strengthen 
the role of the ep.601 Requesting the government in such a manner was 
one thing, but really intervening by, for instance, insisting on greater 
national democratic control of the government’s actions in Brussels ran 
counter to their views on how the Netherlands should position itself in 
matters of European integration. 
This was different for those parties that had categorically refused 
to submit themselves to the mainstream way of thinking. The small 
Protestant-conservative parties sgp, gpv, and rpf had been explicit 
for years already in their fundamental rejection of the transference of 
sovereignty and the objective of a European Union. In the approval 
procedure of the sea, this was no different.602 To them, the democracy 
issue was a key factor, but these parties questioned it on a more 
fundamental level. The rpf disputed the link, established in the 
preamble of the sea, between the process of European integration 
and the wishes of the democratic peoples of Europe. In particular, 
the statement that the ep was a channel for the peoples to express 
themselves, was attacked: ‘Considering the turnouts at the elections 
for this parliament, also in our country’– after the turnout rate of 58.1% 
in 1979, the 50.1% turnout of the ep elections of 1984 had again been 
disappointing – ‘the rpf did not share this opinion.’603 
Although this attack on democratic legitimacy, based on the 
turnout rates at the European elections, was in academic terms 
not particularly strong, the rpf cleverly anticipated feelings on the 
malfunctioning of the European democracy that already existed in- 
and outside parliament. Moreover, the remark is interesting because it 
reveals a fundamental difference of views. The image of a democratic 
relation between a European level of governance and the national 
peoples of Europe – the relation between these peoples and a European 
polity – as created in the preamble of the sea, was contested here. In 
this regard, the rpf comment fundamentally undermined the attempt 
of the twelve governments to indirectly democratically legitimise their 
actions. 
Something similar happened with regard to the introduction 
of the term ‘Union’, which was also received with anxiety in Dutch 
Protestant-conservative circles.604 Gert Schutte, mp for the gpv, 
considered this renaming a confirmation of the tendency towards 
a centrally ruled Europe, and towards the ‘Europe of the citizen’ – a 
trendy term in both Europe and the Netherlands during the 1980s that 
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was intended to bridge the first signs of a gap between political elites 
that made an effort to build a European polity and national citizens 
that seemed to hold aloof.605 According to Schutte the presentation of 
Europe as the mother country of all European nationals was a fiction. 
‘The European citizen […] is a homo economicus in the first place,’606 
he claimed, lacking a political, cultural and historical bond with a 
European-wide polity. Such an economic citizen was ‘a somewhat 
lean figure’ to build a politically integrated union on. The no demos-
argument, in other words, was applied again, and aimed this time at 
nullifying the attempt of the governments to legitimise the project on 
the basis of the concept of national citizenship. 
The resistance of the Protestant-conservative parties against 
the institutionalisation of foreign policy cooperation was based on 
considerations of a similar kind. In the view of the gpv, rpf and the sgp 
foreign policy was an essential element of the sovereignty of the state, 
not to be given up; Europe was not a state, did not have the legitimacy 
of a state and should, for that reason, not be invested with the powers 
of a state. Gert Schutte (gpv) brought forward that keeping a free hand 
in international affairs was essential – in particular for a small country 
like the Netherlands – in order not be forced to go along with policies 
decided on by the bigger Member States. He meaningfully referred to 
the diverging national interests of the various Member States that had 
remained despite the process of European integration: ‘The Europe of 
France for instance is definitely something else than the Europe of the 
Netherlands.’607 
Thus, Schutte launched the attack on the notion, 
structurally upheld by a political majority in the Netherlands, that 
supranationalisation would eventually result in a unified Europe, ruled 
by a common interest, instead of individual national interests. His 
words amounted to the view that Europe would remain essentially 
divided and that harmonious European unity was an illusion. Here 
Schutte touched on older parliamentary concerns of the Netherlands 
being a country not able to control the European continent; a concern 
that had in fact been a core motivation of the political majority to 
keep the Netherlands among the pioneers of progressive European 
integration, that had been raised again with the accession of the 
Mediterranean ‘aliens’ and that would only increase in the decennia to 
follow. 
Schutte and his party were again willing to take a pragmatic 
stance. Since heterogeneity did not matter on the market place, the 
gpv had no fundamental objections against sectorial, namely trade 
integration. Progressive integration in the fields of politics or even 
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economic policy, on the other hand, was something completely 
different. Capitalizing on the problems – a milk lake and a butter 
mountain – that had resulted from the Common Agricultural Policy 
(cap), designed by Sicco Mansholt in the late 1950s, Schutte held out 
the spectre of an autonomous European authority meddling in ever 
more policy areas: ‘I cannot bear to think of a future in which a central 
authority in Strasbourg [autonomously, JH] decides how much milk 
our farmers here, are allowed to produce.’608 Here the Christian-
conservatives found assent with the ppr, which also pointed out the 
importance of being in charge in essential policy areas. With a common 
foreign policy, this party for instance feared to be confronted with the 
‘improper argument’ that the Netherlands should set its goals according 
to what would be feasible within the context of European political 
cooperation.609 
Reinforcing their claim that the Netherlands should cherish its 
independence, the three Protestant-conservative parties referred to the 
Dutch ideal of international neutrality of former days. The handing 
over of national authority in the field of foreign policy, they claimed, 
was made out to lead to breaches with historically cherished constants 
in the foreign policy traditions of the Netherlands.610 The ‘progressive 
infringement’ since 1945 of the century-old tradition of Dutch 
neutrality, would alienate younger Dutch generations from this specific 
element of national history; a development to which these parties were 
not willing to contribute. 
From defence towards consensus
In line with earlier debates, the political majority was not receptive to 
the questions and problems pointed out by the sceptics of progressive 
European integration. Their questions regarding democratic legitimacy 
and political identity of Europe were received as an attack on the 
precarious process of European integration. Besides, the appeal to the 
tradition of neutrality, deliberately abandoned after 1945, was, contrary 
to the almost sacred conviction, by now deeply rooted in the mindset 
of the political mainstream, that neutrality – or ‘withdrawing behind 
the dikes’– as a means to safeguard the Dutch existence, was no longer 
tenable. The political majority was just not open to a shift of perception 
in this matter.
The same held true for the firm conviction that European unity 
– which presupposed homogeneity in interests and wishes – would 
eventually be possible, also in an expanding union that would be by 
nature more diverse. Similarly, the fundamental political theoretical 
question of how the process of European integration could claim 
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democratic legitimacy where a European demos was lacking and the 
direct elections of the ep were still not much more than a not all too 
popular formality, was ignored in the belief that all would be right 
eventually as long as the Netherlands would stay focused on keeping 
promises made in the past, in order to gather the reward waiting at the 
end of the integration process. Again the Treaties of Rome, and their 
approval in the Netherlands were referred to as a ground for approving 
the sea. The remonstrance of the Christian-conservative camp that 
after thirty years the goals that had been set in 1957 might need revision 
– now that the Communities consisted of twelve instead of six and the 
historical circumstances had drastically changed – was brushed aside 
by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans van der Broek. He claimed: ‘[…] 
that since those days the situation has fundamentally changed. That 
is undoubtedly true, but I do not think that because of that, the basic 
considerations of successive Dutch cabinets have actually changed.’611 
It illustrates the determination of the government, supported by the 
parliamentary majority, to pursue its quest for European integration, 
irrespective of the circumstances of the time and any questions that 
could be raised with regard to the outcome. ‘We are going forward, even 
if it is sometimes like the Echternach procession’, the State Secretary 
of European Affairs, René van der Linden sighed in the debate. 612 This 
rendering of an almost religious belief in a promising reward at the end 
of the integration process, has the character of a creed; a term he himself 
also literally used to describe his religiously political conviction that 
the path of European integration should be walked further.613 The old 
conviction that European integration was an instrumental means to 
a desired end, by now seemed to have developed into the belief that 
European integration was a means in itself. 
What the ‘end’ of the integration process exactly would be, when 
it would be reached and what the reward would be, however, was 
still not clear or even – as time passed by – became ever more vague. 
It is noteworthy that in the debate on approval of the sea the term 
‘federation’ – in the early decennia of European integration used by 
all advocates of a united Europe to define the goal of the process – was 
only applied by its opponents to define the ultimate consequence 
of proceeding on the, in their view, disastrous path of European 
integration. Not a single advocate of the treaty put the sea within the 
framework of the development of a federative Europe. Being questioned 
on the details of the final objective of the European Union that was said 
to be brought nearer by the sea, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans 
van der Broek (cda) remained equivocal: 
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‘ The Europe the government envisages in the long run, will be a 
Europe in which at any rate economic cooperation is progressively 
integrated […] It must be a Europe that in the field of monetary 
cooperation will have more integration, a Europe that in 
questions of peace and safety has to develop an identity of its 
own, […] a Europe that wants to be of significance in improving 
the chances of the Third World. […] This must be done within a 
democratically controlled structure.’614 
European cooperation – a thing that the Netherlands had been in favour 
of for ages already – and European integration – a new process, affecting 
the core of state sovereignty – were mixed in this long-term perspective 
of Europe and it was not questioned if and how both concepts differed 
and/or were related. The relation between the process of European 
integration on the one hand and the continuity of the political identity 
of the Dutch state on the other – would the sovereign state of the 
Netherlands eventually become a state in a European federation or even 
a province? – was not entered into.
Considering the focal point of the Dutch political mainstream 
on the positive effects of European integration for the political and 
economic well-being of the Netherlands, this limitation is not to be 
wondered at. The primary, outward focus on European integration 
as a means of disposing the other members of their statelike traits 
and power – a thing that was considered to benefit the position of the 
Netherlands – came with a lack of attention for what this process of 
building a new European political entity eventually implied for the 
political identity of the Dutch state and its people. In other words, 
conceptual questions regarding political identity were ignored in 
favour of the economic and political gains that were believed to result 
from European integration. It underlines the continued existence of a 
paradoxical majority mindset in which supranationalisation was one-
sidedly perceived as a means to contribute to national interests. Within 
this mindset, ironically, the essential characteristic of the concept was 
overlooked, i.e. that progressive supranationalisation might ultimately 
imply that an autonomous European power would call the shots in 
areas that had until then been reserved for the Member States and 
might thus get in the way of Dutch national interests that changed and 
developed over time.
On 18 November 1986 the cda, vvd, PvdA and D66 unanimously 
supported the bill of approval on the sea in the Dutch Lower House. 
On 16 December the Upper House followed. The votes against from 
the gpv, sgp, rpf, ppr, psp and cpn could not shift the balance.615 With 
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the approval of the sea the basis was laid for a new phase in the process 
of European integration in which Europe had an ‘internal market’, 
geographical borders would disappear and a European Union was to 
be proclaimed. A phase, so it would turn out, in which conceptual 
difficulties following from progressive European integration and 
supranationalisation could no longer be ignored. 
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Chapter 5
Spring Tide Stress 
1986 — 1997
‘ Community treaties are not just treaties […], but those are treaties 
concerning all citizens and giving the citizens rights. Because of the 
implementation measures millions of legal relationships with and 
between the citizens of all Member States have come into being.’ 
 
Pieter VerLoren van Themaat (1991)616
5.1  Introduction
With the ratification of the sea, the eec Member States had formally 
agreed on the objective of bringing about a European Union. Sub-
aims, seen as essentials parts of the realisation of this overall goal, 
were reaching agreement on a common policy in foreign affairs, on the 
required political instruments for that purpose and on an Economic 
and Monetary Union (emu). The second half of the 1980s was marked 
by great expectations and ambitions for the process of European 
integration for the nearby future.
The agenda of the meeting of the European Council in Hannover 
in 1988 was dominated by elaboration on the great plans for the years 
to follow. A committee, led by Jacques Delors and including all central 
bank governors of the eec Member States, was installed to propose 
concrete plans for the development of the emu. In April 1989 this 
committee submitted its final report that advised on the integration of 
financial markets, the irreversible convertibility of national currencies, 
the irrevocable fixing of exchange rates, and the possible replacement 
of the national currencies with a single currency.617 The committee 
proposed a time schedule – subdivided into three phases – for creating 
the emu, shifting from closer economic and monetary coordination, 
starting in 1990, to a single currency with an independent European 
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Central Bank and rules governing the size and financing of national 
budget deficits from 1999 onwards. 
Meanwhile, a start had also been made with the abolition of 
the border checks mutually dividing the territories of the Benelux 
countries, the Federal Republic of Germany and France. On 14 June 
1985 these states had reached an agreement in Schengen (Luxembourg), 
which formed the basis for a full-fledged system of freedom of 
movement of goods, persons and services as it would develop in the 
following decades. Formally, having come into existence outside 
the common European legal framework, the Schengen Agreement 
or Accord (also called ‘Schengen’) was not a part of the process of 
European integration. From the outset, however, it was clear that the 
removal of the border checks would be an asset in, or even a necessary 
condition, for finalising the Internal Market. When in the course of the 
years more eec members decided to join in the process, the merger of 
Schengen into the acquis communautaire became a convenient political 
option. With the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam in October 1997, 
the Schengen Agreement became an intrinsic part of the European 
treaty framework.618
Parallel to the attempts of fleshing out the aim of a European 
Union, the Twelve were taken over by a range of historic events that 
marked the transition between the 1980s and the 1990s and which 
formed a reality check for those working for European unification. The 
fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union that followed, had existential implications for the eec. No 
longer did the European Member States have to think of defence against 
a Communist power block in determining their ambitions and actions. 
New problems, however, arose. Firstly, the diminishing of the east-
west tensions stripped the European integration process of one of its 
raisons d’être. Secondly, the events confronted the Twelve with a group 
of potential Member States that, in the long run, might want to take 
up a place within the new European order. In addition, the question 
of German reunification became pressing. These developments raised 
doubts and questions among the Twelve on the foundations and 
stability of the integration process and, as a consequence, the need was 
felt to press the integration process further. 
But there was more to worry about. In August 1990 the Iraqi 
invasion in Kuwait heralded the outbreak of the Gulf War. Not even 
a year later, in June 1991, the disintegration of Tito’s Yugoslavia was a 
fact. A horrendous civil war between Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks was 
the result (1991-1995). It confronted the European Community with 
the relativity of its founding Nie Wieder-maxim. The realisation that 
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much was still to be done became even clearer when the eec members 
discovered that, in spite of their formalised ambitions to develop 
a common foreign policy, they proved to be unable to formulate a 
common ‘European’ approach to both the Gulf- and the Yugoslavia 
conflict. The political-military initiative was perforce left to the un and 
nato; operations in which a central role was reserved for the United 
States of America. It was a thorn in the flesh of the united Europe. 
Going counter to the desire of showing itself as a factor to be reckoned 
with in international politics, it turned out to be fairly impotent when 
the chips were down. 
Thus the transition to the new decade was characterised on the 
one hand by the hope to realise the ambitions that had been set with 
the sea, whereas, on the other hand, the fear of a standstill or failure of 
the project was widely present. Both feelings, however, contributed to 
the urge to proceed with deepening the process of European integration 
and to extend the influence of the European Communities as soon as 
possible.619 Within this atmosphere of political will and pressure, the 
Schengen process, the plans for an emu and a new treaty developed. 
With the ambition to deal with many problems in one blow, the Treaty 
on European Union was signed in Maastricht in 1992. This treaty 
marked the birth of the European Union, equipped with competences 
in the monetary and foreign policy field and in judicial matters; 
areas that until then had been the prerogatives of the nation states. 
The signing of the Maastricht Treaty thus marked a highly relevant 
qualitative development. Finally, the contours of a – de facto –European 
federation took shape. In 1997, with the signing of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam its competences were further refined. 
By hosting both treaty making procedures of the 1990s, the 
Netherlands had a central role in bringing further the process of 
European integration. In line with forty years of supporting progressive 
European integration and the Dutch ratification of the sea, the ‘fourth 
layer of government’ – to use the words of the Dutch Scientific Council 
on Government Policy – was in the 1990s again made stronger and 
embraced by the Dutch governing elite. Reviewing the enormous 
implication of the developments in the field of European integration 
between 1986 and 1997 for the national domain, this support can be 
marked as special in every regard. The negotiations on the emu, a 
common foreign policy, and European citizenship made clear that 
the process of European integration had become a matter of utmost 
importance, touching upon more and more essential elements until 
then belonging to the national sovereign legal domain. 
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Pushed instead of deterred by these implications for the internal 
order, the Netherlands persistently remained in the vanguard of those 
striving for new forms of integration. In fact, the era between 1986 and 
1997 can be rightly marked as the time in which the Netherlands truly 
assumed the role of ‘best pupil in the European class’. The growing 
fear of losing its status in a European Union consisting of over twenty 
instead of twelve Member States was the reason why successive Dutch 
governments thought it was wise to take the lead in modelling its 
institutional design in accordance with Dutch wishes. 
Also in parliament, the increase in the presence of Europe in a 
growing number of policy areas resulted in a stronger involvement in 
European affairs. The wave of ‘directives’ – European rules that obliged 
the Member States to convert the intent of these directives within a 
certain term into national legislation – flooding the Netherlands in 
these years, led to arrears in the compliance of the Netherlands with 
its European legal obligations. In 1987, the country was condemned by 
the ecj for not observing the Bird Directive that obliged the Member 
States to protect their bird populations according to European rules.620 
In 1994, the country was convicted twice for not duly notifying the 
European Commission in accordance with the Notification Directive 
83/189.621 More than anything, these judicial processes made clear that 
Europe, with its European legal framework, had become a power in 
itself that was able and willing to enforce the rulings that the Member 
States had committed themselves to on paper. The former mp (PvdA), 
senator and emeritus professor of Constitutional Law, Erik Jurgens, 
recollected that the swell of European directives in the 1980s and the 
ecj convictions were crucial for the national parliament to become 
aware that European integration to an increasing extent interfered with 
the national domain: ‘It became more and more clear that we depended 
on decisions from Brussels.’622 It was crucial for the development 
of a realisation in parliament that it should extend its grip on what 
happened in Europe; a grip that could only grow by way of a stronger 
control on the actions of the Dutch government in Brussels. 
The parliamentary debates on European integration in the period 
1986-1987 reflect this growing awareness. The lecture of the Dutch 
professor of Constitutional Law, Ter Kuile, with the telling title ‘How 
far is The Hague from Brussels from now on? Reflections […] on 
dwindling powers of our provincial [sic!] States-General within the 
European Community’, held at the opening of the Dutch political year 
in 1989, testifies of this, as well as the symposium organised on 6 May 
1992 in honour of the opening of the new building of the Dutch Lower 
House: ‘Will the Lower House survive Europe?’623 The establishment 
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of a permanent parliamentary committee for European affairs in the 
Netherlands in 1986, with an ‘initiating, signalling and coordinating’ 
role for the purpose of parliamentary control on decision making in 
the European institutions – in particular the Council of Ministers – is 
another clear indication.624 
The change of mentality becomes also visible in the parliamentary 
debates on Schengen, Maastricht and Amsterdam. Because of the 
interference of Schengen with national ideas on crime fighting and 
immigration, the discussions within the Dutch political community on 
the process of removing borders focused sharply on its compatibility 
with the preservation of national notions on democratic governance. 
The Schengen debate reveals the tension experienced by the political 
mainstream in parliament between upholding its more than forty-
year-old pro-European disposition, characterised by openness to 
new European developments, and the consciousness that stronger 
national democratic procedures were needed in order to enhance the 
parliamentary control on what was happening in Europe. The debates 
on the treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam show that throughout 
the 1990s this was the main issue in relation to the process of European 
integration, that kept parliament busy. It was the revival of a discussion 
that had been at the root of the constitutional reform in 1953. But 
although significant cracks became visible in the traditional mindset of 
the Dutch political mainstream, a tradition of forty years of openness 
towards the process of European integration turned out to be tenacious. 
5.2  Implications of a Borderless Political 
Identity: Schengen i and ii
The Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 was designed as a declaration 
of intent that kept silent on the details of its implementation. 
Conscious of the complexity of the removal of border controls, the 
initial five signatory parties agreed on an undefined time term for the 
full implementation of the Schengen Agreement. In the text of the 
document this is reflected by formulations such as ‘endeavour’ or 
‘seek solutions’ for relaxing their policies regarding visa, licensing of 
commercial road transport policies, aliens, etc., ‘as soon as possible’.625 
Thus it laid down the basis for a complex process that called for the 
harmonisation of the national policies of the participating countries 
in the fields of customs, migration and combating crime and for that 
reason contributed to the development of an integrated Europe. 
The agreement, however, was not very precise on how this process 
should get form. On 19 June 1990 a supplementary agreement – the 
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Convention on the Implementation of the Schengen Agreement (also 
known as Schengen ii)626 – was signed in order to convert the 1985 
arrangement into a stronger, implementable instrument. 
Schengen I
On behalf of the Netherlands, the first Schengen Agreement was signed 
by the first Lubbers administration; a coalition of the liberal vvd and 
the Christian-democrats of the cda, led by Ruud Lubbers (cda). 
In the presentation of the agreement to parliament it attracts notice 
that little was said on the motivation for signing the accord. In the 
explanatory note, dated 28 November 1985, approval of the agreement 
by the Netherlands was advised ‘in the light of the aims of the European 
Community’.627 It is striking that the Dutch government immediately 
linked Schengen to the process of European integration, because – as 
has been observed – formally the Schengen process came into being 
outside the official European legal framework. The remark shows how, 
in political practice, the two processes were immediately rhetorically 
connected; a clear illustration of the power of constitutive rhetoric. 
The statement was not further elaborated on; a silence that is likely to 
be related to a presupposed political consensus on both the objectives 
of the process of European integration as on the perception of the 
Schengen Agreement as a step towards these objectives. 
As was also the case with the presentation of the sea, the Dutch 
government downplayed the significance of the agreement in its 
presentation to parliament. In fact, the approval of the Schengen 
Agreement would have far-reaching consequences for the Netherlands. 
The existence of border checks had always been an important tool in 
the prevention, on a national scale, of certain forms of criminality, 
in particular the illegal trade in drugs and weapons and other forms 
of trafficking and tax frauds. Moreover, these border controls had an 
important function in arresting the perpetrators of such criminal acts. 
When Schengen entered into force, supervision on the influx of people 
from outside the Schengen area henceforth needed to be entrusted to 
customs officials and guards at the external borders of the Schengen 
territory. In addition, the new arrangements might eventually make it 
necessary for Dutch citizens to have an identity card with them, to be 
produced on request. Thus Schengen would directly affect the national 
security policy of the Member States and their citizens as well. In line 
with the presentation of Schengen as an element in bringing about 
the higher cause of European unity, the government did not pay much 
attention to the complexity of all this. It basically concluded that the 
loss of the advantages of national border controls, was to be positively 
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compensated for by a higher degree of cooperation of police and the 
judiciary on the level of the signatory countries.628 
As for the approval procedure, the government also preferred to 
keep things simple. In the explanatory note it declared that during the 
negotiations the Netherlands had defended the view that the agreement 
was no more than a common policy arrangement, not to be subjected 
to the official ratification procedure a formal treaty would require: 
‘For the agreement only touches the realisation of a joint policy on 
the administrative level, on the basis of the existing legislation of the 
five countries.’629 By presenting the agreement as ‘administrative’, 
not affecting national legislation in any way, the government, in 
other words, could avert a formal ratification procedure in which 
the agreement needed to be presented to the Dutch parliament. But, 
the explanatory note went on, that, since certain other parties to 
the agreement – not further specified – had insisted on signing the 
agreement as a formal treaty after all, formal approval by parliament was 
therefore needed.630 
However, the Dutch constitutional system offered another 
possibility to prevent national parliamentary debates from slackening 
the approval procedure. The possibility of approval with tacit consent, 
since 1983 couched in article 91, subsection 2 (formerly Article 61) was 
convenient here. According to the government this speedier procedure 
was opted for ‘because during consultations […] it had been established 
already that the standing [parliamentary] committees endorsed the 
Agreement.’631 
The Dutch Council of State did not have any objections with 
regard to the proposed approval procedure.632 And although very little 
can be traced of the consultations with parliamentary representatives 
that the government referred to, from the continuation of the process it 
can be deduced that a majority of the Dutch parliament was willing to 
agree with the government. As requested, it accepted the agreement in 
silence, without a parliamentary debate taking place. As a consequence, 
the approval of Schengen i took place without attendant parliamentary 
debates and therefore the appurtenant parliamentary documents were 
never produced. This parliamentary silence, however, was short-lived.
In the years after its entering into force, a fierce debate developed 
on the actual effects of the Schengen Agreement. Since it was 
implemented in various stages, implying that the effects of the 
complex Schengen process became only incrementally visible, the 
parliamentary debate on its implementation was spread over several 
years between 1985 and 1995. Every new stage in the implementation-
process brought up new or additional parliamentary questions, 
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resulting in an extraordinary amount of parliamentary documents 
– more than a hundred until 1995 – related to the agreement.633 A peak 
in the intensity of the ex-post parliamentary debate on the Schengen 
process can be observed around the signing of the Convention 
implementing the Schengen Agreement (Schengen ii) in June 1990, but 
serious debates on Schengen also took place before that time. Regular 
governmental reports on the implementation of the agreement were 
sent to parliament from January 1987 onwards.634 The parliamentary 
discussions on the Schengen progress were often held within the 
permanent parliamentary committee for questions on Justice and/
or – the recently established – parliamentary committee on European 
Affairs. These committees reported their conclusions to their fellow 
parliamentarians.635 
What stands out in the parliamentary debates that followed in 
the course of the implementation of Schengen i is that parliament 
discovered that the agreement was not to be perceived as merely an 
administrative matter. This discovery contributed to the breaking down 
of the initial ‘business as usual’-frame of the government. Although 
many MPs still appreciated the agreement as a necessary step in the 
process of realising European unity, there were conspicuous concerns 
on how Schengen i touched upon fundamental characteristics of the 
Dutch parliamentary democracy. In the Lower House, the spokesperson 
on foreign-affairs affairs of the cda, Hans Gualthérie van Weezel, for 
instance remarked that the abolition of borders affected the various 
national immigration policies; in his view ‘possibly [the] most 
complicated and most delicate matter that in the various countries, with 
their completely different tradition and history, has grown over the 
years.’636 Also the Dutch policy of tolerance on soft drugs – cherished 
in the Netherlands but reviled abroad – was feared to be sacrificed in 
the course of implementing Schengen.637 Or, as it was more generally 
worded by D66, the agreement might meddle with ‘important 
achievements of the Dutch society’.638 The fear that Schengen implied 
the loss of national policy attainments was a recurring issue, which 
became more pregnant and concrete with every new parliamentary 
debate on the progress of Schengen’s implementation.
It is noteworthy that the Schengen process united advocates 
and opponents of the European integration process in their concerns. 
The abolition of national borders went counter to everything the 
Protestant-conservatives believed in. The comment of Koos van den 
Berg (sgp) that ‘the border plays an essential role in the country’s 
own sovereign legal order’ strikingly resembles the observation of 
Gualthérie van Weezel.639 Most importantly, the various criticisms 
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show that in the course of the implementation of Schengen I, in broad 
layers of the Dutch parliament the realisation set in that it was not just 
an administrative policy agreement, dealing with rather insignificant 
forms of policy harmonisation. On the contrary, Schengen i opened the 
gate to a whole new world of unity in policy that might run counter to 
national freedom in determining deviant national stances, attuned to 
specific national preferences. 
An additional downside that bothered advocates and 
opponents of further European integration alike was that the 
process of implementing Schengen – characterised by successive 
partial arrangements and consecutive rounds of intergovernmental 
negotiations – lacked democratic transparency. As a consequence, 
the concern came up with D66, PvdA and vvd, that in the course 
of implementing Schengen ‘parliament and with it Dutch society 
will […] be confronted with a series of draft proposals and treaties 
that can hardly be amended.’640 Although previous European 
treaties had already laid bare this mechanism, due to its lengthy and 
continuous character the Schengen process made this more visible. The 
governmental metaphor of Schengen as the ‘motor’ or ‘locomotive’ for 
completion of the internal market, fanned anxiousness in parliament. 
641 Andrée van Es of the new party GroenLinks (Green Left), that had 
sprung from the 1990 merger of the ppr, psps, cpn and the evp, warned 
that ‘the column, once in motion, cannot be stopped.’642 
These remarks reveal not only that by now the Dutch 
parliamentarians had internalised that the process of European 
integration was characterised by piecemeal dynamics and that a vote in 
favour of an, at first sight, minor sub-agreement could have far-reaching 
and unforeseen implications later, but also that this process had 
progressed to such an extent that it should be addressed in parliament. 
The ever further stretching influence of Europe, which went far beyond 
economic or trade benefits now, came with an increased need in 
parliament for influence. It decided to put its complaints into action. 
In an attempt to make up for the lack of grip and overview that they 
experienced, D66, vvd, cda, PvdA, rpf, sgp proposed a joint motion 
in which they called on the government to ‘better inform’ parliament 
on the policy implications of the implementation of the Schengen 
agreement. 643 It was adopted by common consent.644 
Whereas parliament had now clearly expressed its desire to 
be kept informed, the phrasing of the motion left considerable 
latitude with regard to how and to what extent the government 
should keep parliament updated. Thus, in line with the political 
tradition of substantial autonomy of the government in international 
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affairs, adoption of the motion did not hinder the government from 
proceeding with its negotiations in the Schengen process. Relying on 
a parliamentary majority that was still positively inclined to European 
integration in general and Schengen in particular, it is likely that the 
Dutch parliament had aimed at a formulation that did not meddle too 
much with the Dutch constitutional tradition of governmental freedom 
in international negotiations. The wording of the motion struck a 
balance between informing parliament on the one hand and sticking to 
the old parliamentary custom of holding aloof in treaty making, on the 
other. Now the ball was with the government again. 
Schengen ii
In the course of implementing Schengen i it became clear to the 
signatory parties that additional arrangements were needed in order to 
reach the desired result. On 19 June 1990, therefore, a second agreement 
was signed, fully dealing with the implementation of Schengen I.645 
That task was assigned to a so called Executive Committee, which 
received regulative competences in certain areas.646 Another important 
instrument established by Schengen ii was the Schengen Information 
System (sis) – a database used by the Schengen states to exchange 
information on persons, goods and services in order to strengthen 
international security.647 Neither the European nor the national 
parliaments were given a role in controlling the work of the Executive 
Committee, nor could decisions made by this body be disputed in 
a court. Thus, new organs with significant powers were established 
without being adequately submitted to democratic or judicial checks, 
other than the democratic process of ratification. 
Position of the government
The third Lubbers administration – a coalition of cda and PvdA – 
signed the agreement on behalf of the Netherlands. Remarkably, in 
contrast to the tacit consent asked for with Schengen I, this time it 
opted for a full approval procedure in parliament. In line with the 
constitutional tradition as it had developed since 1953, the government 
presented the agreement for approval to parliament on the basis of the 
provision in Article 91, subsection 1 of the Dutch constitution. Thus 
it made clear that the agreement was not in conflict with the Dutch 
constitution and considered a simple majority sufficient for approving 
the treaty. 
In the explanatory memorandum, it pointed out the value and 
necessity of Schengen ii in order to realise the objectives set with 
Schengen I.648 Again, the impulse function of the implementation of 
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the Schengen process for reaching the broader objectives of European 
integration was stressed.649 By placing the new agreement in line with 
earlier commitments entered into by the Netherlands, the government 
– similar to what it had done with Schengen i – downplayed its 
significance and, moreover, gave it a hint of legitimacy before parliament 
could have expressed its thoughts about it. Hence, these remarks can be 
read as indirect rhetorical attempts to convince parliament of approving 
the agreement. 
Another argument of the government in favour of approval 
was that a rejection of the text of the agreement might be interpreted 
as a rejection of the Schengen objective as a whole. Since long and 
laborious negotiations had preceded the agreement on Schengen ii, the 
government had no interest in parliamentary rejection of the agreement 
because it would send the Netherlands back to the negotiating table. 
This consideration, however, was rhetorically conveniently framed. 
Rejection by the Dutch parliament, the government claimed, might 
be understood in the other Member States as a signal ‘that the aim of 
realisation of free traffic of persons in the Community was no longer 
alive in the Schengen countries.’650 Would the Dutch parliament really 
want to contribute to this image of European discord and obstruction 
of the process of European integration?, was the rhetorical question 
implicitly put to parliament. By posing this question, the government 
anticipated the long standing pro-international cooperation mindset 
of the Dutch parliamentary majority in which the obstruction of the 
negotiation processes had been consistently perceived and portrayed 
as undesirable for the interests of the Netherlands. To this familiar 
consideration that started from the instrumental gains of European 
integration, the reputation of the Netherlands abroad was added as a 
factor to be taken into account. It was a rhetorical move that befitted 
the dawn of a new phase in the Dutch parliamentary debate in which 
the win-win character of the integration process – the Netherlands 
needs what Europe needs – was questioned in ever broader circles. This 
question was anwered by stressing the importance of the image of the 
Netherlands abroad. 
The government spent some time on the details of the regulating 
power of the Executive Committee that followed from the right of this 
organ to make decisions implying rights and obligation for national 
citizens. Although the government stressed that the Committee 
was competent in this respect only in relation to a small amount of 
provisions of the, in total, 142 articles of the Schengen ii agreement 
– again an example of how the implications of the new agreement were 
downplayed – it elaborated on the constitutional details of approval 
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of these so called ‘implementation agreements’. Here, the rules as laid 
down in Article 92 of the Dutch constitution applied: ‘Legislative, 
executive and judicial powers may be conferred on international 
institutions by or pursuant to a treaty […].651 Although it was not made 
explicit, this seemed to imply that, according to the Dutch government, 
the Executive Committee, was considered to receive the status of an 
international institution. 
With regard to the sis, the government tried to allay possible 
parliamentary worries about this system to effectively signify a database 
violating citizens’ privacy rights. Instead of being an ‘unrestricted 
exchange of information’, the government pointed out that the basic 
principle would only be to record ‘notifications’ that would enable the 
countries involved to act on the basis of the rules as laid down in the 
implementation agreement and national law.652 
Since a majority in parliament was still composed of parties 
generally in favour of progressive European integration – in 1990, the 
cda, PvdA, vvd and D66 still held a majority of more than 90% in 
the Lower House – the government could to a great extent rely on the 
appeals it made to the general and steady pro-European inclination 
of the Dutch parliament. But the elaboration on the details of the 
Executive Committee and the sis seem to indicate that government 
expected these to constitute possible obstacles in the parliamentary 
approval procedure. Especially with the establishment of the Executive 
Committee, which could decide on matters concerning the citizens of 
the Netherlands without interference of the national parliament, such 
concerns were likely to come under discussion again. The government’s 
digressions on these changes come across as anticipating the concerns 
in parliament on its imminent inability to democratically control the 
results of the Schengen process. 
Taking these rhetorical precautions does not seem to have 
been without reason. Also in the public intellectual debate in the 
Netherlands, from the late 1980s onwards, tone and attention shifted to 
the loss of grip on the European integration process. During a national 
conference of experts on public administration in 1991, for instance, 
the professor of European law and Secretary-General of the Dutch 
ministry of economic affairs, Ad Geelhoed, had already concluded that 
‘for the national legislator the substantive elbow room is shrinking.’653 
The rhythm of decision making, he observed, increasingly depended 
on what happened on the European level: ‘also with a typically legal 
subject as the free movement of persons […] it is about enforced 
decisions, about choices imposed by the internal market.’654 Geelhoed 
remarked that the Dutch parliamentary-democratic order was still 
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insufficiently aware of its community surroundings. The consequence 
of such realisations creeping slowly into the Dutch debate on European 
integration was that coming up with strong lines of argumentation in 
favour of going on with the process was becoming more important for 
the government. To put it more clearly, as the focus shifted towards the 
downsides of the European integration process and it, by consequence, 
became more contested, a stronger advocacy was needed of those 
consistently pleading in favour.
Even before the parliamentary approval procedure could 
commence and parliament could utter any concerns that might exist 
on the consequences of Schengen for the national democracy, support 
for the interests of parliament came from the Dutch Council of State 
which in its advice of 8 April 1991 recommended the government 
not to present the Schengen ii agreement in the Lower House.655 
This, of course, was quite a radical proposal. With regard to the eec 
Treaty, the Council had advised a heavier approval procedure than 
the government had in mind – an advice, as has been elaborated on in 
chapter two, ignored by the Drees iv cabinet. This time it went a step 
further, which may be seen as illustrative for the fact that also within 
the Council of State doubts and nuances with regard to the effects 
of European integration were trickling in. One of its main points of 
criticism related to the establishment of the Executive Committee. The 
Council of State deemed it undesirable to grant legally binding effect 
to decisions of this Committee: ‘this means that for the Netherlands 
obligations may be created which are blocked from the right of approval 
of the States-General.’656Although the Council acknowledged that 
such a construction was constitutionally possible for decisions of 
international institutions, this practice should not be transferred to 
fields outside an ‘institutionalised framework.’657 This was in direct 
conflict with the claim of the government. In the perception of the 
Council, the Executive Committee did not meet the requirements of 
the Dutch constitutional term ‘international institution’ and, for that 
reason, could not be equipped with such powers.658 
The Council of State, in other words, called the government to 
a halt now that it rightly observed a new development, namely that 
the government was about to establish a mechanism for European 
integration, outside the official political and treaty framework of this 
process. In addition, the advisory board pointed out the weakness of the 
presupposition underlying the plea of the government that Schengen 
ii would contribute to the completion of a truly supranational or 
‘common’ order. In response to the alleged impulse function of 
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Schengen ii, it argued that the agreement might just as well have a 
decelerating effect on the process of European integration: 
‘ Should the Schengen-system not be functional and effective 
after all, then it will definitely not bring about an impulse but 
will rather accentuate differences of opinion concerning a 
communal system, whereas a successful Schengen-system, […] 
could […] be going to function as an alternative for a system 
communautaire.’659 
Subsequently the Council underlined that stating that non-ratification 
would radiate a negative signal to the other Community members was 
not a valid argument ‘as a positive signal could of course be given in the 
negotiations within the Community.’660 Thus, the Council took the 
edge off two central arguments of the government in favour of approval 
of Schengen. 
It is illustrative of the determination of the government and the 
freedom that it tended to allow itself in the field of treaty making, that 
the Lubbers iii cabinet decided to ignore the advice of the Council 
of State and to present the Convention implementing the Schengen 
Agreement to parliament notwithstanding the objections raised. In 
accordance with Dutch constitutional traditions, the government 
accounted for this approach in a written report to the Queen. The long 
and the short of it was that it stuck to its position that Schengen would 
function as a useful forerunner of European integration in the field of 
the free movement of goods and persons.661 It, once again, referred to 
the consensus between government and parliament that had existed 
on the Schengen objectives since 1985.662 It contested, moreover, the 
observation of the Council that the States-General would be denied 
democratic involvement in the decision making of the Executive 
Committee. It claimed that in the parliamentary debate on the approval 
of Schengen ii a – both for government and parliament – mutually 
satisfactory modus might be found for deliberation, before irreversible 
decisions were authorised by the government.663 With regard to the 
remark of the Council of State that the Committee could not be seen 
as an ‘international institution’ in the terms of Article 92 of the Dutch 
constitution, the government acknowledged that the Committee did 
not qualify as such an organisation indeed. Yet, it argued, that that 
article was nevertheless ‘analogously applicable’; a classic Perelmanian 
argument based on association, applied to put a chaotic reality into an 
existing order. Accordingly, the Executive Committee – just like an 
international institution – could also make legally binding decisions.664 
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Instead of coming up with an analysis of how the Executive 
Committee fitted the terms of Article 92, the government, with a 
reference in fact, simply stretched the provision in Article 92 to the 
extent that it could also concern another category of organisations, i.e. 
organisations not formally qualifying as an international institution. 
In other words, the scope of the constitutional article was blurred in 
favour of the political objective of approving Schengen. This shows 
that, whereas the Council of State brought up strong democratic 
concerns based on the possible contribution of Schengen to the 
comprehensiveness and complexity of the European integration 
process, the government decided to move on at any cost. The 
argumentative mechanism that it chose to force through its opinion 
– stretching the constitutional possibilities – again demonstrates how 
it tended to rely on the old political consensus that the government 
needed freedom in concluding treaties and should therefore not find a 
rigid constitutional order in its way. 
Debate in parliament
In accordance with the motion adopted in the course of approval of 
Schengen I, parliament indeed had been informed before new steps 
in the Schengen process were taken. Thus it could happen that on 
13 June 1990, already six days before Schengen ii was signed by the 
Dutch officials, the parliament of the Netherlands deliberated on the 
agreement. But parliament was not satisfied. An important complaint 
– which also clearly shows the weakness of the motion mentioned – 
concerned the fact that the exact text of the new agreement was still 
unknown to the Dutch MPs. This impeded the possibility of the 
parliamentarians to give an informed opinion on it. 
How was European integration ever to develop into a democratic 
process when the leaders of government kept deciding on Europe’s 
future in an intergovernmental way, behind closed doors, without 
involving the national parliaments, D66 wondered. Under the pretext 
of ‘a fault confessed is half redressed,’ the liberal-democrats of D66 even 
advised the Dutch government not to sign the agreement.665 This party, 
which had hitherto always been outspokenly in favour of progressive 
European integration, referred to its growing understanding that:
‘a process of integration with such radical effects in our society 
and in our constitutional state, cannot be put through without an open, 
substantive parliamentarian discussion, nor without giving society the 
possibility of participating profoundly in that process. If this does not 
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happen, opposing forces in politics and society will be aroused, which 
in the long term will frustrate the process.’666
This remark, which – in hindsight – has turned out to have a strikingly 
prophetic character, displays that the awareness that European 
integration should become democratically legitimised on the level of 
the nation state or should not be at all, was growing in this party, which 
had always been a loyal supporter of progressive European integration. 
GroenLinks supported this line of thought by contending that the 
credibility of European democracy was at stake.667 
The Dutch government, however, turned a deaf ear to these calls 
from parliament. An argument of succession was applied to defend 
its choice. State Secretary of European Affairs, Piet Dankert (PvdA), 
claimed that since parliament had silently approved Schengen i in 1985, 
the basis underlying the Schengen ii agreement had already been agreed 
upon by parliament.668 This reference to a historical, democratically 
and constitutionally obtained consensus provided the new agreement 
with a hint of – historically grown – democratic legitimacy; a rebuttal of 
the argument of D66 and GroenLinks that democratic legitimacy was 
lacking. 
In its persistence to get Schengen ii approved, the government 
knew it could rely on the vvd, which in an earlier meeting on the 
matter had expressed its commitment to the long-standing consensus 
in the Netherlands that treaty making was to be treated with due 
parliamentary distance: ‘You just cannot, with also one hundred and 
fifty MP’s on your back, negotiate with other countries. We understand 
that very well and we wish to stick to that.’669 The cda, in addition, had 
argued that Schengen was needed, precisely to enhance the democratic 
legitimacy of European integration in the functional sense, showing 
the Dutch citizens the benefits of Europe.670 To top it off, the party, 
more explicit than ever before, appealed to the topos of the Netherlands 
being obliged to act as a trustworthy partner on the international stage: 
‘The Netherlands cannot permit itself to be a spoilsport.’671 Along the 
same lines, the PvdA believed that the international credibility of the 
Netherlands was at stake here.672 In this way, the democratic calibre 
of the process was contrasted with the international credibility of the 
country. 
These remarks of the vvd, cda and PvdA all point to the fact 
that, although doubts were growing on if and how to proceed on the 
path of European integration, the traditional mindset of the political 
majority, in which the Netherlands was considered a small country that 
depended heavily on international partnerships and could only exert 
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influence to its own benefit from within the international community, 
was still strong and would not be broken just like that. In addition, the 
need to uphold the image of the Netherlands as a trustworthy partner 
on the international stage was referred to as an extra consideration for 
the Dutch government to sign Schengen ii, regardless of any democratic 
concern that it might entail. The argument of the Netherlands’ image 
became important when discontent grew.
In January 1992, six months after its signing, the official plenary 
parliamentary debate on approval of Schengen ii commenced. In the 
meantime, parliament had been able to delve deeply into the agreement. 
The establishment of the Executive Committee invited critical reactions 
from various parties. Having an intergovernmental set up, in the 
sense that the cooperating national governments would decide on its 
course, control of its implementation by a (European) parliament or 
court would not be possible. Decisions of the Committee – also those 
legally binding all Dutch citizens – would lack a democratic basis. If 
Schengen ii were to be ratified, the Dutch parliamentarians realised, the 
Netherlands would lose legal sovereignty without being democratically 
compensated for this.673 If parliament were to accept this arrangement, 
it realised that, from the perspective of democratic control, it would 
move beyond a critical line. 
Such a course of affairs went counter to what the Protestant-
conservatives considered to be good governance. Gert Schutte, party 
leader in parliament and constitutional expert of the gpv, argued 
that since the decisions made by the Executive Committee could be 
characterised as ‘treaties’ or ‘international agreements’ in terms of the 
Dutch constitution, each of them should be separately presented for 
approval to the Dutch parliament: ‘It is not a question of give and take 
between government and Chamber, but a legal right of the Chamber 
to come to a decision on approval, silent or not.’674 The Protestant-
conservative mp was supported in this view by a broad political 
spectrum. Similar comments were uttered by the sgp, the rpf and the 
cd, but also – and that is particularly noteworthy – by GroenLinks, 
D66, and even the PvdA: ‘Of course diplomacy has its requirements, 
but actually there should be in the national parliaments a true uprising 
in order to take part in the decision making as much as possible, there 
where the decisions are made.’675 
Moreover, various parties questioned or even attacked the idea 
of labelling the Executive Committee as ‘international institution’ 
according to the terms of Article 92 of the Dutch constitution. 
The crushing criticism of the Council of State was brought up.676 
Gert Schutte (gpv) was sharp in his remarks: ‘If I am told that the 
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Constitution is not literally applicable […], but can be applied 
analogically, I become extra critical, for with analogies stipulations 
can be stretched so far that not much is left of these guarantees.’677 To 
this he added the straightforward conclusion that, since the Executive 
Committee was not an international institution, the granting of 
legislative competences to this organ implied a deviation from the 
Dutch constitution, implying that the agreement should be approved in 
accordance with article 91, section 3 of the Dutch constitution, i.e. with 
a two thirds instead of a simple majority.678 
Additional concerns related to the effects of the sis on privacy 
and the negative effects of the harmonisation of criminal law for the 
Dutch policy of tolerance regarding soft-drugs.679 As the vote on the 
treaty came closer, alienation of the citizens to the project of European 
integration was referred to as a possible consequence of Schengen. 
Initially applauded for making unification more visible and involving 
the national citizen more in its positive effects, now that abolition of 
the borders came closer, a reverse effect was increasingly feared. In 
the words of Hans Gualthérie van Weezel (cda): ‘Especially in a time 
of increasing instability and a possibility of civil wars, not far away 
from us, the average citizen gets concerned that the Netherlands will 
throw itself open too much. In that respect the psychological meaning 
of borders must not be underestimated, even if they are internal 
borders.’680
The concerns indicated that with regard to Schengen ii 
ambivalence developed in the Dutch parliament. On the one hand, 
a political majority wanted to go on with the process of European 
integration and for that reason found it hard to reject the new 
agreement. On the other hand, however, the disadvantages of 
proceeding with the approval of a process that was essentially judged 
to be undemocratic, became ever more apparent. Now that concerns 
had become manifest in the ranks of the Council of State, the Schengen 
path became, also in parliament, increasingly contested. Even within 
political parties, opinion got divided. Illustrative is the internal discord 
within D66 – a party that had always staunchly supported progressive 
European integration, but which, at the same time, greatly valued 
democratic procedures. It openly expressed itself divided on the Treaty: 
‘the choice in favour or against Schengen is a choice between two evils, 
a choice between a treaty with evident flaws and not succeeding in 
getting a Europe without border checks at the internal borders.’681
The growing ambivalence, even within political parties, illustrates 
how the Schengen Agreements played a crucial role in the introduction 
of, what could be called, ‘schizophrenic elements’ in the parliamentary 
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mindset with regard to European integration. Whereas, within 
the parties of the political mainstream, the thought that European 
unification was an extension of the interests of the Netherlands had 
hitherto been almost undisputed, now clear cracks became visible in 
this paradigm. In the debates, a mental split began to show. On the 
one hand the political advocates of unifying Europe made an effort to 
uphold the line of argument that progressive European integration 
was needed and desired for the interests of the Netherlands. But 
at the same time, they raised all kinds of concerns with regard to 
national (democratic) interests that might well be at odds with moving 
further with European integration. In the years to come, this split 
view on European integration turned out to involve serious political 
consequences; consequences of which the Netherlands becoming 
Janus-faced was one of the most significant. Within the national 
political and public domain the governmental elite tried to re-adjust to 
the growing doubts, whereas on the European stage the Netherlands 
kept a steady focus on more and deeper European integration. The two 
diverging moves were masked by an ever stronger focus at home on the 
importance of preserving the pro-European image of the Netherlands 
abroad. 
From defence towards consensus
Those who liked to see the agreement approved in spite of the many 
objections – the government, but in particular also strongholds in the 
parliamentary groups of the cda and vvd – felt the need to defend 
approval of Schengen ii. Again, their reasoning started from the mental 
model regarding how to deal with European integration as it had 
developed in the past forty years and in which the process of European 
integration was depicted as the way to preserve the prosperity and 
security in the Netherlands. 
The government kicked off by emphasising the pressing argument 
that approving the agreement was an absolute necessity for the country 
in order not to lose its status as a trustworthy and loyal negotiation 
partner. Disappointing the European partners, it was argued, was 
at odds with the interests of the Netherlands. The State Secretary 
of Justice, Aad Kosto (PvdA), dramatically stated that even ‘doubts 
about the answer to the question if the Netherlands are willing to join 
in the international cooperation’, could be damaging: ‘And that for 
a country which is so enormously dependent on that international 
cooperation!’682 Typically, Kosto spoke of international cooperation, 
as if not aware that European integration and Schengen as related to 
this process, could not be seen as just another episode of cooperating 
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internationally. These complex processes in which regulating 
competences were conferred on a level of decision making of a higher 
order, separated from the Member States, implied that it should be 
assessed and judged differently from traditional forms of cooperation. 
The fact that Kosto did not address the difference, together with the 
seeming casualness with which he ranged Schengen ii in the political 
category of international cooperation, seems to indicate a blind spot. 
For the Dutch governing elite Schengen was just another exponent of 
the foreign policy ambitions of the country. A too simple perception on 
which national decision making procedures on European integration 
were built and which would eventually backfire among the majority 
favouring progressive European integration. 
When Maarten van Traa, a political associate of Kosto, attempted 
to pour some oil on troubled waters by objecting that France had not 
been banned from the international stage after the Assemblée National 
had rejected the European Defence Community in 1954, Kosto sharply 
remonstrated that ‘France is a country of an importance somewhat 
different from a small country in Europe which, with a big air- and 
seaport, is very dependent on an accessible hinterland.’683 As usual, 
the geo-political and trading position of the Netherlands – as opposed 
to the position of the bigger powers – was adduced as an argument for 
approving the Schengen Convention.
Fierce support for this view came from the cda. Approving or 
rejecting the treaty, Hans Gualthérie van Weezel (cda) argued, boiled 
down to choosing between the ‘leading group’ or ‘falling behind with 
the pack of competitors like England, which, because of its geographical 
position, finds itself in a completely different situation from the 
continent of Europe.’684 Again, the argument in favour of approval was 
based on the presupposition that the Netherlands, because of its geo-
political position, could only lose by rejection of the new agreement. 
His fellow cda mp, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, chose a similar approach, 
arguing that the Dutch parliament – for the sake of the Dutch interests – 
should look beyond the provisions of the agreement and any objections 
that might stem from them: ‘Looking at the Dutch interest and the 
way the Netherlands can be of influence, it is clear that should also 
play a role when we are going to make a final assessment of Schengen. 
That, in other words, goes beyond judging the treaty as it stands.’685 
Thus, De Hoop Scheffer tried to take the sting out of the Schengen ii 
implementation convention. In his line of reasoning, the exact content 
of the agreement was irrelevant compared to the broader political 
context in which it had come about. 
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Strikingly absent in these calls for approval of Schengen ii were 
elaborations on how exactly the agreement would be of interest 
to the Netherlands and if and how these interests were of greater 
value than upholding strong national democratic procedures. This 
lack of argumentation fitted the Dutch political culture in which 
the government had structurally been yielded privileges in the 
field of foreign affairs. The questions if and how the process of 
European integration qualified as just another process of foreign 
affairs or of international cooperation, were not asked. In that way, 
the full implications of calling another institution into being that 
had competences to rule the citizens of the Netherlands, were not 
considered in parliament. 
The constitutional objections concerning the legal status of the 
Executive Committee and the Schengen approval procedure were again 
dealt with in a way parliament had been accustomed to since 1953. In 
reply to Schutte’s objection that the Executive Committee could not 
qualify as an ‘international institution’ in terms of Article 92 of the 
Dutch constitution, the government stated that the Committee should 
be seen as a ‘light international institution’, which was – nevertheless – 
covered by Article 92. 
More than being a clear distinction, the introduction of the 
term ‘light international institution’ was a convenient rhetorical 
dissociation,686 enabling the government to fit the Executive 
Committee into the template of the Dutch constitution after all and, 
thus, enabling the government to avert – as Schutte had suggested – 
approval of Schengen by a special, instead of by a simple majority. 
Interestingly, by introducing the dissociation, the government departed 
from the line of argument that it had upheld in its report in answer 
to the Council of State. Then, it had simply acknowledged that the 
Committee did not qualify in terms of an international institution, in 
order to subsequently add that, nevertheless legislative competences 
could be conferred on the Committee. By now introducing the 
dissociation mentioned above, the government fortified its position 
rhetorically. 
In contrast with dissociations made in earlier debates on 
European integration – between the procedures wanted in national 
and international politics, for instance, or between the literal text 
and the spirit of the constitution – this particular dissociation was 
not immediately accepted by parliament. Some wondered what the 
exact legal characteristics of such an international institution, light 
version, were and what the differences were with a regular international 
institution.687 The government had no clear answer but that this 
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organisation would not reside in large buildings and would not be 
supported by a large-scale secretariat. Instead, it would have a lighter 
structure and be linked to an already existing secretariat.688 It is perhaps 
because of these conceptual difficulties of defining a light international 
organisation, that the government in a later parliamentary meeting 
came up with an additional argument to prove that the establishment of 
the Executive Committee could be legitimised on the basis of Article 92 
of the Dutch constitution when it stated: 
‘ that the legal safeguard with regard to [the] conferral of 
competences recorded in Article 92, is not due to the circumstance 
that powers are given to an international institution under 
international law or in the nature of that organisation, but to the 
fact that the assignment may only be given by means of a treaty 
approved by parliament.’689 
Interestingly, since it brings us back to the constitutional structures 
set out in the early 1950s, the argument was literally derived from the 
parliamentary discussion on the constitutional revision of 1953. It 
shifted the focus for legitimising the conferral of competences from 
the exact character of the organisation to the approval of the treaty or 
agreement concerned. In other words, the argument left the character of 
the Executive Committee to be irrelevant for the application of Article 
92. It was a rhetorical invention that justified the disregarding of certain 
inconvenient elements in the Dutch constitution. To further strengthen 
its case, the government stated that deviation from the Constitution 
would only be the case if the Executive Committee would receive the 
power to take decisions that would themselves deviate from the Dutch 
constitution. However, this was not to be feared, since such decisions 
were not only not foreseen in the competences allocated to the 
Committee, but the promise of the government to inform parliament 
in advance of the agenda of meetings of the Executive Committee 
– leaving parliament the possibility to convene a parliamentary meeting 
in advance of such decisions – would also prevent such decisions from 
being taken without the knowledge of parliament.690 This, in fact, 
was not much more than a mere eyewash, since it was by no means a 
guarantee that the Executive Committee would never take decisions 
with constitutional implications. 
In spite of the resistance, the government succeeded in meeting 
its aims. The arsenal of arguments turned out to be enough to 
convince a majority in parliament that the Executive Committee 
could be considered to fall within the terms of Article 92 of the 
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Dutch Constitution and that Schengen ii should be approved with a 
simple majority, in accordance with Article 91, subsection 1. So Gert 
Schutte’s perception of the relation between the Treaty and the Dutch 
Constitution was rejected. Thus, though harder-won than in earlier 
years, the Dutch tradition of constitutional openness towards the 
process of European integration, as it had been growing since 1953, 
remained intact. 
Yet, the tabling and adoption of an amendment introduced by 
Maarten van Traa (PvdA) and Jaap De Hoop Scheffer (cda) shows that 
the political mainstream in parliament was becoming more wary, after 
forty years of being at ease with the willingness of the government of 
investing non-national institutions with regulating competences for 
the cause of European integration. In this amendment to the bill of 
approval concerning Schengen ii, the parliamentary reservation was 
laid down that a draft of a decision of the Executive Committee was to 
be made public and presented for approval to the Dutch States-General, 
immediately after the draft had come about and before the government 
had put its signature under it.691 The initiators added that also in case a 
draft-decision had been approved by the States-General, but was again 
altered in the Executive Committee, a new draft-decision would come 
about that again needed separate approval of the States-General.692
The introduction and adoption of this amendment was 
revolutionary in the sense that, for the first time in the process of 
European integration, the Dutch parliament restrained the government 
in such a clear and unequivocal manner. Although associations might 
emerge with the Klompé and Blaisse amendments to the Bills of 
approval of, respectively, the edc Treaty (1953)693 and the eec Treaty 
(1957)694, the Van Traa/De Hoop Scheffer amendment was of a different 
– almost un-Dutch – order. Whereas these historic amendments 
had ‘merely’ asked the government to present to parliament 
implementation agreements following from the respective treaties, this 
amendment added that the government was not allowed to commit 
itself to draft-decisions of the Schengen Executive Committee before it 
had secured approval of the States-General. 
By laying down this specific condition, the Dutch parliament 
broke with the long-standing consensus with a parliamentary majority 
that the government was to be left free in the process of signing the 
documents resulting from of international negotiations. It is a clear 
sign that, by 1990, parliament broadly felt that the process of European 
integration, and spin-offs such as Schengen, had proceeded to such an 
extent that stronger national parliamentary control, or legitimisation 
was desirable. Looking back on the process and referring to the 
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constitutionally more conscious Germans, the former mp, senator of 
the PvdA and emeritus professor of Constitutional Law, Erik Jurgens, 
spoke of a ‘breakthrough’: 
‘ […] then it began to dawn that gradually we were giving away 
things which – as the Germans would say – conflict with our 
essential Verfassungsordnung.’695 
Paradoxically, however, the increased possibilities for parliamentary 
control that this understanding led to was only indirectly insisted on 
and approval of the Schengen Agreement itself – even via a simple 
parliamentary majority! – was never in danger. Given the choice 
between approval or rejection of Schengen ii, the political mainstream 
in the Netherlands, despite its doubts and objections, eventually 
voted in favour of the agreement. The considerations of D66, which 
had been in doubt on whether it should approve the accord or not, 
is illustrative here. Reverting to an old and familiar topos, the party 
eventually concluded that ‘there is no alternative.’696 The support 
of D66 for the notion that the opening of the national borders was a 
necessary precondition for reaching the sea objective of the internal 
market, and eventually, a fully economically and politically integrated 
Europe, led to a perception of approval of Schengen as the best option 
available. The intergovernmental and undemocratic downsides of the 
agreement were seen as temporary problems that could be overcome 
in the course of further integration. Thus approval of Schengen ii was 
trusted to be a pragmatic step towards a supranational Europe in which 
the endangered democratic relations would be eventually restored. 
On 25 June 1992 the Dutch Lower House approved Schengen 
ii with a marked majority of 123 against 23 votes. In February 1993, 
approval – by sitting and standing– followed in the Upper House.697 It is 
noteworthy that in both Chambers the votes against the agreement did 
not only stem from the traditionally euro-sceptical parties, in particular 
the Protestant-conservatives, but also from parties that had until then 
been known as solidly in favour of progressive European integration. 
In the Upper House, for instance, four of the sixteen members of the 
PvdA voted against the agreement. Among the opponents in the Lower 
House were members of the PvdA and D66.698 These results illustrate 
the friction that started to emerge within these parties with regard to 
the prospect of further European integration and the role of the national 
parliament in it; friction that was also at the root of the Van Traa/De 
Hoop Scheffer amendment. 
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However, whereas the amendment signified a significant crack 
in an old political consensus, the mindset it was part of still remained. 
When it came to the crunch, the broadly shared understanding that the 
Netherlands should for its own sake continue on the path of European 
integration and that a Dutch ‘Alleingang’ should for the same reason be 
rejected as a matter of principle,699 still united a parliamentary majority 
of over 80%. 
5.3  More Cracks Appear:  
the Treaty of Maastricht (1992)
During the deliberations on Schengen ii in the early 1990s, plans 
for a new European Treaty were well underway again. In a sequence 
of summits in Dublin (April 1990), Rome (December 1990) and 
Luxembourg (June 1991) the establishment of the European Monetary 
and Political Union (emu and epu respectively) were discussed. In 
the weeks before the last meeting, the Luxembourg Presidency of 
the eec had presented a draft-treaty to its partners. It introduced the 
establishment of a European Union based on a so called three-pillar 
structure.700 The pillars respectively comprised the eec (i.e. ‘traditional’ 
internal market affairs), the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(cfsp) and Justice and Home Affairs. The first would have a community 
(communautarian) set up, whereas the other two would be structured 
on an intergovernmental basis. This was contrary to the Dutch 
preference, but yielding national sovereignty in these policy fields was 
too delicate an issue for most other Member States. In the latter pillars, 
the European Council was appointed to stimulate and set the general 
guidelines in the various policy areas. 
The Luxembourg plans were greeted with a diversity of reactions. 
Various supranationally oriented parties to the negotiations, such as 
the European Commission, Belgium and the Netherlands, objected to 
a structure with two intergovernmental pillars that were considered 
to contribute to the power of the national governments at the 
expense of the position of the common European institutions, the 
European Commission and the ep in particular. In the Netherlands, an 
intergovernmental structure was deemed no less than a spectre, since 
such a design ran counter to the long and widely shared belief that a 
great amount of power resting with the national governments would, 
within the European framework, mainly benefit the greater powers 
such as France, Germany and Great-Britain. Especially in such a crucial 
field as foreign policy, this was considered to run counter to Dutch 
interests. The Netherlands, together with the other supranationally 
232
inclined parties preferred a tree structure, ‘a tree with three branches’,701 
in which the cfsp and Justice and Home Affairs elements of the Union 
would also be fed by a stem of common supranational procedures.
In addition, there was disagreement among the Twelve on 
whether the European Parliament should or should not receive the 
co-right of initiative. The Commission rejected this, since alteration 
to the traditional procedures would strip this particular institution 
of its exclusive right of initiative. Greece, Spain, Italy, Belgium and 
the Netherlands, on the other hand, applauded the extension of 
competences of the ep.702 The Dutch supranational ideal presupposed a 
full-fledged ep. 
Because of these disagreements on the set-up of a European 
Union, the Luxembourg proposal was rejected. However, since the 
common aim – i.e. the development of the emu and epu – was not 
rejected in principle, the European summit of June 1991 concluded 
with an optimistic note: the Luxembourg draft would function as the 
starting point for future negotiations among the Twelve. Little did the 
Member States know that, in the six months to come, things were to 
run differently under a Dutch presidency.703 
Instead of elaborating on the Luxembourg Plan, a group of leading 
Dutch diplomats and the members of government responsible for 
foreign affairs – i.e. the Prime Minister, Ruud Lubbers (cda), the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hans van den Broek (cda), and State 
Secretary Piet Dankert (PvdA) – spent the summer of 1991 designing 
a new proposal for a European Union, more in line with the Dutch 
preferences. The initiative can be seen as an expression of the hope and 
belief that taking a pioneer role in the process of European integration 
would be beneficial for the country. Or, to put it more down-to-earth, 
as a typical exponent of the old tendency of the Dutch governmental 
elite to choose the headlong flight in matters of European integration in 
order to stay in control. 
The result of the Dutch efforts was a draft treaty in which the 
initial three pillar design had made room for a ‘unitarian structure’, 
i.e. a tree with three branches.704 Supranational (‘communautarian’) 
decision making would be the rule in more areas than was the case with 
the Luxembourg draft. Thus, the Dutch anticipated a great moment 
in the history of European integration: they would propose their 
European partners to take the plunge towards truly federal contours of 
their united Europe. Almost fifty years after the end of World War ii, 
the objective that a Dutch political majority had structurally pursued, 
seemed to come real close. 
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Already soon after its presentation in diplomatic circles, however, 
it became clear that the Netherlands would get a hard time in defending 
the proposal with the European partners. Many of the Member 
States indicated to prefer the Luxembourg draft.705 The Dutch prime-
minister, Ruud Lubbers (cda), his Foreign Minister and State Secretary 
for European Affairs, for reasons of time-pressure and political 
credibility, decided to enter into new negotiations with their proposal, 
notwithstanding the diplomatic criticism.706 
On 30 September 1991 – ‘Black Monday’ in the Dutch literature 
on the subject – the Dutch team in the negotiations saw their worst-
case scenario coming true.707 Apart from Belgium, the Netherlands 
received no support whatsoever on the European stage. The Dutch 
plan was brushed aside by the European partners in an unsparing way. 
The occurrence was experienced and regretted in the Netherlands as a 
diplomatic fiasco. At the end of Monday 30 September, in the building 
of the European Council in Brussels, Minister Van den Broek told the 
Dutch national press that the Dutch had looked like real idiots.708 The 
nrc Handelsblad, one of the largest Dutch newspapers, phrased it as 
a ‘total humiliation’.709 These fierce reactions of shame illustrate that 
in the Netherlands the rejection of the draft was more than merely a 
political disillusionment. It was received as a blow for the image and 
reputation of the Netherlands as an esteemed, tactful and practical 
partner on the international political stage; a reputation that the Dutch 
political community had tried to build conscientiously and on which it 
very much liked to pride itself. 
After the initial shock, however, there was no alternative for 
the country but to accept the retreat and to return to the drawing 
table. Between September 1991 and December of that year, the Dutch 
presidency went all out to close the semester with a victory. The flop 
of 30 September had to be forgotten as soon as possible; an instant 
diplomatic success would considerably contribute to that. Therefore, 
the Dutch negotiation team went to work with fresh courage in 
order to be able to surprise international political friends and foes 
with an acceptable result after all. Since a majority in parliament had 
declared itself generally in favour of a new proposal to be presented in 
Maastricht, as it had also felt both the disappointment of the rejection 
and the urgent need for a new plan, the need for reckoning with possible 
concerns in parliament regarding a new treaty and its effects on national 
democracy was in all probability not given priority. Counting on the 
common Dutch internationalist mindset doing its work, such concerns 
would most probably not endanger national approval of a new treaty 
and could therefore be dealt with later. 
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At the European Summit in Maastricht of 9 and 10 December 1991, 
the Netherlands then, after all, succeeded in concluding its presidency 
with a historic agreement. After toilsome negotiations, in which 
especially the United Kingdom was obstructive on certain points, the 
Member States came to terms on a new alteration to the Treaties of 
Rome. On 7 February 1992 the Treaty on European Union was signed 
in Maastricht. The Treaty of Maastricht, as the Treaty on European 
Union was soon also called, differed from the earlier Dutch proposal 
in that it was much closer to the Luxembourg draft. The European 
Union that was established by it, was given a ‘temple structure’: 
the tympanum of the Union rested on three individual pillars.710 
Following the Luxembourg design, the three pillars respectively 
related to matters concerning the internal market, the cfsp and Justice 
and Home Affairs. Decision making by means of the community 
method remained restricted to first pillar-issues and that contained the 
former eec arrangements.711 The concepts of subsidiarity and Union 
citizenship that had been introduced in the Luxembourg draft, were 
again introduced in the Maastricht Treaty. Furthermore, the Maastricht 
Treaty recorded the commitment of the Member States to go along 
in developing a single European currency – the emu – and made the 
establishment of the European Central Bank possible. 
The subsidiarity concept established for all three pillars implied 
that decisions should be taken ‘as closely as possible to the citizens’.712 
Its extension and transformation into hard law by incorporating it in the 
treaty framework was an attempt to create an instrument for dividing 
up competences to be exerted by the Union and competences to be 
exerted by the nation state.713 Union citizenship yielded the citizens of 
the Member States additional rights on top of their national citizenship, 
among which the right to travel, work and live wherever they wanted 
in the eu. To the historical bond between the European Member States 
and their national citizens, reflected in rights and obligations following 
from national citizenship, an extra dimension – the European one – 
was added. Henceforth, national citizens would also formally derive 
their rights and obligations from a European level of governance. For 
their money, as well, they would increasingly depend on the European 
framework. For the Netherlands it meant that the Dutch guilder would 
eventually disappear as a symbol of national financial independence. 
Thus, with the introduction of these new concepts and policy 
instruments the Treaty of Maastricht was an important step in the 
process of European integration. Having started out as a foreign policy 
experiment, Europe to an ever greater extent became a matter of 
national importance, affecting the national constitutional orders as they 
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had hitherto existed. Although the term ‘federation’ was not explicitly 
used,– in the document the 1957 objective of the ‘ever closer union’ 
was adhered to – with the Treaty of Maastricht the federal contours of 
European unity got in fact clearer-cut. 
Position of the government
At home, in line with the attitude as it had existed since the approval 
of the sea, the government presented the giant leap of the Treaty on 
European Union as not much more than a routine matter. It expressed 
the view that it was in accordance with objectives that had been set 
earlier and should therefore be approved. It reminded parliament of the 
information that it had been given by the government in the various 
stages of the process; various memo’s, such as ‘Going on Building 
Europe’714, ‘The European Political Union715 and ‘Memorandum on epu, 
weu and nato’,716 sent to parliament in the preparatory stage of the 
treaty, were referred to. 
In order to further enhance the treaty’s legitimacy, the Lubbers iii 
government pointed out that the Treaty was the solution – or at least 
a considerable step in the right direction – for solving the democratic 
inadequacies in the process of European integration, which had been 
intensely criticised by parliament, especially with the approval of the 
sea and Schengen ii. The return of that parliamentary complaint as an 
argument in favour of approval of the new treaty, illustrates again how 
the government skilfully turned concerns of the past into pragmatic 
arguments for progressive integration. To substantiate its claim, 
the government referred to the new competences of the European 
Parliament in the fields of legislation and governance,717 but also to 
the introduction of the concept of Union citizenship, the explicit 
mentioning of European observance of the fundamental human rights 
and the honouring of the subsidiarity principle.718 It added that the new 
treaty offered the prospect of further improvement of the democracy-
issue since the document was explicitly aimed at the preservation and 
development of the common legal order and adopting the concepts of 
democracy and subsidiarity as guidelines for future development.719 
Another round of negotiations, scheduled for 1996, to which the ec 
members had committed themselves with the signing of the Maastricht 
Treaty, was to bring further perfection.720 
This positive valuation of the changes that the new treaty 
brought, matched the interest of the government to get the treaty 
approved in parliament. In line with the presentation of earlier treaties, 
less attention was paid to shortcomings, vague implications or 
unforeseeable consequences of the new treaty. Whereas the extension 
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of competences of the ep was focused on, the restriction on its ability to 
control many other second and third pillar issues was discussed just as 
little as the fact that the democratic means of the ep remained restricted 
to the right to reject a bill in last instance. The limitations of the clarity 
that the subsidiarity concept was supposed to bring – questions like 
who was to decide, in what particular cases, whether a task belonged to 
the Union or to the nation states? – was not elaborated on. Moreover, 
the difficulties of a European identity with the national citizens – i.e. if 
such a feeling of connectedness could be created by a treaty and make 
the concept of European citizenship more than a hollow phrase – were 
not entered into. In general, it can be concluded from the presentation 
of the treaty to parliament, that the Dutch government paid no 
particular attention to the major implications that would come with 
rigging a, to an ever greater extent, (con)federally structured Europe. 
With regard to the political interest of the government – a quick 
approval of the treaty – this is not surprising, but the choice to let 
these difficult conceptual questions rest also had a long term effect that 
seems not to have been duly considered. Not talking about these issues, 
involved the danger of losing sight of their long term importance. The 
risk of these matters sooner or later backfiring on the political elite as 
unforeseen or even undesired consequences of the integration process, 
increased. 
Interestingly, and probably due to the fact that the government 
realised all too well the immense scope of the new treaty, despite its 
attempts to be casual about it, special and extensive attention was 
paid this time to the relation between the new treaty and the Dutch 
constitution. Typically, the government again chose the rhetorical 
strategy of soothing any possible tensions beforehand. First of all, 
it was stressed that citizenship of the European Union would be 
complementary and would therefore not interfere with national 
citizenship.721 In addition, the government went deeply into Articles 
126 and 127 of the ec Treaty in the version resulting from Maastricht 
that stipulated that the ec would contribute to the development of 
the quality of education within the Union and decide on actions to 
reach this goal. The Treaty on European Union was the first official 
European agreement that allotted a task to Europe in this field. The 
Dutch government concluded that this was compatible with Article 
23 of the Dutch Constitution, which guaranteed freedom of education 
– i.e. the equal treatment and financing of public and denominational 
education – in the Netherlands.722 A fierce political strife between liberal 
and Christian politicians of more than hundred years – the Schoolstrijd – 
had preceded the insertion of this article in the Dutch constitution in 
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1917. The underlining of the government that the European Union was 
not to tamper with this hard won educational freedom of its Christian 
citizens, reveals an awareness that this might be a breaking point for the 
Protestant-conservatives, and maybe even for the cda, in the process of 
approving the Treaty on European Union. 
The government also anticipated parliamentary protest regarding 
the constitutionality of the monetary arrangements that the Maastricht 
Treaty introduced. It elaborated on the possibility of a conflict 
between the Maastricht provisions on the single European currency 
and Article 106 of the Dutch Constitution, introduced in the Dutch 
constitution in 1983. The latter stated that ‘the monetary system shall 
be regulated by Act of Parliament.’ The government stressed that this 
provision was by no means to signify that the national legislator was 
obliged to maintain a national monetary system; implicitly again an 
interpretative dissociation between a national and an international 
order that was not made explicit in the literal text of the constitution. 
Article 106 of the Dutch constitution, according to the government, 
was not to be interpreted as an obstruction to European integration, 
it merely guaranteed that national legislation was to be developed in 
order to introduce a European monetary system.723 To substantiate this 
statement, the government concurred with the words of the former 
Minister of the Interior, Hans Wiegel (vvd), who in the parliamentary 
discussions on the last constitutional amendment of 1983 had expressed 
governmental consensus on this matter. 724 The then cabinet had even 
stated literally that ‘[This] stipulation […] [can] not be seen in any way 
as a constitutional obstacle for any future European development.’725 
What had been stated back then, the Lubbers administration reasoned, 
still applied in 1992.
The government reached a similar conclusion on the Maastricht 
Treaty provisions on immigration and asylum.726 Article 2, subsection 
two, of the Dutch Constitution, stating that the admission and 
expulsion of aliens should be regulated by Act of Parliament, did not 
prohibit adjustment of national arrangements to a common European 
policy. It only required that such adjustments should be based on 
a national act.727 Ultimately, then, the government concluded that 
none of the provisions of the Treaty on European Union required 
deviations from the Dutch constitution. For that reason, in accordance 
with the Dutch tradition of constitutional openness vis-à-vis the 
process of European integration as it had developed since 1953, the text 
was presented to parliament for approval by a regular parliamentary 
majority following Article 91, subsection 1 of the Dutch Constitution.728 
In accounting for this choice, the government referred, as usual, to 
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Article 92, which provided for the conferral of legislative, governmental 
and legal competences on international institutions. 
The detailed opinions on the various provisions, however, indicate 
that now that the process of European integration was observed to 
interfere to an ever greater extent with policy areas hitherto strictly 
dealt with within the national domain, even the government saw the 
need of further explanation of how this process was to be reconciled 
with the Dutch constitution. Perfect harmony between the two 
political orders could no longer be taken for granted. The fact that, 
in the end, the government felt free to conclude that there were no 
incompatibilities between the two orders, is indicative, firstly of how 
open the Dutch constitutional order had become – the text of the Dutch 
Constitution left ample room for such an interpretation – and, secondly 
and more importantly, of how it still counted on a majority consensus 
in parliament that would endorse this interpretation of openness. 
In its argumentation, the government could fall back on the 
conclusions of the Council of State. Surprisingly, considering its 
fierce concerns on Schengen and, earlier in history, the eec Treaty, in 
its advice on the Maastricht Treaty, the Council had not extensively 
entered into constitutional matters. It had asked the government 
to clarify its point of view on the legal position of the Union in 
comparison to the former European Economic Community and 
on the relation between Article 106 of the Dutch constitution and 
establishment of the emu – requests that the Dutch government 
complied with in the explanatory memorandum – but had not come 
up with a competing view on the reconciliation of the treaty with the 
Dutch constitutional order.729
It was a remarkably relaxed attitude, especially when compared 
to the reaction of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht to the Treaty 
of Maastricht. In its Maastricht Urteil of October 1993, the German 
Constitutional Court felt the need to emphasise that, also after the 
entering into force of the Maastricht Treaty, the legitimacy of the 
integration process would be based on the sovereignty of the Member 
States. Application of European law by German lawyers, the court 
therefore stated, was ultimately effected on the basis of the national 
German constitution. The lack of any such consideration in the 
advice of the Dutch Council of State is telling for the difference in the 
constitutional culture that existed between the two countries. The 
national constitution of the Netherlands is generally interpreted as to be 
far more flexible towards the wider world, than that of Germany.730 
So with regard to the basic principles of approval, the government 
was supported by the Council of State. The consistent pro-European 
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course of the coalition parties cda and PvdA – in 1992, together these 
parties held a majority of 68,7% in the Lower House – was another 
factor that contributed to the likeliness that the Treaty of Maastricht 
would be smoothly approved in parliament.731 There was, however, 
one political rub that the government needed to reckon with. In the 
autumn of 1991, the new party leader of the vvd, Frits Bolkestein, for 
the first time openly denounced the pursuing of the European federal 
ideal in parliament. These were remarkable words from the lips of 
the political leader of the vvd; a party that – just like the PvdA, and 
cda – had adhered to the federal ideal since the early 1950s.732 His 
political turn might be explained in more than one way. It was a strategy 
perhaps to politically adapt to the growing democratic concerns of 
European integration after Schengen and to the post-Black Monday 
reality in which the term ‘federation’ was more and more avoided in 
the Netherlands. It could also be seen as a Thatcherian stance with 
its stronger focus on the costs of the process or, more specifically, 
as an assimilation to the national public debate in which, from 1986 
onwards, a focus emerged on the far-reaching consequences and 
possible downsides of the process of European integration for the 
national domain.733 In any case, Bolkestein’s remark was an indication 
that the political reactions towards progressive European integration 
were becoming more unpredictable. The old story that said that 
European integration, by definition, served Dutch interests and should 
therefore be supported, had lost its self-evidence within the national 
political domain. By all means a relatively new development, that the 
government had to reckon with in the approval debate. 
Another new and remarkable development that would turn out 
to have an impact on the course of the parliamentary debate on the 
Treaty of Maastricht, was the rise of a scholarly discussion about the 
constitutional effects of the agreement. The significance of the Treaty of 
Maastricht for the national (constitutional) order was especially noticed 
among Dutch public intellectuals. In March 1991, even before the Treaty 
of Maastricht had been signed, the influential Dutch legal expert, Ad 
Geelhoed, had characterised the process of European integration as 
a ‘process of legislation as far-reaching or almost comparable with a 
process of constitutional legislation.’734 Contrary to the traditional 
point of departure of the political majority that more integration 
would benefit the influence, and therefore also the interests, of the 
Netherlands, Geelhoed argued that a situation was developing in 
which ‘decisions are taken on the Netherlands, but partly without the 
Netherlands.’735
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In June 1992, the period in which the government presented the 
treaty to parliament, a debate among Dutch constitutional experts 
developed in their professional journal the Nederlands Juristenblad 
(njb), on the question whether the Maastricht Treaty was as 
compatible with the Dutch Constitution as was contended by the 
Dutch government. Commenting on the plea of the government in the 
explanatory memorandum, the expert in comparative constitutional 
law Aalt Heringa (1955-) kicked off the discussion by stating that 
the provisions and objectives of the Treaty on European Union 
conflicted with Article 106 and Article 2, subsection 2 of the Dutch 
Constitution. The first of these articles stated that the ‘monetary 
system shall be regulated by Act of Parliament’ and had been added to 
the Dutch constitution in 1983 by means of the amendment proposed 
by Wöltgens et al.736 At the root of its insertion had been a debate 
between parliament and government on the possible development 
of a future European Monetary Union. With this article, Heringa 
claimed, the initiators had intended to guarantee that the national 
legislator was to decide in case the process of European integration 
would result in fundamental changes of the national monetary system. 
In relation to Article 2 of the Dutch Constitution, which stated that 
‘The admission and expulsion of aliens shall be regulated by Act of 
Parliament.’ Heringa’s argument was similar: ‘an assignment to the 
(national) legislator [seems to me] incompatible with a conferral on 
an international institution which can decide on the subject with a 
(qualified) majority.’737 On the basis of these arguments he argued 
in favour of approval of the Treaty of Maastricht with a two-thirds 
majority of the votes cast, in accordance with Article 91, subsection 3 of 
the Dutch Constitution. 
Heringa’s careful phrasing gives the impression that he himself 
was careful with regard the tenability of his argument. When seen 
in the light of the Dutch tradition of relatively easily giving way to 
Community Law in general, and conferring competences on the 
European level in accordance with Article 92 of the Dutch constitution 
in particular, this caution seems sensible. The tension between 
Heringa’s conclusion and the Dutch internationalist constitutional 
tradition was also observed in the reaction of Marten Burkens, Professor 
of Constitutional Affairs and former sous-chef of the department 
of Constitutional Affairs of the Ministry of the Interior.738 Referring 
to the work of the constitutional expert and former mp for the vvd, 
Pieter Oud, he concluded that on the basis of Article 92 of the Dutch 
Constitution ‘The legislator can assign the competences he has to an 
international institution.’739 This observation was not unconditionally 
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compatible with Heringa’s conclusion that ‘everywhere where a 
constitutional stipulation explicitly requires action of the legislator 
an assignment of powers as meant in Art. 92 is contrary to that 
stipulation’740 Burkens gained support of various Dutch legal experts, 
but also Heringa’s view was – to a certain extent – endorsed by 
some.741 The divergent reactions show that even Dutch constitutional 
experts could, or were not willing to agree on how to interpret the 
Dutch constitution on this point. It is telling for how elusive the 
Dutch constitutional provisions had been set up. And for lack of 
the existence of a Constitutional Court, the discussion needed to be 
settled in parliament. There, without a doubt, political instead of legal 
considerations would be decisive. 
Debate in parliament 
Probably grown wise by the Schengen-experience, the Treaty of 
Maastricht was instantly recognised in the Dutch Lower House 
as grand and special. Already in the written preparatory phase of 
the approval procedure in parliament, hundreds of questions were 
levelled at the government.742 In order to get a grasp of the exact 
meaning of the provisions of the Treaty, the permanent parliamentary 
committee on EC-Affairs even summoned a special expert-meeting. 
Here, the ‘European of the first hour’ Edmund Wellenstein, the first 
Dutch Advocate-General at the ecj (1981-1985) Pieter VerLoren 
van Themaat, the President of the Dutch Central Bank (dnb), Wim 
Duisenburg, and professor of monetary economics Eduard Bomhoff, 
were invited to assist parliament to get a grip on the text of the treaty 
and its implications.743 The complexity and comprehensiveness of the 
document resulted in a lengthy plenary debate.744 
Apart from the widely shared view that Maastricht was an 
important qualitative step on the path to European integration, 
parliament was divided in the appreciation of its content. Being 
generally positively inclined towards further integration, the cda, 
PvdA, D66, vvd, and GroenLinks – a majority of over 95%! – welcomed 
the treaty in principle, as a new step in a desired direction. The various 
parties valued various aspects of the agreement. The realisation of the 
emu in particular was appreciated by the liberal vvd for its economic 
advantages.745 The intensification of cooperation in the fields of 
environment and social affairs was especially valued by GroenLinks. 
The differences in appreciation of the various parts of the Treaty, 
equally resulted in diverging disappointments with the various political 
parties. For all the good things that the vvd saw in the development 
of the emu, it could also mention as many dangers and concerns.746 
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GroenLinks commented that, to its taste, the emphasis of the Treaty 
was too emphatically and one-sidedly on economic integration: 
‘The intentions in the field of environment and the social dimension 
poorly compare with that.’747 The cda, although explicitly advocating 
progressive European integration, was not too keen on the expansion 
of activity of Europe in the fields of education and culture, for the 
party was anxious about infringement of the rights of denominational 
education.748 Within the PvdA, disappointment existed with regard to 
the complexity of the treaty on the one hand and its half-heartedness 
on the other. Erik Jurgens, who by then had become an mp for the 
PvdA, indicated that he would have preferred a ‘constitution’ ‘in which 
the rights and duties are clearly expressed’.749 A constitution, Jurgens 
believed, would appeal more to the citizens of Europe than the not very 
consistent treaty text that had been produced now. According to him, 
this treaty was not much more than a pile of amendments referring to 
the previous treaties.
It is an interesting remark, since Jurgens was the first to bring up 
the concept of a European constitution in parliament as if it concerned 
a feasible objective within the actual political reality of the integration 
process. With his observation that a constitution would have been a 
preferable step, Jurgens referred to the plans of Spinelli and Colombo 
of the 1980s, which in his view had been a useful initiative in that 
direction.750 His remarks show that he perceived the reality of European 
integration to have developed to such a level that it legitimised a 
coherent constitution. This, what could be called, ‘constitutional 
awareness’ of Jurgens, remarkably, connected him to some of the fiercest 
political opponents who turned out to hold similar constitutional 
associations with the new treaty and the state of the integration process. 
Their argument, however, took an opposite turn. Whereas Erik Jurgens 
longed for a formal European constitution to come into being, as far as 
the gpv was concerned, from a material point of view, the Maastricht 
Treaty was just that. The Christian-reformed party judged the Treaty 
to be ‘nothing less than a fundamental constitutional revision of the 
European Community.’751 The comment shows that this party already 
interpreted the European legal order as a constitutional order, and 
– consequently – the new treaty as an essential adaptation to it. Without 
expressing itself explicitly in favour or against the Treaty of Maastricht, 
the gpv wondered whether parliament realised that with the request for 
approval of the text, the States-General of the Netherlands were asked 
to take one of the most important decisions of the political history 
of the country. ‘For, much more than is the case now, adopting the 
treaty and the included competences and the far more comprehensive 
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Community law, will be constituent for the national political 
organisation of our country.’752
The Protestant-conservatives of the gpv, sgp and rpf, 
disapproved of the intention to develop a common policy on what they 
judged to be ‘subjects touching on identity’ such as education, culture 
and healthcare.753 Since these parties saw no ‘material demand’ – a 
‘zakelijke vraag’ – for such forms of common policy, they were of the 
opinion that the European Union overreached its raison d’être with 
the Treaty of Maastricht.754 As they had always done, these parties 
sharply contrasted forms of economic integration, which they believed 
would indeed benefit the Netherlands to all other forms of integration 
that transcended this objective and, by consequence, gnawed at the 
political sovereignty of the Netherlands. They remained true to the 
presupposition that a sharp distinction between economic and political 
integration was possible and that integration in the field of economy did 
not necessarily have to spill over to the field of politics. 
Contrasting their view with that of the political advocates of 
progressive European integration who, with European integration 
progressing, seemed to feel the need for including more and more 
policy areas, it can be observed that ‘the true character’ of the process 
of European integration – i.e. its objective, functioning, chances, 
limitations, etcetera – was still essentially contested on the conceptual 
level. A European Union was coming into being, but what it was and 
exactly implied, no one in parliament completely comprehended. 
The involvement of Europe in educational matters in particular, 
led to protest with the Protestant-conservatives. Due to the 
Schoolstrijd, earlier mentioned in this chapter, these parties strongly 
associated the policy field of education with their group identity as 
Dutch Protestants and the striving of this group for equal rights. They 
feared that the possibility of the European Union influencing the 
education programmes of the Member States might interfere with 
these historically acquired rights.755 Changes in the equal treatment 
of denominational schools and state schools as guaranteed by Article 
23 of the Dutch Constitution was especially feared. Senator Egbert 
Schuurman (rpf) drew attention to the possible endangerment of 
this special Dutch system: ‘Our order of public and denominational 
education is not met with elsewhere in Europe and for that reason 
Brussels may well overlook specific characteristics.’756 Notwithstanding 
the earlier described attempts of the Dutch cabinet in the explanatory 
memorandum to soothe these parties with regard to the scope of the 
objectives of the European Union in this field, the gpv, sgp and rpf 
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feared the consequences of European involvement for their singular 
position within the Dutch educational system. 
One of the other proposals in the Maastricht Treaty these 
parties especially disliked was the introduction of the emu. 
Monetary integration clearly signified a break with the concept of 
state sovereignty: ‘In the monetary field the Netherlands completely 
loses its sovereignty in an emu.’ With this step, so it was reasoned, 
the country would also lose control over the monetary policy it was 
committed to: ‘It is true that in return it gets some voice within the 
emu, but as a small country we will pull little weight there.’757 With 
this statement, the traditional thesis of the Dutch political mainstream 
that more integration would benefit the smaller countries, was – once 
again – attacked. 
In addition, the Protestant-conservative parties also expressed 
their concern on the implications of the introduction of the subsidiarity 
principle. They posed the question of who would determine what was 
exactly to be done by who. Whereas subsidiarity had been presented 
as an instrument to balance the competences of the European and the 
national level, they feared that eventually the notion might stimulate 
a further imbalance. When in political practice the term would be 
explained in accordance with the Roman-Catholic administrative 
interpretation – the doctrine from which the term stemmed originally – 
the sgp contended that the distribution of competences would be 
decided on the central level.758 This might have a centripetal effect, so 
it was argued, leading to an ever more powerful Union.759 For these 
parties the subsidiarity principle was a Trojan horse: ‘It is a centralistic 
principle with the appearance of the opposite.’760 
The reconcilability of the new treaty with the Dutch constitution 
was an issue that loosened tongues throughout parliament, with 
advocates and adversaries of the integration process alike. The 
contentions of Aalt Heringa et al in the Nederlands Juristenblad had 
caught on in parliament. Whereas cda, vvd and D66 only in the 
preparatory stage of the debate had asked the government to respond 
– in general terms – to the concerns of Heringa cum suis, the PvdA and 
GroenLinks took their time in expounding on their views. The PvdA 
emphasised that it considered a debate on the constitutionality of the 
Treaty highly important ‘lest afterwards the reproach may come that 
on approval insufficient attention has been paid to this question.’761 
It is a remarkable comment, since for a long time this party had not 
explicitly cared much for the constitutional concerns in parliament 
regarding new European treaties. Adding it to the constitutional 
remarks of Jurgens and the gpv, and the profound realisation following 
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from implementing Schengen that the process of European integration 
deeply interfered in the national domain in more and more policy 
areas, it shows a growing constitutional awareness within the Dutch 
parliament in relation to the process of European integration. 
Concretely, the PvdA entered into the constitutionality of the 
transference of monetary sovereignty to the European Union. The party 
saw an incompatibility, but a slightly different one from Heringa’s: 
‘ Our constitution is silent about the economic or monetary 
system to be adopted by the government. On the contrary, the 
budget right of the Chambers is expressly not limited in this 
regard. But the EMU-regulations of the Treaty and the relevant 
Protocols do limit it to a certain degree. Is this perhaps a question 
of infringement on a constitutional right, that is to say the right 
[of the States-General] to choose in freedom which economic and 
monetary policies must be pursued?’762
Whereas Heringa had based his contention on Article 106 of the Dutch 
constitution – i.e. the article that the government had also based its 
defence on in the explanatory memorandum – the PvdA grounded its 
question on Article 105. The article concerned the national right of 
parliament to approve the budget. 
GroenLinks also attacked the government’s view that the 
provisions of the Maastricht Treaty did not deviate from the Dutch 
Constitution. But this party followed Heringa’s analysis:
‘ the handing over of authority to the European Community on 
visa policy and on monetary policy is not in agreement with 
the Dutch Constitution, because in that it is laid down for both 
items, that the Dutch legislator must take care of these matters. 
At any rate that in the Dutch law the foundation must be laid for 
regulations and decisions on these items.’763 
The entering into force of the Treaty of Maastricht signified for 
GroenLinks that the Dutch legislator lost its decision making power 
in both policy areas and became the mere ‘executor’ of decisions taken 
in Brussels. For this reason, the party argued that approval of the 
treaty by a simple parliamentary majority in accordance with article 
91, subsection 1 of the Dutch constitution was not appropriate.764 It 
should be done – at the very least – by a qualified majority of the States-
General. However, approval of the Treaty through direct participation 
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of the Dutch people by means of a referendum was considered best. A 
motion to this end was proposed.765 
Apart from its relevance for revealing the constitutional way of 
thinking behind the attitude of the Dutch parliament in European 
affairs, this remark is noteworthy for another reason as well. For the 
first time in the Dutch history of the European project it was proposed 
to present a treaty on European integration to the Dutch people for 
approval. Whereas in other European Member States – Denmark and 
Ireland, for instance – constitutional traditions existed in which a 
popular referendum was an option, the Dutch constitutional tradition 
in which even parliament, as history had shown, preferred the shortest 
possible way when dealing with new European treaties, was miles 
away from an approval procedure in which the nation’s citizens would 
be directly involved. Since 1797, the Netherlands had not witnessed a 
national referendum.766 In this regard, the suggestion of GroenLinks 
implied a clear break with almost two hundred years of constitutional 
thinking in general, and with the Dutch constitutional approach 
regarding European integration in particular. 
This was exactly what the party aimed at. Now that European 
integration affected the national domain in ever more policy fields 
to an ever greater extent, the party felt that the Netherlands should 
develop an approval procedure befitting the importance of the process. 
It shows the presence of a notion that European integration had 
developed to such an extent, that any further progress should be linked, 
somehow, to the will and voice of the Dutch people. The growing 
constitutional importance of Europe, so it seems to have been realised, 
needed a legitimisation, different from and beyond the one the Dutch 
constitutional procedures could offer. GroenLinks, not surprisingly, 
considering their aversion of progressive European integration, found 
support with the Protestant-conservative parties, even though, instead 
of a referendum, they preferred approval by a two-thirds majority in 
accordance with Article 91, subsection 3 of the Dutch Constitution.767 
Although for the parties of the political mainstream the 
introduction of a referendum – implying a break with their usual 
practice since 1953 – or requiring approval with a qualified majority, 
was still a bridge too far, these parties shared some of the concerns of 
GroenLinks and the Protestant-conservatives. The increasing imbalance 
between the ever greater influence of Europe and the open attitude 
of the Dutch parliament until then vis-à-vis the process of European 
integration contributed to concerns on the democratic relations within 
the European Union. A concern that was strong anyway, because the 
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Treaty of Maastricht did not bring the desired improvements in the 
structure of the European framework. 
Since the approval procedures on the sea and Schengen ii, 
the parliament had been held out the prospect of strengthening the 
democratic calibre of the integration process. Now that the Treaty 
on European Union was actually there, advocates and antagonists of 
progressive European integration were equally disappointed with 
the measures the treaty introduced in this respect. The parliamentary 
concerns mainly focused on the two intergovernmental pillars of 
cfsp and Justice and Home Affairs. Communautarisation of these 
policy areas had failed to materialise, which meant that the European 
Parliament would still not be able to democratically supervise decisions 
in these fields. The actual measures taken to enhance the involvement 
of the ep were judged to be not much more than empty shells. 
Complicated procedures in which proposals were to be sent back and 
forth between all separate European organs, led the parliamentarians of 
D66 to conclude that ‘the influence of the European Parliament [will] be 
hardly visible, because the procedures are so complicated.’768 
Now that on the European level sufficient restoration of – what 
was now called – Europe’s ‘democratic deficit’ failed to occur and 
Europe’s competences only increased, more and more Dutch MPs 
deemed it necessary for the national parliaments to get more intensively 
involved in the process of European integration.769 The gpv was 
rigorous in its judgment, stating that the Netherlands should get rid 
of the ‘undisputed axiom’ that reduction of the democratic deficit was 
only possible by extending the competences of the ep.770 The national 
parliament, it insisted, should claim the competences of democratic 
control that belonged to it.
The shift in the mindset of the Dutch parliament towards the idea 
that stronger democratic control was needed, as it had occurred in the 
process of approving Schengen ii, made itself felt again in this approval 
debate regarding the Maastricht Treaty. Similar to the Van Traa/De 
Hoop Scheffer amendment that had been passed in the process of 
approving the Schengen implementation agreement, an amendment 
increasing the involvement of the national parliament was also 
introduced with regard to the bill of approval of this treaty. It was an 
initiative of René van der Linden (cda), Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (cda), 
Erik Jurgens (PvdA) and Maarten van Traa (PvdA), but in the course 
of the debate vvd, D66, GroenLinks, gpv and sgp joined in.771 The 
amendment created a national democratic check on European decisions 
related to Justice and Home Affairs (Title vi of the Maastricht Treaty). It 
required approval of the Dutch parliament before the government could 
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approve a European decision that had come into being under this title. 
On 12 November, the Lower House adopted the motion.
The extension of the parliamentary control mechanism, 
introduced for the Schengen cooperation, to acts adopted under the 
third pillar of the Treaty of Maastricht signified that this well-nigh un-
Dutch measure of enhanced parliamentary control was now officially 
introduced in the process of European integration. Within Dutch 
diplomatic circles, the former civil servant in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Jaap de Zwaan, recollects that this development aroused dismay: 
‘ Foreign Affairs strongly disapproved of this: […] Schengen 
is intergovernmental, whereas the eu is a supranational 
layer of governance which does not allow the creation of too 
many national supervisory mechanisms. […] By doing so its 
effectiveness is hindered […].’772 
It illustrates the breach the amendment implied with regard to the 
old convention between Dutch diplomats and politicians that the 
national parliament would keep its hands off the process of European 
integration. It also shows that in diplomatic circles, characteristically 
for Dutch foreign affairs traditions, stronger parliamentary control was 
explained as going against the process of European integration instead 
of contributing to it. Looking back, De Zwaan declared in 2011: 
‘ We [within the Foreign Affairs Ministry] realised insufficiently 
that the Justice and Home Affairs pillar contained a number of 
emotive and politically sensitive subjects – the right of asylum, 
the right of immigration, fighting criminality – in which the ep 
was hardly involved […]. With hindsight I agree with that. But 
there you are again, you just hurtle on.’773 
The remark illustrates how in the Foreign Affairs mindset in these years, 
there was little room for considering the positive effects of stronger 
control of what was decided and happening on the European level. 
Stronger democracy was seen here as a problem, rather than a solution 
for the future of European integration. 
One of the reasons that the amendment was supported – even 
initiated! – by parties very much in favour of progressive European 
integration must be sought in the fact that, within these parties, the 
notion started to sink in that until then the national citizens had not 
displayed a great interest in, let alone enthusiasm for the process of 
European integration. On the contrary even. As far as a debate in the 
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wider Dutch society had developed, it was to an ever greater extent 
characterised by the presence of critical comments. As referred to earlier 
in this chapter, in the national public intellectual debate on European 
integration a current was developing that focused on national identity. 
Identification with Europe, by contrast, was lacking. Erik Jurgens 
(PvdA) considered this a problem. He argued in parliament that ‘the 
political integration requires […] identification with Europe’774 Similar 
to the MPs of GroenLinks, who called for a national referendum on 
the Maastricht Treaty, the PvdA thought the ever increasing level of 
European integration needed popular legitimisation, which could not 
be found within the familiar constitutional structures. The beginnings 
of the notion that a truly integrated European (constitutional) order 
needed popular legitimisation – the notion that resulted in the 
referendum of 1 June 2005 – was already present here.
This view was shared by others. Parliamentary-wide it was seen 
and acknowledged that outside the domains of politics and policy, 
Europe reaped scorn rather than praise. René van der Linden (cda) 
spoke of a ‘very large gap’ between European integration as it was 
looked at within the political domain and the way the citizens perceived 
it: 
‘ The remarkable thing is that we must conclude that many of the 
things causing us to be faced by great problems at the moment, 
such as the flood of aliens and capital crime, are laid down by the 
citizens at Europe’s door, whereas we [a majority in government 
and parliament] say: we can solve this by way of Europe’.775 
GroenLinks, most clearly, connected the alienation from Europe 
that seemed to be present among the Dutch citizens, to a solution by 
changing the approval procedure. Going with its own proposal for a 
referendum, the party claimed that only informing the Dutch people on 
the effects of Maastricht was too little: 
‘ […] explain, explain, and explain again! I still hear State Secretary 
Dankert saying it. But a treaty with major shortcomings as regards 
content will never convince […] Democratic control, social and 
ecological dimension, they are matters that concern people.’776 
If fear in the Netherlands existed of ‘a bigger association on which 
you have no hold, of an anonymous bureaucracy, far away, without 
a recognisable human face’ then this fear should find its way out by 
means of the explicit involvement of the people of the Netherlands 
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in the decision making process; i.e. by means of a referendum, if this 
party were to choose.777 Strikingly, again a link was expressed between 
further integration and popular legitimisation. 
From defence towards consensus 
In reactions to all the doubts and questions that the Treaty on 
European Union had raised in parliament, the government stuck to its 
familiar ways. It stressed once again that the process was good for the 
Netherlands and that – therefore – the new treaty deserved, just like 
the earlier treaties, parliament’s support. The topos of the Netherlands 
being a small country was again referred to. The Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Hans van den Broek, claimed particular benefits of further 
integration for such countries. The extension of decision making by 
qmv to increasingly more policy areas for instance, would benefit 
Dutch influence: ‘the votes of the smaller countries then […] carry a 
weight that is more advantageous than solely mathematically justifiable 
on the basis of the number of inhabitants.’778 
It was the old argument, based on the foreign policy conviction 
that since the start of European integration in the early 1950s had been 
one of the motivations for the Dutch stance in the process: on its own, 
the Netherlands would only be able to play a minor role, whereas the 
framework of European integration offered the country the setting to 
extend its influence beyond its territory. At the same time, however, 
this attitude implied that an essential characteristic of the process was 
ignored. In its persistence to see European integration as a form of 
international politics, the Dutch government failed to recognise that 
this process could – especially in the post-Maastricht era – no longer be 
seen as just that. With the sea approved, the Schengen process well on 
its way and the European Union on the verge of being founded, Europe 
extended its influence deeper and deeper into issues that had until 
then been cherished as the prerogative of the nation state. Monetary 
policy and calling into existence of direct legal relations between 
Europe and its citizens by means of the concept of Union citizenship, 
are only two examples. The implications of de facto establishing a 
European federation – the signing of the Maastricht Treaty was a further 
defining moment in this respect – for the Dutch state and its national 
interests were not clear in all respects. So, whereas the government 
kept founding its argumentation in favour of progressive European 
integration on old presuppositions, their realism could be increasingly 
called into question. 
The fact that the government displayed no eye for issues like the 
ones mentioned, even after it had introduced an even further-reaching 
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proposal than eventually signed in Maastricht, is indicative again of the 
blind spot that seemed widely present within the Dutch political elite, 
in which the unique and far-reaching implications of the European 
integration process were still overlooked. Of course, it must also be 
noted that the government had a particular interest in preserving the 
picture that European integration was not essentially different from 
other foreign policy objectives. It had a lot of freedom to lose in its 
acting on the European stage if it would confirm parliament in its 
concern on European integration having progressed to such an extent 
that stronger parliamentary, let alone, popular control was necessary. 
Therefore, downplaying the importance of the treaty and the changes 
it introduced, was from the perspective of political strategy, the 
convenient thing to do. 
This consideration might very well have been at the root of the 
Lubbers ii administration’s performance in the plenary debate on the 
Maastricht Treaty. Here, the government was vague on the future 
objective of European integration. When asked where this Treaty on 
European Union would eventual lead to, the government did not come 
with a clear answer. Minister Van den Broek, for instance, said about the 
path of integration ‘[…] the final stage or the ultimate model, is open for 
us.’779 In the run up to Maastricht, Prime-Minister Ruud Lubbers was 
even more superficial in his description of the future: 
‘ What exactly is that political union? I myself think it a rather 
ambitious word. […] It is a kind of process you are working on in 
a certain phase. I would like to emphasise this process-character. 
[…] I think we should not be occupied with the description of the 
final phase […].’780 
Given the new political climate, in which concerns as to the future were 
increasingly clearer expressed by an increasing number of parties, it is 
likely that political opportunism was the basis for turning a blind eye to 
the ultimate consequences of the path that had been entered. Or as Hans 
van den Broek himself – maybe even more sincerely than he intended – 
put it: ‘The clearer you want to make the line, the greater the chance 
that Europe will not come about.’781 As if he claimed that being too 
explicit on where the process would lead, especially in this new, decisive 
phase, was only likely to mobilise opposition. Admittedly, it can also be 
assumed that the government itself was not genuinely able to exactly 
predict how matters were to develop after the entering into force of the 
Treaty of Maastricht. More than it presumably realised, the government 
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strongly depended on the will and wishes of the other Member States; a 
group that was only to grow in the next couple of years. 
Not surprisingly in the light of the purport of the explanatory 
memorandum and the general tendency of the government to 
downplay the implications of the treaty, it trivialised the constitutional 
implications of approval. Again, the interpretation applies that this 
was to the political benefit of the government, which worked towards 
a quick approval of the treaty. With regard to the typically Dutch 
principle of freedom of education as laid down in Article 23 of the 
Dutch constitution, the cabinet pointed out that Article 126 and 127 of 
the Maastricht Treaty strongly confined the competences of the Union 
by binding it to fully respect the responsibility of the Member States 
in this field. It was added moreover, that on the basis of the indicated 
provisions, the Union received no regulating competence: ‘only the 
possibility of taking incentive measures is offered.’782 Therefore, the 
national constitutional guarantees protecting freedom of education 
in the Netherlands would ‘in no way’ be affected. The government, 
however, remained silent on how it would be able to guarantee 
this. With the future of European integration being unclear and the 
piecemeal dynamics of the process in mind, the long term value of such 
guarantees was rather uncertain. In the political reality of November 
1992 it was only relevant that parliament would accept the argument for 
the time being. 
With regard to Article 106 of the Dutch constitution, – the article 
that stated that the monetary system is provided for by an Act of 
Parliament – the government judged that the conclusion of Heringa and 
GroenLinks concerned ‘national legal competence regulations which 
are not in the way of the assignment of competences by virtue of Article 
92 of the Constitution.’ When interpreted in line with ‘the system 
of the Constitution and the whole history of the coming about of the 
provision’, the government stated that this conclusion was the right 
one.783
In the argument it remained unclear what the Dutch government 
actually defined as the history of the coming about of the Dutch 
constitution and how the preferred interpretation was legitimised on 
the basis of which historic constitutional episode exactly. However, 
the argument was rhetorically useful since it suggested an unequivocal 
intention behind the Dutch constitutional system that was conducive 
to the progress of the process of European integration. In fact, the 
argument shows that the tradition of constitutional openness had 
become a topos in itself, on the basis of which the government was able 
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to defend further stretching of the Dutch constitution at any convenient 
moment. 
With respect to the concern of the social-democrats that because 
of the emu the Dutch political community was no longer able to freely 
choose its national economic and monetary policies, the government 
commented that there were no grounds for that fear as long as the 
Maastricht Treaty was constitutionally approved according to article 
91, subsection 1: ‘Government and States-General also retain in that 
case their constitutional competences in the fields mentioned, such 
as determining the budget by virtue of article 105, part one of the 
Constitution.’784 It was added that it was to be expected that, after the 
entering into force of the Treaty of Maastricht, it would be possible 
for parliament to make new choices when exerting its competences in 
economic and monetary policy. But, the government assured, ‘such a 
development has not a harmful effect on constitutional rights but fits 
within the framework of the Constitution.’785 
Although the analysis of the government might have seemed 
tenable at the time, again the question is justified how it could 
guarantee that an intrusion into the fundamental rights of the Dutch 
parliament in budget matters would not happen in the future as a 
belated and unforeseen consequence of the Maastricht Treaty? With 
today’s knowledge, it is clear that the government could not give such 
guarantees. The Eurocrisis eventually moved elements of the various 
national parliamentary budget rights to the European level of decision 
making and – who knows now? – more will follow. However, in 
1992 the Euro was not a reality yet and comprehending how the emu 
provisions would exactly work out was no sinecure. Seen from that 
perspective, the government was free to give promises at their own 
discretion. 
In the discussion on the constitutionality of the Maastricht Treaty, 
an additional argument in favour of approval was sought and found in 
the Brinkhorst motion, adopted in the process of revising the Dutch 
Constitution in the early 1980s.786 It stated ‘that in case of doubt the 
provisions of the Constitution should be explained in such a way that 
they do not obstruct the European integration process.’787 Having been 
adopted without much debate in the national parliament, the political 
significance and usefulness of the motion only became clear with the 
approval of the Treaty of Maastricht, where it offered the government 
an elegant argument to end the discussion on the constitutionality of 
the Treaty. It made further debate on the relation between the Treaty 
of Maastricht and article 106 of the Dutch Constitution in essence 
redundant.
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What all arguments of the government on the constitutionality 
of the Treaty of Maastricht had in common was that they built on 
the old consensus that the Netherlands should be as open as possible 
towards the process of European integration. This consensus, in its 
turn, had its roots in the conviction that the process was needed to 
secure the economic and security interests of the Netherlands. What 
the arguments did not reckon with was that, now that the process 
had entered a new phase, one in which the sweeping consequences 
of European integration started to make themselves felt more and 
more noticeably, the issue of democratic legitimacy of the process 
– in terms of the involvement of parliament and national citizens – 
inevitably presented itself as a theme and was to become of increasing 
importance. It was exactly this issue that, in 1992, started to put the old 
constitutional consensus under pressure. 
Yet, in the course of the parliamentary debate it turned out that 
the old consensus was still strong enough in order not to endanger 
the approval of the Treaty on European Union. D66 supported the 
stance that the Brinkhorst motion made any further debate on the 
constitutionality of the treaty redundant.788 Erik Jurgens (PvdA) added 
that due to the revision of the Constitution of 1953, violation of the 
sovereignty of the Netherlands – as a consequence of the establishment 
of the emu and epu – was not at all related to a violation of the Dutch 
constitution: ‘So the emu violates our sovereignty – a somewhat 
mythical, 19th century national concept – but not our Constitution.’789 
He stressed the democratic legitimacy of the system by pointing out 
that a ‘an overwhelming majority’ had chosen for this system in 1953. 
Jurgens did not enter into the argument of Eimert van Middelkoop 
(gpv) that it was not necessarily logical to apply the way of thinking of 
1953 in 1992, since the historical circumstances in general, and the scope 
of the integration process in particular, had drastically changed since 
then.790 As objections of opponents of the Treaty remained restricted 
to the parties traditionally critical of progressive European integration 
– mainly the Protestant-conservatives and GroenLinks –, its approval in 
accordance with Article 91, subsection 1 was never in danger. 
Also in its reaction to the suggestion of GroenLinks to organise 
a referendum on the treaty, the government relied on the historical 
consensus on the interpretation of the constitution. It emphasised 
that the instrument of the referendum did not exist within the Dutch 
constitutional system.791 In addition, it explicitly called on parliament 
to ‘stick to our own culture and traditions’ in approving the treaty. 792 
It was a clever rhetorical anticipation of the growing focus on the 
preservation of national identity and traditions; a tendency that after 
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1990 had been spreading into the wider debate on European integration 
in the Netherlands.793 
The rhetorical strategy of the government to focus on preserving 
and following constitutional procedures was continued when it 
distanced itself from the Danish way of dealing with the approval 
of the Maastricht Treaty. After the negative outcome of the Danish 
referendum on the treaty on 2 June 1992, this country had asked for 
specific safeguards regarding the emu and the continued existence 
of Danish citizenship next to the introduction of the European 
citizenship. On 11 and 12 December the European Council had 
deliberated on this in Edinburgh, in order to give Denmark the 
guarantees it needed to present the Treaty a second time for approval to 
its people. On this course of events, Lubbers remarked: 
‘ That country wants to deal with the treaty in a specific way: very 
carefully. […] In that country the citizens are apparently very 
worried about the meaning of the treaty.’794 
With this remark, Lubbers widened the distinction between the 
Netherlands and Denmark in their dealing with European integration, 
and implied that the Dutch government was not willing to let in doubts. 
Lubbers’ remark on Denmark shows that he and his administration paid 
no particular attention to the growing concerns within Dutch society. 
If it rested with the Dutch government, the Netherlands, a traditionally 
reliable country when it came to European affairs, would not engage 
in – what was referred to in Dutch diplomatic circles as – ‘Danish 
commotion [in Dutch: Deense toestanden].’795 
Illustrative for how the Netherlands was keen on avoiding a 
delaying fuss in the approval procedure of Maastricht, is the recollection 
of the former Director-General of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Ronald van Beuge. After the summit of Edinburgh of December 
1992, he, together with his services and in close contacts with their 
German equivalents, drafted a declaration for their respective national 
parliaments in order to convince these institutions that, despite the 
extra Danish guarantees, a new approval procedure was not necessary in 
the Netherlands and Germany: ‘[it is] important to note that the Danish 
prime minister Schlüter has confirmed to be of the opinion, together 
with the other governments, that the arrangements made, do not entail 
alterations of the Maastricht Treaty on any issue.’796 
Also with regard to the rejection of a referendum, the arguments 
of the government found consent with the parliamentary majority. In 
a fairly early stage of the approval procedure, Joost van Iersel (cda) had 
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already commented that ‘there was no reason whatsoever to get excited 
about the Maastricht Treaty.’797 As far as he could see, the approval of 
the Treaty was to proceed according to the Dutch practice: ‘On the basis 
of our Constitution and the consequential legal provisions we are going 
to proceed the way we have been used to.’798 The vvd and PvdA agreed 
with this view. So, in spite of the growing dissension, when all was said 
and done, these parties stuck to the business as usual approach they had 
been familiar with since the early 1950s.
Interestingly, even general and widespread democratic concerns 
in parliament do not seem to have been taken too seriously by the 
government. The Lubbers administration felt the democratic deficit to 
be exaggerated by parliament: 
‘ Now that the subject is democracy, I have to say that I am 
definitely somewhat annoyed at the quickly uttered wording that 
the voters have not been able to give their verdict or do not give a 
verdict. Is that really true? I refer to the election programmes of 
our political parties. Do they not include the course they want to 
adopt in Europe?’799
The Minister of Finance, Wim Kok (PvdA), reminded parliament that 
it still had a final say in approving the Treaty of Maastricht: ‘On the 
merits the States-General here and now have the final say […]’800 It was 
a somewhat defiant statement, challenging parliament to put its money 
where its mouth was , i.e. to break the old consensus on the desirability 
of progressive European integration, in case their concerns were too 
great. 
Remarkably, but maybe because it realised that after Schengen 
ii parliament was not to be easily put off this idea, the government 
indicated not to have any fundamental objections against an 
amendment resembling the Van Traa/ De Hoop Scheffer amendment. 
Whereas it judged prior permission of parliament in case of treaties to 
be at odds with the ‘constitutional division of tasks between parliament 
and government’, it said there were no objections on their side against 
such prior permission in case implementation agreements following 
from the treaty were concerned.801 
In conclusion, as with all earlier treaties on European integration, 
the advice of the government to parliament was to approve the Treaty 
of Maastricht. Old promises and spectres were revitalised in order 
to convince parliament of the importance of approval. Progressive 
European integration in general was once again characterised as a ‘a 
necessary good’.802 Rejection of the treaty was depicted as heralding 
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catastrophes. Prime-minister Lubbers reached deep in his rhetorical 
purse when speaking of ‘substantial risks’ and ‘substantial arrears’ that 
would befall the Netherlands ‘when it is going to be again every man 
for himself.’803 He warned of ‘renationalisation and depreciation.’804 
Referring to the extensive interests of the Netherlands abroad, Foreign 
Minister Van den Broek argued, that without the treaty it remained to 
be seen whether the country would be able to ‘throw its weight into the 
scale and to make its influence felt with which we can indeed reach our 
goals.’805 Both reactions are similar in that they presented the rejection 
of the Treaty of Maastricht as ruinous for the wider Dutch interests in 
an international context.
Typically, despite the many complaints and objections that 
had been uttered, also by the parties of the political mainstream, 
when it came to the crunch, these parties still supported the view 
represented by the government. Erik Jurgens (PvdA) pointed out that 
‘disintegration’ as a consequence of rejection of the Treaty ‘would be 
highly undesirable’, especially in the circumstances of the early 1990s, 
with the new free states in the eastern part of the continent waiting 
for accession.806 In order to enforce his argument, Jurgens chose to use 
a heavy rhetorical weapon: ‘Let Europe not suffer the fate of our own 
Republic of the Seven United Provinces.’807 By applying this historical 
analogy of the decline of the Dutch republic in the 17th century, he called 
to mind the spectre of the country losing its wealth and influence – once 
again – in case the process of European integration would fail. In other 
words, approval of the treaty was equated with a prosperous European 
nation in a prosperous European continent, whereas rejection of the 
document was associated with the decline of the Netherlands and 
Europe as a whole. 
The cda as well framed approval of the Treaty of Maastricht 
as a precondition for keeping both Europe and the Netherlands on 
their feet, for ‘stagnation in a unification process means decline.’808 It 
was the introduction of the metaphor of the cyclist that should keep 
pedalling in order not to fall. In answer to the question of sgp senator 
Driekus Barendregt whether it would not be better to perceive a united 
Europe in terms of a convoy of twelve vessels, instead of one ship 
with twelve captains, Rinse Zijlstra (cda) pursued the war analogy by 
saying: ‘Suppose it depends on his [Barendregt’s] decision if this bill 
is rejected or not’, Zijlstra started, ‘[…]Would he today then shoulder 
the responsibility to vote against the treaty, knowing that the convoy, 
like in the Second World War, would be scattered and consequently be 
torpedoed one by one?’ 809 
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In this line of argumentation, similar to the historical analogy that 
Jurgens applied, failure of the Treaty of Maastricht was directly put 
in line with failure of the process of European integration as a whole. 
It was a convenient choice for the advocates of the treaty, who had 
an interest in stressing the great importance of its approval. With its 
opponents, however, this representation led to resistance. Especially 
GroenLinks – the political party that regarded itself, in principle, 
positively inclined towards European integration but cherished 
strong objections with regard to the Maastricht Treaty – reacted with 
irritation. ‘The question “Maastricht: yes or no?” is prematurely and 
unnecessarily made into “Europe: yes or no?”’810 The members of the 
party indicated that they wished not to be placed in that dilemma.811 The 
party had fundamental concerns on the democratic relations within the 
Union in the making and was of the opinion that with the signing of the 
Treaty of Maastricht the government had broken the promises that it 
had made in this respect with the approval of the sea: 
‘ Certain central things that should have been settled at last, which 
we were promised in 1986 already, have not been settled. That 
must not be dismissed by saying that if you do not support the 
treaty, a full-blown disaster is in the making.’812 
The party concluded soberly: ‘If the treaty should not come about, there 
will be a new start. It will be two more years before there is a new treaty 
indeed, but there will be one after all.’813 In line with this argument, 
GroenLinks decided to reject the Treaty of Maastricht. 
The party was right in its observation that the causal relation 
between rejection of the Treaty of Maastricht and the demise of Europe 
was not elaborated on by the advocates of approval. They had used it 
as a topos; an old commonplace on which consensus on the need for 
progressive integration could be built. The fact that the argument did 
not work for the, in principle, moderately pro- European integration 
party of GroenLinks can be seen as an early indication that this topos 
was becoming outworn. It reflected the cracks that had slowly, but 
clearly, appeared in the traditional widespread consensus on progressive 
European integration as it had characterised the Dutch political domain 
since the early 1950s. 
On 12 November 1992, the Dutch Lower House cast its vote on the 
Treaty on European Union. With the cda, PvdA, vvd and D66 voting 
in favour, it was adopted whereas the other parties rejected it. On 15 
December 1992, the Treaty was adopted in the Upper House without 
a vote. It led Ina Brouwer, the leading lady of GroenLinks in the Lower 
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House to conclude that the liberal merchant had beaten liberal Lady 
Justice.814 When confronted with a choice between keeping up with the 
international partners or strictly maintaining democratic principles, a 
majority of the Dutch political community still gave priority to the first 
option. 
5.4  Stuck between Widening and Deepening: 
New Accessions (1995)
With the entering into force of the Treaty of Maastricht in January 1993, 
a period of preparation for new treaty negotiations began. Article N, 
subsection 2 of the treaty stipulated that in 1996 an intergovernmental 
conference was to be summoned in order to further develop the issues 
that could not be settled in Maastricht. Before such a treaty revision, 
however, another priority had to be dealt with: new candidate members 
were waiting at the door. 
The requests for the accession of Austria, Sweden, Finland and 
Norway had already been filed in the run up to the entering into force 
of the Treaty of Maastricht.815 But because the Twelve had feared 
endangerment of their objective of deepening the integration process 
at the time, going into these requests had been delayed. Now that the 
European Union had come into being, the project of expanding the 
Union got attention again. It was even considered convenient to get 
the accession done before the new igc would lead to an amendment of 
the Treaty on European Union. Thus, the new Member States could be 
presented the ‘completed’ acquis as had been agreed on in Maastricht, 
before it was reshuffled again in a new round of negotiations. After a 
positive advice of the European Commission (20 April 1994) and a vote 
in favour of the accession by the European Parliament (4 May 1994), 
the Council of Ministers agreed on the accessions on 16 May 1994. 
Subsequently, on 24 June 1994, the agreement between the eu and the 
four candidate members was formally signed. 
The position of the government
In September 1994, the first cabinet led by the Social-Democrat Wim 
Kok (1994-1998), presented the bill of approval for the accession of the 
four new members to the Dutch parliament.816 It asked parliament to 
approve it in accordance with the traditional procedure of Article 91, 
subsection 1 of the Dutch constitution. Similar to the earlier rounds of 
accession in 1973, 1981 and 1986, the government stressed the positive 
consequences of the accession for the Netherlands. With the new 
Member States being considered northern countries with kindred 
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views on important political issues, the accessions were expected to 
benefit the Netherlands in terms of economy and political-strategic 
position. First of all it was contended that, due to the expansion 
northward, the Netherlands would find itself in a geographically 
central position, which was likely to be to the advantage of the export 
possibilities of the Netherlands.817 Secondly, the government reckoned, 
since the new Member States would, similar to the Netherlands, 
belong to the group of smaller and middle-large countries of the 
Union, the political importance of this group within the Union would 
grow. Concretely the government argued that after the accession the 
Netherlands would stand stronger in its political wishes regarding trade 
policy with eastern Europe, European development cooperation and 
European environment- and health policies.818 
The arguments reveal that the Dutch government, like in former 
days, before the Mediterranean states of Greece, Spain and Portugal had 
joined the European Communities, again tended to think of Europe 
in terms of a northern and a southern part, with both having distinct 
characters and interests. In this dichotomy, the new Member States 
were, together with the Netherlands, classified as belonging to the 
northern part. The exact differences between these countries, their 
views on international politics and their interests were not identified. 
It is telling for how the government tended to see the process of 
European integration to be about interests and alliances – it essentially 
still viewed the process as a foreign affairs undertaking – instead of 
(also) analysing how these markedly different countries, with their 
own histories and constitutional orders would fit into the contours of 
one, unified European federation. Austria, for example, had recorded 
permanent neutrality in its national constitution in 1955.819 How such 
a constitutional starting point related to plans for developing a unified 
European defence was not considered by the government. 
The Council of State made up for this tendency of looking at the 
matter one-sidedly by putting question marks at the beneficial effects 
of the accessions for the Netherlands. By drawing attention to the 
long experience that these candidates had with intergovernmental 
cooperation and their lack of experience with the supranational model 
of European integration, the Council claimed that the net result of the 
accession might well be the enhancement of the intergovernmental 
current within the Union. Such a development, the Council pointed 
out, might complicate decision making in the Union and was moreover 
‘at odds with the Dutch tradition of striving for the coming about of a 
communautarian structure.’820 
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Debate in parliament 
Among the MPs of the PvdA, cda and D66 such effects of the 
expansion were considered negative for the ideal of a supranational 
Europe, an objective these parties had consistently strived after. If the 
contentions of the Council of State made sense, then the expansion 
signified getting into an awkward predicament between their 
traditional conviction that the Union should not develop into a closed 
fortress on the one hand, and the chances of reaching the ultimate goal 
of a supranational Europe on the other. That is why the main theme of 
the parliamentary debate got concentrated on the question of expansion 
versus deepening of the Union. 
Following the Council of State, advocates and opponents of 
progressive European integration alike wondered whether a ‘federal 
Europe’ would still be viable after the accession of the four new 
members or if this aim would be a thing of the past then?821 cda and 
D66 in particular wondered whether it would actually be realistic to 
expect that the new Member States would adjust themselves to the 
supranational way of decision making.822 Especially with regard to the 
development of a common cfsp, the parties doubted the feasibility 
of reaching agreements after the new countries had acceded. Or in 
the words of the mp Bob van den Bos (D66): ‘Communautarisation of 
foreign policy […] seems, with the new expansion, farther away than 
ever.’823 With regard to defence, similar comments were made. André 
Rouvoet, mp for the rpf, wondered how the Austrian constitutional 
principle of ‘immerwährende dauernde Neutralität’ was to be reconciled 
with the accession of the country to the military cooperative body of 
the Western European Union and the aim of the European Union to 
come to a common security policy.
From defence towards consensus
The reaction of the government to these questions can be popularly 
characterised by trying to keep the holes plugged. It was stressed that 
only the accession was stake. The deepening of the Union was a concern 
for the future, which would only come under discussion again when the 
negotiations on a new treaty would take place in 1996.824 With regard 
to the Austrian constitutional neutrality, the State Secretary charged 
with European Affairs, Michiel Patijn (vvd), tellingly remarked that this 
neutrality principle had its roots in the Cold War setting. Now that the 
East-West relations had changed, the message rendered to the Dutch 
parliament was that the neutrality issue might well be less of a political 
obstruction for Austrian accession.825
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More than anything, this viewpoint shows how the Dutch 
governmental elite tended to see constitutional restrictions: as 
obstructions for political objectives, which might be removed in 
due course. Soothingly, the government furthermore referred to the 
‘sophistication and the political tradition’ of the ‘Nordic countries’ 
in taking a constructive stance in matters of foreign policy and could 
therefore be trusted to show a positive attitude concerning Europe. 
Thus, in line with how earlier governments had dealt with the threat of 
diversification of the integration process, the government again tried to 
rhetorically iron out any perceived differences between the Netherlands 
and at least three of the four candidate members. 
Also in line with the earlier accessions, the antagonists of further 
integration positively welcomed the complications for the process of 
deepening European integration that might follow from the expansion. 
Indeed, they did not wish deeper integration at all. Moreover, they 
welcomed the new round of accessions from an identity point of 
view. After the accession of the Catholic Mediterranean countries, 
the accession of the four candidates was – to the satisfaction of these 
parties – perceived to shift the balance towards a more Protestant 
character of Europe.826 Since these parties had always preferred 
widening to deepening, there was no dilemma for them; they would 
vote in favour of the accession. 
The advocates of progressive European integration had to vote on 
the matter in favour, despite the tension they saw emerging between 
widening and deepening of the Union. The debate does not reveal 
much on the arguments that led these parties to vote in favour despite 
the downsides that were foreseen. After the noncommittal response 
of the government, not even a second term was asked by the MPs. It is 
an indication that notwithstanding their concerns, the parties of the 
political mainstream had made up their mind on the accession of the 
four candidates already before the parliamentary debate took place. The 
traditional loyalty of these parties to European treaties already signed 
by the government, is likely to have played a role here. Just like the 
political tradition of voting in favour of an open Europe and the fact 
that – different from the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal – no 
fundamental identity problem was seen with regard to the accession 
of these countries, which, in terms of preferences and interests, were 
believed to match the Netherlands relatively well. 
On 17 November 1994 the Dutch Lower House decided positively 
on the third accession since 1973, without a voting by call.827 Approval 
in the Upper House followed on 13 December. Here, the Act was 
adopted even without a preceding debate.828 In between the approval of 
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the Dutch Lower and Upper House, a negative result of a referendum in 
Norway (28 November 1994) decided that this country would withdraw 
itself from the process of accession. On 1 January 1995, Sweden, Finland 
and Austria became the latest members of the European Union; a Union 
of fifteen countries then. For the time being, the tension present with 
a parliamentary majority, between widening and deepening of the 
union had been neutralised again. The question was: for how long? 
The European Union was about to move on again in terms of policy 
harmonisation. Sooner or later, identity issues would become topical 
again. 
5.5  Concerns Growing Ever Deeper:  
The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997)
On 17 June 1997 the heads of state and government of the fifteen 
European Members States, prepared for yet another historic event 
in the history of European integration. In Amsterdam – again the 
Netherlands had the privilege of hosting the event as President of 
the European Council – they met for a two day summit intended to 
reach a new political agreement after two years of preparation and 
negotiation. A common approach in issues such as the eastward 
expansion of the Union, the further development of the emu, the 
fighting of international crime and terrorism and the restoration of 
the ecological equilibrium were the subjects of the summit. Moreover, 
the institutional basis of the Union was to be further developed and 
improved. 
On 18 June the representatives of the governments of the fifteen 
Member States reached an agreement on the draft of a new treaty. On 2 
October 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam was eventually signed.829 The 
agreement was an amendment of the Treaty on European Union and 
could therefore only be understood in relationship to that document. 
The Amsterdam Treaty has been criticised for indecisiveness on all the 
difficult issues.830 The problem of how to reconcile future deepening 
and widening, the composition of the European Commission in an 
ever larger Union and the extension of qmv of decision making to more 
policy areas, were important institutional issues that, again, were put 
off to a later moment. 
The new Treaty did bring important changes, however, in the 
field of involvement of the ep. After the coming into force of the 
treaty, the European parliament became co-legislator in, for example, 
the fields of environment, foreign aid and social policies. Moreover, 
Article F, subsection 1 of the Treaty on European Union,831 which had 
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already contained a reference to the fundamental rights as guaranteed 
by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (1950), was altered in the sense that the second 
subsection of the provision assigned the Union the task to protect 
these fundamental rights. Indeed, protection of these rights had been 
acknowledged for a long time already by the jurisprudence of the ecj, 
but the introduction of the rule that respect for the principles as laid 
down in Article F was a condition for accession and the imposition 
of sanctions for grave and continuous violation of these rights, were 
important novelties.832 
In addition, the treaty added principles and responsibilities to 
the authority of the Union in the cfsp area. The ‘framework decision’ 
was introduced as a legal instrument to reach a minimum level of 
harmonisation between the legislation of the Member States in the 
fields of criminality and terrorism.833 Such framework decisions 
obliged the Member States to convert their content into the national 
legislation. Last but not least, the tasks of the Union in the field of the 
free movement of persons, asylum and immigration were transferred 
from the third (intergovernmental) pillar of Justice and Home Affairs to 
the first, supranational ec pillar. It was also decided that the Schengen 
acquis would be incorporated into the European Union. With these 
changes, the competences of the European Union, were again – slowly 
but steadily – enhanced. The changes in the fields of foreign, asylum and 
immigration policy contributed to an increasingly statelike character of 
the Union.834 
The position of the government
Because of its interest in getting the treaty approved, the presentation 
of the Dutch government focused on the successes of the negotiation 
process. In the explanatory memorandum, in reaction to the growing 
concerns on the democratic calibre of the integration process, it 
qualified the document as a ‘step forward to a more democratic, more 
vigorous Europe that had come closer to its citizens.’835 The government 
acknowledged that, although not much had been reached with 
regard to the institutional adjustments that were needed to expand 
the Union, the existing institutional framework had certainly been 
improved. In general terms, the government praised the improvement 
of the decisiveness. To this end the subsuming of the visa, asylum and 
immigration policies under the ec pillar was referred to.836 
Important was ‘the strengthening of democratic and legal control 
and of the principles of openness of government and of subsidiarity’ 
that the Treaty was said to bring.837 In concrete terms, the government 
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referred to the extension of the right of co-decision of the European 
Parliament.838 The treaty strengthened the role of the ep vis-à-vis the 
Commission and the Council and thus met the earlier objections of 
the Dutch parliament regarding the uncontrollability of the governing 
institutions of Europe. The further development of the subsidiarity 
principle was another change that the government emphasised in 
order to overcome the concerns in parliament regarding the element of 
democracy. It was stressed that Article 5 of Protocol no.7 of the Treaty 
gave ‘guidelines for judging if things can be done better on a European 
level than on the level of the Member States’839 With the explicit 
reference in this article to the ‘constitutional framework’ of the Member 
States, it was, according to the government, ‘implicitly admitted that 
the principle of subsidiarity may result in certain problems being best 
solved on a regional or local level.’840 A clear indication, possibly given 
in anticipation of concerns on an ever more powerful Union, that 
certain competences would continue to rest with the Member States. 
Also with regard to worries on the absence of involvement 
of the national citizens in the integration process, the government 
claimed that the Treaty of Amsterdam brought improvements. Via the 
new Union competences in the fields of employment, social affairs, 
environment and public health, the government claimed ‘the Union 
is brought closer to its citizens.’841 The more impact the Union had on 
the life of citizens, the closer it would be experienced by the citizens, it 
seems to have thought. That this correlation would not necessarily be 
positively experienced by the national citizens, was not considered at 
all. 
Similar to the presentation of the Treaty of Maastricht, the 
government stressed that it had informed parliament on the progress 
of the negotiations throughout the preparatory phase of the Treaty. 
Between November 1994 and February 1996, five different memoranda 
had been dedicated to briefing parliament on the plans for expansion 
of the Union, the development of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, cooperation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs, 
institutional reforms of the Union and its own priorities in the igc.842 
Moreover, the government explicitly pointed out that representatives 
of the European Parliament had taken part in the meetings of the 
Reflection Group and that in various instances the Council of Ministers 
and the various Ministers of Foreign Affairs had deliberated with 
delegates of this institution. 
The comments come across as attempts to remind and convince 
parliament of how democratically transparent the procedure leading to 
the Treaty of Amsterdam had been. They indicate that the government 
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was aware of the stronger focus of parliament on democratic procedures 
in the process of European integration. The Van Traa/De Hoop Scheffer 
amendment, as proposed in the Schengen ii approval procedure, and its 
successor in the process of approving Maastricht, had not fallen on deaf 
ears. 
Returning to an old, pre-Maastricht trend, the relation 
between the Treaty of Amsterdam and the constitutional order 
of the Netherlands was not given any specific attention. The Kok 
administration presented the document for approval via the standard 
procedure of article 91, subsection 1 of the Dutch constitution. 
This time, the Council of State had no objections.843 The Treaty of 
Amsterdam did not add competences to the Union directly affecting the 
Dutch constitutional order. The comment of the Council concerning 
the rather optimistic presentation of the government of the treaty – the 
Council was not sure that the Treaty would really bring the expected 
improvement in the (democratic) functioning of the Union – were 
never likely to form a serious barrier to getting the treaty approved in 
parliament. In the plenary debate the advice of the Council of State did 
not play any significant role.
Since the approval of the Maastricht Treaty, the viewpoints of 
the Dutch political parties had not changed fundamentally with regard 
to the process of European integration. The cda, PvdA and D66 still 
belonged to the vanguard of supranational thinkers. After Bolkestein’s 
turn in the earlier 1990s, the vvd did not express itself any longer in 
favour of a federal Europe, but the party did not have objections against 
supranationalisation in certain policy areas. GroenLinks had remained 
critical on European integration, in particular with regard to democratic 
aspects and typically ‘green’ themes such as environment, but did not 
reject the integration process itself. The Protestant-conservative parties 
(sgp, gpv, rpf) remained true to their anti-integration views and had 
meanwhile received support, albeit of a markedly different ideological 
background, from the ultra-left Socialist Party (sp) which, although 
established in 1972, had entered the Lower House not before 1994. 
Within this spectrum of parties and viewpoints, the balance still tipped 
in favour of the avowed pro-integration parties (cda, PvdA, D66), 
which held a 63,3% majority in the Lower House. Adding the 31 seats of 
the (coalition party) vvd, this majority was even 84%. Seen from the 
perspective of this political division, the government did not have to 
worry too much about the approval of the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
Individual public intellectuals and governmental advisory bodies 
in the Netherlands, however, were becoming increasingly critical of 
how the process of European integration was proceeding. In 1997, 
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the Dutch Advisory Council on International Affairs (aiv), a new 
independent advisory organ for the States-General, came with the view 
that ‘the lack of sufficient democratic control […] [remains] a serious 
defect in the institutional organisation of the Union.’844 The early 1990s 
public intellectual focus on national identity, moreover, had remained 
and the arguments of those that pleaded for dropping the ideal of 
supranational integration gained strength and public hearing.845 Pim 
Fortuyn, a sociologist and columnist who contended that the European 
order had to remain founded on independent nation-states, was to get 
more and more influence in the public debate and soon also in Dutch 
politics.846 Contrary to this tendency, the Dutch government wanted 
approval of a new, supranationalising treaty. 
A special constraint: the Securitel Affair (1997)
One particular constraint for the government in the approval debate 
in parliament was a question very much in the news and exposing the 
radical consequences of European integration for the national domain: 
the Securitel-affair. The affair, which can be marked as a firm reality 
check for the Dutch parliament on the effects of integration, had its 
origin in the Securitel judgment of the ecj of 30 April 1996. It had 
judged that national rules, of which the European Commission had 
not been given notice in accordance with the European Notification 
Directive 83/189, were not legally valid.847 More than a year later, in 
early June 1997, an article in the Dutch weekly Elsevier revealed that 
the state of the Netherlands had on a large scale omitted to meet the 
obligation set by this directive.848 It implied that numerous rules – three 
hundred and sixty-eight according to the first estimations – existed 
in the Netherlands that could, retrospectively, be judged invalid. This 
was feared to have severe implications for the legal certainty of Dutch 
citizens. Moreover, the issue showed an underlying problem: after fifty 
years of progressive European integration the Dutch legislative system 
was still not adequately equipped for effectively integrating European 
legislation into the national system. Although the negligence of the 
Netherlands had been noted before in diplomatic circles and even the 
Dutch parliament had known in general of the difficulties of keeping 
up with European directives since the 1980s, the publication in Elsevier 
was crucial for showing the legal scope and consequence of European 
integration and making them known to a wider public. 
On 11 June 1997, four days after the publication in Elsevier, the 
Lower House met. Then a hundred parliamentary questions on the 
matter had already been sent to the Dutch government.849 The political 
parties showed reactions of a similar nature in that they all regarded the 
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general pro-European stance of the successive Dutch cabinets since the 
1950s incompatible with what had happened with the implementation 
of the Notification Directive. One example of this is the comment of 
Van Middelkoop (then gpv) in which he summarised the surprise of 
many:
 
‘ Can the minister explain why, of all countries, a country like the 
Netherlands, which at the time belonged to the Europe of the six, 
that a country well-known for its legal traditions and which has 
always lived so close to Brussels, has obviously failed especially on 
this issue?850 
The parties were united in their judgment of the situation. Even the 
staunch Protestant-conservative antagonists of European integration 
cried shame on the government and the legal disorder that had emerged 
through this Dutch inattention: ‘rules are there to be observed, even 
if they are ec rules’851 It shows how widespread the image was shared 
of the Netherlands as a loyal partner in European integration and the 
extent to which the Securitel issue was perceived as a break with that. 
Not surprisingly, the parties wary of further integration seized the 
moments of disregard of the European rules of the various governments 
to, once again, stress the, what they perceived to be, undesired 
consequences of the integration process. The gpv, for example, 
emphasised:
‘ that the legislator increasingly runs the risk of being of no account 
[…], the Dutch judge in the last resort is no longer allowed to 
reach an independent judgment on legal questions concerning 
the reconcilability of national and community law and citizens 
have to be prepared that in an increasing number of cases there 
may be doubt about the legal validity of Dutch legislative and 
administrative measures.’852 
This line of argumentation led the party to conclude once again that 
the traditional axiom ‘that building that Europe coincides with serving 
the Dutch national interest’– for years on end employed by the Dutch 
pro-integration camp to defend the process of European unification – 
needed to be seriously nuanced.853 The Securitel-affair offered the 
perfect occasion for the opponents of further integration to point out 
the downsides of the process. And as such, it was also a perfect occasion 
of highlighting these to the wider public in the Netherlands.
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The cabinet and the parliamentary advocates of European 
integration alike, could not but admit that the Netherlands had been 
negligent, that the mistakes would be repaired and that the Securitel-
affair should be seized as a moment of awakening to a start of a process 
of improving harmonisation between the national and the European 
level. The Minister of Economic Affairs, Hans Wijers (D66), remarked 
that ‘In the sphere of legislation a sweeping change of culture […] still 
has to be made.’854 State Secretary of European Affairs Piet Dankert 
(PvdA) had concluded earlier ‘it just has to get through to the political 
culture, also in the departments, that laws cannot be made without 
looking at the same time at what is already present in Europe.’855 
Inspired by the consistent pro-integrationist attitude of the 
Dutch political majority, in the aftermath of the parliamentary debate 
on the Securitel-affair, a ‘repair operation’ was set up with the goal 
of containing and repairing the damage done and to prevent such a 
thing from happening in the future. A new coordination structure 
was established within the system of the Dutch ministries, in which 
the Interdepartmental Commission on European Law should keep 
track of the developments within the various departments. This one-
sided focus on repair, instead of fundamentally debating the extent to 
which the Netherlands desired the process of European integration 
to interfere with the (legal) sovereignty of the national judge and 
government, is illustrative for how the political majority in the 
Netherlands approached the process: the way it had done ever since the 
earliest European treaties. Instead of fighting further legal integration, 
the Netherlands preferred an attitude of compliance. It was the result 
of the strong conviction, even with the parties opposing European 
integration, that the Netherlands should stick to the European 
commitments it had entered into in the past and the belief with its 
political advocates that this would ultimately benefit the Netherlands. 
It is important to point out that the laxity of the Netherlands may 
in the first place also be attributed to the majority mindset on European 
integration. The tendency of the government of dealing with the 
process as a foreign affairs issue, benefitting the foreign affairs interest 
of the Netherlands, resulted in a general neglect of the implications of 
the process for the national domain; the legislative process in particular. 
This was ingrained even in how the Netherlands had decided in 1953 
to deal with the process from a constitutional perspective. Securitel 
made the consequences of this approach more visible and tangible than 
ever. The way the affair was dealt with within the political community 
is illustrative for how deep-seated the Dutch political traditions on 
dealing with European integration still were. 
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Only one week after the parliamentary debate on Securitel, 
the summit in Amsterdam took place. The parliamentary debate on 
approval of the Amsterdam Treaty was held against the background of 
complaints on the democratic aspects of the Union in the aftermath of 
Schengen and Maastricht, the public debate on European integration 
growing negative and the ‘repair operation’ that had been started after 
the Securitel-debate in parliament. 
Debate in parliament
The parliamentary reactions to the Treaty of Amsterdam were 
outspokenly critical. The text was generally qualified as highly complex 
– ‘150 pages of concrete’, incomprehensible for the citizens of Europe – 
and not in correspondence with the goals that had been expressed in 
advance.856 Over 400 parliamentary questions had been posed only 
in the run up to the plenary approval procedure of the treaty. Various 
MPs complained that little of the Dutch (supranational) objectives 
that had been set out in the preparatory memos had been realised.857 
A clear choice between the intergovernmental and supranational path 
was lacking. On the contrary, even within the framework of the Union 
elements of both these basic structures were to an ever greater extent 
mixed. It led various parliamentarians to the fundamental question: 
what was the process of European integration coming to?858
Much of the criticism on the contents of the treaty focused on the 
democratic calibre of the Union. In accordance with the promises of 
the government in the approval procedures of the sea and Maastricht, 
parliament had hoped for substantive improvements in the democratic 
relations within the Union. Indeed, with the Treaty of Amsterdam 
the ep became co-legislator in certain policy areas. However, whereas 
the competences of the Union in matters regarding Justice and Home 
Affairs (i.e. immigration and asylum) had been extended considerably, 
the ep had not been given additional competences in these crucial areas. 
This led parliamentarians to attack the element that the government 
had hailed as being the ultimate element of progress of Amsterdam: 
improvement in the democratic functioning of the Union.
The cda was unusually bold in its judgment. It emphasised 
that without full co-decision in the areas of justice and police affairs 
– policy fields that had been moved now to the first, supranational 
pillar – the power of the European Union as a whole, and of the 
European Council in particular, could not be democratically 
controlled on a European level. It considered this to be ‘contempt 
of the importance of parliamentary control.’859 The party drew its 
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conclusions: as long as the ep was not given the full right of co-decision, 
the national parliaments should take their responsibility. 
Suiting the action to the word, the mp Hans van den Akker (cda) 
proposed an amendment to the bill of approval that extended the 
right of the Dutch parliament to approve of draft-decisions – ‘before 
any decision-making on it takes place’ – in the fields of justice and 
police affairs; Title iiia of the Treaty of Amsterdam.860 In essence, the 
amendment was a new version of the Van Traa/De Hoop Scheffer 
amendment that had been introduced in the approval procedure of 
Schengen ii and adopted again – albeit in a somewhat different form – in 
the parliamentary debate on the Treaty of Maastricht.861 Just like these 
earlier amendments, the revision proposed by Van den Akker was 
aimed at controlling ‘the venom of the effect’ of the new treaty.862 It was 
unanimously adopted in the Lower House.863 It is a clear indication that 
the growing concern of parliamentary control was increasingly shared. 
Probably grown wiser by the Securitel experience, it is striking 
that various parties in the Lower House became more aware of the 
implications of the new treaty for the legal certainty of the Dutch 
people. Owing to that awareness, questions followed regarding the 
concrete legal consequences of the treaty provisions. The PvdA, for 
instance, together with the vvd and D66 had a question with regard to 
the introduction of the new legal instrument of European ‘framework 
decisions’. What were the consequences of not-converting their 
contents into the national legal order? ‘Can on this point action be 
taken by the Commission, the Council or another Member State? […] 
Can citizens derive rights from it? Could this be a question of unlawful 
action by the government by virtue of the omission of conversion?’864 
The questions boiled down to whether the Netherlands could be 
reprimanded by the European institutions for not converting European 
framework decisions, even if – following the national legal and 
constitutional order – the country was not allowed to change the rules 
as proposed by the eu. Ultimately, then, the question was if national 
citizens could appeal to a framework decision when a matter was taken 
to a Dutch court.865 
It should be observed that these questions did not fundamentally 
interfere yet with the old consensus among these parties that the 
Netherlands should stick to its constitutional openness. Following 
the line of judgement of the Council of State, parliament made not 
much of an issue of the constitutionality of the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
The suitability of approval in accordance with Article 91, subsection 1 
was never fundamentally contested. It shows that despite its growing 
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concerns regarding the democratic calibre of European integration, 
parliament still upheld the tradition of constitutional openness.
A difference with earlier approval procedures, however, was that 
to an increasing extent it was realised in parliament that this typically 
Dutch constitutional way of dealing with European integration was 
fragile now that the eu had grown into an impressive legal and political 
entity. This is illustrated by the following remark of a Professor of 
Constitutional Law, Erik Jurgens, who had become a senator for the 
PvdA in 1995:
‘ If I should go to the trouble to find out where in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam further sovereign powers of the Netherlands are 
conferred on European institutions, it might lead to discussions 
here on the question if that does not need a two thirds majority. I 
will not do that, but it does indicate that our dealings with Europe 
take place on an unstable basis’866 
The comment beautifully demonstrates the dilemma that was 
increasingly felt in parliament: letting progressive European 
integration pass loosely on considerations of political instrumentality 
or strengthening the grip by breaking with the tradition of 
constitutional openness. The dilemma followed from the basic paradox 
that characterised the Dutch position in the process of European 
integration: in order to survive the Netherlands needed to a merge into 
a supranational European union. It is relevant to mention that Jurgens’s 
comment forms the prelude to a plea for a stronger constitutional basis 
for dealing with European Treaties in the Netherlands, i.e. the explicit 
recording of the Dutch membership of the European Union in the 
Dutch constitution.867 
From defence towards consensus
In its reaction to the parliamentary questions and complaints regarding 
democracy, the government adopted a calming attitude and pointed to 
the future for the current dilemma’s to be solved. Again it claimed that 
with every new step in the process the institutional framework could be 
refined: ‘the treaty of Amsterdam is not a thing in its own right. It is part 
of a continual process of continuously building Europe, of constitution 
building. That process is continuing.’868 
It was an argument of succession, turned into the pragmatic 
mantra that the treaty currently at issue was not the end of the road 
and that shortcomings could only be repaired along the way towards 
further integration. The explicit use of the term ‘constitution building’ 
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is remarkable. It shows that the Dutch government felt secure to express 
that building Europe was essentially building a constitutional order. 
Although explicit federal-rhetoric was no longer employed, by referring 
to a European process of constitution building, the increasing statelike 
character of the European Union was thus recognised, approved of 
and – from a constitutive rhetorical point of view– also built further; an 
anticipation in various forms of a path that was about to be entered after 
Amsterdam. 
With regard to the concerns on the introduction of framework 
decisions, the Dutch government emphasised that these only legally 
bound the Netherlands in terms of an end goal: when the Netherlands 
would not reach the goal as had been set in the framework decision, the 
country failed to meet its obligations. Eventually, in case of such failure, 
it was conceivable that the European Commission or the Council would 
reprimand the Member State and/or would take it to the ecj. However, 
the government emphasised, since the framework decisions would not 
have direct effect, a national citizen would not be able to appeal to such 
a decision before a national court.869 
Following the process-character of European integration, the 
government emphasised that ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam 
could not wait. ‘First things first, ratification first and thinking 
meanwhile about the preparations for the following steps’, because, Kok 
claimed, ‘marking time’ would signify ‘a step backwards.’870 Again, the 
government linked its actions to the familiar (rhetorical) paradigm that 
moving on was good. Unlike in the years before 1980, but in line with 
the approval processes of Schengen and Maastricht, the importance of 
acting now was emphasised. Delaying matters was explicitly portrayed 
as harmful; an indication that the government felt the need for raising 
pressure in order to see its goal – treaty approval – to come within reach.
In parliament these creeds served their purpose. Notwithstanding 
their fundamental concerns, the parties of the political mainstream 
were still convinced of the absolute necessity of approving the Treaty 
of Amsterdam as soon as possible. True to the long existing mindset 
of the political majority regarding European integration, these parties 
saw the approval of the treaty as a historical imperative. Without any 
further rationalisation of where this sacred duty came from, D66 stated 
that ‘we must go on and on on the road we have taken since the war.’871 
Perseverance on the path towards a united Europe was also preached by 
the cda: ‘It was not finished yet and it is not finished yet. That is why 
we must go on building it […].’872 Since the end goal was not defined, 
the argument was empty but irrefutable at the same time. 
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On 5 November 1998, the PvdA, vvd, D66 and cda approved the 
Treaty in the Lower House. The opposition, by then consisting of the 
gpv, sgp, rpf, GroenLinks and the sp, could do little else but reconcile 
themselves to the adoption of this new European Treaty. But they 
expressed their disappointment clearly: ‘We are moving further again 
in the direction of Europe, without something substantial being done 
about the democratic deficit, the shortage of jobs, the social deficit.’873 
On 21 December, approval in the Upper House followed without a 
voting by call. The vote confirmed the ambivalent, two faced attitude 
of the political mainstream, already observed in the process of approval 
of Schengen ii. On the one hand, concerns on democracy had become 
widespread in parliament. On the other hand, those concerned – many 
of whom belonging to the parties traditionally supporting progressive 
integration – were wary of applying the emergency brake. Eventually, 
the political tradition of openness towards European integration 
prevailed again over the many doubts and questions. But with this 
decision, the fundamental questions were not answered and the doubts 
not dissolved. The more omnipotent the integration process grew, 
the more the limitation of this fundamental openness revealed itself. 
A development that came with ever more contention regarding the 
traditional majority mindset on European integration. A contention 





‘ We said ‘what’s in a name? A rose is a rose is a rose’ […] It looks like 
a treaty, the articles smell of a treaty. So what if somebody wants to 
stick ‘constitution’ on it. We did not realise that that would have such 
far-reaching consequences. At the time nobody did.’ 
 
Bernard Bot874 
6.1  Introduction 
When the Treaty of Amsterdam eventually entered into force in May 
1999, ideas for a new treaty, to be negotiated in a new igc, were again 
already forthcoming. With the expansion of the European Union, with 
again ten new, Eastern-European members scheduled for 2004, the 
fifteen eu Member States thought it wise to deal with the institutional 
issues not solved in Amsterdam.875 In February 2000 a new round of 
negotiations started, resulting in a new draft treaty in December of that 
same year. On 26 February 2001, the Treaty of Nice was signed by the 
Fifteen. 
Usually presented as a technical improvement of the Amsterdam 
Treaty, dealing with the ‘left overs’, aimed at the rearrangement of 
competences and procedures within the already existing framework 
of the Union and not requiring new transfers of national sovereign 
competences to the European level,876 the fundamental importance of 
the Treaty of Nice is easily overlooked. In fact, however, the signing 
of the Treaty opened the gates towards a new phase in the process 
of European integration – the search for finalising the process by 
formally constitutionalising it. In this regard, the Treaty of Nice was a 
first step towards what was to be the greatest constitutional moment 
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in the history of the European Union: the ratification of the Treaty 
Establishing a Constitution for Europe in 2005. 
Although the concept of a European ‘constitution’ or 
‘constitutional treaty’ was not mentioned in the Treaty of Nice, the 
document unmistakably displayed constitutional elements and offered 
chances for embarking upon the constitutional road in the aftermath 
of its signing.877 A first indication was the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights that was proclaimed in Nice, albeit not as an official, legally 
binding part of the Treaty. Its proclamation was the result of a decision 
of the European Council of Cologne in June 1999, to set in motion the 
process of drafting the eu Charter of Fundamental Rights. In its turn, 
this decision ensued from strong insistence of the German government 
to work towards a constitution for Europe, of which a human rights 
catalogue was – as many constitutions show – an essential part.878 
Interestingly, the more the process of European integration led 
into the direction of an autonomous European polity after the signing 
of the sea, the more careful the European leaders had become in 
linking it explicitly to developing a constitution. Nevertheless, after 
years of silence on a constitutional future, the post-Amsterdam era 
brought the call for a European constitution to the table again. This new 
‘constitutional urgency’ can be traced back to a speech of the German 
Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, delivered to the European Parliament 
on 12 January 1999, in which he called for a debate on the creation of a 
constitution for the European Union.879 Fischer’s call initially seemed 
to produce effect solely within Germany with contributions to the 
same effect of President Johannes Rau, opposition leader Wolfgang 
Schäuble, Minister of Justice Herta Däubler-Gmelin and various 
German academics. After his famous Humboldt Rede (15 May 2000), 
in which Fischer reconfirmed his ideal of federal political integration, 
based on a ‘Verfassungsvertrag’ or a constitutional treaty, the idea 
gained ground.880 
In early June, the Italian President Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, together 
with his German counterpart Johannes Rau, promised to ‘support 
efforts to design a constitutional framework for Europe’. Later that 
month, the French President Jacques Chirac, also expressed his support 
for the objective of a European constitution.881 In Nice, this agreement 
among the European leaders was reflected not only in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, but also in a ‘Declaration on the future of the 
European Union’ that was annexed to the Treaty.882 In the words of 
professor of European Union Law, Bruno de Witte, this declaration was 
‘another of these “rendez-vous clauses” which the Member States of the 
European Union agreed upon when adopting a reform of the European 
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Treaties: each time, the compromise is not entirely satisfactory to all, 
so the commitment is made to look again at some unresolved issues on 
a future occasion.’883 Witte here draws attention to the phenomenon, 
shown to be present more than once in this study, of the self-propelling 
dynamics of European integration, as an integral part of the process in 
order to guard its continuation.
In the Declaration, the eu Member States observed that, now 
that the Treaty of Nice had ‘opened the way to enlargement’ of the 
Union, the time had come to have ‘a deeper and wider debate about 
the future of the Union’ in which the European institutions should be 
involved, just like the representatives of national parliaments, those 
reflecting public opinion in political, economic and university circles, 
representatives of civil society, etcetera.884 The European Council in 
Laeken/Brussels, scheduled for December 2001, was to be the occasion 
for the adoption of a formal declaration that would contain initiatives 
for the continuation of the integration process.885 
The effectiveness of the ‘rendez-vous clause’ proved itself when 
on 15 December 2001 the Fifteen presented the Laeken Declaration that 
called for a Convention on the Future of Europe. This Convention was 
to pave the way for a new Intergovernmental Conference (igc) in 2004 
– another illustration of how the process propelled itself – and had to 
‘consider the potential key issues arising from the future development 
of the Union and try to identify the various possible responses.’886 
Concretely, the Convention was instructed to go into the matter of the 
division of competences within the European Union, simplification 
of the instruments of the Union and the question on how to increase 
the democratic legitimacy, transparency and efficiency of the existing 
institutions. The main feature of the Declaration was that it expressed 
the need to address the question whether the simplification and 
reorganisation of the instruments of the Union ‘might not lead in the 
long run to the adoption of a constitutional text.’887 The Convention 
needed to go into sub-questions on what the basic features of ‘such 
a constitution might be’ and on how to define the values which the 
Union cherished, the fundamental rights and obligations of its citizens, 
and the relationship between Member States in the Union?888
Admittedly, the Laeken Declaration did not explicitly authorise 
the Convention to draft a European Constitution. The final objective 
was left vague. It was most precisely instructed to produce ‘a final 
document’ consisting of ‘different opinions, indicating the degree 
of support which they received or recommendations if consensus is 
achieved.’889 National debates on the future of the European Union, 
together with this final document would then be taken as the starting 
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point for a new igc ‘which will take the ultimate decisions.’890 
But undeniably, with the Laeken Declaration, the ‘constitutional 
atmosphere’ that Fischer, Rau, Ciampi, Chirac and compatriots had 
been building since the late 1990s was turned into hard political action: 
a Convention was about to be summoned that would be assigned to go 
deeply into the formal constitutionalisation of the European Union. 
For the Dutch political and governmental elite in favour of 
progressive European integration this implied that the idea of the 
1950s – a European federation, based on a European constitution – for 
the first time in history seemed to come within reach. But in contrast 
with this old dream becoming ever more true, dissenting opinions in 
the Netherlands swelled, calling in question whether the ultimate step 
of formally constitutionalising the eu was really wise or desirable. 
The Dutch political mainstream, however, still did not plan to allow 
growing doubts and negative advice to be in the way of progress on the 
European stage. 
6.2  Postponing Hard Questions:  
adopting the Treaty of Nice (2001)
As pointed out above, the Treaty of Nice was primarily presented 
as to settle the remainders of Amsterdam, implying that a range of 
institutional points of contention were to be resolved by it. Effectively, 
the Treaty brought a series of institutional ‘improvements’ such as a 
new distribution of seats in the European Parliament, changes in the 
definition and application of the principle of qmv, the composition 
and appointment of the Commission, and the division of competences 
between the European Court of Justice and the Court of First 
Instance.891 Moreover, it laid down a procedure of enhanced cooperation 
setting the rules for Member States who wanted to go beyond the 
minimum level of cooperation in certain policy fields foreseen by the 
Treaty and it provided the Common Foreign and Security Policy (cfsp) 
with a strong basis within the treaty framework of the European Union. 
In fact, more interesting than these rather technical arrangements, 
were the ‘pre-constitutional’ elements, already mentioned above, that 
came with the treaty and its signing, namely the declaration that called 
for a ‘deeper and wider debate’ on the future of the Union and the 
proclamation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. These elements 
were the leg up to concrete political steps towards a constitutional 
future for Europe. They reveal how the Treaty of Nice was not to 
be seen as a document in isolation, but as a crucial new step in a 
dynamic process towards developing a new European political entity 
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that fundamentally changed the face and character of the national 
political identity of the Member States. In the Netherlands, however, 
in line with the old habit of sailing with the European wind without 
lingering on conceptual issues, the Treaty of Nice was not dealt with as 
a landmark setting the course for the future of both the Dutch and the 
European polity. On the contrary, it was seen as yet another necessary 
step towards something bigger, not to be dwelled on. But to what 
exactly? The debate shows a fundamental ignorance of what should 
become of Europe, whereas Europe seemed to nearly know already. 
Position of the government
In its presentation of the Treaty of Nice to parliament in June 2001, 
the second ‘purple’ cabinet (PvdA, vvd and D66) led by the social-
democrat Wim Kok, characterised the document as a ‘meaningful 
step forward.’892 From the explanatory memorandum it becomes 
clear that as far as the Dutch government was concerned, the meaning 
of the Treaty was to be principally found in the technicality of its 
arrangements. The Treaty of Nice was first and foremost lauded 
because of the institutional problems it addressed, preparing the Union 
for the great eastward expansion, which was scheduled for 2004.893 
Moreover, with the extension of qmv and co-decision of the European 
Parliament in more policy fields, the delicate matter of democratic 
working of the Union had been somewhat improved; another reason 
for the Dutch government to judge the Treaty to be worthy of approval 
although – again, similar to the sea and the Treaties of Maastricht and 
Amsterdam – the Netherlands had secured less than it had initially 
aimed for.894 
Typically, in the more than fifty pages in which the government 
accounted for the result obtained in Nice, only very few words 
were devoted to the ‘pre-constitutional’ elements of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and the Declaration on the Future of the Union. 
With regard to the first, the government limited itself to the remark 
that this Charter and its precise status within the eu legal framework 
would be discussed in a future igc.895 On the issue of the Declaration, 
the government rather purposelessly remarked that ‘It is of importance 
that […] it has been laid down that the debate on the future of the Union 
will be continued.’896 On its own preferences regarding the future of the 
Union, the government kept silent. 
Placing the Treaty of Nice in the historical line of consecutive 
European treaties presented by the Dutch government to parliament 
since the early 1950s, it stands out that the line of defence, chosen by the 
government, was by no means new. Repeatedly, the successive Dutch 
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governments had focused on practical results of the negotiations, 
leaving little attention to the great politically-symbolic value of new 
treaties, preambles, or references to the future or final objective. 
More plausible than being merely the result of well thought-out 
political tactics in which parliament was deliberately distracted from 
substantial matters by a focus on technicalities, this might well have 
been the result of a continuing blind spot, resulting from historically 
developed characteristics in the Dutch political culture. A pragmatic 
focus on concrete and substantive results at the European negotiation 
table, considered to benefit the national interests, had structurally 
been regarded more important than any debate on final objectives or a 
constitutional future of the European project. 
Not surprisingly, considering its business-as-usual-discussion 
in the explanatory memorandum, like its predecessors, the Kok 
administration called on parliament to approve the Treaty of Nice, 
in accordance with the regular procedure as laid down in article 91, 
subsection one of the Dutch constitution. A proposal that the Council 
of State did not protest against.897 Interestingly, the Council did 
have extensive comments, but they pertained to the governmental 
presentation of the treaty in general. The lacuna, signalled above, of 
not spending a word on the European constitutional path that was 
announced in Nice, was noted by the Council and it did not omit 
to point to the political danger for the Dutch government of not 
expressing its views on this matter. ‘Meanwhile this […] “finality 
debate” has started in several bodies’, the Council started. ‘The Council 
of State’, it went on, ‘is of the opinion that the Treaty which is presented 
here should be considered especially in relation to this debate.’898 The 
Council condemned the absence of any fundamental political debate 
regarding this finality: ‘That is why the Netherlands is in danger of 
being dragged down into a development it does not want in fact, 
without a clear alternative.’899
Here, the Council of State displayed a sharp eye for what had 
structurally been lacking in political circles in the Netherlands 
ever since the start of the integration process: a fundamental and 
conceptually solid debate on the eventual destination of the process of 
European integration and what the Dutch wishes were in this respect. 
Indeed, successive Dutch governments had declared themselves to be 
in favour of a European federation and/or a European Constitution,900 
but had never taken the trouble of defining the desired power 
relations within this federation-to-be, or of thinking about its desired 
constitutional characteristics. Until 2001, Dutch governments had 
come off well with turning a blind eye to what was structurally 
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disposed of as a matter for the future, not relevant in the here and 
now. But with the constitutional road officially opened in Nice, the 
continuing silence of the government was to an increasing extent 
considered out of place; not only by the Council of State, but also 
among Dutch public intellectuals. 
Filling the intellectual gap that developed from the lack of political 
debate in the early years of the new millennium, Dutch thinkers drew 
attention to the conceptual quandary that the process of European 
integration found itself in. Jan Rood, then head of the Clingendael 
European Studies Programme, for instance, observed that European 
integration was not, and had never been, like the classic processes of 
the creation of states in which power was one of the most important 
motives. The opposite was true. Its original starting point had been 
pacification, aimed at the removal of the power-political attributes of 
the state. ‘What is the meaning of the preceding, seen from the classic 
dichotomy supranational-intergovernmental?,’ Rood wondered. ‘In 
fact,’ he concluded, ‘that these concepts fail in judging the state of the 
integration process’.901 
Whereas the term ‘supranationalisation’ had long served a 
political purpose, Rood’s and suchlike observations contributed to 
the development of a growing need for new concepts or paradigms 
to cover the reality of the integration process.902 When the (political) 
discussion on a constitution for Europe got going in the early years of 
the new millennium this became urgent. Europe was not a state. Why 
should it have a constitution then? The jurist Van der Tang wondered 
if concepts such as a constitution or constitutionalism were applicable 
to the eu, as they had been used only in connection with classic nation 
states.903 Building on the international academic discussions as they had 
developed since Dieter Grimm’s key publication on this matter in 1995, 
on the need for defining a European ‘people’ – a demos – before Europe 
should be constitutionalised, the former judge of the European Court 
of Justice Jos Kapteyn thought a solution for the conceptual confusion 
on the identity of Europe necessary before thinking of writing a 
constitution.904 
The growing disinclination towards constitutionalising the eu, 
and herewith defining the Union in terms of a ‘state’ (i.e. a European 
polity, people, etc.) gave thus rise to a remarkable situation. Whereas 
Europe moved towards defining itself in statelike terms, the Dutch 
intellectual elite moved in the opposite direction of rejecting the 
association of any of these terms with the integration process. The 
ultimate attempt on the European level, in other words, to shift the 
perspective of a European Union built on constitutional nation states, 
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to a Union that encompassed these states – with a constitution of its 
own – was questioned, or even rejected by a growing number of public 
intellectuals. 
Around the same time, in political circles in the Netherlands, a 
remarkable shift was taking place that went counter to the old tendency 
of the Dutch political mainstream to assume a pro-active, cooperative 
and not all too critical attitude in matters of European integration. 
Around the turn of the millennium, in addition to the traditional ultra 
left and Protestant-conservative critics, a new and strong current of 
political antagonists of progressive European integration – seemingly 
almost out of the blue – emerged. This coincided with the tempestuous 
entering into the Dutch political arena in 2001 of the hedonist, 
somewhat dandyish and ever more popular professor Pim Fortuyn as 
the party leader of Leefbaar Nederland (ln, Livable Netherlands) which 
had been established in 1999. Programmatic spearheads of ln were 
direct democracy (i.e. the introduction of referenda) and reviewing the 
mainstream ‘tolerant’ Dutch views on politically problematic questions 
such as, among other things, asylum policies.905 Fortuyn, already 
known in the Netherlands for his unvarnished criticism on what eighth 
years of purple regency had yielded the country, seemed the ideal party 
leader.906 
Fortuyn was also critical of the Dutch approach to the process 
of European integration. He criticised the ‘captiousness’ of Brussels, 
the transference of sovereignty and competences to ‘pale institutions 
such as the European Parliament and the European Commission’ and 
of financial contributions to the eu that were far too high compared to 
what the Netherlands received – an issue soon also to be taken on by 
the financial leading man of the vvd, Gerrit Zalm. It made him publicly 
wonder whether the Netherlands was ‘Simple Simon’ in the European 
classroom.907 With this strong rhetoric, Fortuyn heavily shook up 
the political relations in the Netherlands and in the election campaign 
running up to the national elections of 2002, he would be a great 
challenge for the parties of the political mainstream, which were not 
used to such Europe-critical sounds to fall on fertile grounds outside 
the political boundaries of the Protestant-conservatives and hard-line 
socialists.
At the time of the parliamentary debate on the approval of the 
Treaty of Nice in the autumn of 2001, however, Fortuyn had just 
entered the political stage and no one could foresee the great role that 
he was about to obtain. In the debate on Nice, neither Fortuyn, nor his 
political ideas, making sense or not, nor the wider public opinion they 
represented, played a part. With their comfortable, but in fact ever more 
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worn-out rhetorical coats, the usual advocates pleaded in favour of 
approval of the Treaty of Nice. But below the surface, and it did not go 
unnoticed, something was smouldering. The question that remained 
was how and when the discord would come out. 
Debate in parliament 
Following the pattern of the parliamentary debates on the sea, 
Maastricht and Amsterdam, the parties in favour of progressive 
European integration in general, and the approval of the new treaty 
in particular, started with a lament on the things that had not been 
reached in Nice. Welcoming the increase of decision making by qmv, 
the addition of competences of the European Parliament, the agreement 
on the reduction of the number of European Commissioners once the 
ten candidate members had joined the eu, and some other institutional 
rearrangements that the parties had argued in favour of, at the end of 
the day the PvdA, D66, cda and vvd judged the final result as meagre. 
From the perspective of filling the much denounced democratic deficit, 
of increasing transparency and even the quality of preparation for the 
new round of accessions – this last element had been the main reason 
for negotiating a new treaty – these parties questioned the value of the 
Treaty or even judged it as a step back.908 
Fully in character, the four parties favouring progressive European 
integration, especially in the Lower House, aimed their critical arrows 
at specific and technical arrangements in the text of the treaty that 
they had hoped to see worked out differently. None of these parties 
addressed the issue, specifically highlighted by the Council of State, 
that it was high time for the Netherlands to make up its mind with 
regard to the final objective for the process. As far as the Europe-minded 
parliamentarians looked forward to the European Council in Laeken, 
the Convention on the future of Europe, or the igc scheduled for 
2004, which had all been announced in Nice, they presented it as new 
chances for fixing old shortcomings.909 On the conceptual leap towards 
a constitution for Europe and fundamental questions regarding the 
implications of this leap for the Dutch polity as a whole and whether it 
was willing to accept these, the four parties remained silent. 
In line with earlier debates, the parliamentary parties more critical 
of the integration process, did ask attention for the fundamental 
questions that came with the decision to go along in a process of 
constitutionalisation. Striking in this context is the remark of the 
senator Kars Veling of the Christian Union (cu) – a new party resulting 
from the merger of the gpv and rpf in 2000 – that in the Netherlands, 
and also abroad, a debate was missing ‘as it was for instance actually 
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held when the federation of North American states was built in the 
18th century. The division of power and the democratic control in 
Europe always come up for discussion in stages and never as a whole.’910 
Here, Veling touched upon one of the main characteristics of the 
European integration process so far. The fear of prematurely calling 
the process to an end, before the ideal had been reached, stopped the 
Member States from starting a debate on the existential questions 
regarding the eventual power relations in a European federation and 
to where the power of a European federation should reach. For the 
Netherlands, Veling’s observation was particularly true. Since the 
start of the integration process, a consistent stable political majority 
that considered European integration as a vital necessity for the 
Netherlands, had responded guardedly whenever such questions 
tended to come up. 
Now that internationally prominent political figures had made 
the finality of the European integration a topic of discussion, however, 
it became harder to ignore the questions that had been begged for 
years. The concept of finality, in other words, became significant and 
hard to ignore in the parliamentary debate on the Treaty of Nice, 
whether the political mainstream liked it or not. The cu, for instance, 
insisted on the concrete interpretation and operationalisation of the 
subsidiarity principle, which since the early ‘90s, had been used more 
and more as a makeshift measure to conceal obscurities on the division 
of powers between the level of the Union and that of the Member 
States.911 Illustrative is also the remark of GroenLinks, a party that had 
critically scrutinised the democratic calibre of the integration process 
ever since its formation in 1990, that it would judge the treaty in the 
light of the ‘post-Nice-agenda’ and the organisation of the announced 
constitutional route.912 Now that it appeared that a constitution for 
Europe would be written, this party argued, it was high time to stop the 
‘legislating behind closed doors’ and to directly involve the citizens of 
Europe. 
This idea was by no means new. Ever since the parliamentary 
debate on the Maastricht Treaty, GroenLinks had devoted itself to 
breaking the political tradition of approving basic European Treaties 
with the smallest minority possible, i.e. the regular approval procedure 
via Article 90, subsection one of the Dutch Constitution, by replacing 
it by, or adding to it, a vote by referendum. Already with regard to 
the treaty of Maastricht, the party had proposed a vote by means of a 
popular referendum in order to directly involve the Dutch citizens in 
the process and thus contribute to covering the democratic deficit of 
the integration process observed to be present to an ever greater extent. 
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At the time, a proposal to this end had been turned down. GroenLinks 
saw new chances for reaching its political ideal of a popular vote on 
European integration in the aftermath of Nice by making use of an 
association of the process of constitutionalisation with the notion of 
sovereignty of the people and the general rise of political attention 
in the Netherlands for forms of direct democracy. In the procedure of 
approving the result obtained in Nice, the party again brought up the 
question: ‘is the government of the opinion that […] a future European 
constitution is suitable for a referendum, beside the national ratification 
procedures?
Not surprisingly, the new step towards progressive integration, 
federalisation and constitutionalisation was rejected by the sp. Despite 
its rather politically isolated position within a parliament still largely 
made up of Europe enthusiasts, the party showed to notice, and feel 
supported by, the growth of public doubts and resistance vis-à-vis the 
process of European integration. Referring to public polls executed by 
well-established research centres, it observed that ‘the distrust of the 
European Union and institutions of the Union has not decreased of 
late.’ On the basis of this observation it claimed that with their tendency 
of choosing the forward flight, political Europhiles in the Netherlands 
clearly went against the will of the Dutch people. 913 Considering the 
course of history in the years to follow, the warning of sp leader Jan 
Marijnissen that followed, deserves special mention: ‘The estrangement 
[…] cannot keep increasing with impunity. If the euro project fails, 
because our country will do badly out of it, the Europhiles must be on 
their guard against the anger of the people.’914 
From defence towards consensus
In relation to the Treaty of Nice, however, anger of the people that 
might arise could be left out of consideration, since the ratification of 
this agreement could be dealt with within the walls of parliament if a 
regular majority was willing to support it. And such a majority was to 
be found quite easily.
Notwithstanding their initial complaints, the parties of the 
political mainstream that had hoped for Nice to bring more in the 
fields of democratic relations, transparency in decision making and 
institutional improvement, eventually declared themselves in favour of 
approval. Soothing words or any form of persuasion of the government 
were not even necessary. ‘If it cannot be done the way it should be 
done, then there is nothing for it but to do it the way it can be done’, 
proclaimed the first in line.915 D66 followed: ‘Nice is a minimal thing, 
but let’s put up with it.’916 The cda joined in by stating that: ‘In the 
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end we vote for this quarter-full glass and by doing so in favour of this 
treaty.’917 And the vvd closed the ranks on a similar glum note: ‘Nice 
results, it is true, do not deliver amply sufficient grades, but anybody 
who has been to school knows that in practice one can also get through 
with a meagre six.’918 
Crucial in the considerations of these parties when voting in 
favour of the treaty, was the conviction that ten candidate members had 
been given the prospect of accession in the near future and that – despite 
its many shortcomings – the Treaty of Nice offered the essentials for 
this accession to be carried out as planned. If the Treaty was rejected, 
to put it differently, a new agreement had to be reached, which would 
make it impossible for the eu expansion to take place in 2004. In 
line with their views regarding the earlier rounds of accessions, the 
PvdA, D66, cda and vvd agreed that any delays or cancellation of the 
accessions should be prevented. 
Falling back on the well tested promise-is-debt line of argument, 
the step to pleading in favour of Nice in order to fulfil the obligation 
that the Netherlands accepted, was easily made. From a rhetorical 
perspective, the PvdA expressed this stance most daringly. Frans 
Timmermans, the spokesman on behalf of the party in the Lower 
House, claimed that:
‘ This move cannot be stopped. From time to time this means 
jumping into a swimming pool without the certainty that it is 
completely full of water. But that is under force of circumstances. 
The expansion must take place within a year. That is a historic 
task!’919 
 
The strongest remonstration against this clearly passionate, but 
theoretically rather thin argument was expressed by the antagonist of 
the treaty, Jan Marijnissen (sp): 
‘ This contention concerning dynamics does not appeal to me. 
Those dynamics are the result of an engine and that engine is Mr. 
Timmermans, the cabinet and other Europhiles in Europe.920
It was a strong refutation of the self-evidence of ever progressive 
European integration: Europe did not move along by itself, it moved 
along because the political will was summoned by its political 
advocates. The obligation to approve B, because A had been agreed on 
earlier, just like historic assignments did not exist autonomously; as we 
have seen the basis for this was a rhetorical construction. Of course, in 
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line with previous debates in the Dutch parliament, the advocates of 
approval of the treaty could not be tempted to abandon their reasoning 
in arguments of succession. It was a powerful and convincing way of 
thinking for those who believed that the cyclist should keep riding in 
order not to fall; a spectre for those who wanted to move on. 
Strikingly, even some of the staunch Protestant-conservative 
critics of European integration who strongly objected to transferring 
state sovereignty, went along with the reasoning in favour of treaty 
approval. Considering the fact that they perceived the 2004 expansion 
to depend on the approval of the Treaty of Nice and that its approval 
would not require new transfers of sovereignty, these parties considered 
it best to vote in favour.921 Even the cu spoke of the accession of the 
candidate members as ‘historically inevitable’, perhaps not realising that 
in the long run such words, and acting upon them, would create a new 
‘historical inevitability’, to wit a European Constitution.922 
Joining in with the others, GroenLinks was eventually also 
willing to vote in favour. In reaction to the question of this party to 
the government regarding direct involvement of the Dutch people, it 
had finally received a positive response: ‘the government thinks that 
a future European constitution can under conditions be suitable for a 
referendum.’923 This time, so it would turn out, GroenLinks had sown 
the seed for creating its own political dynamics which in 2005 would 
– ‘inevitably’, a skilful rhetorician could claim – lead to a vote by popular 
referendum on the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe; 
a unique event within the context of contemporary Dutch political 
history, since the last and only national referendum that had taken place 
in the Netherlands dated from 1797.924 But that was all still in the future. 
With regard to the Treaty of Nice, GroenLinks lined up with the party 
views as discussed above: ‘We are very convinced advocates of that 
expansion and think that, with regard to those countries, we cannot 
allow ourselves not to support this treaty now.’925 Thus, disciplining 
itself in voting in favour of the treaty, the Kok-administration did not 
need to worry about approval. And indeed, on 22 November 2001 
the Dutch Lower House, approved the Treaty of Nice with a strong 
majority. Only the sp rejected it. On 18 December, approval in the 
Upper House followed without a formal vote. Again the minutes of 
the meeting register the rejection of the sp party members present. 
Apart from the technical matters that Nice would settle, the vote made 
one thing crystal clear: the Netherlands would embark on the path of 
drafting a constitution for Europe. 
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6.3  Sailing a New Voyage by an Old Compass: 
the European Convention (2003)
On 15 December 2001, three days before the Dutch Upper House 
approved the Treaty of Nice, the European Council had gathered in 
Laeken. As described in the introduction of this chapter, the Declaration 
that resulted from this meeting formed the basis for the installation of 
a Convention, charged with the task of drafting a constitutional text 
for Europe. In this Convention not only high ranking government 
officials of the Member States would take part; an important 
difference with the old habit of designing new European steps in an 
igc. Also representatives of the European Commission, the ep, and 
the national parliaments were actively involved in the process.926 
Even representatives of the parliaments of the candidate members 
were invited to join.927 To this already extensive company, delegates 
of various committees,928 the social partners and the Ombudsman 
were added, bringing about the total number of participants of the 
Convention to over 200. 
In Laeken the Member States agreed to appoint the former 
president of France, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, – the man who in the 
1970s had had a central role in institutionalising the European Council 
and the first attempts of monetary integration – as the Chairman of the 
Convention. The choice for this man in this position was not without 
relevance. Product of his own constitutional culture and statesmanlike 
ambitions and inspired by the American Philadelphia Convention of 
1787, Giscard d’Estaing did little to conceal that he had great ambitions 
with the Convention. Those close to him knew that he was serious 
about it; during the Convention he had the Constitution of the usa 
in his pocket.929 His team and many working in or for the European 
institutions, felt from the very start that the Convention would work 
towards a historic moment.930 
In his opening speech to the Convention on 28 February 2002, 
Giscard d’Estaing did not mince words. Befitting the French ‘tabula rasa’ 
mentality when it came to writing a constitution, Giscard D’Estaing 
proposed to bring a ‘fresh start’ to the multinational adventure of the 
process of European integration.931 The Chairman explicitly aimed at 
creating a single Treaty that replaced the Treaty on European Union and 
its amendments of Amsterdam and Nice. In order to reach this goal a 
broad consensus was needed in the Convention to result in one single 
proposal. If the Convention attained this goal, Giscard claimed, the path 
to a Constitution for Europe would lie open. He decided not to lose any 
time on what the status of this new Treaty should be. ‘In order to avoid 
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any disagreement over semantics,’ Giscard stated resolutely, ‘let us agree 
now to call it: a “constitutional treaty for Europe”.’932 
And there it was. Without any fundamental debate on the 
conceptual details of such a document, bringing about a constitutional 
treaty formally became the central objective of the Convention. 
The rhetorical lobby in favour of formally constitutionalising the 
European Union, started by Joschka Fischer in 1999, now got its way 
in a statement before 200 Convention members telling them to do so. 
The aim of creating a constitutional treaty for Europe, in other words, 
became the new political reality. In its wake the challenge followed 
to find the right words acceptable to all, to explicate the concept that 
– via (preambles of ) European treaties, the development of a common 
legal framework, European jurisprudence, the proclamation of an 
internal market, the introduction of a common currency, etc. – had 
been implicitly systematically built on in the process of European 
integration: the existence of one European polity, encompassing the 
various national polities of the Member States. 
For this task, the Convention had one and a half year, of which the 
first months would be spent on plenarily gathering ideas – the listening 
phase – regarding the umbrella themes: the division of competences 
within the Union, the operationalisation of the subsidiarity principle, 
the role of the national parliaments, and the development of a 
Constitution. Subsequently, a second (the deliberating phase), and a 
third (the proposal phase), were to follow. Throughout the duration of 
the Convention, plenary meetings were to be held on a regular basis, 
with intervals of a few weeks. Giscard D’Estaing, however, managed 
to watch over the direction in every single phase. After the plenary 
meetings, the Presidium – supported by its secretariat – retired to its 
office where it prepared proposals for future meetings. These proposals 
could be discussed and amended in the meetings of the Convention, but 
– as a true founding father – Giscard D’Estaing kept the initiative.933 
Initial indifference in the Netherlands
The historical importance of what was about to happen under the 
direction of Giscard D’Estaing, sharply contrasted with how the 
Convention was initially approached by the governmental elite in the 
Netherlands. The facts and stories on the Dutch position vis-à-vis this 
process, indicate a lack of the sense of the grandeur of what was about 
to happen. It is a public secret that the prime-minister of the two latest 
Dutch cabinets, Wim Kok, was initially seen as a possible candidate 
for becoming the Chairman of the Convention. Although the exact 
reasons are hard to retrieve, for they are wrapped in diplomatic mystery, 
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it seems that an underestimation of what the Convention would yield 
was decisive in the Dutch hesitations about accepting the position 
and the eventual loss of the chance to get it.934 Reacting to the possible 
appointment of Giscard D’Estaing, Kok displayed a mix of relief, 
laconism and haughtiness: ‘I am glad it is not me.’935 The mp for the 
vvd, Frans Weisglas, heartened him by stating in parliament: ‘The good 
thing is that the Prime Minister has not become the chairman of this talk 
circus. That post is far beneath the quality of the Prime Minister.’936
The perception of the Convention as becoming nothing more than 
an inefficient discussion group, was persistent among members of the 
Dutch political and governmental elite. Also the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Jozias van Aartsen (vvd) condescendingly commented on the 
Convention as being an ‘noncommittal debating club’; the real deal, 
so he claimed, would take place in the Intergovernmental Conference 
(igc) planned in its aftermath.937 Even the original representative on 
behalf of the Dutch government to the European Convention, the 
D66 star politician and ‘European’ Hans van Mierlo – in a later stage, 
he was replaced by the (former) (Euro)parliamentarian of the vvd, 
Gijs de Vries – qualified the process on the eve of the opening of the 
Convention as ‘political brainstorming.’938 This attitude might also 
explain why the Netherlands allowed other opportunities to secure one 
of the other key-positions in the Presidium to pass.939 
How to read the initial indifference – ‘disdain’ may be the better 
word – of the Dutch governmental elite for the Convention? Most 
certainly, the internal political worries of the Netherlands contributed 
to that. When the Convention started out in February 2002, the Kok ii 
administration was awaiting the results of an extensive investigation 
into the responsibility of the then government, also led by Wim Kok, 
concerning the Srebrenica massacre that had taken place in July 1995 
in front of ‘Dutchbat’.940 After the results had been made public, the 
Kok ii administration felt compelled to resign. On 16 April 2002, the 
cabinet fell. New elections were necessary. Meanwhile an internal 
party conflict had put an end to the tender political alliance between 
Leefbaar Nederland and Fortuyn. This, however, did not mean the 
end of the political ambitions of the latter. Fortuyn established the 
Lijst Pim Fortuyn (lpf) with which he intended to participate in the 
national elections of 2002 and which became immensely popular in 
a very short period of time. But on 6 May 2002 – nine days before the 
elections would take place – Fortuyn was assassinated by a radical 
activist, leaving his and the other parties in total shock. Maybe the latter 
were even more shocked when on 15 May 2002, the lpf gained 26 of 
the 150 seats in parliament at its first elections. Now the parties of the 
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old political mainstream had to rise to the challenge of incorporating 
into the government this party that attacked many of their sacred cows, 
their deep consensus on the function and desirability of European 
integration being one them. Eventually, the cda succeeded in forming a 
centre-right cabinet with the lpf and vvd. This coalition, however was 
plagued by internal struggles that led to the fall of the cabinet in April 
2003. Again, elections needed to be organised.
All this occurred in the first year of the Convention. The phase 
of national political transition that the country went through and the 
political unrest and introversion that came with it, naturally distracted 
from the debates on the future of Europe as they occurred in the 
Convention. However, also another factor, resulting from how the 
political mainstream had been used to approach Europe, must be taken 
into account when searching for an explanation for the indifference 
of the governmental elite to the Convention. It had its origin in what 
had already been expressed by Van Aartsen himself and which was 
confirmed by the experiences of the Dutch diplomat in the team of 
Giscard D’Estaing: ‘The Netherlands were of the opinion that it would 
be far more powerful in a classic icg.’941 
This conviction – resulting from a historically developed political 
culture in which the government had always had a free hand in matters 
of foreign affairs and European integration was structurally considered 
to be one of these matters – showed itself in the way the Dutch 
government approached and prepared itself for the Convention. From 
its outset it made clear that the traditional spearheads of the European 
policy of the Netherlands would also be its guiding principles in the 
Convention. The strengthening of democracy within the Union, the 
strengthening of the European Commission, the European Parliament 
and the policy instruments of the Union – the cfsp for instance – were 
considered important by the Dutch government.942 The underlying 
thought still was that the economic and political interests of a small 
country – a central element in the perception of the country of the 
political elite – were best guaranteed within a European Union 
characterised by strong Community institutions. The government 
made this view clear when it stated that it was supportive of a European 
constitutional Treaty ‘on condition that it contains every guarantee 
for preservation of the essential characteristics of the communal 
structure.’943 
Illustrative in this regard, is, for instance, the fierce resistance 
against the French-German idea that came up within the convention 
to appoint a Chairman of the European Council for a period of five 
years.944 The institutionalisation of this European ‘Sun King’ – a telling 
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metaphor hinting at the old Dutch fear of French dominance – was 
feared to benefit the larger countries more than the small countries.945 
It was thought to contribute to the institutionalisation of the 
European Council and, by effect, would undermine the position 
of the Commission and the ep. Within the Dutch foreign policy 
mindset, it was believed that the Netherlands would eventually be 
better off in a powerful supranational Union to which it had yielded 
its sovereignty voluntarily through a process of diplomacy and 
deliberation, than within European cooperation in which a structure 
of intergovernmental decision making would keep the power with 
the big continental powers. The paradox that announces itself is that, 
notwithstanding its distrust of an intergovernmental ruling of the 
Union in the long run, the Netherlands was so keen on waiting with 
cutting important knots until the Intergovernmental (sic!) Conference 
of 2004. It seems one of those inconsistencies in the Dutch approach 
towards European integration that is difficult to explain in another 
way than that – it has been observed before – the political mainstream 
tended to look away from the conceptual difficulties of its own 
approach towards European integration, by sticking to the tenability of 
its traditional foreign policy approach in a process which became more 
and more a matter of interior relevance. 
The business as usual approach to the Convention and the 
dogmatic focus on traditional foreign policy spearheads and strategy 
is also underlined by how the Dutch contributions to the Convention 
were prepared. A former staff member in the service of the Dutch 
delegation recalls that within the ministerial circles in the Netherlands, 
behind the scenes of the Convention, traditional diplomacy reigned 
supremely. In order for the Netherlands to obtain support for the Dutch 
stances and contributions to the Convention, high level diplomats from 
the various European capitals were invited at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in order to fine-tune ideas and proposals of the Netherlands and 
possible partners.946 Thus, the Netherlands found a way to continue 
by back channel diplomacy a more traditional igc method, within the 
Convention.
Ironically, because of its persistent focus on the traditional 
priorities of the Netherlands – most importantly, the division of power 
within the Union – the Dutch delegation, and the Dutch governmental 
elite in general, were blind to the immense conceptual leap that was 
prepared by Giscard D’Estaing. The formal introduction of the term 
‘constitution’ or ‘constitutional treaty’ in relation to the process 
of European integration, was an unprecedented historical step. If a 
constitutional text was to result from the Convention – even apart 
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from the exact provisions it introduced – and it would subsequently 
be adopted by the European Member States, a European constitutional 
order, structurally worked on in the past six decennia but until then 
never officially acknowledged in the Member States, would finally be 
formalised. It implied that the various peoples of Europe, until then 
citizens under their respective national constitutions, would henceforth 
be European citizens, bound by a European Constitution as well. From 
the perspective of the identity of the polity not an insignificant change 
indeed! The concept of state sovereignty, moreover, would also de 
jure lose essential elements of its meaning from the moment that an 
umbrella constitution would be adopted by the eu Member States.947 
In the Netherlands, however, the element of the politically 
conceptual changes that would follow from the formal 
constitutionalisation of the European Union, was not deemed a matter 
of concern or even of interest. Interviews with those involved in the 
process of the Convention on behalf of the Netherlands, confirm the 
picture that already appeared from discussions in parliament: that 
the introduction of the term ‘constitution’ or ‘constitutional treaty’ 
by Giscard D’Estaing was a non-issue in the Netherlands. Wim van 
Eekelen, member of the Dutch delegation for the Upper House, 
recollects that little was said, neither in the delegation, nor in political 
circles in the Netherlands, regarding the introduction of this term.948 
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs (2003-2007) and Permanent 
Representative with the eu on behalf of the Netherlands at the start of 
the Convention, Bernard Bot, also explained that in the Netherlands the 
constitutional label was regarded as primarily a matter of symbolism, 
attached great value to by the French, but not essentially altering the fact 
that eventually just another treaty would be signed by the eu Member 
States.949 Diplomatically, it was also deemed sensible not to enter into 
discussions on the use of this term, because it might be at the expense 
of precious time and attention to discuss the institutional wishes of the 
Netherlands. Also in the department of Constitutional Affairs, part of 
the Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, this view 
was dominant: ‘With us it was never under discussion that it was a 
treaty and not a Constitution in the literal sense of the word. What was 
discussed was their pretension to make it look like a Constitution and 
that we then had to be of help in order to bring that about.’950 In this 
observation the rhetoric dissociation stands out between a constitution 
in the literal sense of the word and other texts that carry the title 
Constitution but are in fact not. This dissociation would come to play 
an important role in the process of getting the treaty approved. 
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The indifferent attitude towards the constitutional label can be 
understood from the pragmatic attitude with which the political elite 
had treated the Dutch constitution, in particular when foreign affairs 
were at stake. Emotionally, there had never been deep feelings for the 
constitution, which may be explained from the fact that existentially 
the country had always been very much dependent on the larger world. 
The first chapter of this study has shown, that, in 1953, the Netherlands 
even decided of its own free will to remove essential elements of its 
constitutional sovereignty. By doing so it had showed its belief in 
dependence on the international community, and had consolidated that 
conviction at the same time. For the Dutch political elite, associations 
with the term ‘constitution’ – a sovereign state, a people, a polity – 
might have been far less valuable than for the European partners. 
Illustratively, in the Dutch parliamentary debate the treaty in the 
making in the Convention, was generally carelessly referred to as 
the Grondwet (Constitution) for Europe or the European Grondwet, 
instead of the semantically more concealing term of a constitutional 
Treaty. Many pro-Europeans, in fact supported the coming about 
of a European Constitution in the literal sense of the word and for 
others what the treaty was called was not the issue. As long as its 
provisions benefitted the interests of the Netherlands as they were 
perceived by a governmental and parliamentary elite: strong European 
institutions in order not to be left at the tender mercies of Paris and 
Berlin and, of course, something had to be done as well to improve the 
democratic legitimacy. Solidly rooted in their own mindset regarding 
European integration, this mainstream did and could not foresee how 
– eventually – popular associations linked to the term ‘constitution’, 
would come to play a crucial role in the approval procedure of the treaty. 
Position of the government on the final result
The further the Convention went on and the more it became clear that 
Giscard D’Estaing intended to deliver a text that could not be easily 
brushed aside by the various governments, the Dutch government and 
delegation to the Convention became aware that the initial indifference 
of the Netherlands had been somewhat out of place. 
In the listening phase already, the representative on behalf of the 
government, Van Mierlo, had noted that not all participants to what he 
called the ‘political brainstorming’, i.e. the Convention, wanted to wait 
and see until the deals of the igc that would follow the Convention 
had been made: ‘Some think they are brainstorming, some think they 
are already negotiating.’951 After the summer of 2002, this realisation 
started to set in in wider circles. In its memorandum ‘Europe under 
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construction’ of 25 September 2002, the Balkenende administration 
reflected on what the Convention had yielded so far.952 It signalled that 
under the guidance of Giscard d’Estaing the Convention had greater 
ambitions than initially expected and that the result might become the 
point of departure for negotiations in a new igc.953 Implicitly admitting 
its early underestimation of the importance of the Convention, the 
government – most likely also conciliatory to the lpf critics of European 
integration in the coalition – stated that the moment had come to direct 
the Dutch input in the Convention more emphatically and ‘to monitor 
the progress of the proceedings more closely.’954 On 5 October 2002 
– not long before the deliberation phase had started – the representative 
of the Dutch government, Van Mierlo, was replaced by the liberal 
mp Gijs de Vries (vvd). Although in the official reporting Van Mierlo 
declared that he had given back the assignment allegedly not wanting 
to operate while chained by the government,955 it has also been claimed 
that the resignation of Van Mierlo was welcomed or even orchestrated 
by the government: it offered the first Balkenende administration 
– which had entered the political stage in May 2002 – the chance to 
appoint someone for the post who was generally considered to be more 
of a realist and easier to manage.956 
With Gijs de Vries as the government’s representative, the Dutch 
delegation did its work during the rest of the Convention. Although not 
all Dutch wishes were complied with, it was agreed after all to install 
a permanent Chairmanship of the Council. 957 Concerns regarding 
the power of the Commission and the future of the cfsp remained, 
but on the other hand, from the perspective of the priorities that it 
had set beforehand, the delegation could also look back contentedly. 
One of its main priorities – more decisions in the Council to be taken 
by qmv – was obtained.958 Another result, particularly welcomed by 
the Netherlands was the removal of the pillar structure, introduced in 
Maastricht: ‘That was “Black Monday”. Finally […] the Netherlands 
was put in the right.’959 Even before the Convention had formally 
finished its work the second Balkenende administration (cda, vvd 
and D66) that had come to power on 27 May 2003, qualified the draft 
constitutional Treaty as an ‘gigantic step forward.’960 
Debate in parliament
In the first phases of the Convention, parliament was not closely 
involved in the work and activities of the Dutch delegation. After 
setting the course, the government did not enter into fundamental 
debates on its strategy in neither the Lower nor the Upper House. It 
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befitted the political culture in which parliament was used to giving the 
government a free hand in international negotiations. 
The parliamentary members to the Convention, on the contrary, 
found it important to update their fellow parliamentarians on the 
progress that was made throughout the process. Although they spoke 
in the Convention in their private capacity and did not act on the basis 
of a mandate of the national parliament, they were keen on involving 
their fellow parliamentarians; indeed, the Convention could only 
be considered a success when its result was politically supported by 
those who would – in the end – have to vote on it. In monthly progress 
reports these parliamentarians informed the States-General on what 
had been discussed in Brussels. But also with regard to these reports 
it can be observed that the supply only started to get quantitatively 
substantive from February 2003 onwards, when the last phase of the 
Convention started.961 
Depending on the issues at stake, the parliamentary debates on the 
Convention were dealt with in the various parliamentary committees 
on European, Foreign and Legal Affairs, in plenary meetings of the 
Upper or the Lower House, or in combined meetings of both Houses.962 
Apart from the role of these meetings in informing parliament of the 
progress of the Convention, the input of parliament in the Convention 
was also further developed. The minutes of the meetings show an 
overrepresentation of senators present; a picture that is confirmed 
in interviews with those working in and for the Dutch delegation to 
the Convention.963 Despite the efforts of the Dutch parliamentary 
delegation to involve the Lower House in the process, the interest 
of the members of this house for the Convention remained slight. A 
full parliamentary agenda, national political events and activities and 
a political culture in which it was structurally self-evident that the 
government took the lead in matters of foreign affairs, might well have 
contributed to MPs in the Lower House keeping aloof. Their seemingly 
unconcerned attitude was an eyesore for the parliamentary members to 
the delegation who were worried about the influence of the parliaments 
anyway: ‘The government representatives begin to behave in the 
Convention as if it were an icg. That is why it is getting more and more 
difficult for the parliamentary representatives to also leave their mark 
on the process.’964
The Dutch parliament was in a large measure united regarding its 
priorities in the Convention. Strengthening the European Parliament, 
enhancing the involvement of national parliaments in European 
decision making, and getting the subsidiarity principle conceptually 
clear, were issues widely supported.965 Also the basic idea of clarifying 
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and simplifying the structure of the Union by replacing the series of old 
treaties by one new treaty, did not meet with any fundamental criticism 
in parliamentary circles in the Netherlands. 
Outstanding in the parliamentary discussions on the progress 
of the Convention is the attention that went to the constitutional 
label of the document in preparation. Contrary to the governmental 
indifference to the introduction of this term ‘constitution’, the further 
the Convention got in drafting the constitutional treaty, the more 
value was ascribed to this label in the Dutch parliament. The CDA-
senator Jos van Gennip spoke of a process of decision-making of 
‘exceptional historical relevance.’966 ‘The mere concept “Constitution 
of the European Union”’, he proceeded, ‘puts peace before war, values 
before markets, citizenship before arbitrariness.’967 Senator René van 
der Linden (cda) and mp Hans van Baalen (vvd) both framed it as the 
casting in stone of the European arrangements.968 
Although there is no conceptual or analytical clarity in these 
remarks regarding the way the new treaty would exactly differ from 
its predecessors, they perfectly illustrate the parliamentary perception 
of what was at stake and how its importance was rhetorically charged. 
This, not surprisingly, was grist to the mill of the Dutch Eurosceptics 
who saw in it an extra reason – even apart from the actual content of 
the treaty – to reject the initiative of Giscard D’Estaing beforehand. 
The sp and sgp both indicated that they considered the initiative of the 
development of a European Constitution to be strongly interwoven 
with the attempt to turn the European Union into a full-dress 
federation.969 In line with the viewpoint expressed in the intellectual 
debate by people like Van der Tang, the sgp deemed a constitution to 
be reserved for a national state and since the European Union was not 
a state, the party considered it improper to use this term for the new 
European Treaty. The alternative that it proposed was ‘basic treaty’.970 
Showing an understanding of the working of constitutive rhetoric, 
the sgp also pointed out that, in the party’s view, the issue of the 
formal title of the new treaty was more than mere semantics: ‘The 
designation ‘constitution’ or ‘constitutional treaty’ does put a burden 
on the content of the treaty. The discussion about fundamental rights, 
which is part of a constitution, is an example of that.’971 Harry van 
Bommel, mp for the strongly Eurosceptic sp, seized the opportunity to 
point out that the use of the constitutional label was symptomatic for 
something bigger: ‘The federalists are in charge. The symbols are there 
already; the flag, the national anthem of the Union and now almost a 
constitution.’972 
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Both parties showed that they associated the constitutional 
rhetoric and symbols of which the Convention availed itself, with 
the process of (federal) state forming. In itself, this association was 
not surprising. All historical examples of processes of drafting a 
Constitution were connected to forming (federal) states and with 
the European Union getting one, including its own catalogue of 
fundamental rights, the association was logical.973 The element in 
their considerations that was contested, by, for instance, the cu, was 
that Giscard D’Estaing was not working on a real ‘Constitution’, 
but a ‘constitutional treaty’: ‘The term “constitutional treaty” has a 
considerably greater appeal for my party.’974 In this line of reasoning, 
there was no eye for the fact that this distinction could not be held 
to guarantee anything. Technically speaking, eventually, also a 
constitutional treaty might develop into a formal constitution.
Apart from whether the use of the term constitution was 
desirable, disagreement existed on what (kind of ) provisions a 
European Constitution should contain. The sp, for instance, got up in 
arms against the proposal of the Convention for Chapter 1, Article 3, 
subsection 2. This article stated that ‘the Union shall offer its citizens 
[…] an internal market where competition is free and undistorted.’ In 
the eyes of the socialist senator Tiny Kox it was rather strange that a 
European constitution would formally uphold the principle of ‘free, 
unalloyed competition’, as Kox interpreted the article, ‘whereas such 
a thing cannot be found in the Dutch Constitution.’975 Following from 
this thought, he reasoned that this article might be incompatible with 
the Dutch constitution, to which – Kox added with a sense of pathos – 
he had sworn allegiance.976 His colleague from the Lower House, Harry 
van Bommel, cast similar doubts with regard to the recording of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights: ‘How do these rights relate to the 
constitutional rights of the Kingdom of the Netherlands?’977 
Although these remarks did not essentially differ from earlier 
comments on the compatibility of European Treaties and the 
Dutch constitution – situations for which Article 91.3 of the Dutch 
Constitution was once designed – the fact that the European Treaty 
was called a Constitution, added a new dimension to the discussion. 
Van Bommel warned of what he called ‘constitutional bigamy’.978 On 
a meta level, the adoption of a European Constitution could be seen as 
the ultimate departure from the Dutch constitution. Was the adoption 
of a European constitution, roofing over the constitution of the 
Netherlands, also covered by Article 93, subsection 3?
The dissension in the Dutch parliament on what a European 
Constitution should and should not regulate went beyond the division 
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between staunch supporters and convinced antagonists of further 
European integration. Constitutional expert and senator for the 
Dutch labour party, Erik Jurgens (PvdA), opposed the proposal of the 
Convention to record in the constitutional Treaty that the European 
Union ‘shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue’ with 
the churches; a provision foreign in kind to the Dutch constitution.979 
Emphasising that he was associated with a church himself, Jurgens 
expressed his concern that churches were mentioned here in particular 
and no other organisations: ‘Then there might be people who say that 
this is discriminatory.’980 GroenLinks supported his view: ‘Actually it is 
something that should not be part of a constitution.’981
The issues brought up by Kox, Van Bommel and Jurgens show 
the essential challenge resulting from the European Convention: 
reconciling diverging ideas on the character of a constitution, on what 
it should contain and on what the European Union should do or not 
do. Fundamental questions from the perspective of defining a political 
identity and diverging ideas on this identity came up, not only among 
the various Member States but also among political currents within 
these Member States. An issue, discussed in the Convention, truly 
showing the complexity of reaching agreement on the European 
political identity, is the drafting of a preamble; a topic that exercised and 
divided many minds in the Dutch parliament. 
First of all, Giscard’s wish to record a preamble in the 
constitutional treaty was controversial in the Dutch parliament. 
Groen Links was among the most unequivocal in its denouncing 
of the idea. In the plenary debate in the Upper House senator Leo 
Platvoet (gl) remarked that formulating a preamble was not necessary. 
Taking the Dutch preamble-less constitution as an example –another 
illustration of the sober and pragmatic constitutional culture in the 
Netherlands – he argued that a constitution could perfectly do without 
it: ‘It is said that a preamble should be part of a constitution, but […] 
the Dutch constitution has not got such a preamble. I think that is not 
an argument.’982 On the level of its content, the Dutch parliament was 
divided up into those who did (the cda and the protestant-orthodox 
parties), and those who did not (the liberal and socialist inspired parties) 
deem it desirable that, next to the mentioning in the preamble of the 
humanist tradition, reference should be made to the Judaeo-Christian 
tradition of the European continent. For obvious reasons, the reference 
appealed to the first group. The liberal and socialist inspired parties in 
the Netherlands feared that the explicit Christian orientation would 
work as a symbol of exclusion; not only for persons within the Union 
who did not feel connected with the Judeo-Christian tradition, but also 
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for candidate members – Turkey for instance – to which this reference, 
which strongly referred to the religious history of western Europe, 
would not appeal.
On 10 June 2003, a group of MP’s, headed by the D66 mp 
Lousewies van der Laan, D66, vvd, PvdA, Groen Links and the sp 
introduced a motion in the Dutch Lower House which requested the 
government to oppose in the upcoming igc (October 2003-June2004) 
the recording – both in the preamble or in any of the articles of the 
Treaty – of ‘references to a specific European religious foundation.’ 
In search for a remedy against Jurgens’ complaint mentioned in 
this section, the motion was also aimed ‘against provisions which 
give church institutions a special place compared to other social 
organisations .’983 The motion was based on the considerations that the 
principle of separation of church and state was an important foundation 
of both the Dutch and the European constitutional order, and that 
the reference to a religious basis was alien to the Dutch constitution. 
Together, these parties held a majority in parliament and consequently 
the motion was adopted.984 In the Upper House, a similar motion 
rejecting a special position for the churches was proposed and adopted 
by the same parties.985 With these motions, the preference of the 
Christian parties in parliament for a reference in the preamble to a 
Judaeo-Christian tradition was pushed aside. 
Or was it not? Telling for how this matter kept the Dutch political 
community divided and typical again of the political culture in which 
the government was used to being granted freedom in international 
negotiations, the motion seemed to fall on deaf ears with the 
government. When it became known that, in defiance of the various 
counter motions, prime minister Jan Peter Balkenende had supported 
German, Polish and Italian Christian-democrats at the igc in their 
pleas for a specific religious reference, those who had submitted the 
respective motions, especially the ones in the Upper House, were not 
amused. ‘Does the government take the motions seriously indeed?’, 
Erik Jurgens called out in annoyance.986 The constitutional specialist 
denounced this form of ‘politics of ideology’ which, in his view, 
could not be legitimised on the basis of any national interest.’987 The 
Christians of the cu, on the other hand, complimented the Christian-
Democrats throughout Europe on a ‘nice, proactive proposal.’988 
At first sight, this political fuss in the Netherlands might be seen 
as a detail, not to be dwelled upon. But behind the debate an important 
new dimension is hidden. It certainly shows that the constitutional 
treaty could not be seen as merely dealing with the division of power. 
Essential questions of political identity were raised here: how would 
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the European polity define itself and how would this relate to the 
historically and culturally grown self-definition of the Dutch polity? 
The contestation on the content of the preamble demonstrates friction 
between, on the one hand, the foreign policy reflex of pragmatically 
focusing on power division, beneficial partnerships and moving along 
at the European negotiations table and national cultural traditions on 
the other. Uneasiness regarding the effects of European integration on 
national identity, in other words, already present in the intellectual 
debate since the 1990s, was searching its way into the political domain. 
In addition to the question whether the term ‘constitution’ or 
‘constitutional treaty’ should or should not be used in relation to the 
European Union and the matter of the preamble as an indication of 
the dilemma on what the constitutional treaty should or should not 
contain, a third issue of contestation to be inferred from the Dutch 
debate was if and how the new treaty related to the ultimate objective 
of European integration. In parliament still no consensus existed on 
whether the Union should take the form of a federation or should 
remain a looser – ‘sui generis’ – association of states cooperating only in 
certain fields. In the period running up to the start of the Convention, 
the PvdA had stated that it considered the traditional antithesis of 
intergovernmental versus supranational to be superseded: ‘Europe will 
always keep that hybrid character.’989 It held the view that this would 
not be changed by the adoption of the new, constitutional treaty for 
Europe. In the same debate, the sp and sgp both indicated that they 
saw the initiative of the development of a European Constitution to 
be strongly interwoven with the attempt to turn the European Union 
into a full-dress federation.990 And also the cda showed to have its 
eye, ultimately, on a federal structure for it still believed that this would 
(pre)serve the Dutch ‘singularity’ best: ‘if one wants to preserve a 
considerable degree of national individuality and national legal culture, 
the federal method is actually the only method to guarantee that 
national individuality’991
These divergent perceptions of the structure of the Union and 
the significance of adopting a constitutional treaty for this structure, 
indicates that in terms of constitutional conceptualisation the European 
Union was still contested within the Dutch political community. This 
leads to the observation that while the Dutch polity was working 
towards a constitutional treaty, it had not yet reached agreement on 
what exactly should be constituted. And also on the European level, 
this was not explicated. This most probably was what the former 
European judge, Jos Kapteyn, criticised in his 2002 oration when 
– citing the words of the American lawyer Paul Kahn – he argued: ‘The 
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political community must already understand itself in a certain way 
for the project of constitution writing and popular ratification to make 
sense’.992
A fourth and last issue that concerned the minds of many 
parliamentarians participating in the debates, was how to ‘democratise’, 
i.e. involve the Dutch people in the drafting process and adoption 
of the constitutional treaty. The constitutionalisation of Europe, 
as it was viewed by various parties in the Dutch parliament, was a 
process that presupposed, if not the will of the people, then at least 
their interest. But even in parliamentary circles, senator Erik Jurgens 
(PvdA) observed disappointedly, this interest seemed to be lacking: 
‘It is characteristic that as soon as Europe takes the floor the audience 
leave the room.’993 Member of the Convention on behalf of the Lower 
House, Frans Timmermans (PvdA), argued along the same line: ‘Look 
around in the room: again we are together as Europe-minded people 
who are interested in the subject anyhow. […] Everybody who is always 
present, was present again: the European Movement, the fnv [the 
biggest Trade Union in the Netherlands], the churches.’994 Combined 
with the observation that in the country a basic attitude had developed 
of ‘the only things that come from Europe are bad things’, they were 
reasons for Timmermans to worry about the future of the integration 
process.995 
The PvdA was confronted here with the logical, but unintended 
result of the administrative culture it had co-built and supported 
since 1953. Having structurally contributed to the preservation of the 
freedom of the government to act as it saw fit on the European stage and 
the habit of approving even the most far-reaching decisions without 
insisting on exceptional conditions, the political mainstream had from 
the early 1950s onwards contributed to a lack of fundamental political 
debate on the why’s and wherefore’s of European integration. As far as 
the process was debated in non-political circles – in academia, interest 
groups and, over time increasingly, in the media – the fundamental 
questions and criticism raised there, had never really been translated 
into political action in parliament, let alone translated to or discussed 
with the Dutch people. With a stable parliamentary majority in 
favour of progressive European integration and a national constitution 
functioning rather as a floodgate than a dike vis-à-vis the European legal 
order, such a debate had never been necessary from the point of view of 
political practice. The price, however, as it became visible in this new 
process of treaty making in which the involvement of the Dutch people 
was desired, was a lack of interest in and sense of affinity with what 
actually occurred on the European stage. 
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The social-democrats were not alone in observing and 
disapproving of a disconnection between those designing the new 
treaty and deciding on it and the Dutch people at large. From the most 
ardent advocates of a constitutional treaty to its fiercest critics, the 
will existed to bridge the gap that was felt to develop. Starting from 
different political angles, various parties came with the idea to break 
the lethargy of the Dutch people, in line with what GroenLinks had 
already proposed in the approval procedure on the Treaty of Nice: 
in the Netherlands a referendum should be held on the result of the 
Convention.996 
In the first years of the new millennium the political tide for the 
introduction of the referendum as a decision making instrument was 
favourable. Leefbaar Nederland, Pim Fortuyn and his lpf had pleaded 
for more direct involvement of the Dutch people in political decision 
making. D66, by its political nature, was in favour of administrative 
modernisation and, as a consequence, also of the introduction of the 
referendum as a means of decision making. As a coalition partner in 
the first Kok cabinet the party – together with the PvdA and vvd – had 
been responsible for putting forward a bill in parliament introducing 
the instrument of a corrective binding referendum. After this bill had 
been rejected,997 in July 2001 the Temporary Referendum Act – an act 
by which the Dutch people could insist on a consultative, not binding 
referendum – was adopted. With regard to organising a referendum 
on the result of the Convention, however, this act was not considered 
sufficient, since it left the initiative to insist on a referendum to the 
Dutch people and a referendum could only be held after the Lower 
House had approved the new treaty. In this particular process of 
European constitutionalisation, the only right way to involve the Dutch 
nation was getting to know its judgement on the treaty before the 
parliamentary approval procedure 
To this end, on 20 May 2003, the Bill on the Act Consultative 
Referendum European Constitution,998 was submitted by the MPs 
Farah Karimi (Groen Links) – the party that, since Maastricht, had 
pleaded for a referendum on crucial new steps in the integration 
process – Niesco Dubbelboer (PvdA) and Boris van der Ham (D66).999 
The bill laid down that if a constitutional treaty came about and had 
been signed by the Dutch government, the treaty would be presented 
for approval to the Dutch people before parliament would vote on it. 
Moreover, it was proposed that there would be no electoral treshold.1000 
The proposal, the explanatory memorandum shows, was founded 
on three motives: a positive outcome of the referendum would 
contribute to the legitimacy of parliamentary approval, the referendum 
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itself would encourage political participation and, lastly, a popular 
referendum was considered to form an important impetus for a public 
debate on European integration.1001 
With suggestions for the introduction of referenda being more or 
less common in the Dutch political domain in these years and this Bill 
thus perfectly matching the ‘spirit of the time’, it is easy to overlook 
the breakthrough that this proposal implied for the traditional decision 
making procedure concerning European treaties. It was the culmination 
of political pleas, which had been gaining strength since the Treaty of 
Maastricht, in which it had been argued that the process of European 
integration had progressed so far that it was high time to improve the 
approval procedure and/or give Dutch citizens a vote. As such, the 
proposal attacked the old consensus, guarded by a political majority 
since 1953, that for new European treaties a single parliamentary 
majority in accordance with Article 91, subsection 1 of the Dutch 
constitution sufficed, as long as deviation from the constitution 
was not clearly observed by a parliamentary majority; a thing that in 
political practice had never been the case. The proposed break with 
this constitutional tradition came with a risk: notwithstanding the 
consultative character of the proposed referendum, if the people of the 
Netherlands rejected the new treaty, it would be hard for parliament 
to justify a vote in favour. So the advocates of progressive European 
integration made themselves more vulnerable to a negative outcome; 
a fact that is likely to have contributed to the cda voting against the 
proposal. 
In the Lower House, in November 2003, eleven months before the 
Member State governments would eventually put their signature under 
the new treaty, a debate on the bill, in two terms, took place. Logically 
following from the proposal to break the fifty-year-old tradition 
of approving new European treaties with a simple parliamentary 
majority, the question came up why the new draft treaty legitimised 
a new approval procedure. The main argument of the initiators 
was that the constitutional Treaty was not another revision of the 
Treaties of Rome, but an unprecedented ‘milestone in the history of 
European integration.’1002 In addition to pointing out the benefits that a 
referendum would yield in bringing about a public debate on European 
integration and strengthening the legitimacy of a parliamentary vote 
in favour, the particular character of the treaty, Farah Karimi (gl) 
claimed, made a special approval procedure necessary.1003 This special 
character was to be found in the new and/or further reaching conferral 
of competences in the fields of foreign affairs, criminal law and the 
adoption of the human rights catalogue. 
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The main rebuttal of the cda, which was not too fond of the idea 
of a referendum, was that it was not convinced that the constitutional 
treaty was different – in kind – when compared to previous European 
Treaties and therefore, in their view, the plea for a different form 
of approval lacked validity.1004 The party protested the stance that 
important competences were transferred and emphasised that 
– contrary to what the bill on the referendum suggested – just another 
treaty was to be signed here; a treaty that would by no means take the 
place of the Dutch constitution.1005 In rejecting the introduction of a 
referendum, the cda was supported by the sgp and cu, which were of 
the opinion that the igc should express itself on the treaty before the 
suggestion of a referendum could even be considered.1006 Moreover, 
these three parties, but in particular the sgp, wondered, even if the new 
treaty was really special from a constitutional point of view to such 
extent that a special approval procedure was needed, why there should 
be this insistence on approval via referendum instead of approval in 
accordance with article 91, subsection 3 of the Dutch constitution – the 
article asking for approval by a two-thirds parliamentary majority? 
It had been designed for Treaties with a great impact on the Dutch 
constitution and therefore approval of the constitutional Treaty in 
accordance with this article would match the constitutional logics in the 
Netherlands more than introducing the instrument of the consultative 
referendum.1007
From defence towards consensus 
Since the document produced by the European Convention had no 
formal status until it had been approved in the igc that followed it, the 
parliamentary debate on the draft treaty could only have a provisional, 
open end. Nonetheless, the arguments and remonstrations against the 
various concerns in parliament are interesting here as portents of what 
was to follow. 
With regard to the parliamentary doubts and criticism on the 
use of the term ‘constitution’ in relation to the European Union, it 
stands out that Balkenende and his colleagues in government tended 
to distance themselves from this choice. Not accepting responsibility 
for the political choices of the second Kok administration which was 
involved in the negotiations in Nice and Laeken, the State Secretary of 
European Affairs in both Balkenende cabinets, Atzo Nicolaï, stated: 
‘Nor is it our choice, but the Laken Declaration already makes mention 
of a Constitution for Europe.’1008 By means of this fait accompli line of 
reasoning the responsibility for the name of the Treaty was rhetorically 
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shifted from the current cabinet to a time in which others were in 
charge. 
Adding to the conceptual complexity of the discussion instead 
of clarifying it, Nicolaï went on: ‘What we do want is a treaty 
which includes fundamental principles. That treaty may be called a 
constitutional treaty then. That way it has been put somewhat more 
precisely.’1009 On the exact conceptual difference between the two 
Nicolaï kept silent, but from the following remark in the Upper House 
it can be inferred that a qualitative difference was intended here: ‘You 
might call it a constitutional treaty, but from a legal point of view it 
cannot be called a constitution.’1010 It seems that Nicolaï thus tried to 
downplay ideas circulating in parliament, that something extremely 
special was to happen here, upgrading the European Union to a statelike 
entity. Prime minister Balkenende reinforced Nicolaï’s claim: ‘In essence 
the European constitution remains a treaty and it has no other influence 
on Dutch laws than normal treaties.’ 1011
Interestingly, parallel to this downplaying of the impact of the 
constitutional Treaty, the consequences of rejecting the Treaty were 
blown up by the Dutch government. Similar to the attitude of the 
various successive governments in previous debates on the approval 
of European treaties, misfortune was predicted in case the treaty was 
not approved. An example is found in the following words of Jan Peter 
Balkenende: ‘There is much at stake of course. Do we choose in favour 
of stagnation, that is decline, or do we opt for progress?’1012 According to 
him, ‘the fall-back option Nice’ was the only alternative in case the igc 
negotiations on the new treaty failed.1013 Since Nice offered less in terms 
of transparency, democracy and decisiveness, the government and 
those supporting progressive integration agreed, such a relapse should 
be prevented.1014 
One wonders whether these opposite movements – downplaying 
the legal implications of the new treaty while simultaneously 
emphasising the importance of its approval – benefitted the 
government in reaching its political goals. Indeed, this strategy had 
been applied before and in circumstances when a stable political 
majority was in favour of new steps towards further European 
integration anyway. It had never caused any damage. This time, 
however, the government had to deal with the possibility of a popular 
referendum, introduced in the approval procedure. The organisation 
of such an event implied that the Dutch people should be convinced 
of the value, purpose and/or harmlessness of this new step. Strongly 
emphasising the importance of the new treaty, while distancing 
itself from its constitutional title, aura and implications, defied basic 
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lessons in political communication of unambiguousness and staying 
on message. A thing that, the course of the approval procedure would 
show, would backfire on the Balkenende administration. 
The issue of elements that the constitutional treaty should and 
should not contain and how to harmonise it with Dutch cultural 
and constitutional traditions was disposed of in a few words. It was 
dismissed with the remark that the government would keep an eye 
on the matter and – to this end – had asked the Council of State for a 
preliminary advice.1015 With regard to the recording of a preamble in 
which specific reference to an underlying Judeo-Christian European 
religious foundation would be made, the government, it has been stated 
already, obstinately pursued its own course; an attitude resented by 
parliament and, as a result, contributing to political contestation about 
the draft treaty. 
Leaving all options open as it had been the custom for five decades, 
the government did not give in to the temptation of being coaxed 
into a final statement on the eventual end that the new treaty would 
lead to; a remarkable thing, as the concept of the constitutional treaty 
had its origin in the discussion on finalité of the process of European 
integration. Apparently pragmatic as ever, the government refused 
to commit itself to a scenario that after signing and ratification of the 
draft treaty the integration process would be completed. Protesting 
against labelling the new treaty in terms of the bringing about of a 
European federation, i.e. finalité, the experienced diplomat and Minister 
of Foreign Affairs under Balkenende ii, Bernard Bot (cda), who had 
succeeded Jaap de Hoop Scheffer in December 2003 after his departure 
to nato, claimed in parliament: ‘For if you want finalité, it is over and 
that is actually a thing all of us do not want!’1016 
Bot, however, did not make clear what ‘all of us’ wanted then. 
He clearly did not reckon with the growing minority of political 
antagonists of progressive integration. Had the aim of ‘an ever closer 
Union – set in Rome in 1957 and supported ever since – made way for 
the even more intangible ideal of a never ending process of unification? 
Or did the draft treaty, from a Dutch perspective, not succeed in making 
the Union close enough? Such questions were not dealt with. 
The parliamentary initiative for a referendum had taken 
the government and others closely involved in the process of the 
Convention by surprise. While negotiating the treaty, diplomats had 
never reckoned with this possibility as is revealed by the Permanent 
Representative of the Netherlands with the eu in the first stage of the 
Convention, Bernard Bot: 
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‘ We thought it was going to be ratified, it was a beautiful treaty 
and yes, that is a treaty which will help us a bit forward. […] No 
one of the negotiators in those days dreamt of us getting into the 
ditch of a referendum.’1017
Not surprisingly, therefore, the government was by no means 
enthusiastic about the proposal of GroenLinks, Pvda and D66. In line 
with how successive Dutch governments had structurally approached 
international negotiations, it was considered of great importance that 
once the cabinet would give its signature to the treaty in the igc, the 
treaty would be approved on the national level. As long as everything 
was dealt with within the walls of parliament, as had until then always 
been the case, the government had little to fear. With the mostly pro-
European parties of cda, vvd, D66 and PvdA still having 120 of 150 
seats in parliament, they simply had the support of a majority and even 
if it was decided to take the path of Article 91, subsection 3, a two-thirds 
majority was within easy reach. The experiment with the referendum, 
however, would in this regard introduce an undesired unpredictability. 
The argument in which the government wrapped its 
dissatisfaction with the proposal varied from the remark that in a 
referendum, voters never strictly stuck to the question they were 
supposed to give their verdict on – referenda far too easily got the 
character of ‘a plebiscite for or against government policy in general’ – to 
the concern that a referendum might result in the loss of precious time, 
leaving the European partners waiting for the Netherlands and the view 
that if a referendum should take place at any cost, the arrangements as 
prescribed by the Temporary Referendum Act would suffice.1018 
Unfortunately for the government, however, the initiators of the 
referendum received important support for their initiative from the 
highest legal advisory board in the Netherlands: the Council of State. 
In its advice on their bill of 14 July 2003, invalidating the governmental 
claim that the document was nothing special, the Council referred to its 
position concerning the special constitutional character of the Treaty. It 
stated that: 
‘ in the European Constitution the […] Charter of Fundamental 
Rights will be included […] Fundamental rights are an essential 
element of a Constitution in a democratic constitutional state. 
Moreover, by accepting the treaty to establish a Constitution for 
Europe one European Constitution comes into being, in which 
the (altered) institutional relationships and decision-making […] 
will be settled.’1019 
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Because of this special constitutional character, the Council of State 
continued, ‘Approval of the treaty […] could to a certain extent be 
likened to a constitutional reform.’1020 Therefore, the Council advised 
an approval procedure more in line with the procedure applied in case 
of a constitutional reform.1021 
Something fundamental is indicated by this fragment from 
the advice of the Council of State. Here it becomes clear that the 
introduction of the terms ‘fundamental rights’ and ‘constitution’ 
opened the way for a different form of approval in the Netherlands. 
After fifty years of applying the constitutional logics of Article 91 
another route was advised in relation to the Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe. The constitutional elements of this treaty, 
were crucial in effectuating this shift in the procedural perspective on 
the organisation of a referendum. 
For the Council to reach the conclusion that a referendum was 
to be held on the basis of the observation that the new European 
treaty had constitutional implications, certain remarkable mental 
leaps were needed in which practical objections went before accepted 
procedures. In the Dutch constitution it was laid down that, in case of a 
constitutional revision, Article 137 applied. The article provided for the 
processes of constitutional revisions to be approved via two readings in 
parliament, with the dissolution of the Lower House and new elections 
in between. In addition it set out that, in the second reading, a two-
thirds majority in both Houses was required.1022 
The key-element of the article was that it guaranteed the 
organisation of elections. In this way the consultation of the people 
was provided for. In relation to the approval of the constitutional 
treaty, however, this element was considered as a setback since the 
dissolution of the Lower House and the organisation of elections would 
delay the ratification procedure of the Treaty considerably. For that 
reason, the Council of State agreed with the initiators of the bill that the 
organisation of a consultative referendum might be a good alternative. 
Since a referendum would imply a consultation of the people – the key-
requirement of Article 137 of the Dutch constitution – and would in 
addition come with some organisational benefits, the Council argued, 
approval via a referendum should be preferred.1023 
Substituting the procedure of Article 137 by a referendum was 
far from obvious. On this point, the exact reasoning of the Council of 
State remains mysterious. In its advice the advisory board stated that 
implementation of the procedure as stated in Article 137 was ‘for various 
reasons not very realistic’ and that a referendum would be a good 
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substitute.1024 It failed, however, to substantiate these claims with clear 
legal logic. Also the Constitutional Department of the Dutch Ministry 
of the Interior was amazed: ‘That they were rather uncritical and 
supported the idea of a referendum, that was a surprise.’1025 The advice 
again illustrates how in the Netherlands, at certain crucial moments in 
history, practical objections from a foreign policy point of view were 
given priority over fixed constitutional principles. This time, however, 
those in favour of progressive integration were going to pay for this. 
6.4  A Harsh Reality: Towards 1 June 2005… 
On 25 November 2003, the private member’s bill Karimi/Dubbelboer/
Van der Ham was adopted in the Lower House by a broad majority; 
GroenLinks, PvdA, D66, vvd, lpf and sp voted in its favour. On 25 
January 2005, approval in the Upper House followed.1026 In between 
these voting rounds, the long awaited igc took place in which the 
leaders of government of the eu Member States considered the result 
of the Convention. During this igc, the ‘frame’ of the treaty, as regards 
its title, the recording of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
the like, was left intact. But issues regarding the division of power, 
between both the institutions of the Union and the various Member 
States, needed to be settled before an agreement could be reached. 
Illustrative in this respect are the long-winded discussions on the 
number of Commissioners in the European Commission. The small eu 
Member States feared the relative loss of power if the principle of one 
commissioner per state was to be abandoned. There were worries about 
the preservation of the right of veto in various policy areas, budget 
matters being one of them, and, last but not least, difference of opinion 
on the content of the preamble had to be bridged. 
After various preparatory meetings of the ministers of foreign 
affairs in May and June 2004, in which the various bottlenecks were 
diplomatically dealt with one by one, the European leaders reached an 
agreement on a new treaty at the summit of 17 and 18 June 2004. On 29 
October then, the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe was 
signed in an official ceremony on the same spot where it had all started 
in 1957: the Piazza del Campidoglio in Rome.
The signing ceremony occurred under the chairmanship of 
the Netherlands; a organisational particularity that the Dutch, keen 
on international prestige, did not intend to let pass unnoticed. The 
government had designed a pen for all signatories, made of platinum 
and wood, bearing a Latin text referring to the occasion and its 
Dutch chairmanship: ‘the European constitution has been signed 
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during the Dutch chairmanship of the European Union in Rome 
on 29 October 2004.’1027 It seems to have been meant to be a lasting 
memory of the Dutch positive contribution, in a crucial role, to 
what would be – anticipating a positive outcome of the ratification 
procedure – a historic step in the history of the world: the formal 
constitutionalisation of the eu, which would make all previous 
European treaties irrelevant.
Starting with a preamble in which they, among other things, 
expressed to ‘draw inspiration’ from the ‘cultural, religious and 
humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the 
universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human 
person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law’, the eu 
Member States declared to be set on transcending ‘their former 
divisions and, united ever more closely, to forge a common destiny.’1028 
The 1957 objective of ‘an ever closer union’ had, by now, been translated 
into a state of being in which the ‘unitedness’ of the members was 
presented as the new starting point to work from. After the preamble, 
an immensely complex text of 500 pages followed, not easy to read, let 
alone fully to be fathomed, even by experienced lawyers. It consisted 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights – the eu henceforth formally 
had its own fundamental rights catalogue, in addition to those of 
the individual Member States – a part on the general policy lines of 
the Union, some final remarks on the working, continuity, revision, 
etcetera of the treaty and an extensive series of additional protocols 
and annexes. Nowhere, however, did the text become concrete on the 
constitutional form of the eu. Was it a confederation, a federation or 
something else? A question that remains unanswered in the text of 
the treaty, but on which various authors in the Netherlands were clear. 
They viewed the treaty as another step in the taking shape of a (federal) 
statelike European structure.1029 
The position of the government
Considering its efforts to close the igc with a signed agreement, 
it is not to be wondered at that the Balkenende ii cabinet fiercely 
defended the treaty in parliament. Of course, the government was 
politically strongly devoted to get the treaty approved. In the week 
after the closing of the June summit, the government emphasised 
the institutional improvements that approval of the treaty would 
bring. The strengthening of the position of the Commission and the 
European Parliament vis-à-vis the Council, for instance, matched the 
old wish of a political majority to supranationalise and democratise 
the eu institutions. Extending decision making by the method of qmv 
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had succeeded whereas – also corresponding to Dutch preferences – 
budget matters remained to be decided on the basis of unanimity.1030 
The original objectives of the Laeken Declaration, the ambitions of the 
government and the eventual result of the negotiations were put side by 
side by the Dutch government: 
‘ more transparency, more democracy and more decisiveness 
[…] The government is of the opinion that this treaty is good 
for Europe and for the European citizens. […] Besides, priorities 
given by the Netherlands, can be easily found again in the result of 
the negotiations. The treaty is also good for the Netherlands.’1031
On the issues of institutionalisation of a permanent president of the 
European Council and a specific Judaeo-Christian reference not being 
recorded in the preamble of the treaty1032 – fields in which the Dutch 
government had not reached its initial goals and had, in fact, suffered 
quite heavy diplomatic losses – the government stated that it had 
accepted the compromises reached.1033 
In the formal written presentation of the treaty to parliament, 
the government went all out on the significance of the new treaty. 
With regard to its formal title and its Dutch abbreviation as the 
‘European Constitution’ it pointed to the further-reaching conferment 
of competences of the Member States on the European level of 
governance, the progress made in bringing about a separation of powers 
on this level, and the recording of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
On the basis of these various aspects, it concluded that the new treaty 
showed ‘such likeness to national constitutions, in a political sense at 
any rate, that it can be said to be a constitution.’1034 Stressing its political 
importance further, the government in a rather contradictionary way 
stated that the treaty at issue was to be seen as the ‘provisional final 
[sic!] piece’ or, more unequivocal, ‘the pinnacle’ of an institutional and 
substantive political reform which had been started with the sea in 
1986.1035 
Interesting in relation to this emphasis on the special political 
importance is the conclusion of the government, expressed in the 
explanatory memorandum, that the new treaty did not relate to the 
national constitution of the Netherlands in any specific way. In a, by 
Dutch standards, extensive section on the constitutional aspects of 
approval of the new treaty, the government explored the provisions 
of the European constitution on the basis of which incompatibility 
with the Dutch constitution might be established; a situation that 
would lead to the conclusion that, in parliament – regardless of the 
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result of the consultative referendum – a two-thirds majority (Article 
91, subsection 3) in favour would be needed in order to approve the 
treaty. In particular, the government indicated, it had scrutinised those 
treaty provisions in which ‘competences of a completely new character’ 
would be created for the eu.1036 The government counted six in total.1037 
Among these issues were the precedence of Union law over national 
law, which was explicitly laid down in the new treaty (Article I-6), 
a series of exclusive competences of the Union (Article 1-13),1038 and 
the exclusive competence of the ecj to rule in conflicts related to the 
application of ownership rights, established by the new treaty, whereas 
previously community patents had been dealt with before national 
judges.1039 On all these and some more issues, the government reached 
the conclusion that the provisions in the treaty were nothing more 
than the formal treaty confirmation of customs and jurisprudence that 
had developed in the previous decades and that the Dutch constitution 
did not mention the impossibility of transfer of such competences.1040 
In each separate case, the government underlined its conclusion with 
references to the Dutch constitutional tradition of openness vis-à-
vis the European order. Concretely, it referred, repeatedly, to Article 
92, which made the conferment of competences on international 
organisations explicitly possible and also, in its defence, to the motion-
Brinkhorst c.s. of 1980, which stated that ‘in case of doubt, provisions of 
the Constitution should be explained in such a way that the European 
integration process is not hindered by it.’1041 
In its appeal to the constitutional tradition of openness, in order 
to have the new treaty approved by a simple parliamentary majority, 
the Balkenende administration ignored the Council of State’s advice 
on the Bill Karimi/Dubbelboer/Van der Ham of 14 July 2003. No 
attention was paid to the conclusion of the Council that to the new 
treaty could be attributed a special constitutional character and that 
for that reason its approval could to a certain extent be likened to a 
constitutional reform and should be treated accordingly.1042 In spite 
of the Council’s observation that this new treaty deserved a special 
approval procedure – the observation on the basis of which the Council 
had advised in favour of a consultative referendum – the government 
stuck to old parliamentary conventions. These conventions, it has 
been pointed out, had hitherto systematically worked in favour of the 
political aim of the government, i.e. a smooth parliamentary approval 
of new European treaties without hiccups or undesired delays. The fact 
that this time a consultative referendum would precede the approval 
procedure in parliament, did not seem to alter anything in the view of 
the government. In the explanatory memorandum, it did not pay any 
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substantive attention to the consequences of the organisation and the 
possible results of such a referendum. 
The Council of State noted the strong reliance of the government 
on fixed constitutional traditions in relation to the new, rather 
untraditional Constitution for Europe. And although the Council 
did not meddle with the conclusion of the government that there 
was no direct conflict between the provisions of the eu constitution 
and the national constitutional provisions, on the basis of its form 
and provisions it concluded that with the adoption of the first, the 
latter needed to be adapted. According to the Council, Article 92 of 
the Dutch constitution for instance, stating that ‘organisations under 
international law can by, or by virtue of an agreement be assigned 
powers of legislation, administration and jurisdiction’, which had been 
regarded for many years as the basis for the transference of sovereign 
competences to the eec/eu, did not comply with the European 
reality any longer after the new treaty entered into force.1043 European 
decision making, the Council explained, to an ever greater extent could 
only be partly seen as a product of an internal, European process of 
decision making: ‘To be sure, the final voting behaviour in the Council 
of Ministers is determined by instructions agreed on in the [Dutch] 
Meeting of the Cabinet, but although Dutch people do participate 
in many European bodies, ‘the Netherlands’ itself does not.’1044 The 
Council argued that, by now, the European and national constitutional 
structure had become interwoven to such an extent, that the Dutch 
constitutional qualification of participation in the process of European 
integration – as it had existed since 1953 – did no longer satisfy: 
‘ Now that the European Union explicitly shows itself to be a 
constitutional order, the Council thinks that the moment has 
come for the Kingdom of the Netherlands not to confine itself 
any longer in its Constitution to general rules for participation 
in organisations under international law. That is why the 
Council recommends […] an explication of the desirability of a 
constitutional provision geared to the character of the eu.’1045 
Here the formal constitutional manifestation of the Union by way of 
the new Treaty was marked as a development with implications for 
the national constitutional order and traditions as they had developed 
since 1953. It was a call for a parliamentary reconsideration of those 
constitutional arrangements which had structurally guaranteed the 
Dutch government its freedom to act on the international stage. 
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The Dutch government was of course not immediately afire with 
enthusiasm when confronted with this view. In its reaction to the 
Council’s stance it remained deaf to the recommendation of a revision 
of the Dutch constitution; something strategically comprehensible 
because this matter was of no immediate importance to the central 
question whether the new treaty would be approved or not and, 
moreover, not in the direct political interest of the government. The 
silence of the government, however, did not alter the fact that the 
question on compatibility of the European integration process with the 
Dutch national constitutional order had been brought up. Again, and 
just before the run-up to the Dutch referendum on the Constitutional 
Treaty was about to begin. 
Debate in and outside of parliament 
Since the Dutch States-General, by means of a vote in favour in the 
Upper House in January 2005, had accepted the idea of organising 
a consultative referendum on the Constitutional Treaty, the 
parliamentary order laid down that a parliamentary debate on the 
approval of the European Constitution could be held only after such a 
referendum had taken place. Nonetheless, in parliament many had an 
opinion of course on the result of the igc and did not hesitate to express 
it whenever they got the chance. 
On 23 June 2004, less than a week after the June summit and more 
than six months before the referendum had been definitely decided on, 
the political parties in the Lower House could give their first reactions 
to the constitutional treaty. In the autumn of 2004, various other 
debates followed as part of the debate in parliament on ‘the State of the 
European Union’ – the annual report of government, introduced in 
1999, by which it expounds on its European agenda of the upcoming 
parliamentary year – and after a new bi-annual meeting of the European 
Council had taken place. Moreover, the parliamentary Committee on 
European Affairs made a study of the treaty, in preparation of a plenary 
debate, which it finished in late April 2005; only a month before the 
referendum would take place eventually. 
Although the proceedings of the Committee on European Affairs 
show that many questions existed with regard to the new treaty, in 
general it can be observed that the final result of the igc did not change 
the views in parliament as they had developed since the start of the igc 
in October 2003. Depending on their political colour, the advocates 
of progressive European integration saw various shortcomings 
and flaws in the final treaty. Eventually, however, the parties of the 
political mainstream (PvdA, D66, cda and vvd) adopted once more 
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– in parliament little had changed in all these years – the argument of 
succession-line of reasoning as is clear from, for instance, the words 
of one vvd MP’s: ‘The question then is: is the constitutional treaty a 
change for the better compared to Nice or is it not? […] My conclusion 
is: those who approved the Nice Treaty, now have an extra reason to 
approve this constitutional treaty.’1046 
In campaigning against the constitutional label and characteristics 
of the document, the Protestant-conservative parties, as always 
amongst the most sceptical about the process of European integration, 
also stuck to their old convictions and argumentative structures. André 
Rouvoet of the cu for instance stated: ‘We are not (….) waiting for a 
constitution and this is supposed to be a constitution’1047 This view 
was supported by the sgp, the lpf, the sp and the mp without party 
affiliations Geert Wilders.1048 Apart from the constitutional label, these 
parties objected to what they saw as pitfalls of the Treaty. The sgp, for 
instance, fumed at the text of the preamble, in particular at the lack of 
an explicit reference to the Judaeo-Christian heritage, a thing which 
this Conservative-Protestant party had liked to have seen incorporated 
in the text. The sp still protested against, among other things, the 
‘neoliberal character’ of the constitution ‘which demands competition 
in all fields.’1049 These were by no means surprising notes from these 
parties that had, just like its predecessors, structurally criticised the 
necessity, character and content of the constitutional treaty. So far, the 
Dutch political settling of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for 
Europe predicted few or no surprises. 
A new and uneasy experience: campaigning for treaty approval
In the first semester of 2005 there was a drastic change in the business 
as usual character, when, after the Upper House approval of private 
member’s bill Karimi/Dubbelboer/Van der Ham, preparations 
started for an event that had not taken place in the Netherlands since 
1797: a national referendum. In early February 2005, an independent 
committee had been set up by the Lower House that would take care 
of all practical matters related to the organisation of the referendum. 
Its main tasks were to set the date of the event, to formulate the 
referendum question, to provide the Dutch citizen with an objective, 
non-political summary of the treaty and to supply both advocates 
and opponents of approval of the treaty with subsidy budgets for 
media-campaigns in which they could make their views public. The 
committee consisted of various former politicians of divergent political 
currents and did its work under the chairmanship of the professor of 
Constitutional Law, Tijn Kortman. On 23 February, it was announced 
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that the date of the referendum was set for 1 June 2005. The question 
that would be presented to the Dutch people was: ‘Are you in favour 
or against approval by the Netherlands of the Treaty Establishing 
a Constitution for Europe?’ In deliberation with parliament it was 
agreed that the government would be responsible for a campaign in 
favour of approval of the treaty.1050 The availability of politically neutral 
information on the treaty would be guaranteed by the independent 
referendum committee. 
In February 2005, still, little firework was expected from the 
governmental campaign in favour of approval of the treaty. Although 
recent years had shown a clear increase in the political and public 
criticism and doubts on the process of European integration, the 
Eurobarometer of late 2004 had still shown a Dutch majority of over 
70% supporting membership of the European Union in general.1051 
On the particular issue of the adoption of a European Constitution 
– regardless of the exact text of such a constitution, since that was 
not yet known among the wider public – even 73% had responded in 
support.1052 These were figures that, certainly in combination with an 
over 80% support in parliament for the new treaty, must have inspired 
great confidence in a positive outcome with the Balkenende ii cabinet. 
1053
In the campaign, however, week after week the ‘yes’-camp 
saw its chances diminishing. The referendum and the campaign 
leading up to it, implied a completely new game for the members of 
government, who were the product of a political culture that had since 
1953 reserved decision making on European affairs to a homogenous 
governmental and parliamentary elite which had structurally avoided 
the development of a public debate on the subject. Now that approval 
of successive European treaties had hardly been taken any notice of 
by the Dutch society at large and this nationwide debate on their use, 
necessity and consequences had therefore never really developed, the 
government now was given the task to make its case in favour of the 
constitution for the Dutch people and to convince them that this was a 
great thing, worthy of approval. They turned out not to be really cut for 
that role. 
Summarising the many remarkable acts and statements from 
the side of the Dutch government between the announcement of 
the referendum in February and its actual occurrence on 1 June, the 
first sign of this unease with its new role was the refusal of various 
members of government to actively campaign in favour of a ‘yes.’ 
Famous and illustrative in this respect, is the remark of then Minister of 
Finance Gerrit Zalm (vvd) that he ‘did not like flyering.’1054 A second 
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indication of the government operating out of its comfort zone was 
the publishing and selling of the ‘constitution paper’ in March 2005, 
in order to inform the Dutch people on the treaty and in which 448 
(!) of the articles of the constitutional treaty were printed in full.1055 
The result was a completely incomprehensible product for any non-
expert in European affairs and its typical jargon such as ‘communautair’ 
and ‘subsidiarity’. The complaints on the campaigning strategy of the 
government poured in. Advertising experts, (Euro)parliamentarians 
and research authorities agreed that the paper nourished ignorance and 
confusion among the Dutch people with regard to the constitutional 
treaty, did not give any insight in the pros and cons of its approval and, 
in fact, mainly communicated the message not to be read at all.1056 A 
new disappointment followed when it turned out that civil society 
organisations from which the governmental campaigning team had 
expected support, to an important extent refused to take an active role 
in the campaign.1057 
These setbacks and the negative publicity that followed from it 
got reflected in the opinion polls of March and April 2005, showing a 
decline in support for the new treaty among the Dutch people. This 
negative trend affected in its turn the spirits in the political camp that 
supported the treaty. The pressure on the government to declare itself 
explicitly in favour of the treaty rose.1058 In various ultimate attempts 
to turn the tide, in late April and May, the members of the government 
brought the most heavy rhetorical canon to bear in their pleas for a yes-
vote. Clearly not fully relying on the persuasiveness vis-à-vis the Dutch 
people of the ‘regular’ economic and internationalist political motives 
and arguments of succession it had come off well with when debating 
with parliament, the various members of the government tried to raise 
the stakes by arguing that rejection of the treaty implied no less than 
‘putting the future on the line’ and asking for disaster.1059 By rejecting 
the treaty, the Minister of Justice, Piet Hein Donner, claimed, the people 
of the Netherlands risked disintegration in Europe, comparable to what 
had happened in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s.1060 Prime 
Minister Balkenende walked a similar path when he, in an interview 
in one of the Netherlands’ leading newspapers, alluded to the risk of a 
new Auschwitz in case the treaty would not be adopted; an allusion he 
repeated in a speech at a memorial service of the Second World War at 
the American Military Cemetery, at Margraten.1061 Last but not least, on 
10 May the then Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Economic Affairs, 
Laurens Jan Brinkhorst, was cited to have said that from an economic 
perspective, in case the constitutional treaty was rejected, ‘in time the 
lights would go out in the Netherlands.’1062
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These dramatic forecasts with regard to a rejection of the treaty, 
designed according to the theme of the Netherlands needing foreign 
partners for its economic and political well-being, but adding a good 
share of drama to it, turned out to be counterproductive in this new 
game of involving the Dutch people in European decision making. 
Soon, the Dutch media solely paid attention to the doom scenario’s 
sketched by the government and their effectiveness with the Dutch 
people, who did not feel taken seriously by a government that availed 
itself of such rhetorical intimidation.1063 
The negative attention for the campaign of the government 
and, by effect, also for the political position it advocated was grist 
to the mill of the political antagonists of approval of the treaty. The 
French rejection of the treaty on 29 May only added to their favourable 
tide. The consistent lines of argument of parties such as the sp and 
cu, traditionally critical of the integration process, in which it was 
emphasised that the effect of rejection of the treaty would most 
probably be that the European Union would enter a phase of reflection, 
which might ultimately lead to a new and better treaty, turned out 
to work wonderfully for them.1064 Their anti ‘super state’ rhetoric, 
which made a much stronger case now that the eu had written its own 
constitution, helped to convince more and more people to vote against 
the new treaty. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Bernard Bot would 
later admit that the political choice in favour of the constitutional label 
turned out to be crucial here:
‘ that has been a fatal mistake. […] For those against it was easy 
to use that word. It was the axe, the gun, the rifle , you name 
it, with which they went to battle: “ Have a good look, you are 
bamboozled, constitution yes, there you go! The last piece of what 
is left of control, is being wasted.”’1065
As a consequence of the inability of the Dutch government to gear up to 
the perception of the Dutch people of what was at stake and the success 
of the political critics in this respect, opinion polls kept showing a 
decrease in the percentage of people intending to vote in favour of the 
treaty.1066 
This study has shown that the inability of the government to 
both understand the inner working of constitution making at the 
European level and the feelings and concerns of the Dutch people, 
the latter of which showed itself painfully during the campaign, 
had developed over a long period of time. From the early start of the 
process onwards, unifying Europe had been dealt with as a business of 
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foreign affairs, implying that it was left to the hands of the successive 
governments and their civil servants. For years and years, a political 
majority in parliament had kept the ranks closed and, served by the 
constitutional arrangements introduced in 1953, had been able to brush 
aside fundamental questions on harmonising the political identity 
of the nation-state of the Netherlands with the political identity of a 
unifying Europe. Even when in Dutch society, from the second half 
of the 1980s onwards, the call for answers to these questions became 
louder and public intellectual criticism on the casualness of the Dutch 
dealing with progressive European integration and its results increased, 
the political and constitutional traditions of the country kept serving 
as a safeguard for the political majority supporting government to 
move on. Traditions, that were firmly rooted in the mindset of a stable 
political majority regarding what was best for the Netherlands in an 
international setting. Traditions also, that kept essential conceptual 
difficulties hidden. In that way, a gap could develop between Dutch 
society, in which more and more critical sounds were heard and 
its political elite that unheedingly proceeded its own plan. A fatal 
combination of political miscalculation in the Convention, most 
importantly the underestimation of the impact of the constitutional 
label of the new treaty and political attention for direct democracy 
reaching a historic peak, brought this gap – hitherto latently present, but 
largely remaining without political consequences – to the surface. 
On the day of the referendum, 1 June 2005, the eventual result of 
the vote surpassed the worst case scenario foreseen by the government, 
the ministries involved and advocates of the treaty in parliament.1067 
With a turnout of over 63%, more than 61% of the Dutch voters 
had rejected the treaty. The Hague bubble of progressive European 
integration as the only option available, had burst. On 2 June 2005, the 
Dutch government and parliament gathered to observe that there was 
only one conclusion possible: the Dutch nation had spoken and its 
political representatives would follow its verdict.1068 
6.5  …and Beyond
The eventual result of the revolutionary breakthrough in the Dutch 
political and constitutional culture struck a blow to the notion that the 
process of European integration would benefit from democratisation of 
the national decision making process. Despite initial intentions in the 
political domain to get a broad discussion on the future of the eu going 
in the Netherlands – a discussion in which politicians, civil society 
and citizens would be asked to participate – in everyday political and 
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parliamentary practice old habits turned out to be tenacious. In the 
aftermath of the referendum, much of the national debate focused on 
‘what had gone wrong’ in the run-up to the referendum and who and 
what was to blame for the outcome. As mentioned in the introduction 
of this study, many explanations came up, varying from distrust in the 
Balkenende government to fear among the Dutch of further expansion 
of the Union, in particular the accession of Turkey.1069 Nowhere, 
however, was the outcome directly connected to deeper historical 
causes. Although it was observed that the debate in the Netherlands 
on European integration had been characterised by ‘depoliticisation’, 
the historical roots of this trait in the Dutch political culture and the 
mindset of the Dutch polity continued to be given little attention.1070 
In the political domain, soul searching completely failed to occur. The 
social-liberal mp Boris van der Ham (D66), one of the initiators of the 
referendum, observed in 2007 that in the run up to the elections of the 
Lower House in the autumn of 2006, parties had avoided the theme 
of European integration. ‘For fear of touching the voter on the raw’, he 
claimed, ‘most political parties avoided the subject like the plague.’1071 
But while the Dutch political elite hoped to nurse its wounds 
by ignoring them, European reality moved on. In the spring of 2008, 
the Dutch parliament was presented the Bill of approval of the Treaty 
of Lisbon, signed on 13 December 2007. Stripped of its constitutional 
appearance – it had no constitutional reference in its name, references 
to the eu anthem and flag had been removed and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights was no longer an integral part of the treaty – it 
has been established by many that this treaty, substantively, did not 
differ much from its predecessor. In the words of Giscard d’Estaing, the 
originator of the constitutional treaty: ‘Dans le traité de Lisbonne, rédigé 
exclusivement à partir du projet de traité constitutionnel, les outils sont 
exactement les mêmes. Seul l’ordre a été changé dans la boîte à outils.’1072 
These changes of the treaty, however, were not without political 
relevance. In the Netherlands they offered the government – meanwhile 
the fourth Balkenende cabinet (cda, PvdA and cu) had entered the 
stage – the possibility to return to the well-tried approval procedure of 
before 1 June 2005. The treaty was presented to parliament for approval 
by a simple majority in accordance with Article 91, subsection 1 of the 
Dutch Constitution.1073 In defence of this proposal the government 
referred in the first place to the observation of the Council of State that 
the new treaty markedly distinguished itself from the constitutional 
treaty, thus suggesting that a special approval procedure was not 
necessary.1074 Subsequently, in line with what had been argued in 
relation to the provisions of the constitutional treaty, the stance of the 
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government was that the provisions did not make changes of the Dutch 
constitution necessary. For that reason, the government reasoned, 
a special two-thirds majority was not necessary for its approval.1075 
Although this viewpoint of the government led to complaints with 
the parties advocating, for democratic reasons, another referendum 
– GroenLinks, D66, the sp and the pvv – a political majority agreed 
that approval could take place in accordance with the proposal of the 
government. On 17 June 2008, the Lower House accepted the Bill of 
approval with the support of the coalition parties – now that they bore 
the responsibility of being a governing party, even the Eurosceptics 
of the cu voted in favour – Groen Links, D66 and the vvd. On 8 July, 
approval in the Upper House followed. The ranks had been closed again. 
The eu could quietly march forward without the popular unrest that 
the referendum had caused. 
As far as quietly marching forward was the objective, the 
years that have followed have shown an erratic course. The financial 
destabilisation of the international markets since 2007, bringing to 
light severe weaknesses in the budget policies of various Member 
States – primarily that of Greece – has led to new considerable shifts 
in competences from the Member State to the eu level. The right to 
control the national budget, for instance, – historically one of the 
strongest privileges of national parliaments – has been significantly 
eroded, now that the Euro-commissioner of Economic and Monetary 
Affairs has been yielded the competence to assess national budgets 
and to reprimand a Member State in case its budget deficit exceeds 
the eu norm of 3%. Moreover, in May 2010 the Member States agreed 
to commit themselves to stand surety for Member States that found 
themselves under great financial stress by establishing two temporary 
financial emergency funds (efsf and efsm).1076 From 8 October 2012 
onwards, the eu has had a permanent financial stability mechanism 
(esm) at its disposal from which, under conditions, financial aid 
can be given in emergency situations without the requirement of a 
unanimous vote in favour of such help.1077 It implies, that, at least 
in certain circumstances, Dutch money donated to the fund can be 
passed on without the consent of the Dutch government, let alone that 
of parliament. Thus, again, competences have been yielded without 
particularly strong safeguards in the field of national democratic control. 
These developments towards an ever more fully fledged financial 
governance on eu level have taken place under high political pressure, 
resulting from the fear of economic and political collapse of the eu. 
Of course, these steps could and have not been taken without being 
presented to the national parliaments for approval, but because of the 
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pressure of time, there was only little time for an extensive national 
debate. In Germany, concerned citizens tried to gain some extra time by 
turning to the Bundesverfassungsgericht – the German Constitutional 
Court – for a ruling regarding the constitutionality of the ESM-
Treaty.1078 Considering the political culture in the Netherlands, in 
which the authority to judge the constitutionality of European treaties 
is reserved to parliament, such an option did not exist for concerned 
citizens in the Netherlands. The most clear-cut Dutch parliamentary 
critic of European integration, Geert Wilders, creatively attempted 
to delay approval and circumvent Dutch parliamentary principles by 
approaching the national judge in May 2012 with the request to rule that 
the parliamentary approval of the ESM-Treaty should be postponed 
until new national elections, scheduled for September 2012, would 
have been held. But, as was to be expected, the judge was not willing to 
assume competences belonging to parliament. On 24 May, a political 
majority in the Lower House – vvd, cda, PvdA, D66, and Groenlinks – 
voted in favour of the treaty, following Article 90, subsection 1 of 
the Dutch Constitution of course.1079 Approval in the Upper House 
followed on 3 July. These parties still succeeded in keeping the ranks 
closed. 
The interesting question is if, and for how long they will be 
able to do so. Public complaints about the leaders of the European 
governments moving too fast without paying attention to the 
democratic wants and needs of the people, have been growing lately.1080 
In public intellectual circles, moreover, to an ever fiercer extent, the 
legitimacy of various European institutions has been questioned and 
the nation-state has been qualified as being the sole form for legitimate 
government.1081 These utterances have been noticed in the political 
domain and most parties of the political mainstream have become less 
loud in their previous pro-integration tone in political campaigns and 
public statements. This change of timbre is accompanied by initiatives 
that display the realisation that involvement of the Dutch people 
and qualitative parliamentary control have been neglected far too 
long.1082 Since 2005, adjustments have been made in this respect. In 
2006 the Dutch parliament strengthened its ‘eu staff’, that assists the 
parliamentarians in keeping up to date in the integration process.1083 
Moreover, in 2011 MPs Gerard Schouw (D66) and Han ten Broeke (vvd) 
successfully recommended that prior to a European Council parliament 
should get the chance to discuss matters with all relevant members 
of the cabinet in a plenary debate; a thing that has by now become the 
common procedure.1084 These are unmistakably meaningful changes 
in the old understanding between the government and parliament that 
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foreign policy matters, and eu affairs as part of that, were in the first 
instance reserved to the first. But, on the other hand, recent proposals to 
adjust the Dutch Constitution in order to close the floodgate, wilfully 
opened in 1953, are – for the time being – still turned down.1085 It is hard 
to say goodbye to the deeply rooted internationalist constitutional 
tradition. Even when this can be considered an inevitability that has 
always been present in the objective of successful European integration: 
progressive federalisation requires a Member State to define itself in 
relation to other Member States and the federal authority. A strong(er) 
national constitutional order is a characteristic of that. 
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Conclusion
‘ The dogmas of the quiet past, are inadequate to the stormy present. 
The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the 
occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew. 
We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country.’ 
 
Abraham Lincoln (1862)
When one aims to understand the rejection of the Treaty Establishing 
a Constitution for Europe by a 61,6% majority of the Dutch voters or 
the general problems currently encountered in politically unifying 
Europe, focusing on short term causes, such as general distrust in the 
(national) governments, does not suffice. Neither do explanations that 
take the European rather than national perspective as the starting point, 
or those that heavily lean on abstract theoretical notions such as, for 
instance, the absence of a European demos. They all fail to shed light on 
how in political practice the peculiarities of national democracy have 
contributed to the problems encountered in the process of unifying 
Europe. This study shows that at the heart of the much debated gap 
between the Dutch citizens and the political elite, which revealed itself 
on 1 June 2005 and has still not been overcome, were deep, historically 
rooted foreign policy convictions that reflected in national political and 
constitutional traditions and procedures which had formed the path 
towards Dutch participation in European integration. 
In the first chapter attention has been given to the conviction with 
those dealing with foreign policy since early modern history that for 
the small country of Grotius by the North sea, international treaties 
were essential for guaranteeing its economic and political well-being. 
Early debates in the Netherlands on (sectorally) unifying Europe after 
World War ii, such as the ones on the establishment of the weu – the 
debate on the Van der Goes van Naters/Serrarens motion was part 
of this discussion – and the ecsc show that these initiatives were 
approached by a political majority of liberals, social- and Christian-
democratic parties from this traditional foreign policy perspective. 
Arguments that were brought up to defend these developments show 
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a pragmatic viewpoint in which the focus was on the economic and 
political benefits for the country of the Netherlands; benefits that were 
considered to outbalance any disadvantage of giving up (parts of ) state 
sovereignty and strengthening international interdependence in these 
policy fields. So, it can be observed that in line with foreign policy 
traditions, reasons of economic and political self-preservation were at 
the root of the decision of the Dutch political majority at the time when 
they decided to embark on, what would eventually turn out to be, the 
path towards a unified Europe with increasingly federal structures. 
In these early debates, it stands out that the politicians seemed 
not to be aware of the conceptual difference between traditional forms 
of internationalisation and the character of European integration. 
Unlike the latter, traditional international treaties, based on the Grotius 
concept of bi- or multilateral treaty making between sovereign states, 
clearly stated what was mutually yielded and received. Withdrawing 
from such a treaty unilaterally was relatively easy. European integration 
was going to be completely different. In an incremental process, 
millions of legal connections between European institutions, Member 
States and citizens would develop of which the eventual effects 
were not always easy to foresee. The competence of the European 
institutions – the Commission and ecj – to, under conditions, develop 
further the acquis communautaire without involvement of the national 
political communities, introduced unpredictabilities for the Member 
States that made it hard to anticipate and to assess their legal and 
political effects, let alone to consider them in negotiations. 
This qualitative difference between ‘old-school’ international 
treaty making and unifying Europe was from the very start of the 
process not duly noticed and/or considered in the Netherlands. The 
various parliamentary debates show that, as far as it was raised as a 
theme for discussion, a majority disposed of the conceptual details 
of the process as irrelevant or reasoned them away. Approached as a 
form of internationalisation, positive effects for the Netherlands were 
counted on and that was the main concern of the political majority, 
consisting of social-democrats, liberals and mainstream Catholic and 
protestant parties. 
From this point of departure, internationalisation thinking 
reached and early peak in the decision of the political elite on 
constitutional revision in 1953. Anticipating the development towards 
a unified Europe in general and a European Defence Community in 
particular, an overwhelming parliamentary majority did not see any 
harm in adapting the national constitution in such a way that these 
plans would not be stopped by constitutional objections. On the 
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contrary, implementing them was considered necessary. Pragmatic 
considerations ruled in the arguments of those endorsing the recording 
of provisions that made it constitutionally possible to: 1) deviate from 
the Dutch constitution in an international agreement; 2) approve of 
such agreements with a two-thirds majority in one reading only, with 
no elections in between – a lighter procedure than a formal process of 
constitutional revision required; and 3) approve, if deemed necessary, 
international agreements not deviating from the national constitution 
by tacit consent. 
These changes were far-reaching in the sense that they 
amounted to a ‘gap’ in the Dutch constitution through which state 
sovereignty could be conferred on an international or European level 
of governance, without the need of involving the Dutch people, even 
when such a conferral implied a break with national constitutional 
provisions. Moreover, the changes weakened parliamentary control 
on the constitutional coherence of the Dutch state. It is telling for 
the pragmatic mindset with which the parliamentary majority 
approached the issue of potentially losing grip on the constitutional 
contours of the Netherlands in exchange for greater latitude for the 
government in concluding international agreements, that it embraced 
the constitutional changes as desirable and necessary in the light of the 
political and economic interests of the country. 
By means of the constitutional revision of 1953 then, the Dutch 
political community affirmed itself as fundamentally open towards 
agreements and legislation that were expected to come about in the 
international order. In the years following the revision, a political 
majority worked for European unity from this identity. This notion 
of constitutional openness vis-à-vis the international legal order was 
an important factor in the national approval procedures concerning 
the edc, eec and Euratom treaties. The articles introduced in 1953, in 
combination with a broadly shared political preference for participating 
in international initiatives, guaranteed a smooth and quick approval 
process, without lengthy quarrels on complex questions on the 
compatibility of the agreements with the constitutional order of the 
nation-state. It was contentedly observed in broad circles in parliament 
that the constitutional anticipation of 1953 served its purpose in 
this regard. The fact that the new constitutional arrangements also 
concealed the immense conceptual complexity of the journey of 
federalising Europe, which the Netherlands was about to embark on, 
was not understood but rather embraced as a political convenience. 
Political opponents of the notion of European unification who 
attempted to raise attention for such conceptual difficulties had no 
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chance of being listened to, even when – in relation to the eec, for 
instance – their concerns were shared by the highest legal advisory 
board in the Netherlands, the Council of State. 
During the entire course of the process of European unification 
the broadly shared understanding in parliament that the Netherlands 
should participate in the various European communities, kept 
resting on the foreign policy conviction that the Netherlands needed 
international partnerships for its economic and political well-being. 
This conviction, in its turn, stemmed from deeply rooted ideas 
concerning the character of the Netherlands and its role in the world. 
Such ideas and notions functioned – whether explicit or not – as 
rhetorical topoi in political discussions on progressive European 
integration. The most important topos was that the Netherlands is 
small and its economic and political well-being can only be safeguarded 
through international partnerships. 
 In the parliamentary debates this comes out clearly in the 
rhetorical emphasis of successive governments and parliamentary 
majorities on the absolute necessity of Dutch approval of the respective 
treaties. The second chapter shows that from 1953 onwards a second 
line of argument grew stronger in which apart from necessity, policy 
consistency became the focal point. Since, in anticipation of initiatives 
for European integration, parliament had expressed its support for 
the bringing about of ‘a real legal community of democratic states in 
a federal structure’,1086 and had moreover adopted a constitutional 
revision aimed at the smooth intertwining of the national 
constitutional order and such a federal structure, it was argued that 
approval of the edc, eec and Euratom was no more than fleshing out 
a commitment already taken on. The rationale that ‘in for a penny’, 
should logically lead to ‘in for a pound’ was broadly shared as the 
argumentative basis for approving the various treaties. The proponents 
of progressive integration effectively incorporated an argument of 
succession – next to the argument of necessity – in their rhetorical 
toolbox, from which it could be grabbed at any convenient time. 
And so they did, as is shown by the parliamentary debates on 
European integration following the approval of the Treaties of Rome. 
In fact, the arguments of necessity and consistency – the two main 
considerations on which the majority consensus to join in the process 
of European integration of the 1950s was built – largely remained the 
alpha and omega of the political pleas for progressive integration in 
the decennia thereafter. The debates of the 1960s and 1970s, in which 
the whims of de Gaulle and new possibilities for supranationalisation 
after his resignation were central themes, lend colour to the 
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observation that the political majority for reasons of the country’s 
preservation believed European integration and, more specific now, 
supranationalisation, to be essential. The debates on the merger of the 
European executive organs, the uk accession to the eec and a directly 
elected ep consistently reconfirm that many in parliament considered 
the Netherlands to be a tiny player in the international political order, 
deeply depending on free trade and politically risking to be overrun by 
the bigger powers surrounding it. 
The various efforts to bring about a supranational organisation 
of the eec, including the United Kingdom, were consistently aimed 
at strengthening the strategic position of the Netherlands in terms 
of economic and political power. As is shown in chapter three, a 
central belief that led the political mainstream to vote in favour of 
steps intended to make the eec more supranational, was that the 
strengthening of the European Parliament and Commission, by 
conferring national sovereignty and competences on these institutions, 
would pay out in terms of influence of the Netherlands on the European 
stage. It was argued that the small country of the Netherlands would be 
able to take advantage of the transference of Member State-sovereignty 
to a supranational level of governance because in that way Dutch power 
would relatively rise whereas the influence of the strongest powers 
(France, Germany, and later also the uk), would relatively lessen. ‘The 
community structure’, it was argued in other words, ‘[makes] it possible 
[…] that no decisions about us are made without us, but that we can 
have influence on the course of events in Europe from within.’1087 
The joining of England was considered to bring the desired Atlantic 
counterweight against the all too continentally focused French. A new 
kind of balance of power, of which the Netherlands would reap profit, 
was the aim. 
How this aim related to the process of European integration, or 
– to put it sharper – whether this process was in all respects the right 
instrument to reach this objective, was never fundamentally debated. 
The political mainstream, structurally consisting of liberals, social- and 
Christian-democrats, did not question the central presupposition with 
which it approached the process of European integration. The argument 
of succession-line of reasoning in which all consequential steps were 
explained as the mere fulfilment of earlier promises – in the case of 
Greek accession even called a ‘historic imperative’– only contributed to 
the self-evident striving along on the path of European integration and 
the subduing of any fundamental question that might undermine the 
political consensus of moving forward. 
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The various debates in the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s show that, 
when the political mainstream was faced with (conceptual) difficulties 
and/or was confronted with effects of European integration that were 
hard to reconcile with its central presupposition, the answer was sought 
rather in rhetorical creativity than in a fundamental investigation or 
reorientation on the conceptual starting points. Imperfections were 
pragmatically disposed of as temporary problems to be solved in the 
course of further integration. And fundamental questions regarding 
political identity – what, on the level of national and political culture 
and identity, bound the Dutch to the Greeks or divided them from 
the Spaniards? – were by-passed with far-fetched narratives on inter-
cultural relations and festivities instead of being seized as opportunities 
for an in-depth debate on the theoretical and practical implications 
of the process of European integration that the Netherlands was ever 
deeper getting into.
 Time and again, the political mainstream, in its determination 
of keeping approval of new steps in the European integration 
process short and simple, knew itself backed by the constitutional 
arrangements introduced in 1953. Firstly, the provisions guaranteed 
that, in political practice, all European agreements were to be 
approved by a simple parliamentary majority. But secondly, and more 
importantly, considering the fact that in parliamentary voting rounds, 
a well-over two-thirds majority structurally voted in favour of the 
respective treaties, they served in keeping the political ranks closed. 
In the parliamentary practice of post-1953, the essential question, 
whether the process of European integration was compatible with the 
Dutch constitutional order, could easily be waved aside as irrelevant. 
The political significance of Article 63, its post-1983 successor Article 
91, subsection 3 and the stretching of its meaning with the Brinkhorst 
c.s. motion (1980) was, that – in political practice – it made in-depth 
verification of and discussion on whether new European treaties 
were compatible with the Dutch constitution largely irrelevant or 
superfluous. Thus, the constitutional arrangement contributed, 
apart from being conducive to a smooth approval of new steps in the 
process, to a lack of understanding, in and outside parliament, of how 
European integration actually related to and touched upon the Dutch 
constitutional order. 
The line of argument of the political mainstream, consistently 
built on considerations of necessity, policy consistency and the 
self-created constitutional logic of openness vis-à-vis treaty law, 
implied that, with the approval of one step in the process of European 
integration, a base was established for the following. In other words, 
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through the argument of succession a reality was constructed in which 
it became ever harder for government and parliament to get a hold on 
progressive European integration; on the basis of previous steps in the 
process, new steps were depicted as logical and necessary. Once made, 
new steps were turned into faits accomplis on which, according to the 
parliamentary majority, could and should be built further. 
From this argumentative structure, a self-propelling dynamics 
developed in which striding along on the path of European integration 
was perceived and presented as the sole way to go. These dynamics were 
complementary to the self-propelling rhetorical and political tactics 
employed at the European level of decision making: by means of the 
recording of the pursuit of ‘an ever closer union’ in the Rome Treaties 
of 1957, this became the central objective of European integration for 
the decades to follow. Both worked together in contributing to the 
development of a political reality and consensus from which new steps 
in the integration process could follow as a matter of course. They 
helped to construct a political tradition in which the pro-European 
character of the Netherlands became a topos in itself. 
It is important to call to mind, however, that the pro-European 
majority consensus was never uncontested. From the very start of the 
integration process, the Protestant-conservatives together with the 
Dutch Communists – bien étonnés de se trouver ensemble! – and one or 
two dissidents of the parties in favour of European integration, held 
contrary ideas on the use and necessity of the integration process for 
the Netherlands. In particular the first group turned explicitly and 
for reasons of principle against the idea that the process of European 
integration was to be approached as a means to pursue the interests 
of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The new element of conferral of 
sovereignty on a supranational level of decision making signified in 
their eyes a crucial difference with traditional internationalism based 
on agreements between sovereign states. The institutionalisation of a 
European army or, more abstractly, the proclamation of an ever closer 
European union was in their view hardly reconcilable with the essential 
characteristics of the Dutch nation-state. Whereas a political majority 
was focused on what could be gained for the Netherlands outside the 
national borders – economic prosperity and self-preservation – these 
political opponents of the concept of European integration called for 
attention of what could be lost. Yielding sovereignty, they warned, 
implied the yielding of control on the political course and fate of the 
state. Moreover, they emphasised that Dutch citizens felt emotionally 
connected to their country, their government and their constitution; a 
feeling in danger of being eroded, they feared, in case too much power 
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was conferred on the European institutions. And, so they wondered, 
would it ever be possible to bring about such a connectedness on the 
European level? 
The Protestant-conservatives, to put it differently, did not share 
the mindset of the political majority in which yielding sovereignty 
was seen as an instrument in order to come to economic and political 
well-being, guaranteed by international partnerships. They regarded 
national sovereignty also as a goal in itself and, therefore, the successive 
initiatives aimed at deepening the European interdependence (edc, 
eec, sea and what followed) were not supported by them and neither 
was the constitutional revision of 1953 that made parliamentary 
approval of new steps simpler. The Protestant-conservatives were 
supported in their rejections by the Dutch Communists, who, albeit 
for another reason – in their view European integration was first and 
foremost a capitalist plot – also structurally voted against steps aimed at 
deepening the European ties. This political support, however, did not 
alter the fact that these political critics were too few in number to call a 
halt to the Netherlands continuing on the European path. Building on 
historic experience, the parliamentary majority regarded the notion 
of state-sovereignty as a barrier rather than as a condition for keeping 
the Netherlands well and safe and, for that reason, turned a deaf ear to 
the calls and warnings of those in parliament sceptical about European 
integration. Thus, progress in the process was maintained and a 
parliamentary majority consensus about it guarded. 
But it came at a price. By approaching and procedurally dealing 
with European integration as just another way of reaching international 
partnerships, beneficial to the Netherlands, the political mainstream 
failed to early observe and to fully conceptually consider and question 
the unique and distinguishing traits of the process. The refusal of 
the political mainstream to consider and debate the concerns of the 
Eurosceptics, i.e. the possible downsides for the Netherlands and Dutch 
democracy of the yielding of sovereignty to a European level of decision 
making, resulted in a lack of vision on this point. A blind spot even, 
which would only slowly reveal itself in the course of the 1980s and 
90’s when the immense complexity of the integration process – its true 
nature – became ever clearer.
With the expansion of the eec, the composition of the 
Communities became more heterogeneous; a development that was 
logically reflected in an increase of conflicts of interests between 
the various members and/or the Community as a whole. A clear 
example, which generally disappointed the Netherlands since it had 
zealously devoted itself to the accession of the uk, was the obstinate 
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attitude of Margaret Thatcher regarding the issue of national financial 
contributions to the community. It exposed how national interests 
of powerful states could still hold hostage the political opportunities 
of the European collective. All this went counter to the hopes and 
expectations of the Dutch political mainstream that the Netherlands 
would become in essence more sovereign within the constellation 
of the European Communities because, in it, the collective interest 
– which was conveniently believed to coincide with the Dutch 
interests – would prevail. 
Moreover, with the sea taking effect, the acquis communautaire 
had definitely become more than a trade agreement. The proclamation 
of the objective of a European Union and the anticipation of a historic 
constitutional moment by linking this objective to democratic 
legitimisation by the national citizens, illustrate the great political 
relevance of the agreement. The European integration process was – on 
the level of its design and claims – getting closer to what its passionate 
advocates in the early 1950s had hoped it would bring about: a European 
federal order. On the level of political theory, as can be observed from 
the developments in the intellectual debate on European integration in 
the Netherlands and abroad, this led to fundamental questions coming 
up for discussion: questions regarding the reconcilability of various 
national political and cultural identities, the presence or absence of a 
substantive basis to democratically legitimise the project (i.e. the (no-)
demos issue and the question of how to involve effectively the national 
citizens) and the subject of the economic, political and cultural costs 
of the process. In this way, progress of European integration brought 
to light the essential conceptual difficulties underlying the operation. 
It turned out to be much more than a straightforward foreign policy 
matter and there was an urgent need for answers.
Meanwhile, however, the process went on. Substantively, the 
1980s and 1990s show the development of an ever more mature and 
denser European legal and policy framework, touching on ever more, 
what had until then been, national competences. In these years, the 
Netherlands was increasingly confronted with the disciplining power of 
the European institutions, in particular the ecj. It confronted the Dutch 
political community with consequences of yielding competences to a 
supranational level of governance that could not be univocally explained 
as serving the national interests. The costs of yielding sovereignty, to 
put it differently, became visible; a development that only contributed 
to the call in Dutch society at large to rethink the European dreams of 
the Netherlands and to define its goals more sharply. 
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With the costs and downsides of European integration starting 
to become visible, the political mainstream was confronted with 
the fundamental identity problem that had lay hidden behind the 
paradoxical conviction that the Netherlands needed to merge into 
a unified Europe in order to survive. Ever since the late 1940s, the 
political mainstream had framed its story in favour of progressive 
European integration on the assumption that whatever served 
European integration, served the state of the Netherlands. Within this 
picture, presenting the process of European unification as an essential 
part of the instrumental Dutch foreign policy strategy had been easy 
to defend, just like the substantial autonomy – an old foreign policy 
tradition – and the absence of strong constitutional checks with which 
successive governments could work towards new steps in the process. 
But with Europe growing as a political entity and the dawning 
of a general awareness in the course of the 1980s that progressive 
European integration would come with serious implications for the 
national political system, the crucial weakness in the old narrative in 
favour of European integration became clear. How much of the win-
win storyline could be upheld in a time that the losses came in view? In 
the wake of this question, another, even harder matter came up: if the 
old argumentative line of international instrumentalism had lost the 
most essential parts of its meaning, what narrative could fill the gap? 
The Dutch parliamentary debates on European integration between 
1986 and 1997 show the struggle of the political majority in favour of 
European integration in upholding their fiery pleas for progression 
while worrying and complaining ever more on what this would 
eventually imply. The consequence was a schizophrenic pattern of 
arguments and actions. 
So, although the debates from the second half of the 1980s 
onwards show that the political mainstream in the Netherlands 
started to realise the consequences of what it had endorsed in the past 
four decades and how this made answers to fundamental questions 
regarding legitimacy and national political identity urgent, it stands out 
that this had hardly any direct consequences in parliamentary practice. 
Admittedly, the parliamentary debates in the early ‘90s on the Schengen 
ii agreement and the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties, reveal a 
growing determination in parliament to enhance democratic control 
on the process. This showed itself, for instance, in the amendment-Van 
Traa/de Hoop Scheffer to the bill of approval concerning Schengen ii, 
which asked for drafts of decisions of the Executive Committee to be 
made public, making possible more political involvement of parliament 
in them. Fundamentally, however, little changed. In these debates as 
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well, at the end of the day the parliamentary majority of PvdA, cda, 
vvd and D66, which had consistently devoted itself to the bringing 
about of a supranational European order, decided in favour of new steps 
in the integration process on the same grounds as ever. The conviction 
that the Netherlands needed the process of European integration for 
economic and political reasons and should, for that reason, position 
itself as a willing and reliable partner, remained decisive. In line with 
how the land of Grotius had handled the process from the very start, 
uncertainties and fundamental questions regarding political identity or 
democratic control were once again reasoned away, taken for granted 
and/or considered to be solved in the course of the process.
Thus, the late 1980s and the early 1990s form a period in which 
two contradictory developments can be observed. Whereas the 
process of European integration underwent a crucial evolution and – in 
accordance with that evolution – the questioning and conceptualisation 
of the process in both intellectual and political circles grew, the decision 
making of the Dutch political mainstream, when all was said and done, 
remained rooted in old convictions and presuppositions in which 
European integration was seen and dealt with as just another form of 
beneficial political internationalism. It illustrates the tenacity of the 
pro-European mindset in which, for years, European integration had 
been rather uncontested and sacrosanct. Although they were aware of 
a changing political reality, the pro-European political majority could 
not part with its trust in finding Dutch salvation beyond the borders of 
the state; a trust that made it hard to thoroughly consider – let alone: 
to act upon – questions regarding the use and necessity of national 
sovereignty, state borders, national political identity and on how to 
preserve their beneficial properties. It had developed a blind spot for 
that and for the fact that sooner or later these matters would become 
the crucial and inescapable questions on which progress on the path of 
(federal) European integration would depend. 
Within the atmosphere of growing doubts and frantically 
trying to keeping the ranks closed, the successive governments of 
the 1980s and 1990s only contributed to the schizophrenic situation 
by structurally playing down the importance of every new step in 
the integration, in a time when the rhetoric of moving to finalité was 
clearly started. Ambivalent political communication on the sea, 
Maastricht and Amsterdam was the consequence. These agreements 
concerning crucial steps in the integration process, were structurally 
procedurally presented as little more than business as usual. As soon 
as difficult questions and possible objections were raised in the debate, 
however, the government stressed the urgency of a quick approval 
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and the potential damage of delay, especially for the reputation of the 
Netherlands abroad. And, of course, with the lapse of time, it became 
clear to advocates and antagonists of European integration alike, that 
indeed crucial steps had been taken by signing up to these new steps. 
The tension that the ambivalence of the government and political 
mainstream called into existence, formed fertile ground for various 
politicians. Bolkestein in 1992 and Fortuyn and Wilders after the turn 
of the millennium, started to focus on ‘the people’ and the democratic 
deficit in their attempts to interpret the discrepancy between what the 
Netherlands needed and the process of European integration had to 
offer. 
Thus, a split could develop within the identity of the Dutch 
polity that, by 1997, had grown complete: on the European stage the 
Netherlands still participated as one of the best pupils in class, whereas 
within the national political domain the whole process became ever 
more contested. By consequence, diverging discourses emerged, 
varying from a narrative expressed on the international political stage, 
in which the Netherlands and European integration were presented as 
belonging together as a matter of course, to a narrative in the national 
domain, focusing more and more on how European integration was 
increasingly in the way of what was considered of importance in the 
Netherlands. These observations contribute to understanding how 
the vision on European integration of the Dutch people on the one 
hand, and the decision making of government and parliament in this 
field on the other, had started to diverge; a development of which the 
consequences, as it turned out, would become manifest on 1 June 2005. 
In chapter six it is shown that in Dutch society, in the process of 
the growing dissension on the subject, the constitutional label, put by 
Giscard D’Estaing on the product of the European Convention, was 
crucial. For many in and outside parliament, this label confirmed that 
something hugely important was about to happen that was hard to 
legitimise on the basis of only the scanty constitutional procedures 
agreed on in 1953. Now that a true ‘European Constitution’ was about to 
be adopted, many found that the Dutch people – until then consistently 
kept out of decisions on treaties regarding European integration – 
should be heard. 
The fact that the far-reaching effects of the constitutional label, 
such as the call for a popular referendum, took the second Balkenende 
government by surprise, is again illustrative of the extent to which 
the administrative elite counted on the approval procedures of 1953: 
keeping them short and simple by ruling out fundamental conceptual 
discussions and requiring small majorities. The clumsy campaign 
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of the cabinet in favour of a positive vote in the referendum can be 
explained as to show the historically grown inability of the Dutch 
government to debate in a clear, understandable and balanced way, 
the concept of European integration with a larger and more diverse 
public than a political elite that shared its internationalist mindset. In 
this perspective, both the Dutch call for a referendum in 2005 and its 
outcome are to be understood as consequences of a path chosen in 1953 
that was not critically reviewed ever after. 
With regard to the approval of the Lisbon Treaty, and more 
recently the esm, a return to the old, and well tried constitutional 
procedures of 1953 can be observed. When writing this, (March 2013), 
the European debt crisis that holds the eu Member States in its grip 
has the potentiality to become another propelling factor in bringing 
about a full-dress European federation closer. Simultaneously, the grave 
economic problems in the hardest struck Member States and the aid 
that is needed from those in the community still doing relatively well, 
form an unprecedented test of the mutual solidarity that has always 
been held to be a pillar of the integration process. In the Netherlands, 
popular support for, and trust in the benefits of progressive European 
integration are under pressure,1088 whereas a political majority feels 
forced to further build stronger European governing structures in order 
not to run aground economically. From this perspective, the post-SEA 
history of increasing criticism developing with a political majority 
carrying on as usual, seems to repeat itself. 
In order to reduce the risk of the ambitions of a political majority 
backfiring into another blow to the trust in both the capability of the 
Dutch administration and the feasibility of the process of European 
integration as a whole, it is high time that this majority starts to 
fundamentally reflect on its deepest convictions and beliefs with regard 
to progressive European integration, their realism, and how these relate 
to the dogmatic principle of constitutional openness. The case is new, 
so we must think anew and act anew. Lets disenthrall ourselves. Then 
we might be able to save the eu, and the Netherlands with it. This study 




When I started my search for a first job in the autumn of 2007, the idea 
of writing a PhD thesis had never occurred to me as a serious option. 
Considering my self-proclaimed preference for working in a ‘dynamic, 
applied science surrounding’, the prospect of four (or five, as it would 
turn out) long years of solitary study appeared to me as embarking on a 
journey for which I was not cut out.
But, I took it nevertheless. Looking back on the path that I 
eventually chose, I must admit that there were times indeed when 
it felt as a never-ending uphill struggle, comparable perhaps to how 
many have characterised the European integration process itself: an 
Echternach procession. At the same time, writing this thesis was among 
the most rewarding experiences of my life so far. For the fact that I 
managed to reach the finish line – in sanity (more or less) – I am greatly 
indebted to those who supported me along the way. 
First of all, I want to thank Antoon de Baets, who awakened my 
interest in contemporary political history, inspired me to broaden 
my view of the legal aspects of political processes and who was the 
first to point out to me the possibility and chances of applying for this 
particular PhD project. If it was not for him, I would probably have 
never applied at all. 
I am very grateful to Rik Peters, Peter van den Berg and Laurence 
Gormley. Firstly, I thank them for designing the contours of the 
Contested Constitutions project. Throughout the past five years I have 
been proud to work in a research group that truly did justice to the term 
‘multidisciplinary’ by naturally bringing together insights from history 
and law, and political and rhetorical theory and practice. Secondly, I 
greatly appreciate how these three men guided me through the process. 
I thank Laurence in particular for welcoming me in the European Law 
department and for his supportive attitude whenever I came to him 
with a special request (his permission in 2009 to move to The Hague, 
for instance). Dear Rik and Peter: special thanks to you for all those 
hours we spent in Peter’s far too hot office, discussing my findings 
in the sources. I very much enjoyed these meetings, in which the 
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two of you challenged me to awaken my ‘authorial voice’. Your sharp 
questioning was essential in getting the story out of me.
My working days in Groningen were coloured by the kind and 
supportive colleagues of the European Law department and the Law 
Faculty in general. I keep happy memories in particular of sharing 
an office with Anatole Boute and Jeanne Mifsud Bonnici and of the 
new friends that I made through the various PhD Council and ggsl 
activities. Most of my coffee and lunch breaks I spent with Jelte Olthof, 
my companion on this PhD track, who became a close friend along the 
way. Jelte, your bright view on what the Contested Constitutions project 
was all about and your willingness to share your thoughts with me, 
helped me to get beyond my insecurities of the first year. Later on, your 
sharp comments were crucial in bringing my research products further 
and your friendship was important whenever I doubted if and how I 
would be able to reach the end. I am looking forward to having you next 
to me at my defence. After my move to The Hague, my regular lunches 
with Karin van Leeuwen enlivened my days. Karin, thank you for all the 
times that you helped me out with a book title, contact details for this 
or that person and, of course, for introducing me to the ‘European law 
historians’ network that you came in contact with through Morten. I am 
very much looking forward to reading the future work of this Danish-
Dutch working group on the history of European law. 
Naturally, I wish to thank all those whom I interviewed and 
corresponded with for they were willing to share their experiences with 
me and allowed me to cite from our conversations, letters and e-mails. 
The prospect of these contacts was crucial in my eventual decision to 
apply for the PhD position, for they were my guarantee that I would 
not become a backroom academic only but also that my research would 
yield me insights in what had actually happened in the domain of 
policy and politics. Eventually, the inspiring stories of those involved 
in actively building Europe were a crucial factor in my decision to leave 
academia for a job in the domain of politics in February 2012. 
Coming to that, my gratitude goes also out to my ‘new’ colleagues 
at D66 in general, and the Van Mierlo Stichting in particular. Frank van 
Mil, thank you very much for taking the risk of employing me in spite 
of the fact that my thesis was not finished yet and a slow start of my 
work for the foundation was therefore clear from the beginning. Thank 
you also for the trust you put in me by giving me the role of secretary 
in the Programmacommissie 2012. I have enjoyed this rollercoaster ride 
that you put me on to the fullest and through it – and Marty and his 
methods – I learned the lesson that I needed in this last year of thesis 
writing: sometimes things just need to be finished. Corina Hendriks 
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and Maartje Jansen: thank you for the laughter and support in the past 
stressful year. 
Then, to conclude, a special word of thanks to my close friends 
and family. The girls I met during my history study in Groningen, in 
high-school and even before – you know whom I mean: thanks for 
cheering and celebrating with me every single personal and professional 
milestone in the past years and for getting me past disappointments 
with a beer, your humour or warm words. In the course of this year, I 
hope to make up for all those times in 2012 when I missed a party or date 
in order to finish another section or chapter. 
Special thanks also to my sisters and their families and my family-
in-law, who, with their interest in what I was working on, on the 
one hand, while simultaneously having the talent to tone down the 
importance of it all, helped me to put things in perspective at times that 
I tended to get lost in the work. 
Dear Piter, as I told you many times before, you lighten all my 
days. Your cheer and optimism were essential in keeping a focus on the 
light at the end of the tunnel. I am so happy to have back the evenings 
and weekends to spend with you!
Dear heit and mem, as a way of thanking you, I dedicate this work 
to you. Your interest, support and involvement in my study and work 
were unequalled. 




Abbreviations of Dutch  
political parties explained
arp:  Anti-Revolutionaire Partij (Anti-Revolutionary Party)
cd:  Centrum Democraten (Centre Democrats)
cda:  Christen-Democratisch Appèl (Christian Democratic Appeal)
chu:  Christelijk Historische Unie (Christian Historical Union)
cpn:  Communistische Partij Nederland (Communist Party of the 
Netherlands)
cu:  Christen Unie (ChristianUnion)
D66:  Democraten ’66 (Democrats ’66)
DS’70:  Democratisch-Socialisten ’70 (Democratic Socialists ’70)
gpv:  Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond (Reformed Political League)
gl:  GroenLinks (GreenLeft) 
knp:  Katholiek Nationale Partij (Catholic National Party)
kvp:  Katholieke Volkspartij (Catholic Peoples Party)
ln:  Leefbaar Nederland (Livable Netherlands)
lpf:  Lijst Pim Fortuyn (Fortuyn List)
ppr:  Politieke Partij Radicalen (Radical Political Party)
psp:  Pacifistische Socialistische Partij (Pacifist Socialist Party)
PvdA:  Partij van de Arbeid (Labour Party)
pvv:  Partij voor de Vrijheid (Party for Freedom)
rpf:  Reformatorische Politieke Federatie (Reformatory Political 
Federation)
sgp:  Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (Reformed Political Party)
sp:  Socialistische Partij (Socialist Party)
vvd:  Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (People’s Party for 
Freedom and Democracy)
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Successive Dutch cabinets (1948-now)
Drees/Van Schaik (PvdA, kvp, vvd, chu, 1948-1951) 
Drees ii (PvdA, kvp, chu, vvd, 1951-1952)
Drees iii (PvdA, kvp, chu, arp, 1952-1956)
Drees iv (PvdA, kvp, chu, arp, 1956-1958)
Beel ii (kvp, arp, chu, 1958-1959)
De Quay (kvp, vvd, arp, chu, 1959-1963)
Marijnen (kvp, vvd, arp, chu, 1963-1965)
Cals (kvp, PvdA, arp, 1965-1966)
Zijlstra (kvp, arp, 1966-1967)
De Jong (kvp, vvd, arp, chu, 1967-1971)
Biesheuvel i (kvp, vvd, arp, chu, DS’70, 1971-1972)
Biesheuvel ii (kvp, vvd, arp, chu, 1972-1973)
Den Uyl (PvdA, kvp, arp, ppr, D66, 1973-1977)
Van Agt i (cda, vvd, 1977-1981)
Van Agt ii (cda, PvdA, D66, 1981-1982)
Van Agt iii (cda, D66, 1982-1982)
Lubbers i (cda, vvd, 1982-1986)
Lubbers ii (cda, vvd, 1986-1989)
Lubbers iii (cda, PvdA, 1989-1994)
Kok i (PvdA, vvd, D66, 1994-1998)
Kok ii (PvdA, vvd, D66, 1998-2002)
Balkenende i (cda, lpf, vvd, 2002-2003)
Balkenende ii (cda, vvd, D66, 2003-2006)
Balkenende iii (cda, vvd, 2006-2007)
Balkenende iv (cda, PvdA, ChristenUnie, 2007-2010)
Rutte i (vvd, cda, 2010-2012)
Rutte ii (vvd, PvdA, 2012-now)
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Interviewees
Ate Oostra, from 1970-2001 Ate 
Oostra worked as a diplomat for the 
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(in East-West affairs, as Deputy 
Permanent Representative to the eu 
and Ambassador to China). From 
2001-2008 he was Director-General 
International Affairs of the Ministry of 
Agriculture.
Bart van Poelgeest, works for the 
Ministry of General Affairs. He 
was interviewed in his capacity as a 
former staff member of the Unit of 
Constitutional Affairs of the Dutch 
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The Incoming Tide. Dutch Reactions to the Constitutionalisation of 
Europe (1948-2005) aims to solve the question of how the relation 
between the Netherlands and Europe came under pressure. Widely 
renowned as one of the Founding Fathers of the European Coal and 
Steel Community and as one of the most loyal participants of European 
integration in general, the Netherlands surprised friend and foe 
when on 1 June 2005, its people rejected by a substantial majority the 
European Constitution. Until now, no satisfactory explanation has been 
given for this. 
This study offers a new, long-term perspective. Based on a wealth 
of primary sources – i.e. parliamentary accounts, Council of State 
advice and interviews with key figures in the process – and a rhetorical 
approach, it is argued that the germ for the gap between the Dutch 
political elite and society at large, which became manifest on 1 June 
2005, was already latently present within the identity of the Dutch 
polity. It resulted from the ideas, premises, convictions, and beliefs, 
shared by a political majority and cherished as part of its group identity, 
on (1) the position of the Netherlands in the wider world; (2) the foreign 
policy that befitted this position; and (3) the democratic sacrifices that 
were needed to guarantee it. These essential elements of what could be 
summarised as the mindset of the political elite, have led to blind spots 
within the political community with regard to its approach to, and 
expectations of the process of European integration. Blind spots that, 
in turn, may clarify the development of the gap between those who 
represent and those that were supposed to be represented.
It is argued then that an exceptionally strong identification of the 
Dutch political elite with the process of European integration in its 
early years, eventually led to the erosion of the democratic legitimacy of 
the process of European integration. Though hidden at first, this process 
gradually became manifest in a widening gulf between on the one hand 
the political elite that continued to support the constitutionalisation 
of Europe, and on the other hand the Dutch citizens, who were 
increasingly dissatisfied with national decision making on European 
integration. Blinded by their conviction that European integration 
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should proceed because it was a goal that benefitted the economic and 
international political interests of the Netherlands, the political leaders 
of the Netherlands failed to become aware in time of the diminishing 
support for a European Constitution. Finally, when the Dutch people 
were asked to give their vote on the Treaty Establishing a Constitution 
for Europe, a majority gave a harsh verdict. It protested against 
European integration and called a halt to the seemingly unstoppable 
legal logics by which it had developed in the course of time. 
The full argument is produced in six chronological chapters in which 
the developments in the process of European integration are discussed 
together with developments in the national political domain and the 
perception of the national political and intellectual elite of this process. 
In the first chapter, a study of the crucial elements of the Dutch 
constitutional reform of 1953 demonstrates that, based on a historically 
developed view on the position and role of the Netherlands on the 
international stage, a considerable political majority was willing to 
open up the Dutch constitution for the process of European integration. 
Subsequently, in chapters two to four, on the basis of an examination 
of the parliamentary debates on the coming about of the European 
Defence Community (1953), the European Economic Community 
(1957), the Merger Treaty (1965), the Single European Act (1986), 
the accessions of the United Kingdom (1972), Greece (1981), Spain 
and Portugal (1986), and the introduction of direct elections for the 
European Parliament (1979), it is observed that throughout the process 
of European integration the political majority’s consensus that an 
attitude of fundamental openness came before a strong democratic 
hold, was preserved, strengthened and protected. 
Subsequently, chapters five and six show that when from the 
second half of the 1980s onwards a full-dress European Union came into 
view, the political consensus among the political majority on European 
integration, as it had developed since 1948, became more and more 
contested both in and outside parliament. The political mainstream that 
had held the political power for decennia since 1948, however, failed to 
act truly and structurally upon the growing discontent. Estrangement 
developed between a governmental elite that kept justifying ongoing 
European integration on the basis of a political tradition in which 
instrumental internationalist reasoning with regard to economic and 
security interests came before national political sovereignty, and the 
Dutch people who increasingly desired to prioritise otherwise. In June 
2005, the governmental elite paid the price for that.
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Nederlandse samenvatting
Lange tijd oogde de verhouding tussen Nederland en het Europese 
integratieproces weinig complex. Als één van de grondleggers van 
de Europese Gemeenschap voor Kolen en Staal en voorvechter van 
verdere eenwording in de decennia die volgden, bouwde het land aan 
een reputatie van trouwe bondgenoot in het proces van Europese 
integratie. Vanuit dit perspectief verbaasde het vriend en vijand toen 
het Nederlandse volk op 1 juni 2005 de Europese Grondwet met een 
forse meerderheid afwees. Tot op heden is voor deze opmerkelijke 
gebeurtenis geen bevredigende verklaring gevonden. The Incoming 
Tide. Dutch Reactions to the Constitutionalisation of Europe (1948-
2005) doet hiertoe een nieuwe poging. Vanuit een historisch, lange 
termijn perspectief ontrafelt het onderzoek hoe de verhouding tussen 
Nederland en Europa onder druk is komen te staan. 
De auteur laat zien dat de kiemen van de veelbesproken kloof 
tussen het Nederlandse volk en de politieke vertegenwoordiging 
daarvan, zoals die zich op 1 juni 2005 openbaarde, al lange tijd latent 
aanwezig waren in de identiteit van de politieke gemeenschap. Hierbij 
baseert zij zich op een retorische analyse van een scala aan primaire 
bronnen – parlementaire verslagen, adviezen van de Raad van State en 
interviews met sleutelfiguren in het proces – die eerder onbestudeerd 
bleven. Deze kiemen kwamen, ten eerste, voort uit binnen het 
politieke domein breed gedeelde ideeën met betrekking tot de 
Nederlandse positie in de wereld. Ten tweede, uit vooronderstellingen, 
overtuigingen en geloofsartikelen aangaande het buitenlands beleid 
dat bij deze positie hoorde. En, ten derde, uit opvattingen betreffende 
de democratische offers die nodig waren om die positie te garanderen. 
Deze kernelementen van, wat kan worden omschreven als, de ‘mindset’ 
van de politieke elite, leidden tot blinde vlekken binnen de politieke 
gemeenschap met betrekking tot haar benadering en verwachtingen 
van het proces van Europese integratie; blinde vlekken die op hun 
beurt de ontwikkeling verklaren van een kloof tussen hen die 
vertegenwoordigden en hen die vertegenwoordigd werden. 
The Incoming Tide stelt dat de aanvankelijk buitengewoon sterke 
identificatie van de Nederlandse politieke elite met het Europese 
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integratieproces uiteindelijk de democratische legitimiteit van 
dit proces uitholde. Hoewel deze ontwikkeling zich lange tijd aan 
het zicht onttrok, toonde zij zich uiteindelijk in de vorm van een 
groeiende afstand tussen een politieke elite die de constitutionalisering 
van Europa bleef steunen en de Nederlandse burgers die zich in 
toenemende mate zorgen maakten om het verlies van grip op Europese 
besluitvorming. Handelend vanuit de overtuiging dat Europese 
integratie wel voort móest schrijden om de economische en politieke 
belangen van Nederland te waarborgen, verzuimden de Nederlandse 
politieke leiders de slinkende steun voor de Europese grondwet tijdig 
te onderkennen. Uiteindelijk, toen het Verdrag tot Vaststelling van een 
Grondwet voor Europa, per referendum, aan het Nederlandse volk ter 
goedkeuring werd voorgelegd, liet een ruime meerderheid geen twijfel 
bestaan. Het protesteerde tegen Europese integratie en de ogenschijnlijk 
niet te remmen juridische en politieke logica waarmee dit proces zich 
sinds 1948 had voltrokken. 
Het betoog ontvouwt zich in zes chronologische hoofdstukken 
waarin ontwikkelingen in het Europese integratieproces worden 
besproken in samenhang met ontwikkelingen in het nationale politieke 
domein en de perceptie van de nationale politieke en intellectuele elite 
op dit proces. 
In het eerste hoofdstuk laat een analyse van de cruciale elementen 
in de Nederlandse grondwetswijziging van 1953 zien dat, op basis 
van een historisch ontwikkeld perspectief op de positie en rol van 
Nederland op het internationale toneel, een politieke meerderheid 
bereid was om de Nederlandse Grondwet open te stellen voor het 
Europese integratieproces. Vervolgens laten de hoofdstukken twee tot 
vier zien dat gedurende dit proces de opvatting dat een fundamenteel 
open houding ten opzichte van Europese integratie voorrang verdiende 
boven sterke nationale democratische grip op dit proces werd 
gekoesterd, versterkt en beschermd. Hier baseert de auteur zich op 
bestudering van de parlementaire debatten rond de totstandkoming van 
de Europese Defensie Gemeenschap (1953), de Europese Economische 
Gemeenschap (1957), het Fusieverdrag (1965), de Europese Akte (1986), 
de toetreding van het Verenigd Koninkrijk (1972), Griekenland (1981), 
Spanje en Portugal (1986) en de introductie van directe verkiezingen 
voor het Europees Parlement (1979). 
Hoofdstukken vijf en zes, ten slotte, laten zien dat vanaf de tweede 
helft van de jaren 1980 – toen de realisatie van de Europese Unie in zicht 
kwam – Europese besluitvorming in toenemende mate werd betwist. 
Echter, de politieke mainstream van Christen- en sociaal-democraten 
en liberalen, die sinds 1948 het land in wisselende samenstelling 
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had bestuurd, verzuimde om daadwerkelijk en structureel te 
anticiperen op de groeiende ontevredenheid over de totstandkoming 
van een vierde bestuurslaag waarop Nederlandse burgers en hun 
politieke representanten steeds minder grip hadden. Het gevolg 
was vervreemding tussen de bestuurlijke elite die voortschrijdende 
Europese integratie bleef rechtvaardigen op basis van een beleidstraditie 
waarin instrumenteel, internationalistisch belangen-denken voorrang 
kreeg boven nationale politieke soevereiniteit en het Nederlandse volk 
dat in toenemende mate aangaf haar prioriteiten anders te stellen. In 
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